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Abstract 
 
The role of ethics in international politics is highly contested. Despite this 
contestation, there is a widespread assertion that multilateral aid organisations 
(MLOs) are more likely to be driven by ethical considerations than bilateral aid 
organisations (BLOs). However, this claim has not been systematically established or 
examined. To address this gap, this thesis first develops a framework for analysing 
the importance of ethical considerations, and, second, applies it to the introduction of 
a ‘new’ norm – Women/Gender and Development (WID/GAD) – into three 
organisations with different organisational characteristics: UNDP, EC/EU and 
ODA/DFID, using the method of comparative heuristic case studies. The analysis 
aims to establish the extent to which norm integration was driven by ethical 
considerations, and if this was influenced by organisational characteristics. The 
thesis finds that ethical considerations played a minor role in all organisations, 
suggesting that organisations as such are generally not likely to be driven by ethical 
considerations. However, the analysis also finds that people within the organisations 
seemed likely to be driven by ethical considerations, and, when given the freedom, 
power, and resources to act, they could drive norm integration and have their ethical 
commitments reflected at organisational-level. The level of freedom, power, and 
resources of these individuals was significantly influenced by organisational 
characteristics. Specifically, characteristics typical of MLOs are found to provide a 
restrictive environment, while characteristics typical of BLOs, if combined with a 
committed decision-maker, provide an enabling environment for committed actors to 
drive norm integration. However, BLOs are volatile and, without a committed 
decision-maker, are likely to take no action at all on a new norm. MLOs, due to their 
high susceptibility to scrutiny, are more likely to always take some action on a new 
norm – just not action driven by ethical considerations. These findings question 
MLOs’ claim to substantive moral legitimacy and provide a potential explanation for 
weak integration of WID/GAD in many development organisations. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The role of ethics and morality in international politics is widely contested in the 
discipline of International Relations (IR).1 Indeed, some IR theorists suggest that 
“morality is mostly a myth…a cover for self-interest” and “a product of power” 
(Jack Donnelly quoted in Lumsdaine 1993, p. 8), while others claim that “moral 
convictions can have real effects, even in international politics” (Pogge 2008, p. 
217). Some scholars, especially those rooted in international political theory, go 
deeper and question the dichotomous relationship between ethics and morality on the 
one hand, and self-interest on the other, extending the debate to the foundations and 
meaning of ethics.  
 
This thesis is not an attempt to engage in the complex debate on the foundations and 
meanings of ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ – this is being done elsewhere.2 Instead, the aim 
here is a different one: using Hutchings’s ‘common sense’ definition of ‘ethics’ as 
referring to “codes of behaviours or sets of values that set out what is right or wrong 
to do within a particular context” (Hutchings 2010, p. 5), this thesis aims to examine 
the extent to which ethical considerations – considerations of ‘doing the right thing’ 
– matter in international politics. In other words, this thesis makes no judgement on 
whether particular ethical considerations are right or wrong in any absolute sense, 
but rather aims to examine the extent to which claims about rightness or wrongness 
matter in international politics. Such an endeavour, it is proposed and substantiated 
in Chapter Two, does not require a substantive definition of what ‘doing the right 
thing’ is, and thus, does not necessitate a detailed engagement with the foundations 
and substantive meaning of ‘ethics’, while still allowing for an examination of the 
role of ethical considerations.  
 
Having said that, this thesis does take one substantive normative stance. Following 
Alexander Wendt, pure self-interest considerations are seen as opposed to ethical 
considerations, because they are defined “without regard to the other – who will 
                                                
1 Hutchings notes that it is contested within the literature whether a distinction should be made 
between ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ (Hutchings 2010, p. 8). For the purpose of this thesis there is no 
reason to distinguish between the two terms and, for simplicity, I will mostly refer to ‘ethics’ unless 
quoting someone else’s work.  
2 See for example (Hutchings 1999); (Hutchings 2010); (Pogge and Moellendorf 2008). 
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instead be viewed as an object to be manipulated for the gratification of the self” 
(Wendt 1995, p. 52). 
 
Understood as such, various scholars have made an additional specific claim 
regarding the role of ethics in international politics. They have argued that, while 
states may be driven by strategic or self-interest considerations, International 
Organisations (IOs) are more likely to be guided by ethical considerations3 (Sikkink 
and Finnemore 2001; Kickbusch 2000; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2001; Park 
2006; Grigorescu 2002; Finnemore 1996; True and Mintrom 2001). Others, in 
contrast, are adamant that IOs are purely driven by self-interest considerations, 
strategic calculation, or do not, in fact, have any independent agency vis-à-vis states 
at all (Mearsheimer 1994; Abott and Snidal 1998; Keohane 1984/2005; Pierson 
1996).  
 
Thus, both types of claims – general claims about the role of ethics in international 
politics, and specific claims about the way ethics impacts on the behaviour of IOs – 
are highly contested (see section 1.2 below). Moreover, both remain under-
researched in IR. It is the aim of this thesis to tackle these shortcomings by engaging 
in-depth with the question of whether ethical considerations – considerations of 
doing the ‘right thing’ – matter in international politics, and if the extent to which 
they matter is different in international organisations as opposed to bilateral 
organisations. To address these general questions, the thesis focuses on one specific 
issue area: international development aid. It, thus, poses the following research 
question: Are multilateral development aid organisations more likely to be driven by 
ethical considerations than their bilateral counterparts? 
 
The reason for the focus on international development aid is three-fold. First, the role 
of ethics in aid has been particularly contested across different academic disciplines 
and yet, it has proven to be a particularly hard case that even sceptics of ethics have 
been struggling with. While the idealist scholar Lumsdaine insists that development 
                                                
3 This thesis employs a formal definition of International Organisations (Snidal and Thompson 2000) 
and uses the following definition used by the OECD that understands International Organizations to 
be  “entities established by formal political agreements between their members that have the status of 
international treaties; their existence is recognised by law in their member countries; they are not 
treated as resident institutional units of the countries in which they are located” (OECD 2014b). 
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aid cannot be understood without acknowledging the role of ethics (Lumsdaine 
1993) even Hans Morgenthau concedes that “of the seeming and real innovations 
which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy, none has 
proven more baffling to both understanding and action than foreign aid” 
(Morgenthau 1962, p. 301). Thus, if ethics matters at all in the international politics 
in general and in the behaviour of IOs specifically, it should matter in the area of 
development aid, as this is widely acknowledged, even by realist scholars, to be 
difficult to explain by reference only to the national interest of states. And, as the aim 
of this thesis is not to examine whether ethics matters to a great extent in many 
contexts in international politics, but, rather more modestly, to explore whether it 
does matter to some extent in some contexts, and, if so, which circumstances are 
particularly conducive to this, the issue area of development aid seems particularly 
appropriate for this endeavour.  
 
Second, the issue of development aid has not yet been widely explored by IR 
scholars although it might provide critical insights into the nature of international 
politics. This potential is rooted in the fact that, despite numerous attempts at 
studying motivations for aid, to date, no empirical model of aid allocation has 
managed to sufficiently explain all aid allocations (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 
1998; Maizels and Nissanke 1984; Hattori 2001; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Trumbull 
and Wall 1994). Leading development aid scholar, Carol Lancaster, notably admits 
that she does not “have a model (to explain development aid)…There are too many 
interacting variables to justify a model that would be both parsimonious and 
insightful” (Lancaster 2007, p. 210). This sentiment has been echoed by Bauer 
(Bauer 1984) and, most recently, by Van der Veen (Van der Veen 2011) who states 
that development aid “presents a uniquely interesting issue area for testing 
competing IR theories. In other areas…the scope for different beliefs about the goals 
of a particular policy is often narrower” (Van der Veen 2011, p. 13). 
 
Third, as will be seen below, the assertion that international organisations present a 
particularly good context for ethical considerations to matter is even more strongly 
pronounced in the literature on international development. Yet this claim has also not 
been systematically established or analysed.  
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This Chapter first substantiates the key claims made above in detail, thereby 
illustrating the relevance of this thesis. It establishes that  (1) the role of ethics is a 
highly contested issue in IR; (2) that some scholars have taken the role of ethics 
seriously and claim to have established that it is an important force in IR; and (3) that 
many of these claims suggest that IOs provide particularly conducive environments 
for moral norms to emerge and diffuse. The Chapter further shows that none of these 
claims have been systematically, or with sufficient depth, substantiated. Second, the 
Chapter narrows the literature review to the issue area of international development 
aid, while expanding the scholarly focus to the fields of political economy and 
development studies. It shows that, indeed, the same assertions are equally 
widespread and under-researched in these contexts.  
 
Last, the Chapter outlines the thesis structure to show how the research question will 
be answered and summarises its key findings, which show that the thesis finds no 
support for the simplistic assertion that multilateral organisations provide a better 
enabling environment for ethical considerations to matter than bilateral 
organisations. Indeed, the cases suggest that organisations per se are generally 
unlikely to be driven by ethical considerations – it is people within them that may be. 
If committed people in organisations are given the freedom and power to act on their 
ethical commitments, norm integration is likely to be driven by these individuals’ 
ethical beliefs and is likely to be reflected as such at the organisational-level. 
Specific characteristics most typical of bilateral aid organisations – cultural 
homogeneity, few decision-makers, and open mandates – if combined with a 
committed top-level decision-maker, make bilateral organisations more likely to 
provide such freedom and power; while characteristics most typical of multilateral 
organisations – cultural diversity and multi-member decision-making – are likely to 
reduce the freedom and power of committed staff.  
 
However, bilateral organisations are also very volatile with frequently changing 
priorities and top-leadership, and if they do not include a committed decision-maker 
or have a closed mandate they are likely to take highly limited or no action at all on a 
norm, while multilateral organisations – because of the same organisational 
characteristics that reduce the freedom and power of committed actors, and if 
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combined with an open mandate and high-levels of susceptibility to scrutiny – are 
likely to always take some kind of action on a new norm.  
 
In short, bilateral organisations either feature strong norm integration driven by 
ethical considerations or next-to-no norm integration at all, while multilateral 
organisations are likely to take some kind of action on a norm but this action is likely 
not to be coherent or comprehensive and will most probably be driven by 
reputational concerns rather than ethical considerations. 
 
1.1 The contested role of ethics in International Relations 
 
Some scholars, particularly those rooted in the realist tradition, assert that ethics or 
morality is always trumped by power or self-interest in international politics 
(Donnelly 2008). As mentioned in the introduction to this Chapter, Donnelly claims 
that “morality is mostly a myth…a cover for self-interest” (Jack Donnelly quoted in 
Lumsdaine 1993, p. 8) and E.H. Carr has famously stated that, “in the international 
order, the role of power is greater and that of morality less” (Carr 1964, p. 8). Even if 
moral discourse or ethical arguments feature to some extent in international politics, 
these are seen as instruments used purely for the attainment of power: “The search 
for power is not made for the achievement of moral values; moral values are used to 
facilitate the attainment of power” (Spykman 1942, p. 18).  
 
Others allow for a, albeit highly limited, role of ethics in international politics; one 
that constitutes “the outer limits of permissible behaviour but little else” (Hutchings 
1999, p. 16). Yet despite this nuance, there is an underlying doubt about “the notion 
that moral principle has the power to control politics over time…political realism 
focuses attention on the principles or forces which underlie non-moral motivation” 
(Hutchings 1999, p. 17). Thus, in short, in the words of Jack Donnelly ‘Realism 
entails an “exclusion of morality from politics” (Jack Donnelly quoted inLumsdaine 
1993, p. 8). 
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Apart form realism, also other IR theories are highly sceptical about whether or not 
ethics can play an independent role in international politics. Notably, Andrew Hurrell 
concludes in his book On Global Order that,  
 
While the density of international society has undoubtedly 
increased, the elements of deformity have remained all too 
prominent…It is so say that this (international) society remains 
deeply contaminated by power and that the political theorists can 
only ignore the persistence of this structural contamination at the 
cost of idealisation. (Hurrell 2007, p. 305)  
 
Radmila Nakarada concurs when she states that,  
 
Exposing the inconsistencies between the normative, rhetorical and 
practical performance of global capitalism has no preventative or 
transformative capacity. The forces of power have proven to be 
immune to such exposure; revelations have had no serious political 
consequences; moral indignation has had very limited 
reach…expecting effects from revealing the inconsistencies between 
the rhetorical and practical would imply that the global structures of 
power are erected on different principles than they really are; that 
paradoxes, pain, unnecessary deaths of men, women, and children 
mean something; and that the system can be shocked or shamed into 
generosity and solidarity. It would mean that one is appealing to a 
sense of justice that does not rule our word. (Nakaranda 2000, p. 68)  
 
 
Yet on the other end of the spectrum scholars, such as Charles Beitz, have 
“challenged the realist paradigm by arguing that there are substantive moral 
principles that meaningfully address questions of international affairs, and that the 
formulation of foreign policy is intrinsically a domain of moral choice” (Chalres 
Beitz quoted inMcElroy 1992, p. 4). Others, like Thomas Pogge have gone even 
further and claimed that “…moral convictions can have real effects even in 
international politics” (Pogge 2008, p. 217). Thus, the role of ethics is indeed highly 
contested in IR. 
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1.2 Constructivist claims on the role of ethics in norm emergence and diffusion 
 
One approach to IR that has paid most rigorous attention to the role of ideas and 
ideational factors, including ethics or ‘norms’ in international politics is social 
constructivism.  
 
Although norms are not necessarily bound up with moral or ethical ideas, as they are 
frequently defined as, “standard(s) of appropriate behaviour of actors with a given 
identity” some definitions do include a distinct sense of ‘oughtness’ or explicit 
reference to moral standards (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 892). James Fearon 
for instance argues that “social norms take the generic form of “Good people do (or 
do not do) X in situations A, B, C” because “we typically do not consider a rule of 
conduct to be a social norm unless a shared moral assessment is attached to its 
observance or non-observance” (Quoted in Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 892).  
 
Moreover, a lot of empirical work on norms by constructivist scholars deals with 
norms that are considered ‘good’ or ‘progressive’ and much research focuses on 
complex ethical questions such as human rights, humanitarian intervention, 
migration, sanctions, and – albeit to a limited extent – international development aid 
(Price 2008b; Crawford 2002; Park and Vetterlein 2010a; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 
1999; Reus-Smit 1999, 2011). Thus, although this work mostly does not engage in 
detailed theorising on the “ethical desirability” of the norms in question or provide 
any sufficiently sound attempt to establish that ethical considerations about the value 
of the norm drive norm integration processes (Price 2008a, p. 317), as will be 
discussed later, there is a strong assumption underlying this work that the norms 
under discussion are in fact, distinctly based on “propositions about what is good and 
right” and that norm integration is driven by these considerations (Crawford 2002, p. 
89). 
 
This is so much so that it has been claimed that, “as a research programme, 
constructivism has established that moral norms – and thus ethics – matter in 
international relations” (Price 2008a, p. 317). Indeed, much work that focuses on the 
‘life cycle’ of norms, in other words the emergence and spread of norms in the 
international sphere, suggests that the ‘moral’ quality of norms plays an important 
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role in these processes. Notably, Finnemore and Sikking argue that the first step in 
their “Cascade Model”, norm emergence  – the point at which an idea is taken up by 
a sufficient number of actors to quality as being based on a ‘shared moral 
assessment’ – is driven by norm entrepreneurs who are motivated by “altruism, 
empathy, ideational commitment” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, p. 898). 
 
Others, such as Neta Crawford’s work in Argument and Change in World Politics go 
further and claim that the moral quality of norms is a critical factor that facilitates 
their spread across the international sphere, a process frequently referred to as ‘norm 
diffusion’, and that, working through normative persuasion, norms can affect 
outcomes in international politics (Crawford 2002). Similarly, Richard Price asserts 
in Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Lands Mines that 
“the role of moral persuasion….(is) particularly crucial” (Price 1998, p. 616) in 
explaining the adoption of a norm to prohibit land mines in international law. Martha 
Finnemore also dedicates a chapter of her book National Interest in International 
Society to analysing how the anti-poverty norm, as an addition to the norm on 
international development aid, emerged and spread (Finnemore 1996, chapter 4). She 
finds that this process was to a significant extent driven by ethical considerations as 
she points to the instrumental role played by the, then, President of the World Bank 
McNamara who, according to her, “…believed that aid was a moral obligation of 
rich nations and that it could and did work. He was an internationalist driven by 
internationalist morality and optimism” (Finnemore 1996, p. 104). This lead to the 
norm to become a “defining feature of development” as, at the end of the process 
described by her, “everyone involved in development was talking, writing, and 
structuring policies about poverty issues” (Finnemore 1996, p. 97). 
 
Similarly, Risse, Roppe, and Sikkink conclude in their in-depth study of norm 
integration in The Power of Human Rights that “…moral consciousness-raising is 
necessary to ensure enduring human rights change” (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, 
p. 256). Hulme and Fukudu-Parr’s study on International Norm Dynamics and the 
End of Poverty, argues that moral convictions significantly contributed to the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) being widely taken up as the leading 
framework for development aid (Hulme and Fukudu-Parr 2009). Donnelly, in his 
contribution to Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink, Restructuring World Politics states that 
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his analysis of a global debt cancellation campaign carried out by Transnational 
Advocacy Networks (TANS) shows that NGO’s persistent lobby efforts framed in 
terms of “moral demands” helped to “…account for…verbal commitments to the 
need for multilateral debt reduction in mid-1994” (Donnelly 2001, p. 175). Susan 
Burgerman contends that “moral conviction” and “moral outrage” have significantly 
contributed to states cooperating to promote human rights (Burgerman 2001, p. 6) 
and Ann Marie Clark emphasises the importance of “moral leverage” used by NSA 
to strengthen legal human rights norms (Clark 2001, p. 30). 
 
The above shows that much constructivist work asserts that norms, understood as 
having an ethical dimension, play a significant role in international politics precisely 
because of this ethical dimension. This finding is also echoed by Barnett and Sikkink 
who states that,  “Constructivist investigations of states policies and of international 
society argue that they are shaped by deep beliefs, including ethical or moral beliefs 
about the purpose of the state, humanitarianism, and justice” (Barnett and Sikkink 
2008, p. 69).  Does this mean that Richard Price’s claim – that constructivism has 
shown that ‘ethics matters’ in international politics – is justified? If so, might 
constructivism have also shown that ethics matters more or less in specific 
organisational contexts, making my thesis superfluous? The next section turns to 
this. 
 
The promise and limits of current constructivist work on ethics in norm emergence 
and diffusion 
 
Despite the fact that much of constructivist work claims to have established the 
importance of ethical considerations in international politics, some scholars have 
questioned these attempts due to their lack of ‘normative theorising to establish the 
ethical desirability of the norms in question. Reus-Smit makes this point very clearly 
when he states that constructivist scholars “must take seriously the need to match the 
rigor of their empirical analysis of normative politics with an equally rigorous 
defence of their implicit normative agenda…” (Reus-Smit 2002, p. 504). 
 
This critique certainly limits the constructivist contribution to the study of moral 
progress in international politics. However, as already stated in the introduction, this 
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is not the aim of this thesis. The aim here is to study whether ethical considerations – 
considerations of ‘doing the right thing’ – have any weight at all in international 
politics, and whether this is more or less likely in certain organisational contexts. No 
judgement is made on whether particular ethical considerations are right or wrong in 
any absolute sense. Understood as such, I propose that constructivist approaches, 
despite their lack of normative theorising, lend themselves very well to the study of 
ethical considerations. This is so for the following two reasons: 
 
First, constructivism takes ideas and ideational factors seriously, allowing for the 
study of ethics and ethical considerations. Second, constructivist scholars frequently 
study processes of norm integration. Both factors make constructivist approaches apt 
for the endeavour in this thesis because (as its explained in detail in Chapter Two and 
Three) a careful study of norm integration processes, allows for an examination of 
the importance of ethical considerations. 
 
In other words, it is suggested that an examination of norm integration processes 
enables an analysis of which drivers – ethical considerations or others – drive these 
processes without requiring a solid normative defence of the absolute ‘rightness’ of a 
certain value. All that is examined is whether or not ethical considerations 
dominantly drive the integration of the norm - not the ‘ethicality’ of the norm itself. 
Thus, constructivist approaches, due to their focus on norm integration, lend 
themselves very well to the study of ethical considerations.  
 
However, despite this potential to shed light on the role of ethical considerations, 
constructivist work on norms has one critical limitation: most work pays insufficient 
attention to different drivers of norm integration (see Chapter Two for detail). This 
seriously limits the plausibility of existing constructivist claims on the role of ethics 
in norm integration. The work frequently refers to ‘persuasion’ as a key process in 
norm integration but does not sufficiently distinguish between different drivers of 
persuasion such as shaming, practical and scientific arguments, or ethical arguments 
and ethical considerations. This lack of distinction makes the work inapt to actually 
establish whether or not ethical considerations mattered in a particular instance. 
Thus, although offering the conceptual potential for the study of ethics, constructivist 
scholarship has not done enough to be able to claim that it has established that ethics 
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matters. This means that the aim of my research – to understand whether or not 
ethical considerations drive behaviour in international politics and whether or not 
this is more likely in certain organisational contexts – is not superfluous. On the 
contrary, it is relevant and has the potential to significantly contribute to current 
theorising on the role of ethical considerations in norm integration. 
 
International Organisations as norm facilitators 
 
The role and nature of IOs is highly contested in IR. Notably, a number of prominent 
theories, such as neorealist and neoliberal approaches question whether IOs have any 
independent agency at all. Based on a state-centric ontology of IR and a “definition 
of the problem as one of getting exogenously given egoists to cooperate” they are 
highly sceptical about international organisations as actors in their own right (Wendt 
1994, p. 1). Neorealists tend to view international organisations as not “worthy of 
explanation….(and) have no place for IOs in their model…international outcomes 
are determined by state power and interest alone…IOs are not important arenas 
within which states interact, and IOs are certainly not autonomous actors in their own 
right” (Nielson and Tierney 2003, p. 244). Hutchings concurs when she states that,   
 
Realism is highly sceptical of the virtues and efficacy of 
international institutions and even more so of political 
cosmopolitanism. Not only is there no basis for political authority 
above and beyond that agreement of states in the international 
sphere, but also international institutions based on internationalist or 
cosmopolitan legitimations are regarded suspiciously as an idealistic 
coating of the real pursuit of underlying state interests. (Hutchings 
1999, p. 23)  
 
For neoliberalists, on the other hand, “IOs do matter, but they matter only as 
structural constraints on state behaviour, not as autonomous actors.” (Nielson and 
Tierney 2003, p. 244)  
 
This limited view of international organisations has been seriously challenged, in  
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particular by constructivist scholars. Notably, Barnett and Finnemore have argued 
that IOs,  
 
…have authority, autonomy, and agency, and are political creatures 
that have effects similar to the effects of other authority-bearing 
actors, including states. The impact of IOs is not limited to the 
functions assigned to them by states and the regulation of already 
existing state interests. (Barnett and Sikkink 2008, p. 71)  
 
Referring to a number of other constructivist IR scholars Park strongly reinforces this 
point when she states that research has shown that,  
 
IOs operate within and across all aspects of international relations 
and act not only as forums for states’ interests but also as instigators 
of change in areas as diverse as development…IOs formulate and 
implement policies that cannot be described as the simple product of 
interstate bargaining. (Park 2006, pp. 111-112) 
 
In fact some research suggests that IOs may actually “operate in ways not intended 
by the states that establish them” (Park 2004, p. 80). 
 
In addition to general claims about the role and nature of IOs, constructivist scholars 
also frequently make another assertion: they suggest that norms are particularly 
likely to emerge and diffuse in IOs. Most notably, Finnemore and Sikkink argue that 
“international organizations ‘teach’ states new norms of behaviour” (Sikkink and 
Finnemore 2001, p. 401). This claim has been echoed by other scholars such as Boli 
and Thomas and Adler and Barnett. (Boli and Thomas 1999; Barnett and Adler 
1998). Indeed, Kickbusch explicitly asserts that, “States were ‘taught’ by the WHO 
that a national health policy was part and parcel of modernization and that the 
organization would advise countries on how to go about establishing such a policy” 
(Kickbusch 2000, p. 981). In a review article of constructivist research, Finnemore 
and Sikkink establish that a lot of work suggests that “International Organizations are 
effective agents of social construction…” (Sikkink and Finnemore 2001, p. 401).  
 
Others argue that IOs provide opportunity structures for norm emergence and 
diffusion. Grigorescu notably asserts that “One of the main mechanisms through 
which IOs contribute to domestic change is through the transmission of norms” 
(Grigorescu 2002, p. 467) and Khagram, Riker and Sikkink state that, “Most often 
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states work together to make norms in the context of international organizations” 
(Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2001, p. 14). Indeed, Park, in her overview of 
constructivist work on norm emergences finds that, in this literature IOs play the role 
of “norms diffusers or transmitters within the international realm” (Park 2006, p. 
343).  
 
Some scholars further suggest that IOs, due to their structural set-up as multilateral 
agencies, provide space for more honest policy deliberation, and are more readily 
believed to be driven by moral motives. Risse makes this point in “Lets Argue!”. He 
states that “International institutions create a normative framework structuring 
interaction in a given issue-area. They often serve as arenas in which international 
policy deliberation can take place” (Risse 2000, p. 15). Similarly, Martha Finnemore 
alludes to a special property of multilateral organisations, in National Interests in 
International Society, as she states that “..the fact that the Bank was a multilateral 
entity created less suspicion about its moral and humanitarian motives than might 
have been applied to similar actions by a single powerful state” (Finnemore 1996, p. 
125). Fukudu Parr, and True and Mintrom make similar claims in their work on 
poverty-focused development, and gender equality promotion (Hulme and Fukudu-
Parr 2009; True and Mintrom 2001). Thus, there is indeed a widespread assertion 
that IOs provide a particularly fertile ground for norm emergence and diffusion. 
 
The above has established that, although the role and nature of IOs in IR is highly 
contested, some scholars persistently claim that IOs have independent agency and, 
indeed, provide a particularly fertile ground for norm emergence and diffusions. It is 
these claims that I am interested in. How strong are they? The next section shows 
that there are significant limitations in these claims, further illustrating the relevance 
of this thesis and pointing to an additional key contribution that this research can 
make to IR theorising.  
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The limits of claims about the impact of organisational characteristics on ethical 
considerations 
 
Many scholars referred to above do not further substantiate or attempt to explain 
their claims that norm emergence and integration are more likely in IOs. For 
instance, Khagram, Riker and Sikkink state that, “…states work together to make 
norms in the context of international organizations” without further elaborating on 
this claim (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2001, p. 14).  Kickbusch and Fukudu Parr 
similarly do not theorise about why IOs might be ‘better’ at moral norm emergence 
and diffusion (Kickbusch 2000; Hulme and Fukudu-Parr 2009). 
 
Other studies present international organisations as wedged between transnational 
advocacy networks, where norms are said to be first taken-up, and states, who are the 
end-target for norm advocacy (Park 2011; Nelson 2001; Khagram 2001). While this 
work describes in some detail why Transnational Advocacy Networks are well-
placed to act as norm promoters – ranging from their expertise, their domestic 
political constituency to their frequent representation of southern views  – the work 
only hints on reasons for why international organisations are seen to play a particular 
role, including material resources, expertise, and international standing of (certain) 
international organisations (Nelson 2001, p. 9). 
 
Having said that, some accounts do provide some suggestions as to which particular 
characteristics may make international organisations particularly apt for moral norm 
integration. For example, Leon, in his study on the establishment of international 
structures to combat HIV/AIDS, states that it was UNAIDS’s outreach, expertise, 
access to policy-makers, resources, and open membership that made it well-placed 
for norm promotion. This argument is echoed by True and Mintrom who stress the 
UN’s outreach and expertise as important factors in making it an important player in 
the promotion of gender equality (True and Mintrom 2001). Risse in “Let’s Argue” 
suggests that international institutions, including IOs, are most apt to facilitate policy 
deliberation if they are “non-hierarchical and network-like international institutions 
characterized by a high density of mostly informal interactions should provide the 
structural conditions in international relations to allow for discursive and 
argumentative processes” (Risse 2000, p. 15). Yet, none of these claims are 
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elaborated on, let alone examined in any way, and therefore remain under-researched 
and un-substantiated. 
 
Four accounts that come closest to developing a theory on organisational 
characteristics and norm integration are Martha Finnemore’s, Antje Vetterlein’s, 
Miller’s, and Hafner and Pollack’s work (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000; 
Finnemore 1996; Miller 1998; Vetterlein 2010). Notably, Martha Finnemore claims 
in National Interests in International Society that the World Bank was effective at 
norm creation, promotion, and integration due to its organisational structure. 
Notably, she states that, 
 
Under Robert McNamara, the Bank’s influence, its visibility, and its 
credibility among development experts made it an effective 
proselytizer for poverty concerns. Its organisational structure was 
particularly important in this case. (Finnemore 1996, pp. 90-
91)…The Bank’s ability to do this stemmed from a combination of 
prestige and power. In addition, the fact that the Bank was a 
multilateral entity created less suspicion about its moral and 
humanitarian motives than might have been applied to similar 
actions by a single powerful state. (Finnemore 1996, p. 125)  
 
In short, Finnemore argues that it was the Banks high levels of expertise, it being 
perceived as impartial and autonomous by other global actors, and its ample financial 
resources that made it effective at norm development, promotion, and integration. 
 
Vetterlein argues in her study on the IMF that what determines an organisation’s 
likelihood of integrating a norm are five organisational features: the organisation’s 
original mandate; its organisational structure with its set of rules, regulations, 
operational procedures, and departments; informal regulations that emerge through 
daily interactions of staff; the professional profile of staff; and the organisation’s 
autonomy from its member states. Out of the five, staff profile, in particular the 
congruence between a new norm and already existing beliefs among staff, is 
highlighted as especially important. Notably, she finds that “staff who consist of 
economists trained in conservative economic theory were not interested in pursuing 
social issues” (Vetterlein 2010, p. 95). McNeil and St. Clair concur with this claim 
(McNeill and St. Clair 2009, p. 811). 
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The third noteworthy attempt at developing a theory on organisational characteristics 
and norm integration developed by Miller is based on insights developed by Kardam. 
Miller’s framework suggests that three factors influence how organisations integrate, 
in her case, the norm of gender equality in development cooperation. She suggests 
that the three most important factors are (1) vulnerability to external pressure; (2) 
proximity of the organisation’s mandate to gender equality; (3) presence and 
capacity of gender advocates within the organisation (Miller 1998). These factors are 
subsequently applied to in-depth case studies of the integration of gender equality 
into the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. The study finds, indeed, that all three 
factors influenced if, how, and to what extent gender equality was taken up by the 
organisations. 
 
Along the same lines, Hafner and Pollack suggest in their work on Mainstreaming 
Gender in Global Governance that the timing and the extent to which the norm of 
gender mainstreaming is taken up by IOs is influenced by three factors: (1) the 
organisation’s political opportunity structure; (2) the fit of the organisation’s 
mandate with the norm; and (3) the organisation’s capacity for implementation 
(Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000). This framework is applied to the integration of 
gender mainstreaming into UNDP and the World Bank. While the first two 
characteristics are discussed in detail and the work claims to show, as does Miller’s, 
that both played a role in influencing how gender mainstreaming was integrated into 
the organisations, the last characteristics is not described in sufficient detail, let alone 
examined in the case studies.  
 
Thus, overall, the frameworks suggest that the organisational characteristics that 
make IOs ‘good’ at norm development and integration are high levels of expertise, 
perceived impartiality, financial resources, staff profile, open opportunity structures, 
and congruence between the organisation’s profile and a specific norm.  
 
However, none of the work provides a comparison between IOs and state-based 
organisations and, indeed, most of these characteristics listed as critical are not 
limited to international organisations. The only characteristics mentioned above that 
are more typical of IOs than state-based organisations – impartiality and autonomy – 
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are not examined in any systematic way by either scholar. Indeed, they are merely 
stated as important. Thus, the work does not provide arguments that substantiate or 
refute the asserted facilitating role for ethical considerations of IOs per se. Moreover, 
a number of suggested factors that influence organisation’s likelihood of taking up a 
norm, such as the organisation’s mandate fit or an organisation’s capacity for norm 
integration, are, in my view, indicators of norm uptake rather than influential causal 
factors. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Ten. 
 
The available work, therefore, does not provide a coherent or well-specified theory 
on what characteristics might make IOs better at moral norm emergence and 
diffusion than bilateral organisations. Combined with the limitations relating to the 
work’s ability to measure the extent to which ethical considerations actually drive 
norm integration, it seems fair to conclude that constructivist scholars have not 
provided a satisfactory answer as to whether ethics matters in international politics 
and, if so, whether it matters more in IOs than in bilateral organisations. 
 
1.3 Narrowing the focus: The claimed ‘ethicality’ of multilateral development 
organisations 
 
This section shows that the issue area of development aid is particularly well suited 
to the study of ethics in general and the role of IOs within it because motives for aid 
giving, although highly disputed, frequently include ethical considerations. 
Moreover, some scholarly work on development aid includes strong claims that 
multilateral development organisations (MDOs) are more guided by ethical motives 
than their bilateral counterparts. These claims, however, have not been sufficiently 
examined. 
 
Although there are numerous explanations for why countries give development aid 
most scholarly accounts of aid engage in a debate of whether or not – and if so, to 
what extent – aid is driven by ethical considerations (Lumsdaine 1993; Lancaster 
2007; McNeill and St. Clair 2009; Singer 1984; Morgenthau 1962; Maizels and 
Nissanke 1984; Hattori 2001; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998; Alesina and Dollar 
2000; Neumayer 2003; Akonor 2007; Hout 1991; Frey and Schneider 1986; Rowe 
1978).  Usually posited against aid driven by self-interest, much of this work 
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suggests that at least some aid – albeit, often a very small proportion – is driven by 
ethical considerations. Yet, the picture that emerges is highly complex, and indeed, 
many theorists suggest that motivations for aid are continuously changing, calling 
this the “pendulum of aid” (Riddell 2007, p. 92). Notably Pratt talks about a 
“continued battle between development, political and commercial interests with 
different interests gaining or losing ground in different time periods” (Pratt quoted in 
Riddell 2007, p. 97). Those that suggest that aid is largely motivated by ethical 
considerations do, in Akonor’s words, “when pushed, generally admit that their calls 
for intervention are self-serving and not purely altruistic” (Akonor 2007, p. 1073), 
while others insist that strategic interests similarly fail to explain all aid (Lumsdaine 
1993). The most convincing accounts suggest that aid motivations vary from country 
to country and across time depending on the dominant perception, or “frames” of 
what the purpose of aid should be at any given time in any given country (Van der 
Veen 2011). In any case, the above suffices to show that the role of ethical 
considerations in aid is an important component of debates on aid, is highly 
contested, and very much on-going, making this issue area an interesting focus for 
the study of the role of ethical considerations in organisational decision-making. 
 
In addition, the claim suggesting that IOs present a particularly good context for 
ethical considerations to matter is even more strongly pronounced in the issue area of 
international development.  Many scholars suggest that multilateral aid4 is more 
likely to be guided by a focus on recipient needs, poverty alleviation, and overall 
more “humanitarian”, “moral” or “ethical” concerns than bilateral aid. Importantly, 
this is not to say that this point is undisputed, as various scholars, particularly those 
rooted post-colonialism, are highly critical of the possibility of ‘ethical aid’ in 
general, and the ethicality of (certain) multilateral organisations in particular 
(McEwan 2009; Chossudovsky 2003). However, the claim is remarkably widespread 
across various other types of literature, as illustrated by the quotations below, 
 
                                                
4 According to the OECD, multilateral ODA is a contribution made to a recipient institution that: 
conducts all or part of its activities in favour of development; is an international agency, institution, or 
organisation whose members are governments, or a fund managed autonomously by such an agency; 
pools contributions so that they lose their identity and become an integral part of its financial assets. 
Multilateral ODA includes both assessed and voluntary un-earmarked contributions. See DAC 
Statistical Reporting Directives in (OECD 2011, p. 21). 
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…aid channelled through the UN and other multilateral 
organizations is likely to have a stronger moral element than 
bilateral aid. (Singer 1984, p. 15)  
 
International development organizations share a moral purpose: the 
reduction of poverty. (McNeill and St. Clair 2009, p. 47)  
 
Most authors seem to agree that multilateral giving will be different 
than bilateral aid. They suggest that multilateral aid will in itself 
be…more humanitarian in orientation. (Hawkins et al. 2006, p. 114)  
 
It (multilateral aid) has long been favoured over bilateral aid 
because it is widely viewed as…more likely to be channelled to 
recipients on the basis of need, and with fewer conditions attached.” 
(Riddell 2007, p. 77)  
 
 …preferential allocations in favour of African countries by the 
multilateral aid agencies are more likely to reflect concern for the 
development needs of the poorest developing countries. (Maizels 
and Nissanke 1984, p. 886) 
 
The bilateral donor’s emphasis on its own security needs, while 
doubtless ensuring some aid, may well not serve the developmental 
priorities of the recipient…By contrast, multilaterals are…more 
exclusively concerned with development. (Cassen 1994, p. 216)  
 
 
The limits of current work on ethics, aid, and organisational structure 
 
Despite the widespread assertion that ethical considerations matter more in MDOs 
than in BDOs, this claim has not been systematically analysed or substantiated. This 
is so for the same reasons noted above that limit constructivist work on norms in 
general. These are (1) aid driven by ethical considerations is measured by employing 
substantive measurements (eg. aid given to countries with low GDP/capita) without 
sufficient theoretical engagement with how appropriate these measurements are and 
(2) under-researched claims regarding organisational structure. 
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i. Limited theoretical engagement with appropriate measurements of aid driven 
by ‘ethical considerations’ 
 
 Quantitative research on aid motivations usually employs substantive measurements 
of ‘ethical aid’ without any theoretical engagement with the concept of ‘ethics’ or 
‘ethical considerations’, and even without any discussion, let alone, defence of the 
specific measurements employed. Notably, Schraeder, Hook and Taylor measure aid 
motivated by ethical considerations as aid that aims to “alleviate the suffering of 
those in distress” (Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998, p. 303). The extent to which 
these considerations drive aid is assessed by analysing the amount of aid allocated 
based on “humanitarian need”, which, in turn, is simply measured by looking at 
average life expectancy and a caloric intake of the target population (Schraeder, 
Hook, and Taylor 1998, p. 298).  The authors do not offer any discussion or defence 
of employing such a simplistic substantive measurement to establish ‘humanitarian 
need’. 
 
Similarly, another prominent scholar, Neumayer, uses McKinlay and Little’s 
distinction between the ‘foreign policy view’ and the ‘humanitarian view’ of aid 
where the ‘humanitarian view’ of aid is defined as aid motivated by ethical 
considerations and assessed by an examination of aid allocation based on ‘recipient 
need’ (McKinlay 1977). ‘Recipient need’ is measured by looking at GDP per capita 
and ratings on the Physical Quality of Life Index (Neumayer 2003, p. 52). The 
appropriateness of this measurement is not discussed, let alone defended. Alesina 
and Dollar look at aid as either motivated by “strategic interest” or by a “moral 
vision”. The latter is understood as “recipient poverty” and measured by examining 
the amount of aid allocated to countries with low real per capita income (Alesina and 
Dollar 2000, p. 35). Trumbull and Wall define aid driven by “recipient well being”, 
as aid allocated to countries with low per capita income and high infant mortality 
rates (Trumbull and Wall 1994, p. 879). By doing so, these contributions make two 
implicit assertions that are not defended and, most frequently, not even 
acknowledged as potential points for contestation. First, they implicitly assert that 
aid can only be said to be motivated by ethical considerations if it is allocated based 
on the absolute needs of the target population. Second, they assume that these needs 
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can be measured by looking at broad and highly contested measurements, such as per 
capita income or average life expectancy. 
 
Others, such as Easterly and Williamson use more sophisticated definitions of aid 
driven by ‘good’ or ‘ethical’ considerations, including an examination of the level of 
aid agency transparency, overhead costs, effective delivery, and allocation to less 
corrupt and more democratic countries (Easterly 2011, p. 1930). However, none of 
the measurements are discussed and certainly not defended as appropriate 
measurements for aid driven by ethical considerations. Easterly and Williamson 
simply state that their measurements are “derived from what practices the donors 
themselves, outside aid monitors, and the academic literature suggest agencies 
should follow” (Easterly 2011, p. 1930). 
 
These simplistic accounts and lack of conceptual engagement with, and justification 
for, measurements of aid driven by ethical considerations are problematic. This is 
particularly so, as it is, in fact, highly contested what aid driven by ethical 
considerations should ‘look like’. This issue has been subject to very sophisticated 
debates in political philosophy, frequently framed around questions of ‘global 
justice’ (Pogge 2008b). These complex debates strongly suggest that simply using a 
substantive measurement of ‘ethical aid’, such as aid allocated to countries with low 
GDP per capita without defending it, or even without any kind of conceptual 
engagement with it, as is done by much quantitative work reviewed above, is 
problematic and insufficient to establish the actual extent to which ethical 
considerations drive aid organisations.  
 
ii. Unjustified claims on the impact of organisational characteristics in the literature 
 
Similarly to the constructivist work reviewed above, quantitative work comparing 
multilateral and bilateral aid also does not sufficiently assess what specific 
organisational characteristics of IOs might make them more likely to be driven by 
ethical considerations. Indeed, the majority of work does not provide any 
explanations for this asserted ‘ethicality’. Those that do, base their explanations 
largely on the simple fact that multilateral organisations are composed of more than 
one state, but do not examine or test this assertion in any way. Hattori notably states 
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that, “as a collective practice, multilateral aid obscures the identity of the donors, 
thus undermining the presumption of…strategic intent” (Hattori 2001, p. 644). Henry 
Cabot Lodge similarly asserts that aid given through the United Nations is 
“obviously insulated against political manipulation” (Cabot Lodge 1960, p. 525). 
The flip side to this argument – that aid given by one state individually is more likely 
to be influenced by non-development strategic state interests – is also frequently 
mentioned in the literature. Notably, Dengbol-Martinussen states that bilateral aid 
allocations are “heavily influenced by commercial and political interests” (Dengbol-
Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 1999, p. 120). Milner re-affirms this by stating 
that “a good deal of research suggests, however, that bilateral aid is more tied to 
donor interests than multilateral aid” (Milner 2006, p. 110). Yet, these statements are 
not sufficiently explored or assessed. 
 
In addition, the literature mentions two other characteristics that are said to make 
MDOs more driven by ethical considerations than BDOs. First, the distinct nature of 
multilateral aid has been linked to the fact that some multilateral agencies are 
governed by the collective decisions of both donors and recipients (Riddell 2007, p. 
77). This suggests that in addition to ‘lateralism’, the composition of the decision-
making body, in particular the presence and decision-making power of both donors 
and recipients, could be an important characteristic that might make development aid 
more likely to be driven by ethical considerations. However, some research suggests 
the opposite. Notably, McNeill and St. Clair strongly argue that the presence of 
developing states, some of which are authoritarian, or at least fairly un-democratic, 
might drastically reduce the extent to which an organisation can exercise moral 
authority and act accordingly. They state that,  
 
Multilateral organisations are created by, and answerable to, 
governments – many of which are authoritarian and/or corrupt. It is 
difficult for a multilateral organisation to seriously address the 
ethical challenge of poverty while also cooperating with a 
government, which manifestly does not promote the well-being of 
its people. (McNeill and St. Clair 2009, p. 37) 
 
Thus, there is no agreement on the impact of the composition of an organisation’s 
decision-making body. In addition, none of the work systematically assesses the 
impact of this organisational feature on the role of ethical considerations. 
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Second, some of the literature suggests that multilateral development agencies are 
more driven by ethical considerations or at least have the potential of being so 
because their mandates focus on promoting the common good and poverty reduction. 
McNeill and St. Clair for example, state that “International development 
organisations share a moral purpose: the reduction of poverty” and that “international 
organisations derive moral authority from their claim to act for the common good” 
(McNeill and St. Clair 2009, p. 29). This ‘moral purpose’ is derived from their global 
mandates. Importantly, McNeill and St. Clair do not claim that organisations’ 
mandates necessarily make them more able to act ‘ethically’. In fact, one of the key 
arguments advanced in their book is that other organisational characteristics such as 
democratic governance structures; limited independent financial resources; and 
expertise that might not sit comfortably with moral arguments can drastically reduce 
the extent to which an organisation can exercise moral authority. However, they do 
seem to suggest that if these factors are controlled or overcome, multilateral aid 
organisations will act according to their mandates and, since the mandates are 
‘moral’, their actions will be so, too. Yet, again, these assertions are not ‘tested’ or 
even substantiated in any way, but merely assumed to be true. 
 
In summary, the above has shown that there is indeed a widespread assertion in IR 
and Development Studies that ethical considerations do carry some weight in 
international politics, particularly so in the issue area of development aid, and that 
multilateral organisations provide a particularly conducive context for this to happen. 
Yet, these assertions are highly disputed and have not been satisfactorily established 
or examined due to (1) a failure to engage with sufficient theoretical depth in how to 
measure whether or not ethical considerations drive processes and (2) a lack of any 
systematic examination of the impact of specific organisational characteristics on the 
role of ethical considerations in these processes. It is the aim of this thesis to address 
these shortcomings. Doing so, it is hoped, will contribute to the on-going debate on 
what forces do indeed “rule our world” (Nakaranda 2000, p. 39) and add some 
insights into existing work on the role of ethics in international politics in general, 
and in development aid in particular, work on norms, and theories on the role and 
nature of IOs. The next section outlines how this will be done. 
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1.4 Structure of the thesis 
 
An analysis of the importance of ethical considerations in development 
organisations, and the impact of organisational structure on this, first requires the 
establishment of a framework for assessing the extent to which ethical considerations 
matter. This is done in Chapter Two. First, attempts within different literatures to 
establish the importance of ethical considerations in international development 
organisations in general, and in the context of norm integration processes in 
particular, are examined, with the hope of finding a suitable framework for 
application in this thesis. The Chapter concludes, however, that existing efforts in 
this regard are incomplete and, ultimately, do not allow for an identification of which 
considerations – ethical or otherwise – drive processes. Even the more detailed and 
sophisticated frameworks do not allow for a distinction of whether intrinsic or 
instrumental ethical considerations – considerations about the ‘moral rightness’ of an 
issue itself or considerations relating to the utility perception of the issue to achieve 
another, ‘morally right’, end – matter. To address this shortcoming, an alternative 
framework for an ‘ethical considerations analysis’ is proposed. The framework 
distinguishes between three different ‘drivers’ of processes, including norm 
integration processes, in organisations: intrinsic ethical considerations, instrumental 
ethical considerations, and social influence consideration. This differentiation allows 
for an analysis of the extent and nature of ethical considerations in norm integration 
processes. 
 
Subsequently, Chapter Three presents the method applied in this thesis: heuristic 
comparative case studies of the integration of a ‘new’ norm in three organisations 
with very different organisational characteristics. The process of ‘norm integration’ 
is understood to encompass both the inclusion of the norm into (1) policies and 
strategies as well as (2) operational procedures and budgets. The choice of the 
organisations is based on characteristics hypothesised to facilitate ethical 
considerations driving norm emergence and integration in the literature: (1) overall 
composition of the organisation (bilateral/multilateral; global/regional; 
donors/donors & recipient countries); (2) the nature and substance of the mandate; 
(3) the organisations main source of authority; (4) its decision-making structure; and 
(5) its funding sources. The Chapter explains the choice of method as most 
 32 
appropriate for the research objective, while recognising its limitations, and describes 
in detail how the different norm integration drivers can be identified by introducing a 
list of proxy indicators. It outlines the data collection process, which involved 36 
semi-structured interviews with key informants as well as a thorough document 
analysis of published and unpublished policies, strategies, guidelines and other 
relevant materials such as training guides, as well as official and unofficial records of 
decision-making processes, covering the period from 1970 – 2000 from all three 
organisations studied (UNDP, EC/EU, ODA/DFID). 
 
Chapter Four introduces the case studies of the first introduction and subsequent 
integration of the Women in Development/Gender And Development (WID/GAD) 
norm into UNDP, the EC/EU and ODA/DFID. First, a detailed introduction to the 
three organisations examined in this thesis is provided, giving a solid rational for 
their selection and showing how the selection of the three organisations aims to 
minimise selection bias. Second, Chapter Four introduces the norm - women/gender 
in development - by providing a brief overview of the norm’s origins and global 
evolution prior and throughout the period of analysis. 
 
Chapters Five to Seven present the findings of the case study analysis and establish a 
theory of the impact of organisational structure on the importance of ethical 
considerations in norm integration in development organisations. This is done by 
first examining the first ‘key moment’ in norm integration in each organisation - the 
first high-level recognition of the norm - to establish which norm integration driver 
dominated, and if the dominance of this particular driver was influenced by specific 
organisational characteristics. This is done in Chapter Five.  
 
The Chapter finds that the first high-level recognition of the norm in all three 
organisations was driven by social influence considerations, and not ethical 
considerations, be they intrinsic or instrumental. The dominance of social influence 
was largely due to a lack of agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of the norm 
in each organisation’s top-level decision-making body. This meant that norm 
integration involved debate and required negotiation, justification and compromise, 
which lead to weak and incoherent policies that favoured instrumental or non-
conceptual approaches to the norm. Lack of agreement also meant that there was 
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insufficient political and financial support for coherent and comprehensive norm 
integration. In some cases, lack of agreement and appreciation of the norm in fact 
restricted the freedom of actors in the organisation who seemed committed to the 
norm to promote the norm as they saw fit, further contributing to weak and 
incoherent policies and weak operationalisation. 
 
The Chapter shows that the likelihood of an agreement on the value of the norm 
under investigation was influenced by specific organisational characteristics. 
Specifically, three organisational characteristics most typical of multilateral aid 
organisations - namely multi-membership and cultural diversity in the organisations’ 
respective decision-making fora and consensus-based decision-making processes - 
made an agreement on the value of the norm less likely. However, as much as these 
characteristics made coherent policies featuring intrinsic arguments and 
comprehensive norm integration less likely, the first two characteristics, when 
combined with an open mandate and strong susceptibility to diverse scrutinisers, 
also significantly facilitated some kind of quick action on the norm.  
 
Characteristics most typical of bilateral organisations – relative culture homogeneity 
and few members involved in decision-making – were found to decrease the 
likelihood of the presence of a committed top-level decision-maker and, especially if 
combined with weak susceptibility to scrutiny, were found to make any action at all 
on a new norm highly unlikely. 
 
Thus, Chapter Five suggests that multilateral organisations might be quicker at initial 
norm uptake than their bilateral counterparts. However, it also clearly shows that this 
was more related to these organisations’ heightened reputational concerns than 
greater openness to ethical considerations as norm integration in neither organisation 
was driven by ethical considerations. This suggests two things. First, it suggests that 
neither multilateral nor bilateral organisations provide a particularly conducive 
context for ethical considerations to drive norm integration, thereby certainly calling 
into question the claim that IOs provide spaces particularly favourable for ethical 
considerations to matter. Second, it suggests that ethical considerations did not play 
any significant role at all in the cases analysed, potentially calling into question 
theories that claim that ethics matters in international development organisations. 
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Since the analysis presented in Chapter Five is limited to one policy it only provides 
very tentative insights into whether, and if so, which, organisational characteristics 
influence the nature and extent of ethical considerations in norm integration in these 
three organisations. To expand the analysis, Chapter Six moves beyond the first 
high-level recognition to the second ‘key moment’ in norm integration: the adoption 
of the first comprehensive WID/GAD policy or strategy in each organisation. The 
Chapter conducts the same analysis as Chapter Five and first establishes which norm 
integration driver dominated and subsequently examines the impact of organisational 
structure on the dominance of this particular driver.  
 
The Chapter supports the tentative findings of Chapter Five. It finds that this second 
step towards norm integration in each organisation was also dominantly driven by 
social influence. As in the previous Chapter, the simple and overarching reason for 
this was the continued lack of agreement on, or appreciation of, the importance and 
value of the norm by the organisations’ top-level decisions makers. The same 
organisational characteristics noted in Chapter Five – multi-membership and 
culturally diverse decision-making bodies and consensus-based decision-making 
processes – are found to have made such an agreement difficult. Yet, as in Chapter 
Five, Chapter Six finds that the same characteristics were also instrumental in 
facilitating some action on the norm, as they increased the likelihood of the presence 
of committed and vocal decision-makers who put the issue on the organisations’ 
agendas. Cultural homogeneity, few decision-makers, and weak susceptibility to 
scrutiny, on the other hand, decreased the likelihood of a presence of a committed 
actor among decision-makers, and made the organisation less likely to take any 
action at all on the norm. 
 
The one remarkable difference between this Chapter and the previous one is that in 
this second step towards norm uptake there was a visible presence of pockets of 
ethical commitment that drove parts of the norm integration process in all three 
organisations resulting in more coherent policies and strategies. In each case, this 
was largely enabled by the presence of committed individuals at various levels in 
each organisation who were, albeit to different extends, enabled to act on their 
personal ethical commitment due to increasing operational freedom. Yet, in all three 
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organisations, these individuals did not have significant decision-making power or 
resources and, therefore, did not manage to influence the overall process that drove 
norm integration across their organisations.  
 
Crucially, the presence, and level of freedom, power5, and resources of committed 
decision-makers and operational staff – and thus, their ability to influence norm 
integration – was significantly conditioned by organisational characteristics. Notably, 
in the case of UNDP and the EU the Administrator and some member states 
respectively seemed very committed to the norm but certain organisational 
characteristics of UNDP’s and the EU’s decision-making bodies, especially their 
diversity and multi-membership (which made agreement on the value of the norm 
less likely), reduced the freedom of these decision-makers, and even more so, 
committed operational staff to act on their beliefs. In other words, organisational 
characteristics most typical of multilateral organisations (diversity and multi-
membership) provided a form of ‘straight jacket’ for committed decision-makers and 
operational staffs to have their ethical commitments to the norm drive norm 
integration at organisational-level. 
 
Yet the example of ODA found that even the reverse (homogeneity and few 
members in decision-making) can provide a constraining environment for ethical 
considerations to drive norm integration because these characteristics make the 
presence of a committed top-level decision-maker less likely. This absence of a 
committed decision-maker, in the case of ODA during the second key moment, 
coupled with low susceptibility to scrutiny, meant that committed operational staff – 
when present  –  were not given the freedom, power, and resources to have their 
ethical beliefs on the norm drive norm integration.  
 
However, do these characteristics typical of bilateral organisations (homogeneity and 
few members in decision-making), if combined with a committed top-level decision-
maker, provide a better enabling environment for ethical considerations to drive 
norm integration?  
 
                                                
5 “Power” in this context refers to ‘decision-making power’, such as the inclusion in certain decision-
making fora, throughout the thesis. 
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Chapter Seven turns to this question. Drawing on additional empirical evidence from 
the ODA/DFID case study, the Chapter considers the evolution of WID/GAD in 
ODA/DFID under two different leaders with different levels of personal commitment 
to the norm: Lynda Chalker and Clare Short. It shows that, indeed, with top-level 
commitment present, committed actors in ODA/DFID were given the freedom and 
resources to promote the norm, making norm integration comprehensive and framed 
around the intrinsic value of the norm. Indeed, norm integration during this period is 
the strongest and most strongly framed around intrinsic arguments observed in this 
thesis. Yet, when top-level commitment shifted – a function of the volatility of 
bilateral organisations – freedom and resources for WID/GAD integration reduced 
drastically. The Chapter, thus, shows that the characteristics of homogeneity and 
few-member decision-making can either provide a strongly enabling or highly 
restrictive environment for WID/GAD norm integration, depending on the presence 
of a committed top-level decision-maker. It also points to another significant 
characteristic most typical of bilateral organisations – their volatility.  
 
Chapter Eight summarises the overall findings of this thesis, which are as follows: 
1. Organisations per se are unlikely to be driven by ethical considerations, while 
people within may be. 
2. If people within organisations who are committed to a particular norm are 
given the freedom, power and resources to act on their ethical beliefs and 
drive norm integration, then norm integration at the level of the organisation 
is likely to be driven by their ethical considerations. 
3. Certain organisational characteristics make it more or less likely that 
committed people are present, especially at decision-making level, and are 
given the necessary freedom, power, and resources to act on their beliefs.  
4. Characteristics most typical of multilateral organisations – cultural diversity 
and multi-membership – make it more likely that a decision-maker 
committed to the norm is present but provide a restraining environment for 
committed actors to act on their beliefs. Characteristics most typical of 
bilateral organisations – cultural homogeneity and few decision-makers – 
while making the presence of committed decision-maker unlikely, if 
combined with such a committed top-level decision-maker, provide an 
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enabling environment for committed actors to act on their beliefs, making it 
more likely for norm integration to be driven by ethical considerations. 
5. The same characteristics that are likely to reduce the freedom and resources 
of committed actors to act on their personal beliefs (those most typical of 
multilateral organisations), if combined with high-level susceptibility to 
scrutiny and an open mandate, make organisations more likely to take some 
kind of action on a new norm, particularly if the norm has reached a certain 
level of international recognition. Yet, this is most likely driven by 
reputational concerns (which this thesis refers to as social influence), not 
ethical considerations. 
6. On the flipside, the characteristics that are likely to enable freedom and 
resources for committed actors (those most typical of bilateral organisations) 
if not combined with a committed top-level decision-maker, make an 
organisation less likely to take any action on a new norm at all. 
7. Thus, norm integration in bilateral organisations is likely to be either very 
comprehensive and driven by ethical considerations, or weak or non-existent; 
while multilateral organisations are likely to take some kind of action on a 
new norm, but this is likely to be weak and dominantly driven by social 
influence considerations. 
 
Chapter Nine critically engages with these findings by first discussing three 
alternative explanations that could be put forward for what has been observed: (1) 
the role of global discourse; (2) the role of specific actors; and  (3) the specific nature 
of the norm. All three are discussed in turn, and it is shown that, although important, 
how, and to what extent all three factors influenced norm integration was 
significantly conditioned by the organisational characteristics noted above. Second, 
the Chapter asks how generalisable the findings of this thesis are. This is done be 
extending the proposed theory to (1) different organisations and (2) a different norm 
(human rights mainstreaming/the human rights-based approach to programming). 
The Chapter shows that in both cases the findings of this thesis hold. Having said 
that, the expansion exercise does further refine the theory by suggesting that some – 
albeit very few – bilateral organisations in fact tend to be the ones that kick-start 
action on new norms and subsequently promote the norm at multilateral-level. Thus, 
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the findings of the thesis do indeed contribute to theorising on ethics, norm 
integration, and IOs. 
 
The final Chapter, Chapter Ten, turns to the implications of the findings. Do they 
matter and what, if anything, do they contribute to current theorising on WID/GAD, 
norms, ethics, and IOs? The Chapter shows that these findings matter for three 
reasons. First, they matter because they add to existing theories on WID/GAD and 
organisational characteristics. By re-visiting two theories introduced in the 
introduction of this thesis by Miller and Hafner and Pollack, the Chapter shows that 
the theory suggested here supports, but also helps to further refine, both theories, 
thereby contributing to theorising on gender and organisations. Second, the Chapter 
shows that the key insight of this thesis matters: ethical considerations, especially 
intrinsic ethical considerations, seem generally unlikely to drive international 
development organisations and this is even less likely in multilateral organisations. It 
matters because, first, broadly speaking, many multilateral organisations base their 
authority on substantive moral legitimacy – in other words, a claim that they are 
driven by ‘doing the right thing’. By showing that multilateral organisations are not, 
as such, likely to be driven by ethical considerations, the findings of this thesis 
seriously call into question any kind of generic claim of multilateral organisations to 
substantive moral legitimacy, thereby casting doubt on a fundamental basis of their 
authority.  Second, the findings are significant because norm integration driven by 
social influence and instrumental reasoning is likely to weaken the sustainability and 
comprehensiveness of norm uptake, pointing to a possible explanation for the 
frequently observed patchy integration of norms. 
 
Last, the Chapter notes that this last claim – that norm integration driven by social 
influence and instrumental arguments leads to less comprehensive and sustainable 
norm integration – has only been tentatively established and concludes by suggesting 
that further examining this tentative assertion would provide a promising and critical 
area for further research. Such an endeavour would not only help to shed more light 
on the question whether ethical considerations have any weight in international 
politics, but also on whether it actually matters if the do. 
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Chapter 2: Towards a framework for an ‘ethical considerations’ 
analysis 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous Chapter has established that, although the role of ethics in IR is highly 
contested, some theorists, particularly those rooted in social constructivism, claim to 
have shown that ethical considerations matter and can affect outcomes in 
international politics. Yet, the previous Chapter has also pointed to a number of 
significant limitations in this work, illustrating that these claims have not been 
sufficiently substantiated.  
 
Despite these shortfalls, it was argued that social constructivism offers conceptual 
possibilities for the study of ethical considerations. This, it was suggested, is so 
because the work takes ideas and ideational factors seriously and frequently engages 
in examinations of norm integration processes. This, in turn, offers the opportunity to 
study what kind of considerations  - ethical or others - drive these norm integration 
processes. In short, the Chapter has suggested that constructivist approaches offer a 
conceptual opening to study the importance of ethical considerations without 
necessitating an engagement in substantive normative theorising or making 
simplistic claims about the normative desirability of certain values. This insight is 
fundamental for my quest in this thesis, as it provides me with a good starting point 
for the identification of an appropriate framework for measuring the importance of 
ethical considerations in development organisations. However, how exactly should 
such a framework look like? This Chapter turns to this and proposes a framework for 
an ethical considerations analysis.  
 
The Chapter first revisits and carefully examines current constructivist work on norm 
integration process already touched-upon in the introduction in order to identify a 
suitable framework for the quest in this thesis. However, the assessment finds that 
overall, the work does not sufficiently engage with the specific processes – and 
especially the drivers – of norm integration to be useful for this thesis. Indeed, the 
Chapter shows that frequent reference to ‘persuasion’ as a key process in norm 
integration disguises a number of different drivers behind persuasion, ranging from 
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reputational concerns to practical, scientific arguments, as well as ethical 
considerations. This failure to distinguish ethical from other considerations makes 
the work inapt for the quest in this thesis, which is to understand whether or not 
multilateral aid organisations are more likely to be driven by ethical considerations 
than their bilateral counterparts. Thus, an alternative framework for an ethical 
considerations analysis is proposed that distinguishes between three norm integration 
drivers: (1) intrinsic ethical considerations; (2) instrumental ethical considerations; 
and (3) social influence. 
 
2.1 Ethical considerations in theories on persuasion and norm socialisation 
 
As already stated in Chapter One, this thesis does not aim to investigate the grounds 
and nature of ethical principles and values underlying development aid; this is being 
done elsewhere.6 Rather, it attempts to examine the impact of organisational 
characteristics on the importance of ‘ethical considerations’ – considerations of 
‘what is right or wrong to do in a particular context’ – and whether this is influenced 
by organisational characteristics. No judgement about the absolute ‘rightness’ or 
‘wrongness’ of a particular value is made. 
 
The only substantive stance this thesis takes is that, following Alexander Wendt, 
pure self-interest considerations are seen as opposed to ethical considerations as they 
are defined “without regard to the other – who will instead be viewed as an object to 
be manipulated for the gratification of the self” (Wendt 1995, p. 52). In short, by 
asking whether ‘ethical considerations’ matter, the thesis essentially examines 
whether considerations about ‘what is right or wrong to do in a particular context’ 
matter – with the ‘right or wrong’ being defined with ‘regard to the other’ and not 
pure self-interest – and whether the importance of this is influenced by organisational 
structure. 
 
Understood as such, Chapter One has shown that the approach that has taken the role 
of ethics in general, and in the context of norm integration and uptake specifically, 
most seriously in IR is social constructivism. Thus, it is seems like an appropriate 
                                                
6See for example (Pogge 2008); (Miller 2007); (Opeskin 1996); (Nagel 2005); (Gasper 1999); 
(O'Neill 1975); (Singer 1984); (Singer 1984) 
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starting point for the identification of a framework to measure the nature and 
importance of ethical considerations. 
 
Indeed, as noted in the previous Chapter, much constructivist work engages with 
processes of norm integration, such as socialisation and internalisation. Yet scholars 
have also noted a lack of theoretical engagement with the processes as such. Notably, 
Johnston states that “For much of the constructivist literature, socialization processes 
are unclear” and that, “A fair amount of empirical work has focused on macro-
historical diffusion of values and practices, measured by correlations between the 
presence of a global norm and the presence of corresponding local practice” 
(Johnston 2001, p. 492). He further notes that,  “when constructivists do begin to 
look at these micro-processes of socialization, the focus is almost exclusively on 
persuasion.” He further suggests, however, that the term is used in many different 
ways across the broader constructivist literature and scholars often do not study the 
process of persuasion in sufficient detail to understand its precise nature (Johnston 
2001; Crawford 2002; Payne 2001). The next section examines this allegation in 
more detail. 
 
Different kinds of persuasion 
 
Echoing Johnston’s concerns, Payne finds that much constructivist work that refers 
to persuasion does not distinguish between persuasion based on “normative levers” 
or “material levers” such as the threat of sanctions or withdrawal of financial 
resources (Payne 2001). He finds that that, in fact, in much constructivist research on 
norms, “..factors like the resources or relative power of advocates might well 
influence the results of a frame contest” (Payne 2001, p. 37). Indeed, according to 
Payne,  “constructivist empirical literature illustrates the central importance of 
material levers in achieving normative change” (Payne 2001, p. 37). 
 
Johnston takes the critique of constructivism further and points to a failure of much 
of the work to distinguish between different kinds of ‘normative levers’, notably  
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non-coercive and coercive persuasion. He states that,   
 
For some [constructivists] the term is something akin to non-
coercive communication of new normative understandings that are 
internalized by actors such that a new course of action is viewed as 
entirely reasonable and appropriate…For others, persuasion can 
mean both something akin to communicative action and something 
more normatively coercive, entailing shaming or opprobrium. Here, 
compliance with a norm need not be a function of internalization but 
is, rather, a function of state elites’ aversion to public criticism. 
(Johnston 2001, p. 493)  
 
A careful analysis of constructivist work on norm integration sustains this critique. 
For example, in their contribution, The Power of Human Rights Risse, Ropp, and 
Sikkink do indeed stress the importance of persuasion in their norm socialisation 
model (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999). Persuasion is not explicitly defined, but the 
authors describe how they perceive the way in which persuasion works and what its 
outcome is. A closer look at this strongly suggests that they include many different 
micro-processes as part of ‘persuasion’.  
 
For instance, Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink present different techniques used for 
persuasion, “including appeals to emotion, evoking symbols, as well as the use and 
extension of logical arguments” (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, p. 14). They further 
state that, “In the area of human rights, persuasion and socialisation often involve 
processes such as shaming and denunciations, not aimed at producing changing 
minds with logic, but on changing minds by isolating or embarrassing the target” 
(Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, p. 14). The authors specifically argue that 
“shaming…implies a process of persuasion, since it convinces leaders that their 
behaviour is inconsistent with an identity to which they aspire” (Risse, Ropp, and 
Sikkink 1999, p. 15). Thus, the authors use the term persuasion very broadly as 
encompassing many different micro-processes - shaming, denunciations, appeals to 
emotion, evoking symbols, and logical argument. By doing so, their account does 
not, as alleged by Johnston and Payne, distinguish between different micro-processes 
involved in persuasion.  
 
This is a significant limitation of this approach for my thesis, as the various micro-
processes differ regarding the level and nature of ethical considerations they involve. 
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Notably, shaming does not involve any kind of ethical consideration, particularly not 
regarding the specific norm in question. Actors change their behaviour because of a 
realisation that, in order to avoid social punishment or to attract a social reward they 
have to appear to be acting in line with certain norm. This involves cost-benefit 
considerations rather than considerations about the value, including the ethical value, 
of the norm as such. Moreover, as seen in more detail below, appeals to logical and 
practical arguments are also unlikely to involve ethical considerations relating to the 
norm in question, but rather considerations of a practical nature. Thus, failure to 
distinguish between these different micro-processes makes this framework unsuitable 
for the quest to understand the importance of ethical considerations per se. This 
matters as it calls into question the validity of conclusions drawn from this work on 
the importance of ethical considerations. It also matters, as will be discussed 
throughout the thesis and, in particular in the Chapter Ten, because norm integration 
driven by ethical considerations, especially intrinsic ethical considerations, is most 
likely to lead to comprehensive and sustained norm integration.  
 
The various different drivers encompassed (and not distinguished) by Risse, Roppe 
and Sikkink’s framework are summarised in the diagram below. 
 
Diagram 1: Different drivers of persuasions in constructivist frameworks on norm integration 
 
 
 
An analysis of other constructivist work explicitly focused on norms further 
illustrates the alleged limited engagement with norm integration processes. For 
example, a closer look at Richard Price’s work in Reversing the Gun Sights: 
Transnational Civil Society Targets Lands Mines shows that, although he explicitly 
refers to ‘moral persuasion’ as a key process in his analysis, he does not define 
‘moral persuasion’ and the way in which persuasion is described suggests, yet again, 
Different drivers of “persuasion” for norm 
integration 
Practical considerations 
Norm compliance driven 
by the practical value of 
the norm. 
Intrinsic ethical 
considerations 
Norm compliance 
driven by the  intrinsic 
value of the norm. 
Social pressure & reputational 
considerations (cost-benefit) 
Appearance of norm compliance 
driven by fear of punishment or a 
desire to attract social rewards. 
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a broad conceptualisation of the term (Price 1998). Notably, Price uses ‘moral 
persuasion’ alongside references to social pressure, but does not explicitly 
distinguish between the two, precluding any insights into their respective roles and 
effects. For instance, he refers to “persuaded decision makers and social pressure of 
international reputation” as having been the “catalysts for change” in his case study 
but does not clearly distinguish the two processes (Price 1998, p. 617). 
 
Moreover, the description of the norm integration process suggests that different 
arguments, including scientific and not just ethical arguments, were used to promote 
the norm under discussion in the article (the ban of anti-personal landmines) but they 
are not differentiated and we do not learn which argument was most persuasive. For 
example, when discussing an important symposium in the anti-personal landmine 
campaign, Prices states that the participants included, “military strategists, mines 
specialists and manufactures, experts in international humanitarian law and 
disarmament, surgeons and orthopaedists, representatives of demining organizations, 
NGOs, and the media” (Price 1998, p. 618). Whose arguments were most powerful is 
not discussed. In addition, Price describes in some detail the practical arguments 
advanced during the campaign, questioning the military utility of landmines rather 
than their amoral effects:  “…many ban proponents…have sought to take on the 
military establishment of the world by emphasizing the common ground of 
assessments of military utility and necessity” (Price 1998, p. 632). Yet, Price does 
not discuss the effectiveness of these types of arguments versus ethical arguments.  
 
Despite this, Price insists that he is not describing “epistemic communities” who are 
making “authoritative claims of scientific knowledge”. Instead, Price claims that 
their “influence derives …from their ability to successfully engage in policy process 
and engage in moral proselytizing through persuasion” (Price 1998, p. 618). 
However, this assertion is not substantiated and no detailed analysis showing that – 
and if so how – moral persuasion as opposed to practical persuasion or reputational 
concerns was key in these processes is provided. Lastly, when Price summarises the 
norm integration process described in his article, he does not actually seem to refer to 
moral persuasion as such. In fact, he emphasises the role of shaming and, 
subsequently, emulation, both of which are based on practical utility considerations 
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rather than on ethical considerations relating to the value of the norm a such (Price 
1998, p. 640).  
 
To complement the above, let me turn to some specific work on norms in 
international development. Notably, Martha Finnemore’s study of the promotion of 
social development in the World Bank describes the overall process of norm 
introduction, promotion, and (asserted) internalisation. However, the specific 
processes and mechanisms leading to norm integration are not described in much 
detail. Apart from the prominent role assigned to the World Bank President as a 
‘norm entrepreneur’, the chapter merely refers to “a mixture of persuasion and 
coercion” that was used by the Bank to promote the anti-poverty norm (Finnemore 
1996, p. 91).  However, the terms are not defined, or even distinguished, and no 
detailed description on how exactly they worked is provided.  In addition, the 
Chapter suggests that both practical and ethical arguments were used, without 
disentangling the two. For example, Finnemore states that the Bank aimed to 
persuade development experts, “as to the viability and moral necessity of a poverty 
focus” and that, “By helping the poor, rich nations could answer the moral 
imperative and serve their own interests at the same time” (Finnemore 1996, p. 104). 
This ‘broad brush’ with which the norm integration process is described does not 
enable judgement of the extent to which ethical considerations versus other 
considerations resulted in norm uptake. 
 
Last, let me turn to two studies that have developed specific frameworks for studying 
norm integration: Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink Restructuring World Politics 
(Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2001) and Park and Vetterlein Owning Development 
(Park and Vetterlein 2010b). At the outset of their book, Khagram, Riker, and 
Sikkink present a specific framework for studying norm integration, which lists 
different processes through which norms are promoted by transnational advocacy 
networks (TANS). These include information, persuasion, moral pressure, and other 
forms of pressure. However, the framework does not distinguish between these 
micro-processes and the fact that they are driven by different considerations, such as 
reputational, practical, and ethical (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2001, p. 16). 
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A closer look at the case studies presented in the book reveals that the majority of 
cases presented also does not distinguish between different micro-processes. The 
studies frequently refer to dialogue, lobbying, convincing, education, pressure, and 
reputational concerns as part of one and the same process. Notably, Donnelly states 
that “NGO efforts were…limited to the staging of protests at the joint IMF/World 
Bank meeting, visits to congressional offices to elicit support, and popular 
education” and that “Campaigners in some debtor countries, most notably Uganda, 
have engaged in dialogue and lobbying efforts with their own government” 
(Donnelly 2001, p. 162).  
 
Some case studies seem to largely refer to reputational and instrumental pressure 
when they describe the processes at work in their cases, yet this is not acknowledged 
simply because the frameworks do not distinguish between the different micro-
processes. For example Riker states that “INFID placed collective pressure on the 
Suharto government and international donor agencies for public accountability” 
(Riker 2001, p. 187) and Khagram notes that “Motivated by the continued criticism 
internationally, worried about growing evidence from its own monitoring efforts and 
aware of broadening opposition domestically within India, the World Bank sent its 
largest ever resettlement mission to the Narmada Valley in April 1987” (Khagram 
2001, p. 216). Thus, the processes described by Khagram, Rikker, and Sikkink 
include a variety of specific processes some of which are driven by ethical 
considerations, while others, such as those appealing to instrumental reasoning and 
reputation, are not. As these processes are not distinguished, we do not learn if the 
changes in behaviour were due to ethical or other considerations, making also this 
framework inappropriate to answer the research question in this thesis. 
 
Next, let me turn to Park and Vetterlein’s contribution. In their book they develop a 
model of the norm integration process, which they call the ‘norm cycle’. The process 
comprises (1) norm emergence; (2) norm stabilisation; and (3) norm contestation. 
According to the authors, norm emergences involves the use of “argument, 
persuasion, and negotiation” to get organisations to “adopt a much broader approach 
to development” (Park and Vetterlein 2010a, p. 21). However, neither, persuasion, 
nor argument or negotiation are defined and persuasion seems to be used in a variety 
of different ways. At one point, persuasion seems to be perceived as being different 
 47 
from shaming and social pressure, as the authors suggest that, “Norm advocates try 
to persuade and/or shame the IMF and the World Bank to adopt new policy norms” 
(Park and Vetterlein 2010a, p. 21).  Yet, at a different point in the book, persuasion 
seems to be seen as synonymous with social pressure and shaming, as it is seen in 
contrast to ‘social recognition ‘ and ‘stabilisation’: “…the Fund has been persuaded 
to engage with the policy norm on social development, yet internally the norm has 
not been stabilized. It exists formally but…has not be socially recognised by IMF 
staff” (Vetterlein 2010, p. 14). These imprecisions leave the reader unclear about the 
exact meaning of persuasion, and indeed the other norm emergence processes 
(argument and negotiation) in the study. 
 
Moreover, the framework does not explicitly distinguish between different ‘drivers’ 
of persuasion, mixing reputational, practical and ethical considerations. For this 
reason, the case studies presented in the book, although providing detailed process 
tracing and argument analysis and describing a variety of different arguments used 
for norm integration ranging from effectiveness, identity, and scientific to ethical 
arguments, do not provide strong and explicit insights into the extent to which ethical 
considerations – as opposed to other considerations – drive norm integration.  
 
In summary, none of the work reviewed explicitly engages with the role of ethical 
considerations in the norm integration processes outlined. Some processes and 
mechanisms described stress the importance of persuasion, but persuasion is hardly 
ever defined and a closer look at its use suggests that it incorporates a variety of 
different mechanisms, some of which are likely to be driven by ethical 
considerations about the norm in question, such as dialogue, education and moral 
persuasion, while others, such as reputational pressure, threat of denunciation or 
shaming, are not. Most work does not engage in detailed argument analysis, discuss 
the use of ethical argument in norm integration and promotion, or attempt to study 
whether ethical considerations – or others – drove action on the norm. Thus, we do 
not learn if norm integration was driven by ethical considerations of the rightness of 
the norm or if other material or non-material reasons have lead to norm-compliant 
policies and behaviour.  
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The lack of engagement with the various drivers involved in norm integration limits 
the aptness of most constructivist frameworks for my quest. Since the aim of this 
thesis is to understand whether ethical considerations drive norm integration in 
development organisations and whether specific organisational structures make this 
more or less likely, tackling the first part of the question – whether ethical 
considerations matter – requires a theoretical framework that goes beyond the broad 
process of ‘persuasion’ and takes ethical considerations per se seriously. 
 
Thus, let me, lastly, turn to one framework that comes closest to doing so: Neta 
Crawford’s approach in Argument and Change in World Politics (Crawford 2002). 
Her exploration of what causes change in world politics engages in a careful analysis 
of different types of arguments used to justify colonialism and slavery and asserts 
that convincing ethical arguments have lead to changes in ethical beliefs about these 
practices, resulting in the practices becoming de-legitimised and, ultimately, 
changing. Notably, Crawford, in contrast to many mainstream constructivists, insists 
on a distinction between behavioural norms and normative beliefs. According to her, 
“normative beliefs are beliefs about what is right to do” while behavioural norms are 
“typical or model behaviour or the dominant practice in a certain context” (Crawford 
2002, p. 90 and p. 86). In addition Crawford bases her argument analyses on a four-
fold distinction between different kinds of arguments: (1) scientific; (2) practical; (3) 
identity; and (4) ethical. According to her, ethical arguments are arguments on “how 
to act in a particular situation so as to be seen to be doing good, assuming that the 
good has been defined through cultural consensus or meta-argument” (Crawford 
2002, p. 24). These distinctions are a crucial basis for teasing out the importance of 
ethical considerations, in contrast to other kinds of considerations. 
 
In order to conduct her analysis of the extent to which ethical argument has impacted 
on practice in world politics, Crawford suggests a method she calls “informal 
argument analysis of ethical arguments”. This informal argument analysis provides a 
solid framework to identify first, the extent to which ethical arguments were present 
in a certain instance, and second, the extent to which behaviour changed in line with 
normative beliefs promoted through ethical arguments.  
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Although the framework engages in a convincing plausibility test to examine 
whether ideational or material considerations resulted in the observed change in 
behaviour, the framework presents one crucial limitation: it does not shed sufficient 
light on the specific process through which ethical argument is said to work to justify 
conclusions about the importance of ethical considerations per se. In her narrative, 
Crawford asserts that ethical argument impacts on practice through ethical 
persuasion that leads to people changing their minds about the ‘rightness’ of a 
particular issue per se (Crawford 2002, p. 99 and p. 117). However, despite 
seemingly arguing that the mechanism through which ethical argument works is 
ethical persuasion, which, in turn, impacts on behaviour, Crawford’s model does not 
look for evidence of whether ethical persuasion actually takes place. Rather, she 
looks for the presence of ethical argument, on the one hand, and the subsequent 
occurrence of norm-compliant behaviour, on the other. By doing so, Crawford looks 
to the outcome (changed behaviour) as proof that a ‘change of mind’ has taken place, 
while simultaneously claiming that the ‘change of mind’ explains the outcome. As 
Dessler and Owen critique, “Crawford writes that after an argument wins the day, 
behaviour should conform to it; but she supplies no way for us to know that an 
argument “won” without referring the very behaviour it is supposed to explain. Nor 
is it clear why Crawford does not offer stronger tests of whether arguments really do 
change minds” (Dessler and Owen 2005, p. 602). This critique also ties in with 
Payne’s statement that, “looking at state practice is a poor way of evaluating the 
persuasiveness of normative ideas” because “persuasion occurs when actors 
preferences change in response to communicative acts and cannot be revealed merely 
by examining behaviour” (Payne 2001, p. 42). 
 
This limitation is particularly damming in the issue are of development, which is 
saturated with ethical arguments and provides ample examples of instances of 
behaviour aligned with such arguments. 
 
The reason for this limitation in Crawford’s framework might be related to the 
methodological difficulties involved in measuring actual attitude change (Checkel 
and Moravcsik 2001). While fully appreciating this difficulty, this thesis proposes 
that the specific mechanisms through which ethical arguments work can be studied in 
more detail without having to measure ‘changes of mind’ as such. Indeed, the thesis 
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suggests that this can be done by taking seriously the different micro-processes that 
drive persuasion noted above. How exactly this can be done is detailed below. 
 
2.2 A proposal for a an ‘ethical considerations’ analysis framework 
 
The basis for my framework is the proposition that persuasion, even if dominated by 
ethical argument, and in the absence of overt material coercion and other kinds of 
dominating arguments, and even if leading to some form of subsequent norm-
compliant behaviour, can be driven by different distinguishable process drivers, only 
some of which are driven by the ethical desirability of the norm per se, while others 
are not  (see diagram 2 below). 
 
Diagram 2: Possible drivers through which ethical argument can work 
 
 
 
What, then, are these other drivers? As already hinted on, I suggest that dominant 
ethical argument can essentially work through persuasion driven by any of the three 
drivers identified above. First, I propose that ethical arguments, can work through 
reputational concerns, shaming and social pressure, rather than ethical 
considerations. I will refer to this driver as ‘social influence’. Coined by Johnston, 
the term ‘social influence’ refers to “a class of micro-processes that elicit pro-norm 
behaviour through the distribution of social rewards and punishments” (Johnston 
2001, p. 498). Crucially, the rewards and punishments are social. This means that 
“only groups can provide them, and only those groups whose approval an actor 
values will have this influence” (Johnston 2001, p. 498). This concept is similar to 
Schimmelfenning’s concept of “rhetorical action” by “weakly socialised actors” 
(Schimmelfennig 2001, p. 63). According to Schimmelfennig, these are actors who, 
“do not take the standard of legitimacy either for granted or as a moral imperative 
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that directly motivates their goals and behaviours” (Schimmelfennig 2001, p. 63). 
Instead, “They confront the standard of legitimacy as an external institutional 
resource and constraint” (Schimmelfennig 2001, p. 63).  
In short, social influence is driven by reputational considerations such as a desire to 
“maximize status, honour, prestige, and the desire to avoid a loss of status, shaming, 
or humiliation and other social sanctions” (Johnston 2001, p. 500). It involves 
“public conformity without private acceptance” (Johnston 2001, p. 499). Thus, social 
influence is likely to involve ethical argument and might result in some level of norm 
compliant behaviour but is not driven by ethical considerations relating to the norm, 
let alone by considerations about the ethical desirability of the norm per se. 
 
This concept can be seen in contrast to processes that are driven by considerations 
relating to the value of the norm. Yet, even processes that are driven by 
considerations relating to the value of the norm need to be differentiated as they can 
involve two distinct types of considerations both of which involve ethical argument, 
but which differ in one key respects: they differ on how they view the ethical value 
of the norm. The norm can either be seen as intrinsically valuable – as an ethically 
desirable ‘end’ in and of itself – or as an effective means towards another intrinsically 
valuable, pre-defined ‘end.’ In the latter, ethical justifications focus on the pre-
defined end and not on the norm in question, which, instead, is justified using 
practical arguments linked to the norm’s utility to achieve these ends. In other words, 
the norm is not justified on ethical grounds but on instrumental ones and the ethically 
valued ‘ends’ remain unchanged by the norm. This process is similar to persuasion 
simply driven by practical arguments but differs regarding the extent to which it 
involves ethical arguments to justify the ends that the norm is said to achieve. I will 
refer to these two kinds of ethical considerations as ‘intrinsic ethical considerations’ 
and ‘instrumental ethical considerations’ respectively. The three drivers of norm 
integration are summarised in diagram 3. 
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Diagram 3: Possible drivers through which ethical argument can 
work
 
 
Let me illustrate the difference between the three drivers through an example closely 
related to the work discussed above and further examined in this thesis: the 
introduction of the norm on ‘women/gender in development’ (WID/GAD) into an 
organisation that has as its main aim (end) the reduction of poverty. Arguments used 
in this context are likely to be predominantly ethical, whether they relate to the 
overall aim of the organisation (poverty eradication) or the norm itself. Yet, the 
introduction of gender equality can be driven by a number of different mechanisms. 
First, gender equality could be introduced as an issue that has reached a certain level 
of international recognition and is considered something that global development 
organisations should be ‘seen to be doing’. In this case, the organisation is likely to 
take few steps towards norm integration, as it wants to be seen to be doing something 
on the norm in order to avoid social punishment or attract social rewards. Norm 
integration is driven by reputational considerations. In fact, the ethical or practical 
substance of the norm does not matter much – the norm could be anything – what 
matters is the recognition by the organisation that it is expected to look like it is 
integrating that particular norm. Such a process would be an example of ‘social 
influence’.  
 
Second, norm integration could be driven by recognition of the instrumental value of 
gender equality to achieve the already pre-defined aim of poverty eradication. 
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units’ and their active participation in development contributes to economic growth 
and poverty reduction. In this case, the ends of the organisation remain the same 
(poverty eradication) and the norm is merely seen as a means to an already given, yet 
ethically valued, end. In other words, the norm is integrated based on its utility 
perception not its intrinsic value. In this case, norm integration would be driven by 
instrumental ethical considerations. The considerations are still ‘ethical’ as they 
relate to the ethical value of the pre-defined goal of the organisation (poverty 
eradication), but are not based on the intrinsic value of the norm itself.  
 
Third, the process of norm integration could be driven by a recognition of the 
intrinsic value of gender equality itself. In this case, the aim would be to change the 
organisation’s ‘ends’. Gender equality would either become part of the 
organisation’s overall aim or become an integral part of the given ‘end’ of poverty 
reduction. The table below summarises this example. 
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Importantly, the three proposed processes are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they 
are highly interlinked and are likely to feature simultaneously in any process of norm 
integration. Yet I suggest it is very likely that one specific norm integration driver 
dominates norm integration at any given time across an organisation and that it is 
possible to identify which one. Indeed, I propose that analysing these three micro-
processes is methodologically more feasible than aiming to measure ‘changes in 
mindset’ as such, while providing better insights into the extent to which – and what 
kind of – ethical considerations actually matter in norm integration than is currently 
allowed by existing models. How exactly this will be done is described in the next 
Chapter. 
 
 
 Table 1: Drivers of norm integration likely to involve ethical argument 
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Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has argued that the importance of ethical considerations in 
organisations can be assessed without engaging in normative theorising on what 
constitutes ethical aid. Specifically, it was suggested that such an examination can be 
conducted by analysing various drivers – ethical or others – of norm integration 
processes into organisations. Available frameworks on norm integration, however, 
are not apt for this task, as they do not sufficiently distinguish between different 
drivers of norm integration. Thus, the Chapter has proposed a framework for an 
ethical considerations analysis that distinguishes between three different drivers: 
intrinsic ethical considerations, instrumental ethical considerations, and social 
influence. Yet how can these drivers be identified? And, how will this be linked to 
the main explanatory variable of this analysis – organisational characteristics? The 
next Chapter addresses these questions in turn. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis asks whether multilateral organisations are more likely to be driven by 
ethical considerations than their bilateral counterparts. In other words, the thesis 
investigates if specific organisational characteristics, especially those typical of 
multilateral or bilateral aid organisations, influence the extent and nature of ethical 
considerations in norm integration processes in these organisations. To answer this 
question, the previous Chapter has proposed a framework for an ‘ethical 
considerations analysis’. This Chapter outlines in detail how the framework will be 
applied and how the impact of the key explanatory factors – organisational 
characteristics – will be assessed. This is done by, first, specifying the research 
objective of the thesis. Second, the method employed by the thesis – structured and 
focused comparison of heuristic case studies of the integration of a new norm in 
three development organisations – is described and justified as appropriate to meet 
the research objective. Third, the logic of case study selection is presented and it is 
shown that the selection of organisations is based on maximum variance of 
organisational characteristics that are hypothesised in the literature to impact on the 
role of ethical considerations in norm integration in organisations, and is, thus, 
theoretically informed and deductive. The selection of the norm is guided by the aim 
to reduce the plausibility of alternative explanations. Fourth, the Chapter outlines in 
detail how the three norm integration drivers will be identified. A number of proxy 
indicators are presented and it is described how data will be collected and analysed. 
Last, some overall limitations of the methodological choices are noted and set 
against the benefits offered by the same. 
 
3.1 Research objective – theory development  
 
As stated above, the aim of this thesis is to engage with the assertion that multilateral 
aid organisations are more likely to be driven by ethical considerations than their 
bilateral counterparts. The previous Chapters have established that, despite the 
widespread nature of the asserted ‘ethicality’ of MDOs, it has not been well specified 
in the literature. Thus, the aim of this thesis is not to test this ‘theory’ as, I submit, its 
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underspecified nature does not allow for meaningful testing. Rather, the thesis aims 
to further develop a theory around the potential impact of organisational 
characteristics, especially those typical of multilateral and bilateral aid organisations, 
on the nature and extent of ethical considerations in norm integration into 
international development organisations. 
 
3.2 Method – structured and focused comparison of heuristic case studies 
 
Introduction to the method 
 
The method employed by this thesis is a structured and focused comparison of 
heuristic case studies (George and Bennett 2005, p. 73). Harry Eckstein describes the 
heuristic case study method as follows, 
 
One studies a case in order to arrive at a preliminary theoretical 
construct. That construct, based on a single case, is unlikely to 
constitute more than a slim clue to a valid general model. One 
therefore confronts it with another case that may suggest ways of 
amending and improving the construct to achieve better case 
interpretation; and this process is continued until the construct 
seems sufficiently refined to require no further major amendments 
or at least to warrant testing by large-scale comparative study. 
(Eckstein 2000, p. 146) 
 
Justification of the method 
 
The technique of heuristic case studies was chosen as it is considered particularly 
appropriate for theory development because it allows the research to  “inductively 
identify new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms and causal paths” (George 
and Bennett 2005, p. 146). The method is based on the insight that “theories do not 
come from a vacuum, or fully and directly from data. In the final analysis they come 
from the theorist’s imagination, logical ability to discern general problems and 
patterns in particular observations” (Eckstein 2000, p. 146).  Heuristic case studies 
are seen as particularly conducive to empirically informed, yet imaginative and 
inclusive, theory development because they “do not commit the researcher to a 
highly limited set of variables, and thus increase the probability that critical variables 
and relations will be found” (Eckstein 2000, p. 146). 
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Requirements of the method 
 
George and Bennett and Harry Eckstein outline a number of specific requirements of 
this method. The method requires a research design that includes (1) the clear 
definition of a research objective; (2) the specification of variables; (3) careful case 
selection; (4) a description of variance in variables; and (5) the formulation of data 
requirements (George and Bennett 2005, pp. 73 - 86). Point (1) and (2), the definition 
of the research objective and the specification of variables, have already been 
addressed; point (3) is addressed in section 2.2.3; and point (4) and (5) are dealt with 
in section 2.3 below. Let me begin with point (3), the selection of case studies. 
 
Logic of case study selection 
 
Since the aim of this thesis is to further develop an existing – yet underspecified – 
theory on the impact of organisational structure on the importance and nature of 
ethical considerations in norm integration into international development 
organisations, the selection of case studies requires (1) the selection of a norm; (2) 
the selection of appropriate organisations.  
 
The logic of case study selection is of critical importance, especially in the context of 
the specific method of comparative heuristic case studies that is mostly inductive. 
The selection of case studies should aim to delineate this inductive approach. Harry 
Eckstein notably states that “the brief for heuristic case study is strong only to the 
extent that cases especially instructive for theory, and subject to rigorous inquiry, can 
be identified” (Eckstein 2000, p. 139). For this reason the thesis employs an 
inductive approach that is informed – but not determined – by available theory and 
hypothesis. Specifically, the thesis engages in theory-driven deduction in order to 
select appropriate case studies and subsequently conducts what George and Bennett 
call, “analytical, theory-driven induction” to carry out heuristic case studies in order 
to assess if, and if so which, organisational characteristics may influence the nature 
and extent of ethical considerations in norm integration (George and Bennett 2005, p. 
240). This, it is hoped, will allow for the inclusion of as many potentially relevant 
variables as possible.  
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i. Selection the norm 
 
The criteria: The selection of the norm is guided by the criteria that the cases should 
indeed be “instructive for theory development.”  Specifically, the aim of this thesis is 
not to show that ethical considerations matter to a large extent in most cases. On the 
contrary, the goal is much more modest, aiming to carefully analyse if, and if so, 
what kind of, ethical considerations matter more than other considerations in some 
cases and whether or not this is influenced by organisational characteristics. Thus, 
the choice of the norm is first guided by the aim of choosing a ‘most likely scenario’ 
for ethical considerations to matter and for the processes outlined in the theoretical 
framework to be empirically identifiable. In other words, the norm should have been 
promoted in ways sufficiently aligned with the different norm integration drivers 
identified in the theoretical framework (e.g. based on its instrumental value, its 
intrinsic value, and be well enough recognised to allow for social influence 
considerations to have played a role). 
 
Second, the choice of the norm aims to limit the plausibility of alternative 
explanations to explain the variance in norm integration processes, such as material 
interest explanations or lack of know-how of how to integrate the norm for most 
development organisations, which would limit and bias the selection of organisations 
that can be studied in this thesis. Thus, the norm needed to be widely and 
internationally recognised, offer low-cost implementation options and a multitude of 
guidance on how to operationalise it in development organisations must be available. 
 
The norm selected: The norm selected for analysis in this thesis is the ‘Women in 
Development/Gender in Development’ (WID/GAD) norm. WID/GAD is a suitable 
norm as it meets all these criteria. First, as outlined in Chapter Four, the promotion of 
WID/GAD has always been closely entangled with ethical arguments. However, the 
norm has also been promoted using other types of considerations, including 
instrumental and reputational ones. Thus, the norm provides a ‘most-likely’ case for 
ethical consideration to matter without being deterministic and, therefore, 
meaningless. Thus, as shown in Chapter Four, the different frames used for its 
promotion align well with the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two, 
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making it likely that the analysis will produce relevant findings that will indeed be 
‘instructive for theory development’. 
 
Second, a focus on the WID/GAD norm limits material interest explanations for 
action or inaction on the norm, helping to narrow the focus on ideational ‘levers’ (see 
Chapter Two, section 2.1 on levers). Importantly, organisations have not been 
threatened with material punishment or enticed with material rewards if they do or 
do not take action on WID/GAD. Although some donors have attached some 
conditionalities relating to the norm to their funding for certain organisations, this 
has been very limited, mostly used to directly fund work on WID/GAD, and has, 
therefore, not been employed to exert significant overt pressure on the organisation 
to take or avoid action on the norm.7 Indeed, no donor has to date attached strong 
conditions on WID/GAD to their general funding for development (Khan 2009; 
Dubel 2007). Moreover, WID/AD is relatively inexpensive, especially as measured 
by this thesis, which strongly focuses on examining low-cost measures such as the 
extent to which the norm has been integrated into policies and operational tools (see 
indicators in Chapter Three). This considerably weakens the plausibility of 
arguments claiming that lack of financial resources explains limited norm uptake. 
 
Third, as Chapter Four shows in detail, WID/GAD emerged in the 1970s and reached 
the status of being an internationally recognised global norm by the late 1970s/early 
1980s and most development organisations had taken some kind of action on the 
norm by then OECD 1988). This allows for a broad choice of organisations that can 
be studied, reducing selection bias. 
 
Last, the high-level recognition and momentum around WID/GAD also meant that, 
since the 1970s, numerous tools for norm integration have been developed and are 
widely available, weakening the plausibility of an alternative explanation relating to 
a lack of ‘know-how’ (Miller and Razavi 1995, p. 14). 
 
  
                                                
7 See for example NORAD’s and SIDA’s funding of WID/GAD training and WID/GAD officials in 
EC development cooperation. 
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What about gender-bias? Despite all the above, choosing WID/GAD adds a layer of 
complexity to this analysis, as the issue of gender equality is complex, disputed, and 
in many ways highly personal. Notably, a large volume of literature exists on the role 
of ‘gender bias’ in development cooperation in general, and various types of 
organisations, including development organisations and large bureaucracies, 
specifically (Goetz 1992, 1994; Cornwall, Harrison, and Whitehead 2007). It is not 
the aim of this thesis to downplay the importance of this work and the crucial 
insights drawn from these perspectives. Indeed, the thesis pays particular attention to 
evidence of gender-bias and, rather than undermine this work, aims to contribute to it 
as much as possible. However, in order to ensure that these specific characteristics of 
the norm do not bias the findings of this thesis, one criteria for the choice of 
organisations is that they are all large bureaucracies with mandates and cultures 
similarly aligned with WID/GAD, as will be shown below. Thus, the case study 
analysis will pay particular attention to the role of gender-bias as an important factor, 
while at the same time doing its utmost to ensure that this factor does not bias the 
findings of the thesis relating to organisational characteristics. 
 
ii. Selection of the organisations  
 
The criteria: To counter-balance the inductive approach of heuristic case studies, the 
selection of organisations follows a theory-driven and deductive logic based on the 
various organisational characteristics hypothesised by the literature that might matter 
in this context. This, it is hoped, provides an adequate balance to the inductive and 
open heuristic case study method employed to study the selected cases. The guiding 
criterion for selecting the organisations to be studied is maximum variance on 
organisational characteristics that might influence the extent to which ethical 
considerations matter as hypothesised in the literature.  
 
The section below briefly re-visits and summarises the key factors that the literature 
suggests influence the importance of ethical considerations in international 
organisations, as outlined in Chapter One of this thesis. The aim is to provide a solid 
and theoretically informed basis for case study selection. 
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Existing theories on organisational characteristics and ethical considerations 
from development studies: As outlined in the introduction, much literature drawn 
from development studies and political economy suggests that the simple fact that 
multilateral organisations are composed of more than one state makes them more 
likely to provide a facilitating environment for ethical considerations to matter 
(Hattori 2001; Dengbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 1999; Milner 2006). In 
addition some scholars mention the composition of the decision-making body, 
especially whether it is composed of developing and developed countries or not, as 
important, although opinions differ whether multi-membership and cultural diversity 
hinder or facilitate ethical considerations to matter (McNeill and St. Clair 2009; 
Riddell 2007). Last, some of the literature suggests that multilateral development 
agencies are more ‘ethical’ or at least have the potential of being so because their 
mandates focus on promoting the common good and poverty reduction (McNeill and 
St. Clair 2009, p. 29). 
 
Thus, literature drawn from development studies and political economy suggests that 
the characteristics summarised in table 2 might influence the extent to which ethical 
considerations drive organisations.  
 
Table 2: Organisational characteristics suggested by development studies and political economy 
literature to influence the importance of ethical considerations 
 
 
 
Existing theories on organisational characteristics and ethical considerations from 
IR: To further complement and refine some of these characteristics, let me re-visit 
and expand on some of the constructivist arguments on organisational characteristics 
that facilitate norm integration outlined in Chapter One. First, some scholars such as 
Leon and True and Mintrom claim that multilateral organisations’ outreach and 
expertise make them apt for moral norm integration (True and Mintrom 2001). This, 
especially the point on outreach, is similar to Pollack and Hafner-Burton’s emphasis 
on the importance of open opportunity structures (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000). 
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Others, such as Risse have suggested that international institutions are most apt to 
facilitate policy deliberation if they are “non-hierarchical and network-like 
international institutions characterized by a high density of mostly informal 
interactions should provide the structural conditions in international relations to 
allow for discursive and argumentative processes” (Risse 2000, p. 15). In addition, 
Finnemore and others stress the proximity of the organisation’s mandate to the norm, 
its financial autonomy, measured through the organisation’s funding sources, its 
level of earmarking and the length of its funding cycles, as well as the professional 
profile of staff and their level of expertise.  
 
Before summarising the hypothesised characteristics, I would like to supplement the 
already outlined characteristics with some suggested Barnett and Finnemore in their 
book Rules for the World (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Notably, they mention a 
number of structural characteristics that influence an organisations’ behaviour such 
as particular voting systems, including voting rights and voting mechanisms, and 
NGO representation (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 46 and p. 167). Barnett and 
Finnemore also emphasise a final characteristic as being of critical importance: an 
organisation’s source of authority. They identify three sources (1) delegated; (2) 
expertise; and (3) moral.  ‘Delegated authority’ is derived from the perception that 
international organisations “represent the collective will of their members, who 
themselves have the authority to delegate tasks to IOs” (Barnett and Finnemore 
2004, p. 22). ‘Expert authority’ is derived from technical expertise in a specific 
subject matter and ‘moral authority’ is based on the understanding that IOs “embody, 
serve, or protect widely shared set of principle and defend those principles against 
“self-serving claims of states” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 23).  
 
Summary: Thus, in summary, the literature suggests that the following organisational 
characteristics might influence the extent to which ethical considerations drive 
development policy-making and implementation: 
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Table 3: Organisational characteristics suggested by constructivist literature to influence the importance of 
ethical considerations 
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To analyse whether any of these characteristics directly or indirectly impact on the 
extent and nature of ethical considerations in norm integration into organisations, the 
organisations for study in this thesis are selected based on maximum variance on 
these characteristics, as described in detail in Chapter Four. The selected 
organisations are: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the 
European Community/European Union (EC/EU), and the Overseas Development 
Administration/Department for International Development (ODA/DFID). 
 
Period of analysis 
 
The period of analysis covers the first two key moments in WID/GAD introduction 
in all three organisations: the first high-level recognition of the norm (first key 
moment) and the adoption of the first comprehensive WID/GAD policy or strategy 
(second key moment), as well as the three years following each key moment. The 
key moments took place in 1975, 1982, and 1986; and in 1986, 1995, and 1988 in 
UNDP, the EU/EC and ODA/DFID respectively. In order to allow for the further 
analysis of one tentative finding from the cases studies, the period is extended in the 
case of ODA/DFID until 2000. 
 
Level and unit of analysis 
 
The level and main units of analysis in this thesis are organisations, not individuals. 
In other words, the thesis does not systematically investigate what considerations 
motivated specific individuals in various organisations to act or not act on the norm 
in specific ways. The reasons for this are twofold. First, measuring individuals’ 
motivations is methodologically very complex, especially if one aims to understand 
the reasons why individuals are motivated by specific considerations (Checkel 2005). 
Second, a focus on individual motivations is not, in fact, necessary or even most 
appropriate for the quest in this thesis, which aims to analyse dominant norm drivers 
at a broader, organisational, level. While less deep than a measure of individual 
persuasion, this approach provides a broader, less subjective, and relatively more 
consistent measure of the nature and extent of ethical considerations in norm 
integration processes across the organisation.  
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Having said that, while individual motivations are not systematically assessed, the 
role of committed individuals whose commitment is tentatively established through 
anecdotal evidence and analysis of their behaviour, and interview data, is indeed 
considered throughout the analysis. 
 
The analysis step by step 
 
The analysis conducted in this thesis followed Harry Eckstein’s interpretation of the 
heuristic case study method as quoted above. Specifically, the following concrete 
steps were undertaken: 
• First, a chronology of the integration of the new norm in the selected 
organisations, which is understood to encompass both the inclusion of the 
norm into (1) policies and strategies as well as (2) operational procedures and 
budgets, was established through a period of “soaking and poking” (George 
and Bennett 2005, p. 92). The outcome of this process is summarised in 
Annexes One to Three. Attention is paid to whether the different kinds of 
norm integration processes proposed in the theoretical framework were 
identifiable and whether they could be tentatively linked to specific 
organisational characteristics.  
• Second, the first and second key-moment of norm integration, the first high-
level recognition of the norm and the first comprehensive policy or strategy 
on the norm, were identified and their specific timing and the process leading 
up to them as well as norm operationalisation in the subsequent three years 
were examined in order to establish (1) the dominant norm integration driver 
and (2) assess the impact of organisational characteristics on which norm 
integration driver dominated. The dominant norm integration driver was 
identified by assessing proxy indicators (see section 3.1 below) relating to the 
following criteria: 
o Language used in official documents (policies, strategies, etc) 
o Number and status of human resources allocated to the norm; 
o Training courses (frequency, status, and substance) on the norm; 
o Staff incentives regarding the norm; 
o Programming tools on the norm & integration of the norm in 
mainstreaming programming tools; 
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o Financial resources allocated to promoting the norm (if measured at 
all); 
o Performance on the norm as judged by external evaluations. 
• Third, a number of findings on the impact of organisational characteristics on 
the importance of ethical considerations were drawn from the above and 
further examined with additional empirical evidence gathered from the case 
studies. 
• Fourth, possible alternative explanations were considered and the 
generalisability of the findings was assessed by expanding the analysis to 
other organisations as well as to one other norm 
• Fifth, the implications of the findings were considered and avenues for future 
research identified. 
 
3.3 Data collection 
 
After having outlined what this thesis analyses, this section describes in more detail 
how the necessary data for the analysis was collected. 
 
Challenge of observability & proxy indicators 
 
Before outlining the process of data collection, it is necessary to discuss one 
challenge in social science research in general, and in research dealing with abstract 
issues such as ‘ethics’, in particular: the issue of ‘observability’. This is highly 
controversial, dividing methodological approaches to IR (King, Keohane, and Verba 
1994, p. 109; Jackson 2011). Indeed, some scholars strongly advice that  “we should 
choose observable, rather than unobservable concepts wherever possible. Abstract, 
unobserved concepts …can play a useful role in theory formulation; but they can be 
a hindrance to empirical evaluation of theories and hypothesis” (King, Keohane, and 
Verba 1994). 
 
I concede that the three different norm integration drivers identified in the theoretical 
framework, which constitute the key dependent variables in this thesis, are not 
directly observable. However, I submit that they are detectable through (1) the 
examination of proxy indicators relating to two observables: arguments (e.g. policies 
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and strategies) and institutional behaviour (e.g. operationalisation) and (2) by 
engaging in careful analysis of the processes leading up to decisions on key policies 
and steps towards operationalisation.  
 
Broadly speaking, norm integration driven by ethical considerations is expected to 
manifest itself through (1) coherent and comprehensive policies and strategies that 
conceptually engage with the norm and (2) comprehensive norm operationalisation. 
Intrinsic and instrumental ethical considerations are distinguished by the nature of 
ethical arguments and reasoning involved in norm integration in organisations. 
Annex Four specifies a number of detailed proxy indicators for the detection of the 
three norm integration drivers. Admittedly, such an analysis does not allow me to 
‘prove’ that a certain driver dominated but, nevertheless, provides a solid and 
plausible indication of which considerations dominated the norm integration process 
in the organisation. 
  
Data collection and data analysis method 
 
Data collection was based on three sources: first, publicly available documents 
(policies, strategies, budgets, meeting records, training manuals) including archival 
searches and external sources (NGO reports, etc); second, internal documents 
accessed through personal contacts with staff in the respective organisations; and 
third, interviews with key actors. 
 
Interviewees were selected based on two different processes. First, a number of key 
actors were purposefully selected due to their position and role in the respective 
organisation and, using the snowball method, other key actors were identified. 
Second, additional interviewees were randomly selected by sending requests for 
interviewees to the organisations’ alumni groups. Efforts were made to interview 
representatives from as many different parts of the organisation and thematic fields 
as possible. In total 36 interviews were conducted for the thesis. 
 
Interviews were semi-structured following a similar structure across all interviews, to 
the extent appropriate, which is attached in Annex Five. Document analysis was 
conducted using the same proxy indicators as outlined above. All the above, it is 
 69 
hoped, makes the method applied sufficiently “reliable, transparent, and replicable” 
(King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, p. 26). 
 
3.4 Methodological limitations  
 
After presenting the overall methodology, describing the specific methods and 
outlining the logic of case selection, this Chapter highlights a number of issues that 
this thesis does not aim to tackle, outlines some general limitations of the 
methodological choices made in this thesis, and describes how their negative impact 
will be mitigated. 
 
What this thesis does not attempt 
 
First, as noted in the introduction, this thesis does not engage in a debate on the 
foundations of ethics or on the complex relationship between ethics and self-interest. 
Instead, the thesis employs a common-sense usage definition of ethics as proposed 
by Hutchings as referring to “codes of behaviour or sets of values that set out what is 
right or wrong to do within a particular context” (Hutchings 2010, p. 8) and follows 
Wendt in distinguishing ethics from self-interest (Wendt 1995, p. 52). Based on this, 
the thesis proposes a framework for an ‘ethical considerations analysis’ that allows 
for an examination of the importance and nature of ethical considerations without 
requiring a substantive definition of ethical aid. 
 
Second, the analysis does not aim to measure whether persuasion has, in fact, taken 
place. It merely aims to examine what considerations drove processes of norm 
integration in organisations and why. This means, as already recognised above, that 
the proposed framework does not entirely overcome the shortcomings of Crawford’s 
work as measuring levels of persuasion presents serious methodological challenges 
that, if at all, cannot be overcome in a research project of a limited time span, such as 
this one (Checkel 2005). However, the framework still offers a deeper analysis of the 
processes of norm integration and, specifically, a focused analysis of what kind of 
considerations drove these processes, thereby providing better insights into the extent 
to which ethical considerations actually matter than is currently allowed by existing 
models. 
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Third, as stated above, the level of analysis is not set at an individual level but rather 
at organisational-level. Fourth, the analysis is not an attempt to establish a causal link 
between arguments and behaviour. The examination of norm operationalisation is 
merely used as an aid to help the identification of the different drivers of norm 
integration, as it provides a better indication of the importance of ethical 
considerations than argument analysis alone.  
 
General limitation of case studies 
 
i. Selection bias  
 
Case studies present a number of methodological limitations. Most notably, case 
study research is said to be “particularly prone to versions of ‘selection bias’” 
(George and Bennett 2005, p. 28). To avoid selection bias, it is generally 
recommended to choose cases based on the independent variable, which in my case 
is ‘organisational characteristics’. As the organisations have been selected based on 
criterion of maximum variance on this independent variable, it is hoped that the 
thesis avoids such bias. In addition, the concluding Chapter of this thesis tentatively 
applies the findings of the case studies to a number of other organisations, thereby 
further limiting the risk of selection bias regarding the choice of the organisations 
contaminating my findings. 
 
Regarding the choice of the norm, it has been explicitly noted above that the aim is 
to choose a most-likely case in which ethical considerations might matter. Thus, had 
a different norm been chosen, the findings might be different. This limitation impacts 
on the applicability of the theory generated and is noted in the section on 
‘applicability’ below. However, the impact of this limitation is to some extent 
mitigated as the concluding Chapter of this thesis also tentatively applies the findings 
of the case studies to another norm. 
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ii. Representativeness 
 
In addition to the risk of selection bias, case studies concentrate on a very limited 
number of specific cases and therefore lack ‘representativeness’ of a broader 
‘population’ (George and Bennett 2005, p. 30). This, in turn, limits the applicability 
or generalisability of findings. Moreover, the in-depth nature of case studies and the 
resulting level of causal complexity often result in case studies attaining less 
theoretical parsimony than other types of research. The in-depth nature of case 
studies, however, also brings with it a number of advantages that might outweigh the 
necessary trade-offs. Notably George and Bennett state that while case studies may 
have “less explanatory power across other types of cases”, they exhibit “greater 
explanatory richness within a type of case” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 31). They 
conclude that, “case study researchers generally sacrifice the parsimony and broad 
applicability of their theories to develop cumulatively contingent generalizations that 
apply to well-defined types or subtypes of cases with a high degree of explanatory 
richness” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 31). This focus on context-specific causal 
complexes may not lead to generalisable findings, but hopes to uncover causal 
processes that other approaches might not detect. Moreover, the negative effects of 
limited ‘representativeness’ are mitigated by the expansion of the findings to 
additional organisations and another norm in Chapter Nine. 
 
Bounds of applicability of theory 
 
Since the subject matter of the thesis - ‘ethical considerations’ - is a highly abstract 
concept, there is a need to rely on proxy indicators to study it. As outlined above, the 
thesis aims to study the extent to which ‘ethical considerations’ matter by applying a 
framework for an ‘ethical considerations analysis’ developed in Chapter Two to the 
introduction of a norm into three organisations with different organisational 
characteristics.  The norm chosen is WID/GAD. Thus, strictly speaking, the findings 
of this thesis only comprehensively apply to the introduction of this particular norm 
in the three organisations during the period under analysis. However, a strong focus 
on alternative explanations that particularly looks at explanations relating to the 
specific nature of the norm, as well as the tentative expansion of the findings to other 
organisations and another norm may allow for a contingent extension of the 
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applicability of the theory (George and Bennett 2005, p. 30). Having said that, the 
overall aim of this thesis is to uncover rich, context-specific causal complexes, which 
comes at the necessary expense of reduced generalisability. 
 
The challenge of indeterminacy 
 
Especially in statistical methods, research designs are required to exhibit positive 
degrees of freedom. Some authors apply the same standards to qualitative work 
(King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, p. 171). However, others, such as George and 
Bennett vehemently disagree with this standard. They state that, especially for the 
case study researcher, “the exclusion of potentially relevant variables can be a 
greater threat to valid inferences than the inclusion of additional variables that may 
or may not be spurious” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 247). In the case of George 
and Bennett, researchers are advised to let the “number of independent observations, 
not the number of cases set the upper limit on the number of independent variables 
that can be tested”, and, therefore, to “start with a broad range of variables that are 
potentially relevant to the phenomenon under study” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 
247). The research design for this thesis follows George and Bennett’s view and 
commences with a broad set of possible explanatory variables (i.e. different 
organisational characteristics that might matter).  
 
The challenges of unit heterogeneity and equifinality 
 
The case studies in this thesis are complex and span over a considerable period of 
time. The organisations chosen are different in many respects, thus exhibiting a 
relatively low level of unit homogeneity. Although criticised by some as posing a 
methodological weakness, many scholars agree that a certain level of unit 
heterogeneity is unavoidable in social science and, thus, must be tolerated (King, 
Keohane, and Verba 1994). However, research should attempt to be as explicit about 
the level of unit hetero/homogeneity as possible. This thesis will take due account of 
the similarities and differences of the case studies by providing an in-depth 
contextualisation of each – a luxury which only a limited number of cases allows for. 
Moreover, a certain level of homogeneity is hoped to be achieved by choosing 
examples for in-depth study from similar time periods across all cases. 
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The complexity of the research question and the organisations under study makes a 
certain degree of equifinality very likely. In fact, it is highly possible that rather than 
one organisational characteristic, a number of characteristics interplay to produced a 
certain effect (dominant norm integration process). This possibility will be kept in 
mind with particular attention to causal priority of the various factors.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has described how this thesis attempts to achieve its aim of developing 
a more specified theory on whether and, if so, which, organisational characteristics 
influence the nature and extent of ethical considerations in norm integration in 
development aid organisations. First, the specific method applied was outlined and 
justified and, second, a number of limitations associated with the study of abstract 
concepts such as ‘ethical considerations ‘ and the application of the case study 
method, were noted. Steps taken to limit certain potential shortcoming such as 
selection bias and the challenge of observability were outlined while other 
limitations, such as the limited applicability of findings, were acknowledged but set 
against advantages brought about by in-depth case studies, such as a high degree of 
explanatory richness. 
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Chapter 4: Introduction to the case studies 
 
Introduction 
 
The preceding Chapter has described how the thesis will engage with the research 
question. It has outlined the method of heuristic, comparative case studies of the 
introduction of a ‘new’ norm into development aid organisations and has described 
the logic of case study selection. Further, the Chapter has briefly described the 
selected norm – WID/GAD – and listed the selected organisations: UNDP, the 
EC/EU, and ODA/DFID. However, the suitability of the selected cases for the 
purpose of the thesis has not yet been established. The present Chapter turns to this 
by introducing both, the organisations, as well as the norm, in detail. This provides 
the necessary context for the case study analysis that follows in Chapters Five to 
Seven and substantiates the claim that the case study selection is, indeed, suitable for 
the purpose of this thesis. 
 
4.1 The norm 
 
This section substantiates the claims made in the previous Chapter that the norm is 
appropriate for this thesis because it is likely to lead to findings instructive for theory 
development, which is the overall research aim. This is done by sketching out the 
origins and global developments of the norm in order to show first, that the norm was 
indeed a global norm during the period of analysis. Second, this section illustrates 
that the norm has been promoted using different rationales or ‘frames’ over the years 
and third, shows that this makes the norm particularly well aligned to the theoretical 
framework established by this thesis.  
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Origins of the Women in Development (WID) norm and its international 
recognition 
 
The norm on Women in Development (WID) has its origins in the international 
recognition of the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of sex, first formally 
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Prominently placed in article 1, the 
Charter declares that the purpose of the UN is, amongst others, to, 
 
…achieve international co-operation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian 
character…for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion. (United Nations 1945, article 1) 
 
The first international institution set-up to deal with women-specific issues was the 
UN Commission on the Status of Women, set-up in 1946. In 1967 the UN 
Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women was adopted, 
framing discrimination against women as “fundamentally unjust” in an of itself, but 
also viewing the issue as essential to the “welfare of the family and of society” 
(United Nations 1967, preamble and article 1). This Declaration is also the first 
formal document that explicitly refers to the role of women in development. 
Specifically, it presents women’s participation in development as an important 
means to achieve development, as it states that, “…the full and complete 
development of a country, the welfare of the world and the cause of peace require the 
maximum participation of women as well as men in all fields” (United Nations 1967, 
preamble). Following this Declaration, the International Development Strategy for 
the Second United Nations Development Decade, adopted in 1970, includes amongst 
its objectives the encouragement of the “full integration of women in the total 
development effort” (United Nations 1970a, para. 18(h)). 
 
In 1972 the UN proclaimed 1975 as ‘International Women’s Year’ (Tinker and 
Jaquette 1987, p. 419). This was done in a General Assembly Resolution, which 
stressed, above all, women’s roles and responsibilities in development, rather than 
their right to equality and non-discrimination (United Nations 1972, article 2(b)). 
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The next key development in the emergence of the norm was the first formal legal 
recognition of WID in the US Foreign Assistance Act through the Percy 
Amendment. The Amendment stated that “Assistance granted by the United States 
was required to help integrate women into the national economies of foreign 
countries, thus improving their status and assisting the total development effort” 
(Miller and Razavi 1995, p. 3). Although the Percy Amendment did not directly 
influence development at the international level, it certainly further elevated the 
status of WID (Jaquette and Summerifled 2006, p. 37). 
 
The ‘International Women’s Year’ was marked by the First World Conference on 
Women, held in Mexico in the summer of 1975. The conference had three key 
objectives identified by the UN General Assembly one of which was the “full 
integration and full participation of women in development” (United Nations 1975a). 
The Conference resulted in the adoption of the 1975 Declaration of Mexico on the 
Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace. In line with 
previous international statements, the Declaration stressed the importance of 
women’s participation in order to achieve development and peace. However, the 
Declaration also strongly emphasised the values of equality and justice and 
distinguishes itself in two important aspects from previous statements. First, it 
presents women’s participation as a means to development – but also views 
development as a fundamental pre-condition for women’s rights. Notably, the 
Declaration states “The attainment of economic and social goals” is “basic to the 
realization of the rights of women…” This is even more strongly re-iterated in the 
World Plan of Action resulting from the conference, which states that 
“…development should be seen not only as a desirable goal in itself but also as the 
most important means of furthering equality of the sexes…” (United Nations 1975a, 
para. 21) It was also further re-iterated in the UN General Assembly Resolution on 
the World Conference on the United Nations Decade for Women adopted in 1980, 
which recognises in its preamble, “the need for the integration of women into the 
development process so that the equality of men and women may be reaffirmed and 
their situation improved” (United Nations 1980, preamble). 
 
Second, and most importantly, the Declaration states that women’s participation is an 
intrinsic part of development: “Full participation of women in the various economic, 
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social, political, and cultural sectors is an important indication of the dynamic 
progress of peoples and their development (emphasis added)” and points towards a 
broader conception of development when it states that “The ultimate end of 
development is to achieve a better quality of life for all, which means not only the 
development of economic and other material resources but also the physical, moral 
and cultural growth of the human person” (United Nations 1980, Para. 16). 
 
The overall momentum created in the 1970s was followed by the Second and the 
Third World Conference on Women held in 1980 in Copenhagen, and 1985 in 
Nairobi, respectively. By the late 1980s most development donors had included WID 
into their mandates and created offices specifically dedicated to the promotion of 
women in development (OECD 1988).  
 
The uptake of WID in policies and – to some extent – in organisational structures 
does by no means mean that the norm influenced actual development practice, a 
point that will be touched upon below and tackled in detail in Chapters Five to 
Seven. In fact, even at the time of writing, many commentators point to the 
‘implementation gap’ between gender equality policies and institutions on the one 
hand, and budgets, projects, and monitoring and evaluation frameworks on the other 
that still exists today. However, this brief overview does suggest that by the mid-
1980s, the norm of WID/GAD had been formally recognised in global aid discourse. 
Thus, it seems justified to classify it as an internationally recognised norm. 
 
The different frames: From WID to GAD and from equality to efficiency 
 
Although originally framed as Women in Development (WID), the norm changed in 
name and, partly, in substance in the 1980s and 90s resulting in the emergence of the 
Gender and Development (GAD) norm. As hinted at above, the rationales and 
justifications used for its promotion have been varied and manifold since its first 
appearance on the international stage (Moser 1993, p. 55). This section turns to this 
issue and highlights some implications of these changes in rationales, justifications, 
and concepts for the thesis. 
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One of the most frequently referred to classifications of different approaches to 
WID/GAD was developed by Moser (Moser 1993; Interview with Colombo). Moser 
suggests a five-fold distinction between the (1) welfare approach; (2) the equity 
approach; (3) the efficiency approach; (4) the anti-poverty approach; and the (5) 
empowerment approach. Although Moser’s account is roughly chronologically 
organised, it is critical to note that, also as shown by this thesis, the different 
classifications continued to exist simultaneously throughout the research period with 
only slight tendencies towards one or the other. 
 
According to Moser, the first overall approach to WID/GAD was the welfare 
approach. The approach is based on three assumptions, 
  
First, that women are passive recipients of development, rather than 
participants in the development process. Secondly, that motherhood 
is the most important role for women in society. Thirdly, that child-
rearing is the most effective role for women in all aspects of 
economic development. (Moser 1993, p. 61) 
 
This approach was – and still is at the time of writing – popular with many donors 
mainly because it is, as Moser suggests, “politically safe, not questioning or 
changing the traditionally accepted role of women within the gender division of 
labour” (Moser 1993, p. 61). However, as much as it may be popular, it is also 
limited in its effectiveness as it does not view equality as its aim, presents women 
almost exclusively in their reproductive roles and, thus, reinforces gender stereotypes 
that may be detrimental to gender equality. 
 
Largely in reaction to critiques of the welfare approach, additional approaches to 
WID/GAD emerged. As suggested by the document overview above, and also 
suggested by Moser, the first such approach was the equity approach. Moser notably 
states that, “Equity is the original WID approach, introduced within the 1976-85 UN 
Women’s Decade. Its purpose is to gain equity for women in the development 
process. Women are seen as active participants in development…It challenges 
women’s subordinate position” (Moser 1993, p. 63). In addition, this approach, while 
acknowledging women’s important role in development, also views development as 
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a means to achieve gender equality and views gender equality as an integral 
component of development.  
 
In direct opposition to the welfare approach, the equity approach aims to transform 
power relations and sees, as the name suggests, equity between the sexes as the 
ultimate goal. However, the approach was criticized by developing countries for 
promoting a Western view of feminism that does not apply to non-western societies 
and was, according to Moser, not very popular with donors due to its political and 
controversial nature (Moser 1993, p. 27). She states that, “Politically, the majority of 
development agencies were hostile to equity programmes precisely because of their 
intentions to meet not only practical gender needs but also strategic gender needs, 
whose very success depended on an implicit redistribution of power” and that “From 
the perspective of the aid agencies, equity programmes necessitated unacceptable 
interferences with the country’s traditions” (Moser 1993, p. 65).  
 
Again, in reaction to this politically charged approach, as well as the welfare 
approach, the anti-poverty and the efficiency approach emerged. The anti-poverty 
approach stresses the importance of women’s productive roles in the economic 
development of the countries (Moser 1993, p. 67). Based on ground-breaking work 
by Boserup on women’s economic role in development, shifting the aim from equity 
to WID/GAD as an important means to poverty reduction (Miller and Razavi 1995, 
p. 3). This is very similar to the efficiency approach, which states that “development 
is more efficient and effective through women’s economic contribution” (Moser 
1993, p. 69). Women were presented as “the missing link in development, a hitherto 
undervalued economic resource in the development process” (Miller and Razavi 
1995, p. 5). Importantly, in this approach the value of WID/GAD is purely 
instrumental and assumes that “the costs of investing in women’s productivity are 
justifiable in terms of economic and social returns” (Miller and Razavi 1995, p. 5). 
As Razavi and Miller state, “…women as a social group are targeted by planners as a 
means through which prioritized development goals can be realized, which may or 
may not be in the direct interest of women” (Miller and Razavi 1995, p. 7). Thus, 
equity or equality is not promoted as intrinsically valuable per se, but as a means to 
development, a critique that was already voiced at the time, notably by Huntington. 
One serious problem associated with this approach is that it is likely to limit the 
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implementation of the WID/GAD norm to instances where the economic case is 
strong (Tinker and Jaquette 1987, p. 64). This was particularly limiting in the 80s 
and 90s when there was limited “rigorous or convincing” evidence to show that 
investing in women leads to increased economic growth (Miller and Razavi 1995, p. 
163). 
 
Lastly, Moser presents the empowerment approach, which aims to “empower women 
through greater self-reliance” (Moser 1993). According to her, this approach 
emerged from third world women’s movements, stresses the importance of 
acknowledging multiple discrimination faced by many women, and highlighted that 
women are not a homogeneous group. 
 
During this period, the official discourse on Women in Development, gave way to 
Women and Development – an attempt to move away from the ‘added-on’ character 
of the norm –and finally to Gender and Development (GAD). The move from 
‘women’ to ‘gender’ that came about in the 80s and 90s was significant in two ways. 
First, gender refers to both women and men and the relationship between them, 
allowing for a greater focus on power relations in the family and society at large – an 
issue that was previously largely absent from discussions on WID. Second, GAD is 
based on a distinction between ‘sex’ – referring to biological differences between 
women and men – and ‘gender’, which describes the socially constructed roles 
associated with being male and female. Importantly, gender roles are seen as 
constructed and, therefore, amenable to change. However, the extent to which the 
concept of gender has really been taken up by development organisations or has 
simply become a replacement term for ‘women’ is highly questionable. Indeed, 
many scholarly accounts and interviews with gender advocates conducted for this 
thesis suggest that the term gender has not been sufficiently understood by 
development practitioners and that it is still often taken to mean ‘women’ (Miller and 
Razavi 1995; Interview with Okondo). To capture this ambiguity, this thesis refers to 
the norm as WID/GAD throughout the period of analysis. 
 
The above has shown that the WID/GAD norm has been internationally recognised, 
briefly described its substance and evolution over time, and provided an overview of 
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the different global approaches for its promotion. However, in addition to being 
widely recognized, is the norm well suited to the purpose of this thesis? 
 
Applicability of the theoretical framework to WID/GAD 
 
This section shows that the various approaches used for the promotion of WID/GAD 
align well with the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two. In line with the 
principle of ‘most likely case’ this suggests that the various norm integration 
processes identified in the theoretical framework might indeed be identifiable in the 
introduction of WID/GAD in the selected case studies.  
 
Recall that Chapter Two suggests a framework for an ‘ethical considerations 
analysis’. The suggested framework distinguishes between three norm integration 
drivers: social influence, instrumental ethical considerations and intrinsic ethical 
considerations, as summarised in the table below. 
 
 
Using the same distinctions between ends, means, and justifications, the table below 
shows how the five approaches to WID/GAD suggested by Moser align with the 
theoretical framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Framework for an ethical consideration analysis - suggested norm integration processes 
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Table 5: Alignment of WID/GAD approaches to the theoretical framework 
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Since all approaches have aims that are justified on largely ethical grounds – 
development, poverty reduction, empowerment, and equity – they are all likely to 
involve ethical considerations and ethical arguments of some kind. However, the 
welfare, anti-poverty, and efficiency approach view the WID/GAD norm as a means 
towards achieving a given interest (welfare, development, poverty reduction). Thus, 
they are unlikely to lead to a re-definition of how actors’ perceive their ‘ends’. On 
the contrary, they reinforce given ends and aim to adapt the norm to align with them. 
Since all three approaches use instrumental reasoning, they are driven by 
instrumental ethical considerations. Equity and empowerment, on the other hand, 
view the WID/GAD norm as having intrinsic value and, thus, as an end in itself. 
Norm integration in these two approaches depends on the appreciation of the 
intrinsic value of the norm as part of the organisational ends. Thus, the equity and the 
empowerment approach are driven by intrinsic ethical considerations. 
 
Moreover, as already established, WID/GAD had already achieved wide 
international recognition during the period of analysis as an issue that development 
actors should be seen to be doing, making it equally plausible that norm integration 
could be driven by social influence considerations. 
 
In short, the various approaches used for the promotion of WID/GAD align well with 
the three norm integration drivers outlined in my theoretical framework, making a 
study of this norm likely to allow for findings ‘instructive for theory development’ 
and, thus, highly suitable for the quest in this thesis. 
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4.2 The three organisations 
 
As stated in the previous Chapter, the selection of organisations is deductive and 
guided by maximum variance on key characteristics that the literature asserts might 
influence the extent and nature of ethical considerations in organisations. These are: 
(1) overall composition and mandate; (2) composition of decision-making bodies and 
decision-making processes; (3) financial autonomy/funding mechanisms; (4) sources 
of authority; (5) staff profile; and (6) susceptibility to scrutiny.  This section 
introduces the three organisations selected for this thesis and substantiates the claim 
that they, indeed, exhibit maximum variance with regard to these characteristics, 
making them highly suitable for the analysis in this thesis, as summarised in table 6 
below. 
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Table 6: Key organisational characteristics of ODA/DFID, EC/EU, UNDP 
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Key organisational characteristics of UNDP 
 
i. History, composition, and mandate 
 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was established in 1966. It 
was set-up to combine the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance (EPTA) 
and the United Nations Special Fund (Murphy 2006, p. 5).  UNDP is composed of all 
UN member states and is, thus, global, comprising a majority of developing 
countries. When it was first established, UNDP’s principle aim was to “co-ordinate 
and administer United Nations resources for technical cooperation...” and to 
“promote self-determination and self-reliance of all countries, specifically recipients 
of development aid” (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 9). The strong focus on national 
ownership was carried forward from the mandate of the EPTA, which firmly 
enshrined this principle in its founding policies that stated that, 
 
United Nations’ help to developing countries would: (1) be rendered 
only in agreement with the governments concerned and on their 
request; (2) not be a means of foreign economic interference nor be 
accompanied by any considerations of a political nature; (3) be 
designed to meet the specific needs of the country, be decided by the 
government and be provided as far as possible in the form it desires. 
(UNDP 1985b, p. 13) 
 
Born out of the context of de-colonisation, this focus on national ownership and 
neutrality meant that until the mid-1980s UNDP’s mandate was largely procedural, 
lacking any specific substantive content. This has lead some commentators to 
suggest that UNDP had a “no-strategy approach” and that “one of the principle 
unwritten laws of UNDP seems to be “Don’t have a strategy” (Klingebiel 1998, p. 
13). However, this changed to some extent with the arrival of a new Administrator, 
Bill Draper in 1986, and the end of the Cold War, which made it easier for UNDP to 
take a stand on certain issues relating to its work (Interview with Eide). Notably, 
UNDP’s annual report for 1985, written in 1986, first introduced the concept of 
Human Development as UNDP’s substantive mandate, setting it apart from other aid 
agencies. In the foreword, Bill Draper states that, “Uniquely among multilateral 
funding agencies, UNDP is concerned with Human Development, with the release, 
enrichment and management of human resources as the driving forces in economic 
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and social progress” (UNDP 1985a, p. 2). This did not only set UNDP apart from 
other dominant multilateral agencies such as the Word Bank and the IMF with their 
focus on structural adjustment, it also gave the UNDP an, although limited, advocacy 
role.  
 
Over the following years, the Human Development paradigm became increasingly 
recognised as UNDP’s core mandate and the programme’s advocacy role seemed to 
increase (Klingebiel 1998, p. 386). In Murphy’s words, the processes of writing the 
Human Development Reports, which started in the late 1980s,  
 
…were one part of what was once considered a somewhat 
revolutionary programme of ‘advocacy’ that UNDP first took on 
explicitly in 1986…Advocacy was ‘revolutionary’ only because in 
the first forty years of the UN’s development network under 
different names, UNDP had become the development programme of 
the developing countries, the intergovernmental organization most 
trusted by governments in the developing world because it was most 
responsive to them. (Murphy 2006, p. 7) 
 
Yet, despite this growing push for advocacy, UNDP continued to firmly promote its 
image as a neutral actor working on behalf of its member states. Notably, in his 
report for 1989, the Administrator stressed that, in the context of growing diversity 
among developing countries, “…there can be no general blueprints for development” 
(UNDP 1989b, para. 38). He further describes UNDP’s assistance as being 
“responsive to the Government’s own policy priorities and strategies, its flexibility, 
multilateralism, neutrality and universality…” (UNDP 1989b, para. 38). Lastly, he 
states that “We see UNDP in the 1990s as a facilitator and catalyst for member 
countries, enabling them to mobilize the system’s technical resources to help 
developing countries improve the quality of life of their citizens” (UNDP 1989b, 
para. 137). 
 
This dual mandate of neutrality and Human Development remained throughout the 
period of analysis, although it shifted somewhat with the arrival of the new 
Administrator Gus Speth who added a strong environmental dimension, thereby 
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altering the concept to Sustainable Human Development.8 This duality caused a 
certain level of friction and conceptual confusion in UNDP’s work.  For some UNDP 
officials it is UNDP’s neutrality that is its most important characteristic and asset, as 
one senior staff member states that: “If I had to single out the most powerful tool, it 
is our convening power, based on our perceived neutrality.” Yet others state that 
“Advocacy is very important. A comparative advantage of UNDP is to be a good 
advocate. (There are) some basic issues on which we can’t be neutral; for example 
abject poverty” (McNeill and St. Clair 2009, p. 71). 
 
Thus, in summary, UNDP is global in its composition and comprises donors as well 
recipients. UNDP’s mandate has developed from being exclusively focused on 
neutrality, with very little substantive focus, to include an increasingly strong 
substantive focus on Human Development, although tensions between the two 
remain. Despite this tension, UNDP’s mandate has, throughout the period of 
analysis, been strongly focused on promoting global development on behalf of the 
international community. This sets the organisation apart from the other two case 
studies.9  
 
ii. Decision-making: composition and process 
 
UNDP is governed by an Executive Board, which is composed of 36 member states 
selected from five regional groupings who serve on a rotating basis and includes 
donors as well as recipients of aid. Prior to 1992 the Board was known as the 
Governing Council and composed of 48 member states. Although the composition of 
the regional groups is slightly in favour of Western European states (with a 
membership of 12 as opposed to 8 for Africa and 7 for Asia), UNDP’s decision-
making structure is still one of the most open, diverse, and egalitarian compared to 
other international organisations, as all members of the Executive Board have equal 
voting power, regardless of their financial contributions to the organisation. This 
                                                
8 For the purpose of this thesis the ‘new’ mandate will be referred to as Human Development 
throughout the research period as the inclusion of the sustainability dimension did not have a very 
significant impact on how WID/GAD was framed or operationalised. 
9 The EC was founded with the aim of promoting economic and political integration among European 
countries with global development as a very minor additional responsibility, while ODA/DFID had 
the promotion of UK national interest as one its objectives for a number of years during the period of 
analysis. 
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means that the programme is highly unlikely to be an instrument of any donor’s 
foreign policy.  As Murphy states, “The United States, for example, could veto 
World Bank loans to Allende’s government, but could not change UNDP’s 
commitment to serve Chile” (Murphy 2006, p. 21). Moreover, the composition of the 
Board means that it is highly likely to have a decision-making majority of 
developing countries, although UNDP has a long tradition of taking decisions by 
consensus (Kaufmann 1980, p. 77). 
 
iii. Funding sources 
 
UNDP is largely funded through voluntary contributions of its member states 
decided on a biannual basis. OECD states provide more than 90 percent of core 
funds to UNDP’s budget (Bissell 1985, p. 8). Contributors have the right to earmark 
parts of their specific contributions to particular themes, sectors, or programmes. The 
proportion of earmarked versus non-earmarked funds has increased drastically 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, with earmarked funds significantly surpassing non-
earmarked funds in the 1990s (Klingebiel 1998, p. 121). 
 
All these characteristics - the high proportion of earmarking, the short funding cycles 
and the voluntary nature of funding - have serious implications for the workings of 
UNDP as they all limit the organisation’s autonomy. Notably, earmarking allows 
donors to push for specific issues their consider important. For some, this type of 
funding is in fact a “bilateralisation of multilateral aid” (Interview with Kaul). Less 
overt, but similarly powerful, the voluntary nature of UNDP’s funding is also 
restricting UNDP’s autonomy, as explained by Bissell: “As it became increasingly 
difficult to persuade governments to raise their voluntary contributions by an amount 
sufficient to meet UNDP’s lofty targets, special theme targets were established to 
catch potential donors’ eyes” (Bissell 1985, p. 8). 
 
Overall, UNDP’s funding mechanisms are strongly “donor-driven” and severely 
restrict the organisation’s autonomy (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 354). 
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iv. Source of authority 
 
The debate on UNDP’s mandate outlined above has already illustrated that the 
organisation’s source of authority was originally rooted in delegation from the UN 
system. In other words, it was the UN system that first made UNDP responsible for 
global development, thereby delegating authority for this task from the system to the 
organisation.  Yet, very quickly, and largely due to its global membership with a 
majority developing countries and the political context of the time (decolonisation), 
UNDP was seen as the development programme of the developing countries, shifting 
its source of authority somewhat from being delegated by the UN system to being 
delegated by its member states. 
  
Thus, UNDP’s source of authority was delegated by the UN system and the member 
states. Although this source of authority could also be seen as ‘moral’, as UNDP’s 
neutrality and the space and power it gave to developing countries to decide on 
policies and resource allocations that affected them can, and was, seen as ‘morally 
right’, in my view this merely amounted to a form of ‘procedural morality’ that gave 
the delegated source of authority a certain amount of legitimacy. In other words, it 
was the fact that the organisation’s source of authority was delegated combined with 
the nature of the ‘delegators’, and the form of delegation that gave the organisation a 
certain kind of moral clout.  This moral clout was, therefore, a function of the 
organisation’s nature of delegation, thus, secondary to it, and meant that UNDP’s 
overall source of authority was ‘delegation’. 
 
However, as described above, UNDP’s weak substantive mandate was increasingly 
replaced by its mandate to promote global Human Development. This shift 
represented a move from this ‘delegated’ source of authority to an increasingly 
substantive ‘moral’ authority. Human Development, a concept developed by UNDP 
itself (thus, not delegated), is presented as a morally ‘right’ view of development. 
The quote above, suggesting that abject poverty is an issue that UNDP cannot be 
neutral towards, illustrates this point very well. McNeill and St. Clair concur when 
they state that, “Through the promotion of the concept of Human Development, it 
(UNDP) has gained some moral authority” (McNeill and St. Clair 2009, p. 5). 
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However, as with its mandate in the mid 1980s, the shift in source of authority has 
not been complete or linear and continues to move between ‘delegation’ and ‘moral’. 
McNeill and St. Clair suggest as much when they state that UNDP’s moral authority 
is “constrained by its need to work so closely with national governments” (McNeill 
and St. Clair 2009, p. 22). 
v. Staff profile 
 
The staff profile of UNDP is highly diverse with many staff having general 
backgrounds in various social sciences. Staff are usually appointed based on their 
expertise, although national quota regulations, especially in more senior posts, also 
play an important role in staffing decisions. The impact of this profile on staff 
competence and attitudes is difficult to ascertain.  
 
Notably, Miller and Razavi argue that UNDP’s staff profile is largely determined by 
the overwhelmingly administrative tasks that it carries out. They state that,  
 
…as a central administrative agency of the United Nations, high 
priority is placed on good management rather than on substantive 
issues…Although UNDP staff may be trained as social scientists 
they are known as ‘managers’ and performance is based on good 
administrative skills. (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 10) 
 
However, most other commentators as well as interviews carried out for this thesis 
come to a different conclusion. For example, Geisler suggests that the multitude of 
staff backgrounds “enables appreciation for and support of the multi-dimensional 
focus of UNDP work” (Geisler 1999). Similarly Murphy states that “the 
overwhelming majority of UNDP staff have been people who passionately believe in 
the goals of the organization” (Murphy 2006, p. ix). Indeed, he asserts that UNDP 
staff are so passionate about their work that they work for Human Development not 
because they have been delegated to do so by the Governing Council, but rather, 
because of their own convictions (Murphy 2006, p. ix). Interviews with former high-
level UNDP staff suggest the same. Notably, one interviewee stated that in staff 
meetings she was frequently “surprised by the commitment (to development) in the 
room” (Interview with Reid). 
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vi. Susceptibility to scrutiny 
 
Due to UNDP’s main source of authority being ‘delegated’, the organisation is 
highly susceptible to scrutiny from its ‘delegators’. Since, as established above, 
UNDP has two very different ‘delegators’ – the UN system on the one hand and the 
member states on the other – UNDP is susceptible to scrutiny from multiple and 
diverse scrutinisers. The extent of its susceptibility to scrutiny from these scrutinisers 
is further reinforced by the fact that UNDP’s funding relies entirely on the member 
states, giving them considerable power, while its mandate makes UNDP the 
development programme of the UN, thereby making it also highly responsive to 
demands from the UN system. Moreover, UNDP’s shift towards moral authority 
from the late 1980s onwards has further increased the organisation’s susceptibility to 
scrutiny from the UN system and the global development community in relation to 
promoting Human Development. 
 
Key organisational characteristics of the EC 
 
i. History, mandate, and composition 
 
The European Union (hereinafter referred to as ‘EC’10), established as the European 
Economic Community (EEC) with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, has as its 
overarching mandate the economic integration, development, and stability of its 
member states (European Economic Community 1957, article 1). Development 
cooperation, although explicitly included in the Treaty of Rome, is very much 
positioned as a minor issue for the organisation. Notably it is listed last amongst the 
activities of the Community (as point ‘k’) and is only very briefly elaborated on in 
Article 131 and 132 (European Economic Community 1957, article 3) .   
 
The formulation of the articles on development, as well as an analysis of its drafting 
process, show that developmental aims were, at best, secondary to historical ties and 
                                                
10 The European Economic Community was re-named European Union in 1993, making the European 
Community one of three pillars of the EU, alongside the ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ and the 
‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’. In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon, merged all three pillars under 
the European Union. Since the period of analysis of this thesis does not reach to 2009 and is only 
concerned with matters falling under the first pillar (European Community), the thesis will refer to the 
organisation as EC throughout, unless quoting other work. 
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political motives for cooperation with third countries. Notably, the treaty states that 
“The Member States agree to associate with the Community the non-European 
countries and territories which have special relations with Belgium, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom” (European Economic Community 1957). 
Thus, the level of need was not considered in the selection of partner countries. This 
conclusion is supported by Holland and Doidge who, in their history of EU 
development cooperation, show that article 131 was only included due to the 
insistence of France who, “in the wake of the Second World War, with its increasing 
inability to fund the heavy cost of its colonial possessions …saw the new European 
architecture as a solution to its problems” (Holland and Doidge 2012, p. 22). Thus, it 
was “…historical ties rather than need had been the driving rationale behind 
preferential treatment” (Holland and Doidge 2012, p. 49). This close linkage between 
historical ties and EC aid continued throughout the period of analysis. Notably, as 
new member states joined, such as the UK in 1973, EC aid expanded to countries 
these new member states had historical ties with (Holland and Doidge 2012). 
 
Although the aim of EC development cooperation has changed over the years and is 
now officially focused on ‘poverty eradication’ the overall mandate of the EC 
remains internally-focused, with development cooperation only playing a minor role 
(European Economic Community 1992) (European Union 2005). In addition, EC aid 
has, since its establishment, struggled with a clear ‘added value’ vis-à-vis member 
states bilateral policies. This has been especially so since the Treaty of Maastricht in 
1992, in which the EC introduced the principles of complementarity and subsidiarity 
in its operations. These principles essentially mean that the aim of the EC is to 
‘complement’ actions by its member states and act only when it is better placed than 
its member states to do so. The Treaty of Maastricht explicitly states that, 
“Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall be 
complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States.” However, what 
exactly this entails remains unclear and contested to this day. Notably, Holland 
observes that,  
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…what clear advantages can the EU route offer? Historically, what 
has been lacking is a coherent and accepted yardstick to determine 
those aspects of development cooperation that are best done 
bilaterally by member states, and those that are better done 
collectively at the EU level. (Holland 2002, p. 11) 
 
Thus, the above suggests that the EC has a fairly weak, vague, and ever-evolving 
mandate on development cooperation and its role as a development actor is, at best, 
secondary to its role to integrate EU member states’ policies. 
 
Overall composition: The membership of the EC is qualified by geographic scope, as 
only European states are eligible for membership. Its membership has increased from 
six in 1957 to 28 at the time of writing. As a donor, the EC has been referred to as a 
hybrid between a multilateral and a bilateral donor (Holland 2002, p. 49). Notably, 
the OECD/DAC states that  “The European Union is unique among DAC members 
in that it plays a dual role in development assistance. Although the EU is a DAC 
member in its own right and an individual donor, it is often presented as a 
multilateral in DAC publications.” Thus, the OECD/DAC sees the EC as a donor that 
embodies a certain duality viewing the EC both as a “multilateral organisation and as 
a bilateral donor contributing to other multilateral organisations” (OECD 2011, p. 
26). 
 
Regarding its multilateral character, the EC exhibits a further rare quality amongst 
multilateral donors: it is entirely composed of donor countries rooted in similar 
historical and cultural backgrounds. This distinguishes the EC starkly from the first 
case study, the United Nations Development Programme, and means that the EC 
exhibits a moderate level of cultural diversity in its overall composition. 
 
ii. Decision-making: composition and process 
 
The EC’s decision-making structures on development have changed considerably 
over the years and are different for different parts of the developing world. Due to 
this complexity and for the purpose of clarity, the following analysis focuses on the 
structures in place for most of the period of analysis, excluding the changes that took 
place with the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. Moreover, 
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since the EC has a different institutional set-up for its relations with different parts of 
the developing world, the analysis only deals with the EC’s relation with Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), although some policies referred to below are 
global in their reach. 
 
The EC’s relations with the ACP are managed by a number of different EC 
institutions. The central administrative body of EC aid is the European Commission. 
However, in the case of the EC, the European Council (now the EU Council) also 
plays an important role in decision-making on development cooperation policy and 
implementation, especially in relation to the ACP. For this reason, the following 
analysis focuses on both, the Commission as well as the Council. The European 
Parliament’s role in development cooperation was mainly oversight until the Treaty 
of Amsterdam in 1999, although it did play an important role in some budgetary 
decisions and is, therefore, also taken into account below. 
 
The Council & the ACP-EU Council of Ministers: The Council of the European 
Union is the most important decision-making body of the EC. Its role is to pass laws 
together with the European Parliament, approve the overall budget and replenish the 
European Development Fund. The Council meets in different configurations 
depending on the subject matter and is composed of the respective ministers of all 
EU member states. Development cooperation issues in general are discussed in the 
framework of the Working Group on Development and decided on by the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council, which is composed of ministers of foreign 
affairs or development cooperation.  Thus, the Council exhibits a moderate level of 
cultural diversity. 
 
Decisions on development cooperation used to be based on unanimity until the 
Treaty of Maastricht, which officially introduced qualified majority voting for the 
issue area of development (European Economic Community 1957, article 136 and 
198(c)). However, despite this formal shift, even post-Maastricht Council practice 
has been to aim for consensus whenever possible.  
 
Lastly, it should be noted that issues pertaining specifically to the ACP are decided 
by the European Development Fund Committee, which is composed of all EU 
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member states and – in contrast to other Council bodies – operates a weighted voting 
system. However, thematic issues such as WID/GAD fall within general 
development cooperation not the EDF. 
 
The European Parliament & the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly: The 
European Parliament (EP) is responsible for passing legislation together with the 
Council, approves the overall budget of the EC together with the Council, can take 
up issues on its own initiative, and plays an important democratic oversight role as it 
has the right to raise questions to the Commission and the Council or set-up official 
hearings. It is composed of representatives of all major political parties from all 
member states and is, therefore, moderately diverse. However, a lot of its business is 
conducted in thematic Committees, including a Committee on Development and 
Cooperation and a Women’s Committee. The Committees meet once or twice per 
month and draw-up, amend, or adopt legislative proposals and own-initiative reports. 
They are generally characterised by a high level of homogeneity, as members of 
parliament usually choose to join Committees on issues they are interested in and 
supportive of. 
 
The European Commission: The European Commission is the main executive arm of 
the EC. During the majority of the period of analysis, the European Commission’s 
department on development, DGVIII, later know as DG Development and now 
merged with DG AIDCO into DG DEVCO, is responsible for the day-today running 
of EC development cooperation operations with the ACP, including budget 
management and proposing policies and laws relating to development to the Council. 
In addition, DGI (external economic relations) also plays a role, albeit it is much 
more focused on Asia and Latin America (Holland 2002, pp. 85 - 87). Both 
departments are composed of civil servants who were employed by and, thus act on 
behalf of, the European Commission and the Community as a whole.  
 
The different DGs of the Commission are headed by a Director General who is 
responsible for the day-to-day running of the department and a Commissioner who 
has overall political responsibility for the subject areas the department works on. The 
Director General reports directly to the Commissioner. Decisions inside the DGs are 
taken in different and frequently changing ways and are not formally enshrined in 
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any document (Interview with Marchetti). Interviews with Commission officials 
suggest that most decisions in DGVIII including on WID/GAD, are taken in a fairly 
informal and centralised way by the various heads of unit and the Director General 
(Interview with Joelsdotter-Berg). 
 
iii. Funding sources 
 
The general budgetary process is initiated by the Commission, who draws up a draft 
budget. This draft is subsequently modified by the Council and finally adopted by the 
European Parliament. Thematic issues, such as WID/GAD fall under this procedure, 
giving both Parliament and Council co-decision power on allocations to WID/GAD 
since the establishment of the first WID/GAD budget line in 1989. Importantly, 
decisions on the budget in the Council are taken by unanimity and earmarking of 
budget allocations for specific issues by member states is not permitted. This 
differentiates the EC strongly from UNDP, where earmarking is common, as will be 
seen in the Chapters Five and Six. Thus, due to the equal power of Council and 
Parliament, as well as the need for unanimity in the Council and the restrictions on 
earmarking, the EC budget is relatively autonomous. This, however, only applies to 
issues that are explicitly mentioned in the budget as stand-alone budget lines. Since 
the budget line for WID/GAD was only established in 1989, the decision of how 
much to allocate to WID/GAD prior to 1989 was entirely up to the Commission, 
giving it considerable financial autonomy on this issue.  
 
In addition to annual budgets, the EC decides on multi-annual spending frameworks 
covering a period of five years in which allocations to budget lines are forecast. This 
makes the allocation of financial resources fairly predictable, slightly increasing the 
EC’s financial autonomy. Moreover, detailed decisions on allocations within the 
overall budge line ceiling, as well as the day-to-day administration of the budget are 
carried out by the Commission, providing it with considerable amount of freedom in 
this regard. 
 
Lastly, it should be noted that the bulk of EC aid to the ACP is channelled through 
the EDF, which is not part of the EC budget and the procedure outlined above. 
However, thematic issues, such as WID/GAD do not fall under the EDF but are part 
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of the overall EC budget. Thus, regarding WID/GAD, the EC has medium level of 
financial autonomy from its member states. 
 
iv. Sources of authority  
 
As stated above, although the EC has been active in development cooperation since it 
was set-up, it was not founded with development cooperation as its main goal 
(Holland 2002; Grilli 1993). The EC was originally set up with a broad aim of 
bringing stability and development to European states and has, especially since the 
Treaty of Maastricht, stressed the principles of complementarity and subsidiarity in 
its operations. This suggests that the EC does not have a very strong, substantive, or 
independent identity as a development donor and the precise nature of the EC’s 
‘source of authority’ as a development actor is contested (Holland 2002, p. 24). 
Although, as with many issue areas, the EC has been aiming to increase its autonomy 
in development cooperation, the above indicates that the EC’s source of authority in 
development cooperation is largely based on ‘delegation’ from the member states. 
This suggests that the EC is not directly very susceptible to external pressure or 
global development trends, but rather to internal pressure exercised by its member 
states.  
 
Having said that, the EC is also increasingly rooting its authority for development 
cooperation in being particularly well placed to promote ‘good values’ and fulfil a 
kind of moral obligation of poverty eradication. Notably, its recent development 
policy, the European Consensus on Development, states that the EU aims to “reduce 
poverty in the world, to ensure sustainable economic, social and environmental 
development and to promote democracy, the rule of law, good governance and the 
respect of human rights” and that doing so is a  “moral obligation” for the EU 
(European Commission 2012) (European Union 2005).  This suggests that the EU is 
also increasingly rooting its authority for development cooperation in ‘morality’. 
 
In addition, members of the European Parliament also root their authority in both 
‘delegation’ and ‘morality’. Although formally drawing their source of authority 
largely from their constituencies and their political party, interviews with MEPs also 
suggest that they have a high level of freedom to engage in issues they personally 
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feel strongly about as long as they do not contradict the wishes of their constituency 
(Interview with Turner). Thus, their source of authority is partly ‘delegation’ by their 
constituencies and partly based on their sheer presence in the European Parliament 
and their personal convictions, possibly coming, at times, close to a claiming ‘moral 
authority’. This seems especially so for members of the Women’s Committee many 
of whom, according to interviews, identify strongly with a global women’s 
movement and frequently referred to ‘solidarity’ among women’s rights advocates, 
stressing their responsibility as representatives of this movement in the European 
Parliament (Interview with Rodano; Interview with Hemeldonck; Interview with 
Gaiotti). 
 
v. Staff profile 
 
Commission officials, the main operational staff, are employed based on having 
passed the ‘concours’, an EC entrance exam testing general knowledge, rather than 
specific areas of expertise, and are frequently moved across departments with very 
different areas of focus (Interview with Marchetti; Interview with Joelsdotter-Berg). 
In addition to officials, the Commission also employs contract agents and ‘Detached 
National Experts’. The former are employed for a limited period of time and are 
usually hired for a specific task while the latter are seconded to Brussels from 
member states for a determined period of time. 
 
Council officials are usually career civil servants who are employed by their 
respective governments and are mandated to represent their country’s position. Most 
frequently they do not have particular technical expertise in the issue area they are 
working in. Similarly, members of parliament are usually career politicians who 
might have a specific interest in certain issues, but are hardly ever trained technical 
experts in the fields. 
 
vi. Susceptibility to scrutiny 
 
Since the EC’s source of authority is largely delegated by the member states, and its 
entire revenue comes directly from the member states, the organisation is highly 
susceptible to scrutiny from them. In addition, with an increased focus on the 
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EC/EU’s democratic nature vis-à-vis the citizens of Europe, the European Parliament 
has become increasingly important as a powerful source of scrutiny, particularly in 
the area of international development. Yet, the EC’s relatively weak mandate on 
global development makes it only very mildly susceptible to global and external 
pressure, such as pressure emanating from the UN system. This may increase with a 
move towards rooting the EC’s authority increasingly in ‘morality’, but has not 
manifested itself as significant during the period of analysis. 
 
Key organisational characteristics of the UK aid administration 
 
i. History, composition, and mandate 
 
The UK government’s development administration was established in 1961 and has 
since undergone numerous and significant structural changes. Most notably, the 
administration frequently shifted from being an independent ministry to being a wing 
of the Foreign Office, also during the period of analysis. In 1986 aid was 
administered by the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), a wing of the 
Foreign Office. ODA was active until 1997 when it was replaced by the independent 
Department for International Development (DFID), lead by a Cabinet Minister.  
 
Despite these structural changes, ODA/DFID’s overall composition generally 
remained the same. As Conlin states, “Whether the agency is an Administration or a 
Ministry, the general structure has been fairly consistent…” ODA/DFID is, as a 
bilateral donor, composed of one donor country with an administrative centre in 
London and various “mostly scientific” units outside (Conlin 1985, p. 74). 
 
Yet the administration’s mandate has changed considerably over the years. Notably, 
prior to 1997, ODA’s mandate as a global development actor was fairly weak. 
Indeed, the administration was largely perceived as acting on behalf of the Foreign 
Office and promoting UK national interests, rather than development cooperation. 
This was particularly so in the 1970s and 80s, when even official rhetoric clearly 
stressed the importance of national interest promotion. Notably, in a speech, the, then 
Secretary of State for development stated in 1985 that the, 
 
 101 
…objectives (of development aid) are not confined to promoting 
economic development of the poorest countries…Aid is also an arm 
of foreign policy…It serves the diplomatic purpose of promoting 
better relations. It promotes commercial interests. (Conlin 1985, p. 
75) 
 
Thus, national interest promotion played a significant role. Even when poverty 
reduction objectives where increasingly included in ODA policy language in the 
early 1990s, the organisation was still widely considered as “middle-of-the-pack 
development agency” (Barder, p. 2). Additionally, ODA was only responsible for aid 
and was, therefore, not included in negotiations relating to other issue areas that 
impact on development, such as matters of trade and security. 
 
When DFID was set-up the mandate of the administration significantly increased to 
cover development policy more broadly, allowing the Minister to sit on several 
interdepartmental committees such as the committee on the environment, drug abuse, 
women’s issues, health, and arms sales (Barder, p. 9). The rise in status significantly 
boosted the ministry’s decision-making autonomy and political clout and made the 
department’s mandate more focused on promoting global development. Indeed, a 
study conducted for the Canadian government found that “Today (2005) DFID is 
generally considered to be the best (development agency) in the world” (Barder, p. 
2). 
 
ii. Decision-making  
 
The overall ODA/DFID policy framework is decided in the ‘Multi-Annual Spending 
Review’, which is drafted by the Treasury in consultation with ODA/DFID and 
presented to Parliament for approval.  However, more detailed policy decisions and 
decisions pertaining to implementation are taken by ODA/DFID in consultation with 
other government departments, such as the Department for Industry and Trade. The 
level of consultation and involvement in other government departments has changed 
over time and, while the impact of, for example the Foreign Office, was much 
greater during ODA’s times, the breath of involvement of other government 
departments has significantly increased with the setting-up of DFID (Barder, p. 15). 
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Having said that, many detailed decisions, especially in relation to issues of limited 
relevance to other government departments, such as WID/GAD, are either taken by 
officials working on the issue in the administration, the Permanent Secretary, or the 
Minister or Secretary of State for International Development him or herself. The 
precise level of involvement of the Minister or Secretary of State in specific 
decisions has varied with the different individuals holding the post. While some were 
fairly hands-off and delegated a lot of decision-making to operational staff, such as 
Lynda Chalker, others, such as Clare Short were much more involved (see Chapter 
Seven for detail). Overall, however, decisions on specific themes, such as 
WID/GAD, are taken in a largely informal and homogeneous setting by only few 
decision-makers inside ODA/DFID.  
 
iii. Funding sources 
 
Even before DFID was set-up, ODA had its own allocated budget line in the official 
budget issued annually by the Treasury. The overall budget available for 
development is proposed by the Treasury after negotiations with ODA/DFID and 
approval by the Prime Minster. This is done on a four-year basis through the ‘Multi-
Annual Spending Review’, and it is subject to annual review. However, once 
approved by Parliament, ODA/DFID has considerable autonomy in allocating money 
to specific activities, albeit in line with the overall policy priorities agreed in the 
Spending Review. Thus, ODA/DFID’s finances are entirely autonomous from 
external sources, yet significantly dependent on government, in particular the 
Treasury and the Prime Minister’s Office, except for detailed funding decisions.  
 
iv. Source of authority 
 
ODA/DFID’s main source of authority has been, and remains to this day, rooted in 
‘delegation’ (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, pp. 20 - 29). As a government 
department, or sub-department, it has been delegated the function of development 
cooperation by the government. Since its funding is also approved by Parliament, 
Parliament is also an important ‘delegator’ of authority. In addition, being part of 
democratically elected government, ODA/DFID’s authority is also rooted in 
delegation from UK citizens or UK civil society organisations. 
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However, to legitimise this delegation, DFID is also increasingly basing its authority 
on ‘doing good’. Notably, DFID states that it is acting out of “moral responsibility 
towards the poor” and sees its main task as “lead(ing) the UK’s work to end extreme 
poverty” (DFID 2014) Thus, DFID’s authority is also to a certain extent, and 
particularly recently, rooted in ‘morality’. 
 
v. Staff 
 
At operational level ODA/DFID is largely staffed with civil servants of British 
nationality with educational backgrounds in economics or social science although the 
ration of economists versus other social scientists has changed drastically over the 
years, with economists largely outweighing other specialisations up until the late 
1980s. Leadership positions are usually held by career civil servants, while the post 
of Minister and Secretary of States is occupied by an individual with a party-political 
background.   
 
vi. Susceptibility to scrutiny 
 
ODA/DFID is largely susceptible to scrutiny from the government as well as 
Parliament, as it derives most of its authority as well as it s funding from them. In 
addition, as a government department of a democratic state, the organisation is also 
mildly susceptible to scrutiny from non-state-actors, however, mostly those relatively 
aligned with the political ideology of the ruling party. Thus, ODA/DFID’s 
susceptibility to scrutiny is limited to relatively few and homogenous scrutinisers. 
This was particularly so when ODA was part of the Foreign Office and changed 
somewhat with the establishment of DFID and the arrival of Clare Short, both of 
which raised DFID’s status as a global development player, making its authority 
increasingly rooted in ‘morality’ and, therefore, more susceptible to external and 
global scrutiny. 
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Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has introduced the norm as well as the three organisations selected for 
examination in this thesis. It has established that both are highly appropriate for the 
purpose of this thesis. First it was established that the norm has been widely 
recognised, is, therefore, a global norm, and has been framed in many different ways 
closely aligned to the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter Two, making the 
case studies likely to yield results instructive for theory development. Second, the 
Chapter has introduced the organisations chosen for case study analysis and has 
established that they do, indeed, differ considerably on a number of factors that are 
hypothesised by the literature to influence the extent to which ethical considerations 
matter in organisations.  
 
The remainder of this thesis now turns to a detailed analysis of the introduction of 
WID/GAD into these three organisations in order to establish, first, which norm 
integration driver – social influence, intrinsic ethical considerations, instrumental 
ethical considerations – dominantly drove WID/GAD integration in the 
organisations, and second, whether the dominance of a particular driver was the 
result of specific organisational characteristics. The following Chapter focuses on the 
first high-level recognition of WID/GAD in each organisation. 
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Chapter 5: First high-level recognition of WID/GAD 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous Chapter has established that by the mid-1970s the WID/GAD norm had 
achieved considerable international recognition and many donors were starting to 
take some action on it. Does this mean that gender equality was being increasingly 
accepted by international development organisations as an important value and, 
indeed, that it was a desire to promote gender equality per se and to ‘do the right 
thing’ that drove the observed norm integration? In other words, are we seeing 
‘ethical considerations’ about the value of gender equality driving this norm 
integration process? And, if so, was the importance and nature of ethical 
considerations in these processes influenced by specific organisational characteristics 
typical of multilateral aid organisations, making these types of organisations more 
likely to be driven by such considerations and take action on the norm? 
 
To answer these questions, this Chapter considers the first key moment in norm 
integration in the three organisations chosen for this thesis - the first high-level 
recognition of the norm - and examines in detail what kind of considerations drove 
this first step. Was it considerations relating to the value of women’s rights and 
gender equality as ethically desirable goals in and of themselves (intrinsic ethical 
considerations); a concern about the need to integrate women as necessary 
‘production units’ to achieve other ethically desirable ends (instrumental ethical 
considerations) or; indeed, was it not about the norm at all and simply driven by 
reputational concerns (social influence)? This is done by applying the framework for 
an ‘ethical considerations analysis’ development in Chapter Two to a careful 
examination of the processes that lead up to the decisions and analysing their content 
as well as norm operationalisation during the three subsequent years. Second, the 
Chapter asks whether the dominance of the different drivers – intrinsic ethical 
considerations, instrumental ethical considerations, or social influence – was 
influenced by particular organisational characteristics.  
 
The Chapter finds that the first high-level recognition of the norm, which happened 
in 1975 in UNDP, in 1982 in the EC, and in 1986 in ODA was in each case driven by 
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social influence considerations, and not ethical considerations, be they intrinsic or 
instrumental. The dominance of social influence was largely due to a lack of 
agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of the norm in each organisation’s top-
level decision-making body. This meant that norm integration involved debate and 
required negotiation, justification and compromise, which lead to weak and 
incoherent policies that favoured instrumental or non-conceptual approaches to the 
norm. Lack of agreement also meant that there was insufficient political and 
financial backing for coherent and comprehensive norm integration. In some cases, 
lack of agreement and appreciation of the norm in fact restricted the freedom of 
actors who seemed committed to the norm to promote the norm as they saw fit, 
further contributing to weak and incoherent policies and weak operationalisation. 
 
The Chapter shows that the likelihood of an agreement on the value of the norm 
under investigation was influenced by three specific organisational characteristics, 
namely multi-membership and cultural diversity in the organisations’ respective 
decision-making fora and consensus-based decision-making processes, all of which 
made an agreement on the value of the norm less likely. However, as much as these 
characteristics made coherent policies featuring intrinsic arguments and 
comprehensive norm integration less likely, the first two characteristics, when 
combined with an open mandate and strong susceptibility to diverse scrutinisers, 
also significantly facilitated some kind of quick action on the norm.  
 
Thus, the Chapter suggests that multilateral organisations might be better at initial 
norm uptake than their bilateral counterparts. However, it also clearly shows that this 
was more related to their heightened reputational concerns than greater openness to 
ethical considerations as norm integration in neither organisation was driven by 
ethical considerations. This suggests two things. First, it suggests that organisational 
characteristics specific to multilateral or bilateral organisations do not significantly 
influence the importance or nature of ethical considerations in norm integration, 
thereby calling into question the claim that IOs as such are morel likely to provide 
spaces particularly conducive for ethical considerations to matter. Second, it also 
suggests that ethical considerations did not play any significant role at all in the cases 
analysed, potentially calling into question theories that claim that ethical 
considerations have any weight at all in international development organisations. 
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5.1 The first high-level recognition of WID/GAD in UNDP 
 
Of the three organisations analysed in this thesis UNDP was the first to officially 
endorse WID/GAD in January 1975, although efforts to promote gender balance in 
the organisation’s internal human resource policy had commenced considerably 
earlier (Interview with  Miller). The endorsement took the form of a decision by the 
Governing Council, UNDP’s highest decision-making body. The following section 
analysis which considerations drove this first formal recognition. 
 
Which norm integration driver dominated? 
 
i. Process and timing 
 
As outlined in Chapter Four, the UN system had already taken on WID in the 1950s 
and 1960s and UNDP was, since its establishment, under mild, yet explicit, external 
pressure to take up WID. This pressure took the initial from of an explicit ECOSOC 
recommendations in 1966 in which it “addressed a request to bodies in the United 
Nations system...including UNDP to assist in developing a unified long-term 
programme for the advancement of women” (United Nations 1995, p. 8). The 
pressure further increased when, in 1970, the United Nations General Assembly 
included WID as a consideration in the Second Development Decade. Specifically, 
the Assembly asked that “the full integration of women should be encouraged” 
(United Nations 1970a, para. 16(h)). 
 
Yet despite the increasing recognition of WID/GAD by the UN system and explicit 
calls on UNDP to integrate the issue, no action was taken by UNDP prior to 1975. 
Indeed, a detailed analysis of Governing Council decisions and debates prior to 1975 
reveals that neither the Governing Council nor the Administration itself exercised 
any pressure, be it normative or material, on UNDP to take any action on WID/GAD. 
Indeed, WID was only mentioned once in passing in 1972, when the Director of the 
Office of Technical Co-operation mentioned a project “in the Central African 
Republic where the promotion of participation of women in development was the 
main feature” (UNDP 1972, para. 335). WID/GAD was not mentioned by any 
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UNDP Administrator report nor did any of the Administrator’s or other UNDP 
staff’s contributions to Governing Council debates mention the issue prior to 1975. 
In 1975 UN-system pressure on UNDP increased significantly when the UN decided 
to declare 1975 – 1985 the Women’s Decade and commemorate it with a World 
Conference on Women to be held in 1975 in Mexico. Indeed, one purpose of the 
conference was to publically hold UNDP and others to account for their actions, or 
lack thereof, on WID/GAD. The General Assembly Resolution on the conference 
explicitly states that one of its aims was to, 
 
examine to what extent the organizations of the United Nations 
system have implemented the recommendations for the elimination 
of discrimination against women made by the Commission on the 
Status of Women… (United Nations General Assembly 1974, 
preamble) 
 
In follow up to this, the General Assembly made a further explicit call for action to 
UN Agencies. It, 
 
…calls upon the United Nations system to provide increased 
assistance to those programmes…which will encourage and promote 
the full integration of women into national, regional and 
interregional economic development activities. 2. Recommends to 
all organizations concerned within the United Nations system to 
review their work and personal programmes in order to assess their 
impact on the further participation of women in development...” 
(United Nations General Assembly 1974, para. 1 and 2) 
 
Thus, by the mid-1970s there was very strong and increasing pressure by the UN 
system on UNDP to take action on WID/GAD. This was especially so as UNDP was 
going to be formally and publically held accountable for its action/inaction on the 
norm in the processes around the first World Conference on Women in 1975.  
 
The lack of internal calls for action and the mounting UN system pressure strongly 
suggests that it was external pressure linked to reputational concerns that drove the 
first high-level recognition of the norm. Interviews conducted for this thesis concur 
with this assessment (Interview with Anstee; Interview with Hamadeh; Interview 
with Reid). Notably, one senior official stated that WID/GAD was first taken up by 
UNDP “in reaction to the first Women’s Conference” (Interview with Leitner) and a 
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former director of the WID Division stated that “You have to remember that there 
was a UN Decade for Women…and since this (the UN Decade for Women) was a 
UN Resolution the multilateral system as a whole was also much concerned” 
(Interview with Eide). Indeed two senior UNDP officials suggested that it was 
indeed reputational considerations that drove UNDP to take this first step. One stated 
that after the first Women’s Conference in Mexico in 1975 it became “absolutely the 
fashion of the day. Everybody wanted to be seen to be [my emphasis] doing 
something” (Interview with Anstee). A former WID/GAD officer concurred when 
she stated that, indeed, UNDP took action on the norm because “the pride [my 
emphasis] of the organisation was at stake” (Interview with  Miller). 
 
ii. The policy approach 
 
The actual decision by the Governing Council that first officially recognised WID as 
an issue relevant for UNDP is very short and does not include anything about 
UNDP’s rational or reason for integrating WID, apart from strongly stating that it 
was acting in response to requests from the UN system. The decision opens as 
follows, 
 
Recalling that in its resolution 3010 (XVII) and 3275 (XXIX), the 
General Assembly proclaimed the goals of International Women’s 
Year 1975…(b) to ensure the full integration of women in the total 
development effort…Noting that in its resolution 3342 (XXIX), the 
General Assembly called upon the United Nations system to provide 
increased assistance to those programmes…which will encourage 
and promote the further integration of women into national, regional 
and interregional economic development activities…(UNDP 1975, 
pp. 39 - 40)  
 
The actual commitment to WID is fairly weak and stresses the importance of taking 
into account member states’ views, 
 
Considering that the concept of development…should in general 
give more importance to the needs, competence and aspirations of 
women; Bearing in mind the comments made by members of the 
Governing Council during the discussion… (UNDP 1975, Preamble)   
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The decision does make a clear request to UNDP but only invites governments to 
take action, 
 
Requests that the integration of women in development should be a 
continuing consideration in the formulation, design and 
implementation of UNDP projects and programmes; 2. Invites 
Governments to take the appropriate decisions in order to ensure the 
participation of women in the planning process, in decision-making, 
and in the implementation of development projects… (UNDP 1975, 
para. 1 and 2)  
 
Thus, the approach is strongly framed in responding to UN system demands, is 
extremely vague regarding what needs to be done to integrate WID/GAD, and does 
not involve any substantive rational or conceptual engagement with the norm.  
 
iii. Operationalisation 1975 - 1978 
 
After the adoption of the Governing Council Decision some steps towards 
institutionalising WID were taken. Notably, in 1975 a new UNDP Policies and 
Procedures Manual and accompanying Guidelines on Project Formulation 
“concerning the formulation, design, implementation and evaluation of projects with 
a view to integrating women as participants and beneficiaries in all relevant areas of 
development work” were developed (UNDP 1975a, para. 27). In addition, training 
kits were prepared in the same year and some staff training was undertaken in 1976 
United Nations Development Programme 1975 (Razavi and Miller 1995a). A WID 
focal point was appointed in 1976, whose main responsibility was to sensitise UNDP 
staff members and make available research on WID. The focal point was supported 
by four additional focal points in the regional bureaux (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 
14). 
 
Despite these steps, a more detailed look at them suggests that operationalisation 
remained at a very superficial, if not tokenistic, level. For example, an analysis of the 
status of the WID focal point shows that the focal point was not included in UNDP 
decision making procedures and the additional focal points did not even have terms 
of reference for their work on WID, let alone sufficient expertise in the area. The 
training was ad-hoc, not compulsory, and no agency-wide training was introduced 
 111 
during this period (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 16). Moreover, the WID guidelines 
were weak. First, they were voluntary and second, they were included in the UNDP 
Programming Manual under “Special Considerations” indicating an ‘added – on’ 
status” (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 14). Third, regarding their actual content, the 
guidelines were very vague, hardly justifying to be called ‘guidelines’. Notably, after 
a general discussion of WID, the document states that, “more specific advice 
concerning the diverse problems of how to better integrate women in the 
development process has been given in the form of an annotated list of references” 
(Kardam 1991, p. 19). The list of references merely provides a bibliography of a 
number of texts on WID/GAD and does not even include any annotation to the texts. 
This lack of detail has lead one prominent commentator to suggest that “the vague 
nature of the UNDP’s directions to staff is an indication that no particular procedural 
or programmatic changes were planned to deal with gender issues in the agency’s 
development assistance activities” (Kardam 1991, p. 19). Last, UNDP’s reporting 
system on project implementation, an important source of information on actual 
UNDP activities, was not amended to include WID during this period (United 
Nations Development Programme 1986c). 
 
Regarding financial resources, UNDP did start to record financial resources allocated 
to WID/GAD in 1974 and available data suggests that the allocation to WID/GAD to 
technical cooperation was on average 0.9% of UNDP’s budget from 1975 – 1980 
(United Nations Development Programme 1982). Even UNDP itself admitted that 
this allocation was very low, as a Report of the Administrator stated that, “it is 
abundantly clear that…financial resources allocated for this purpose (WID), are very 
small” (UNDP 1982a, para. 14). In addition, the accuracy of the recording system 
left a lot to be desired. Notably, an evaluation of the integration of WID/GAD into 
UNDP’s systems found that “A review of the existing financial management system 
shows that the current UNDP classification framework does not allow to track 
resource allocation to gender mainstreaming within its present structure” (UNDP 
1998b, p. 11). 
 
 
 
 112 
 
The above strongly indicates that operationalisation in the three years after the first 
high-level recognition of WID seemed to have been superficial, if not tokenistic. 
This finding is further supported by other evaluations as well as member states’ own 
assessments. In the Governing Council debate in 1978,  
 
…several members express the view that the paper (on WID) 
appeared incomplete, both in terms of analysis and the data 
presented. They felt that UNDP should be playing a much more 
active role... (UNDP 1978, para. 279) 
 
Indeed, one member’s impression was that “UNDP’s emphasis in this area had been 
somewhat haphazard” (UNDP 1978). In addition, an evaluation undertaken in 1978 
found “limited progress in promoting women’s participation in development projects 
and programmes”, a conclusion echoed in other evaluations, including UNDP’s own 
assessment (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 14). Interviews conducted for this thesis 
concur with this conclusion. Notably, one senior UNDP official interviewed for this 
thesis stated that “…in the 1970s UNDP paid mostly lip service to the issue..” while 
another mentioned that in the 1970s, “everybody paid lipservice to the idea but they 
were not quite so good at translating it into practice” (Interview with Hamadeh; 
Interview with  Miller; Interview with Anstee). 
 
 
 
Table 7: Summary of WID/GAD operationalisation in UNDP 1975 - 1978 
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iv. Summary: Which norm integration driver dominated? 
 
The above account strongly suggests that it was social influence in response to 
pressure from the UN system that drove the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD 
in UNDP. First, there was no evidence of any calls for action on WID/GAD from 
inside the organisation, yet strong evidence of considerable and increasing pressure 
from the UN system and testimonials of officials indicating that it was reputational 
concerns rooted in pressure from the UN system that drove the first official high-
level recognition of the norm in the organisation. Second, the policy itself is 
explicitly framed as a response to this pressure and, in fact, does not mention any 
other justification or rational for the integration of WID/GAD. Third, 
operationalisation was very weak and largely viewed as ‘lipservice’ by observers in 
and outside of UNDP, suggesting that there was no genuine appreciation of the value 
of the norm across the organisation. This is especially so as a number of steps 
towards operationalisation would have been low-cost or no-cost, such as the 
amendment of UNDP’s reporting system on project implementation, a stronger and 
more comprehensive integration of WID/GAD into the Programming Manual, and 
the recording of expenditures on WID/GAD. Moreover, considerable know-how on 
how to integration WID/GAD in development operations already existed at that time 
(Miller and Razavi 1995, p. 14). This strongly indicates that it could not have been a 
lack of resources or know-how that resulted in the weak operationalisation of the 
norm, leaving a lack of appreciation of the value of the norm as the most plausible 
explanation. 
 
A combination of these observations strongly suggests that the first high-level 
recognition of the norm was indeed driven by social influence considerations. Ethical 
considerations relating to the value of the norm – whether intrinsic or instrumental – 
did not seem to have played a significant role in WID/GAD integration during this 
period in UNDP. 
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Why did this norm integration driver dominate? 
 
i. Explaining the timing 
 
The timing of the first high-level recognition of WID by UNDP was strongly 
influenced by the decision to declare 1975 – 1985 the UN Women’s Decade and by 
the announcement of the first World Conference on Women. Why did these 
developments have an impact on UNDP while they did not influence developments 
in the EU or ODA who only took action in 1982 and 1986 respectively? Moreover, 
why did this only lead to superficial norm integration driven by social influence 
considerations? 
 
The reasons for this can be found first, in UNDP’s split source of delegated authority 
in the 1970s. UNDP was established by, and part of, the UN family, and its main 
function was to coordinate UN development efforts. The Programme, therefore, felt a 
certain obligation to respond to direct requests by the UN system, as it was this 
system that provided it with part of its authority. However, UNDP’s source of 
authority was also to a significant extent rooted in delegation from the member states 
on which it also depended for its funding. Thus, UNDP was strongly susceptible to 
multiple scrutinisers - the UN system and its member states. It was this 
organisational characteristic that explains why UNDP took action when it did – as it 
responded to pressure from one of its scrutinisers: the UN system – and why the 
response was half-hearted – as there was no noteworthy pressure from the other 
scrutinisers: the member states on WID/GAD prior to 1975.  
 
This lack of push by UNDP member states can be partly explained by the fact that 
the norm had not reached very widespread international recognition at that point and 
not many member states had explicit and strong bilateral WID/GAD policies. In 
addition, however, the reason for why no state pushed for action on the norm was 
rooted in the Governing Council’s high level of cultural diversity and multi-
membership resulting in a lack of agreement on the value of the norm, as illustrated 
below. Combined with a weak substantive mandate that did not provide an easy 
‘hook’ for the norm, a strong procedural mandate that called for member state 
ownership and an identity perception as the ‘development programme of the 
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developing countries’, did not provide Governing Council members with sufficient 
freedom to push for the norm, which helps to explain why even the states that had 
already adopted bilateral policies, such as the US, did not push for action on 
WID/GAD in UNDP.  
 
Last, UNDP’s delegated source of authority focused on the UN system and the 
member states, combined with a weak substantive yet strong procedural mandate and 
a very hierarchical set-up also meant that the Administration, although diverse and 
with expertise on WID/GAD, had very little freedom to promote issues on its own 
volition.  
 
Thus, UNDP’s split source of delegated authority and its susceptibility to multiple 
scrutinisers – member states on the one hand and the UN system on the other – 
explains why it responded to pressure from the UN system at all, as opposed to the 
EC/EU and ODA/DFID. Its source of authority, combined with the high-level of 
cultural diversity and multi-membership of the Governing Council and its strong 
procedural mandate and the resulting limited freedom for member states and 
Administration staff to promote WID/GAD also explains why there was no pressure 
from inside the Governing Council or the Administration. This, in turn, explains why 
UNDP’s response was slow and meagre and only once UN pressure was very strong 
with the onset of the UN’s International Women’s Year, the beginning of the UN 
Decade for Women, and the first World Conference on Women, that UNDP finally 
took some action to integrate WID/GAD. 
 
ii. Explaining the approach  
 
The weak and hands-off approach to WID/GAD in UNDP was a direct result of the 
specific characteristics of its key-decision making body, the Governing Council. The 
Governing Council is characterised by a high level of cultural diversity amongst its 
membership, a relatively large number of principals with equal voting power, and a 
consensus-culture. This organisational set-up meant that reaching an agreement on 
many things, including the value of WID/GAD in the Council, was very difficult. 
Notably, an examination of the report of the Governing Council session describing 
the proceedings that led to the Governing Council Decision points to significant 
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differences of opinion between and among UN staff and UNDP member states about 
the importance and justification of WID.  
 
For example, a consideration of opinions expressed by the member states during a 
Governing Council debate illustrates the diverse opinions on WID/GAD in the 
Council. Notably, a number of members stressed the importance of preserving 
different cultural approaches to the issue of integrating women in development. 
Some very clearly stated their preference for a non-transformative approach to WID, 
emphasising the importance that WID does not “prejudice either the family as a 
social unit or the existing ways of life…emphasising that the role of women was the 
giver of life” (UNDP 1975, para. 137). Representing the other end of the spectrum, 
some members criticised UNDP’s approach for being too non-transformative, stating 
that UNDP’s approach “contained practically no account of the social factor and 
added that the social structure of a society was the deciding factor in the status of 
women in it” (UNDP 1975, para. 143). This exchange does indeed indicate that there 
was no agreement on the importance of the value of gender equality amongst the 
members of the Governing Council. This conclusion is further supported by a 
statement by the Assistant Administrator in a subsequent Governing Council debate 
in which he states that “…even the definition of the concept of integration of women 
in development left much to be desired: a range of opinions exists on the issue…” 
(UNDP 1982b, para. 38). 
 
Combined with (1) the political context of the time, which lead to a strong ‘hands-
off’ approach to development from former colonial powers and a particular 
reluctance to impose specific issues or values on developing countries and (2) an 
only just emerging norm on WID/GAD, this explains why UNDP’s policy was weak 
and non-conceptual, clearly avoiding any engagement with the value of the norm 
itself. 
 
iii. Explaining the level operationalisation  
 
As established above, due to UNDP’s specific organisational characteristics such as 
its source of authority, its strong procedural mandate emphasising neutrality and 
country ownership, any impetus for norm operationalisation would have had to come 
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from the Governing Council. This was especially so as there was no pressure by the 
UN system as a whole on UNDP to take specific internal actions on the norm and 
decisions on steps towards operationalisation would have also required formal 
approval by the Council (United Nations 1970a). Moreover, the 1975 Decision did 
not provide any detail on how WID/GAD should be taken up. Recall that it merely 
requests that “the integration of women in development should be a continuing 
consideration in the formulation, design and implementation of UNDP projects and 
programmes” (UNDP 1975b, para. 151). Therefore, the Administration was not 
provided with a mandate, and thus had very little freedom, to take specific action on 
the norm, relying on a push from the Governing Council to take action.  
 
However, the Governing Council’s high-level of cultural diversity, its multi-
membership and its consensus culture, coupled with only just emerging international 
recognition of WID/GAD, and a strong procedural mandate as the development 
programme of the developing countries, meant that there was no agreement on the 
value of WID/GAD and, therefore, no push for action on the norm. Notably, in a 
Governing Council session in 1976 several member states, when discussing UNDP’s 
actions on WID/GAD “referred specifically to the frank and realistic appraisal of 
limited unanimity among members participating in the discussion as to the 
importance of the subject…” (UNDP 1976a, para. 132). The Administrator endorsed 
this hands-off approach as he “… expressed agreement with the idea that the 
Programme’s major responsibility at that point was largely to develop a preparedness 
to respond when national authorities and executing agencies defined the 
opportunities” (UNDP 1976a, para. 137). Thus, the lack of agreement on the 
importance of WID/GAD in the Governing Council, a function of its specific 
organisational characteristics, meant there was no strong push for norm 
operationalisation, resulting in very little action on the norm. 
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5.2 The first high-level recognition of WID/GAD in the EC 
 
The EC first formally recognised WID in November 1982 in the Council 
Conclusions Concerning Community Development Aid in Relation to the Situation of 
Women in Developing Countries (Council of the European Communities 1982a). 
 
Which norm integration driver dominated? 
 
i. Process and timing 
 
Although the adoption of the 1982 Council Conclusions was the first high-level 
recognition of WID/GAD, it was preceded by a number of developments on 
WID/GAD in the European Parliament and the Commission that help to explain the 
decision to formally recognise WID/GAD in 1982. Notably, the first significant steps 
towards the integration of women’s issues in the EC in general were taken by the 
European Parliament in 1979 when an ad-hoc Committee on Women’s Rights was 
set up. In October 1980 the Committee organised a discussion on WID/GAD and 
invited the Commissioner for Development, Mr. Cheyson, to give a presentation on 
‘Women in Development’ (European Parliament 1980). Following this meeting, the 
Committee issued a detailed report in January 1981 on The Position of Women in the 
European Community, which included an extensive section on WID/GAD (European 
Parliament 1981). The rapporteur for the report, and also one of the most vocal 
members of the Committee on issues relating to development cooperation was a 
Dutch Member of the European Parliament (MEP), Hanja Maij-Weggen (Interview 
with Turner). 
 
The section of the report on WID/GAD is remarkable as it strongly blames gender 
inequality in developing countries on colonialism and development actors, 
suggesting that the position of women was much stronger in traditional African 
societies. Notably, the report states that “Under the influence of colonial policy…the 
role of women was gradually reduced” and that “women, who during the colonial era 
were forced into the unpaid employment sector, are frequently ignored by modern 
development experts” (European Parliament 1981, para. 14.2.1).  
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Despite this glorification of traditional African societies, the report takes a very 
strong stand against harmful traditional practices, and strongly presents the aim of 
WID/GAD as improving the position of women in developing countries, without a 
strong emphasise on effective development (European Parliament 1981, para. 
1.14.1). In addition, the report is very detailed, covering a number of different issues 
such as education, health, and work, and is very coherent.  
 
The approach taken by the report, while different from most other donor or global 
accounts of WID/GAD at the time, including the Declarations of the First and 
Second World Conferences on Women in Mexico and Copenhagen, is very similar to 
the Dutch WID/GAD policy of 1980 (United Nations 1975a, 1980).  Notably, the 
Dutch policy states that “The literature shows that the penetration of Western 
economic influence in developing countries has had a preponderantly negative effect, 
particularly on the economic independence of women in those countries” 
(Directorate General for International Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Netherlands 1980, para. 2.2). This suggests strong and direct influence on the 
content of the report by the Dutch rapporteur, Hanja Maij-Weggen. 
 
The report was followed by a Resolution of the European Parliament On the position 
of women in the European Community, which equally included a substantive section 
on WID/GAD, and strongly puts the aim of the Resolution as combating “women’s 
subordination”, another term that is not included in global documents but in the 1980 
Dutch WID/GAD policy (Directorate General for International Cooperation of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1980; Parliament 1981). 
 
The developments in the European Parliament, largely originating from the 
Women’s Committee, in particular from Maij-Weggen, a Dutch member, were 
followed by an intervention of the Dutch representatives in the Council at a meeting 
of Development Ministers in May 1981. In this meeting the Dutch representatives 
formally requested the EC to take up the issue of WID/GAD (Council of the 
European Communities 1981). It was this request from the Council that lead to the 
European Commission to draw up its first statement on WID/GAD in October 1982. 
Notably, the document entitled Women and Development in Community Practice – 
Impact of Women on Community Action explicitly states that it was written in 
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response to a “request by the Dutch delegation to take up the issue of Women in 
Development” (Commission of the European Communities 1982a, para. 1). The 
document presents a very weak account of WID/GAD, putting forward the opinion 
that focusing on one part of the population, such as women, poses the risk of creating 
“tensions in families”, and strongly stressed that development should aim to benefit 
all (Commission of the European Communities 1982a, p. 1). In line with this, the 
document states that respect for national cultures – or, indeed, the view expressed by 
national authorities – must guide any actions on WID/GAD, which are only to be 
undertaken if the partner country explicitly demands it.   
 
The Commission report does not refer to the importance of equality or rights, does 
not present WID/GAD as important for effective development, and does not provide 
any information on how the issue will be integrated in EC cooperation. Overall, the 
report does not provide a clear stand on WID/GAD and reflects a very cautious, even 
reluctant, attitude towards the issue.  Thus, it embodies a very different approach to 
the one taken in the European Parliament Report and Resolution.  
 
Following the Commission document, the Council adopted its Conclusions in 
November 1982. Thus, it seems to have been the cumulative pressure from the 
European Parliament’s Women’s Committee, spearheaded by a Dutch MEP, as well 
as the Dutch representatives in the Council that resulted in the Commission 
document, which ultimately lead to the first high-level endorsement of WID/GAD by 
the Council in 1982. The impact of explicit Dutch pressure on the adoption of the 
Conclusions is further supported by the fact that the Dutch policy on Women in 
Development of 1980 explicitly states that the Dutch government  
 
…will promote the adoption of an emancipatory development policy 
by the Common Market, a policy devoting attention to the 
advancement of women... (Directorate General for International 
Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 
1980, para. 4.2.3) 
 
Thus, the adoption of the 1982 Conclusions seems to be, at least in part, a result of a 
Dutch policy priority and pushed for by the Women’s Committee of the European 
Parliament. A prominent member of the European Parliament concurs with this 
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assessment as she stated in an interview for this thesis that “It all began in the 
Women’s Committee” (Interview with Rodano).  
 
A brief look at actions undertaken by other Committees of the European Parliament 
and by the Commission further supports this conclusion, as neither seemed to 
allocate any importance to WID/GAD in 1981/82, suggesting that it was not them 
that put pressure on the Council to adopt the Conclusions. First, the Development 
Committee of the European Parliament did not engage with WID/GAD until much 
later and then, seemingly, reluctantly. Notably, it did not appoint a rapporteur to 
react to the Resolution on women in the EC in 1981, and rejected a Motion for a 
Resolution on WID/GAD tabled by one of its members in 1982, giving the reason 
that this issue is better dealt with by the ACP-EEC institutions (European Parliament 
Committee for Development Cooperation 1983). In fact, it was not until 1986 that 
the Development Committee issued its first report on WID/GAD, and only did so 
after it was explicitly asked to do so my Parliament following the Nairobi 
conference. 
 
Similarly the Commission did not include WID/GAD in its memorandum on the 
“Community’s development policy” of October 1982 nor is WID/GAD mentioned in 
its Plan of Action to Combat World Hunger or its Action Programme on the 
Promotion of Equal Opportunities for Women (Commission of the European 
Communities 1982b, 1982a, 1981c). This strongly indicates that neither the 
Commission nor the Development Committee of the Parliament put any pressure on 
the Council to take up WID/GAD and further supports my conclusion that it was 
indeed the pressure from the Dutch through the Parliament’s Women’s Committee 
and the Council that significantly contributed to the first formal recognition of 
WID/GAD in EC development cooperation.  
 
ii. Policy approach 
 
Overall, and in contrast to UNDP, the first EC Council Conclusions on WID/GAD 
deal with conceptual issues relating to WID/GAD but are conceptually very 
incoherent.  For instance, the document strongly stresses that the aim of WID/GAD 
is not to benefit women specifically, but rather to “contribute to harmonious 
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development of the entire population” (Council of the European Communities 1982a, 
preamble). In order to achieve this, the Council “is prepared to take full account of 
the role of women in development…” (Council of the European Communities 1982a, 
preamble). Yet, the substantive part of the Conclusions present the aim of the policy 
as increasing the status of women. Notably, the document states that,  
 
The creation of income for women which contributes to the 
subsistence of the family will strengthen the position of women in 
the local community and increase their participation in the economic 
development process…Training is especially needed…with the aim 
of increasing women’s capability to manage their productive 
resources…(Access to credit) should enable women to obtain the 
production elements necessary for them to benefit fully from the 
opportunities opened up by the creation and increase of income. 
(Council of the European Communities 1982a, para. 2(c))  
 
No other justifications related to efficiency are given for these suggested 
interventions. This strongly indicates that the overall reason for integrating 
WID/GAD is not solely increasing the effectiveness of development, but also 
improving the status of women as an aim in its own right. However, the way it is 
presented – the efficiency argument being stressed in the preamble while the others 
being stressed in the substantive part of the conclusions  – illustrates a considerable 
level of conceptual incoherence in the document. 
 
The level of incoherence is even stronger when the treatment of culture is 
considered. While the preamble explicitly states that “development aid projects in 
favour of women must be carried out in conformity with the development objectives 
of the recipient country”, the substantive section of the conclusions calls on the EC 
to take action on  “cultural, religious, social and economic factors, which determine 
the status and low level of participation of women in development” (Council of the 
European Communities 1982a, preamble and para. 1(c)). 
 
iii. Level of operationalisation 1982 - 1985 
 
The first step towards norm operationalisation was taken in 1982 when the first WID 
desk in DG Development was set up. However, the WID desk was only staffed by 
one part time and one temporary post, which seemed highly inadequate considering 
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that the desk was responsible for “staff sensitisation and training, internal 
networking, provision of technical advice concerning WID/GAD, provision of 
information and preparation of studies and project and programme evaluations” 
(Commission of the European Communities 1994 p. 29). In addition, the desk was 
located in the Human Resources division in the DG giving it very little influence 
over policy-making or implementation procedures and falsely framing WID/GAD as 
a human resource issue (Colombo 1994a). 
 
Apart from the creation of the first WID desk in DG Development, there were hardly 
any other steps taken to operationalise WID/GAD in EC development cooperation. 
No training sessions on WID/GAD were held until 1985, there were no staff 
incentives for the integration of WID/GAD, no programming tools for the integration 
of WID/GAD, and no financial resources allocated to its promotion. In addition, 
WID/GAD was not taken up by other policies, whether they related to development 
or the promotion of women’s rights. Notably, the Commission’s Memorandum on 
Development Policy does not mention WID/GAD, which is not noted by any of the 
European Parliament or Council reactions to it (Commission of the European 
Communities 1982b). Also, the Action Programme on Equal Opportunities for 
Women and Men 1982-85 does not mention development or external relations, an 
oversight again not picked-up by any of the other EC institutions at the time 
(Commission of the European Communities 1981b).  
 
WID/GAD was to some extent integrated in general programming tools, such as the 
“Manual for project preparation and appraisal” and the “Handbook on project 
evaluation and assessment” (OECD 1988; European Parliament 1986a). However, 
these tools were hardly used and were overall considered ineffective. Notably, their 
use was not compulsory leading only to the “occasional existence of gender 
assessment in project design” and to some evaluations looking at WID/GAD, 
depending on the personal interest of the consultant (Commission of the European 
Communities 1985a). Thus, it seems fair to conclude that in the three years after the 
first high-level recognition, WID/GAD had not been integrated in any significant 
way in EC aid operations. 
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Table 8: Summary of WID/GAD operationalisation in EC aid 1982 - 1985 
 
iv. Summary: Which norm integration driver dominated? 
 
The above analysis of the process leading up to the Conclusions, its content, and the 
level of operationalisation show that also in the case of the EC, this first step towards 
norm integration in the Council was driven by social influence considerations. First, 
the process analysis showed that it was explicit and prolonged pressure for action on 
WID/GAD from the European Parliament that significantly contributed to the first 
high-level recognition. This suggests that the decision to adopt the Conclusions was 
overall driven by reputational concerns rooted in the need to respond to calls from 
Parliament, especially as Parliament had only just begun to be directly elected, 
giving it a particular status as representing the voice of the people of Europe. The 
decision was further facilitated by the fact that Parliamentary pressure was echoed by 
one member state in the Council, and, coupled with increased international 
recognition of the norm, which meant that most member states accepted some action 
on norm integration, as they agreed that the EC should be seen to be doing something 
on WID/GAD. Further, the policy itself is very incoherent and hardly any steps 
towards operationalisation were taken in the three years following the adoption of the 
conclusions, suggesting that this first high-level recognition was indeed dominantly 
driven by social influence considerations, rather than ethical considerations of the 
value of the norm across the organisation. 
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Why did this norm integration driver dominate? 
 
i. Explaining the timing  
 
As with UNDP, also the timing of the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD in 
the EC can be explained by reference to its organisational structure, notably its 
source of authority. The EC’s source of authority on development was, like UNDP’s, 
split between delegation by the member states and delegation by the European 
Community as a whole. This source of authority partly rooted in delegation by the 
European Community meant that the Council was to some extent susceptible to 
pressure from the European Parliament. This was especially from 1979 onwards, as 
members were now directly elected by citizens of Europe and Parliament could more 
genuinely claim that it represented the interests of the people of the Community.  
 
The particular set-up of Parliament, in turn, facilitated that the pressure exercised 
was strong indeed. First, Parliament exhibited a medium level of diversity with 
members representing a variety of different nations and political parties. Diversity 
was only ‘medium’ as members are exclusively European. Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) also had a high amount of freedom, as apart from representing 
their constituencies, they are relatively free to promote their views on matters they 
consider important, provided they are in line with the EC’s mandate and their overall 
party group (Interview with Turner; Interview with Sichrovsky). The open mandate 
of the EC in relation to development aid further increased the level of freedom of 
MEPs, providing opportunities for the inclusion of many different issues using a 
variety of different frames (Interview with Fransen). 
 
This diversity of Parliament increased the likelihood of the presence of members 
who felt strongly about WID/GAD, such as some Dutch members, and the high level 
of freedom allowed them to act on their believes and strongly push for the 
advancement of the norm in the way they saw fit. In addition, the setting-up of the 
Women’s Committee allowed for the aggregation of these MEPs, creating a highly 
homogenous group strongly committed to the intrinsic importance of equality, again, 
with a large amount of freedom to make their voices heard. It seems to have been 
this homogeneity coupled with the level of intrinsic persuasion on the issue, allowed 
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for by the medium level of diversity in the European Parliament as a whole, and the 
level of freedom to act on this persuasion, that explains the relatively early timing 
and the coherent approach focused on the intrinsic value of the norm of the Women’s 
Committee Report. 
 
Apart from the susceptibility to pressure from Parliament, the timing of this first 
high-level decision was facilitated by the medium level of diversity in the top-level 
decision-making body itself. This is illustrated by the fact that the next and most 
decisive step towards the adoption of the 1982 Conclusions was the call by the Dutch 
representative for development cooperation in the Council, and the subsequent 
Commission document. Thus, it was the presence of an intrinsically persuaded actor, 
made more likely by a medium-diverse decision-making forum, that was crucial in 
this context. This was further aided by the relatively open mandate of EC 
development cooperation, which provide considerable freedom for delegations to 
raise issues and allowed for the Dutch representative to make the case that 
WID/GAD fits squarely within the EC’s mandate. In contrast to UNDP, this freedom 
was not curtailed by a strong procedural mandate that could have discouraged the 
promotion of specific issues by donor states.  
 
ii. Explaining the approach  
 
The reason for the incoherent approach to WID/GAD was, as with UNDP, largely 
due to the composition of the EC’s top-level decision-making body, the Council. 
First, the Council is composed of all EC member states and operates on a consensus-
basis. This means that decisions are taken by a large number of principals from 
diverse cultural backgrounds (albeit less diverse than UNDP). The diversity and 
multi-membership meant that there was no agreement on the value of the norm and 
the consensus culture as well as the weak substantive mandate for development 
meant that the content of the policy had to be based on a compromise between actors 
with different views on WID/GAD. 
 
A case in point was France’s position on WID/GAD in the negotiations leading up to 
the Conclusions. France, at that time, did not want to be perceived to be interfering 
with recipient states regarding their ‘cultures and traditions’, especially in relation to 
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WID/GAD and strongly advocated for a hands-off approach to the issue (Interview 
with Maij-Weggen). The first draft of the Conclusions did not include an opening 
paragraph that stressed the primacy of national culture. In reaction to this ‘absence’, 
the French permanent representative proposed an amendment to the draft 
conclusions, suggesting the addition of the following opening paragraph, which was 
the only amendment proposed in the entire negotiation process, 
 
Desirous that its co-operation action should contribute towards the 
harmonious development of the entire population in the beneficiary 
countries the Community is prepared to begin talks with these 
countries on the question of the role of women in development. The 
Community is ready to examine with the authorities of the States 
concerned with due respect for their sovereignty and for their 
economics cultural and social organizations measures which could 
be taken to ensure that the aid is more closely integrated with the 
local situation and is therefore more effective due allowance being 
made for the traditional role and particular problems of women. 
(Council of the European Communities 1982d, p. 5) 
 
To satisfy France and solicit her agreement the Council Working group drafted the 
following paragraph, which was subsequently adopted in the final Conclusions, 
 
In adopting these conclusions, the Council, anxious that its co-
operation measures should contribute to the harmonious 
development of the entire population in the countries assisted, is 
prepared to take full account of the role of women. The Community 
is aware that development aid projects or operations in favor of 
women must be carried out in conformity with the development 
objectives of the recipient country (Council of the European 
Communities 1982b, preamble).  
 
The paragraph captures the essence of the French proposal but the actual wording is 
less evasive and less insistent on protecting the sovereignty of recipients with regard 
to WID/GAD. Still, the addition of this issue significantly contributes to the overall 
incoherence of the document.  
 
Moreover, to appease France, the Council of Ministers for Development meeting on 
8 September 1981, also agreed that the integration of WID/GAD had to “avoid 
anything that could be interpreted as interference with partner countries’ internal 
affairs as well as any philosophical or sociological discussions.” Focus was to be 
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given to “concrete examples of development projects that benefit women” 
(Commission of the European Communities 1982a, para. 2). 
 
Thus, this need for negotiation, justification, and compromise resulting from the 
multitude of views and the need for consensus reduced the freedom of committed 
actors and certainly helps to explain why the Conclusions are not strongly framed in 
intrinsic language of equality, do not aim for social transformation, do not mention 
empowerment or do not take a stronger stand on culture, and are overall incoherent – 
all of which is done, for example, by the Dutch WID/GAD policy of 1980 and the 
European Parliament Report and Resolution. However, in contrast to UNDP, the 
EC’s open mandate and less culturally diverse composition, meant that some 
member states were less concerned with promoting specific values in its 
development cooperation. In addition, in the early 1980s the WID/GAD norm had 
achieved greater international recognition which meant (1) that some member states, 
such as the Netherlands, had taken significant steps towards norm integration in their 
bilateral work and (2) that there was an emerging perception that, as a responsible 
development actor, one should be seen to be doing something on WID/GAD. This 
meant that member states pushed for stronger conceptual engagement, which 
resulted in a policy that, in contrast to UNDP, did address conceptual issues, albeit 
incoherently. 
 
iii. Explaining the level of operationalisation  
 
The reason for weak norm operationalisation was essentially twofold. First, there 
was no consistent pressure or follow-up from the Council on the level of 
implementation of the decision by the Commission and the Council had not allocated 
specific funds for this purpose. Second, weak operationalisation was related to the 
particular characteristics of the Commission. As outlined in Chapter Four, the 
Commission is characterised by relatively homogenous staff and centralised top-
level decision-making lead by the Commissioner and the Director General as well as 
an identity conception focused on delegation. The former meant that the likelihood 
of a strongly persuaded top-level decision-maker was lower than in the Council 
while the latter meant that  (1) action in the Commission was dependent on a strong 
and explicit push from the Council to implement specific actions and that (2) the 
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freedom of staff to pursue their own personal beliefs was highly limited. Yet, as seen 
above, no strong and explicit push towards specific actions on WID/GAD was 
exercised by the Council after the adoption of the Conclusions. 
 
However, as the Conclusions had given the Commission a mandate to take action, 
norm operationalisation could have also resulted from a strong push from the 
Commissioner or the Director General, which, however, would have required them 
to be strongly persuaded of WID/GAD, the likelihood of which was reduced as 
explained above. Indeed, interviews suggest that the then Commissioner for 
Development, Chyson, as well as the Director General did not seem particularly 
committed to the issue and did not push for action on WID/GAD inside the 
Commission (Interview with Rodano; Interview with Maij-Weggen; Interview with 
Hemeldonck). Such an absence of individuals strongly committed to the norm, 
coupled with the limited amount of freedom of operational staff, meant that hardly 
any action on operationalising WID/GAD was taken inside the Commission. 
 
Despite the limiting effect of diversity on comprehensive norm operationalization, it 
was the same structural characteristic, combined with an increasingly strong 
international momentum on the norm and the ability of member states to earmark 
funding for WID/GAD that allowed for the few steps towards operationalization to 
take place. Notably, the establishment of the WID/GAD desk was a result of direct 
pressure from a member state in the Council of Ministers and the WID/GAD posts 
were directly funded by a number of specific member states (Commission of the 
European Communities 1984b, p. 22). 
 
Thus, in short, the mild diversity of the Council allowed for some steps of 
operationalisation to take place, while at the same time providing an obstacle for 
strong and consistent pressure for action on WID/GAD that would have facilitated 
comprehensive norm operationalisation. The homogeneity of decision-making in the 
Commission facilitated the absence of persuaded decision-makers and, coupled with 
a lack of freedom for action of operational staff, and no strong push from the 
Council, made operationalisation of WID/GAD weak. 
 
 130 
5.3 The first high-level recognition of WID/GAD in ODA 
 
The UK aid administration adopted its first official WID/GAD policy in 1986. Until 
then the administration had not taken WID/GAD up in its official discourse or 
operations despite the global trend and momentum created by the three International 
Women Conferences and the adoption of specific OECD/DAC WID guidelines in 
1983 (OECD 1983; Cassen 1982; Eyben 2003; Ryrie 1984; Conlin 1985; ODA 
1982). ODA’s lack of action on WID during this early period was such that the 
OECD/DAC considered the UK “...as one of the major obstacles to mainstreaming 
WID issues in the work of the DAC” (Eyben 2003, p. 883). 
 
Which norm integration driver dominated? 
 
i. Process and timing 
 
ODA’s decision to publish its first WID strategy was not preceded by any 
preparatory action inside the department or any pressure exerted by government or 
Parliament. Notably, an analysis of parliamentary debates in the years and months 
prior to the drafting of the policy show that the issue of WID was only very scarcely 
mentioned. Even though the Third World Conference on Women brought a number 
of issues on women to the forefront, these were largely related to the ratification of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(Hansard, 19 June 1985, 20 February 1986). In addition, an agenda item called 
“Advancement of Women” appeared frequently across many different issues areas 
after the conference. However, the specific issue of women in development was only 
raised three times during 1985 and 1986. All three contributions essentially requested 
more information on what ODA was doing to promote women in development and 
asked how ODA assessed the extent to which its interventions were effective 
(Hansard, 01 July 1985). Having said that, the questions were posed with 
considerable time lapses between them and no specific questions or requests were 
made regarding the drafting of a WID policy in the two years prior to its adoption. 
This hardly seems to amount to significant pressure on ODA from Parliament. 
 
 131 
What, then, lead to the adoption of this policy? Interviews with former ODA officials 
and women’s advocates, as well as written accounts by observers, strongly indicate 
that it was specific pressure exercised by a group called the ‘WID lobby’ that 
resulted in the adoption of the first WID/GAD policy. This ‘WID lobby’ consisted of 
“a loose network of women academics working in the field of gender and 
development studies, joined by some women in development NGOs and the British 
Council” (Eyben 2007, p. 68). According to Rosalind Eyben, ODA/DFID Social 
Development Advisor from 1986 – 2000 it was this group that created a “push” and 
that “the booklet was produced for this reason” (Interview with Eyben). A number of 
other commentators interviewed for this thesis concur with this assessment 
(Interview with Holden; Interview with Beall). Interestingly, although it seems to 
have been efforts by a national WID lobby, the lobby did use the momentum of the 
global 1985 Nairobi conference to organise itself and to commence its direct lobby 
efforts. This was done through a meeting between the lobby and a Junior Foreign 
Office Minster present at the Nairobi conference (Interview with Eyben). This lobby 
meeting was followed by a subsequent meeting in London with senior staff in ODA, 
which became the first in a series of regular meetings between the Lobby and ODA 
officials that lasted well into the 1990s (Interview with Eyben; Interview with 
Moser). Thus, the available accounts of the time leading up to the 1986 booklet and 
interviews with key actors do indeed suggest that the pressures of the national lobby, 
that gained momentum through the global Nairobi conference, was a decisive factor 
that lead to the drafting of ODA’s first WID policy.  
 
However, why was it this particular conference and this particular lobby group that 
lead to the adoption of a WID policy? A tentative answer to these questions is that 
the WID lobby did, indeed, only get increasingly organised around the Nairobi 
conference, and, thus, managed to exercised more effective pressure on ODA than 
before (Interview with Moser). This was further aided by the momentum created by 
the Nairobi conference, which increased the pressure on ODA to take action on WID 
more so than the previous two conferences. In addition, the WID lobby, although 
including a broad range of actors, was relatively aligned with government priorities. 
This was so especially in contrast to a British women’s network that had lobbied on 
the inclusion of WID into ODA prior to the mid-1980s. This group, called the 
“Subordination of Women Group” (SOW) was very active in the 1970s on a broad 
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range of issues, including WID. Politically rooted in socialism, this group had a very 
transformative vision aiming for significant changes in the way in which 
development agencies – and governments in general – approached issues of gender, 
power, and social relations (Interview with Beall; Interview with Young). It seems 
that the lobby’s strong ‘transformative’ approach, as well as its focus on training, 
research, and capacity building of women’s groups in developing countries as 
opposed to focused lobbying of ODA meant that SOW did not have any significant 
impact on the uptake of WID/GAD by ODA (Interview with Young). This suggests 
that a combination of concerted lobby efforts, increased access to decision-makers, 
and increased global momentum on WID – all of which were facilitated by the 
World Conferences – combined with a lobby group fairly aligned with government 
priorities, contributed to the drafting of the first WID policy by ODA.  
 
ODA’s decision to publish its first WID strategy in 1986 is, thus, significant in three 
regards. First, it suggests that ODA was not significantly susceptible to external 
pressures – be they at global (UN) or regional (OECD/DAC) level. Interestingly, 
even the need to report on its implementation on the OECD/DAC’s WID guidelines 
in 1983/84 did not seem to have resulted in any kind of significant action inside the 
organisation. This indicates that externally generated pressure did not lead to any 
kind of norm integration process – not even one driven by social influence. Second, 
the timing of the first policy suggests that there was no strong internal commitment 
to promote the agenda at top-level in government or ODA. Had such an internal push 
existed, action on WID/GAD would have, most likely, been taken significantly 
earlier (Interview with Eyben). Third, the timing suggests that ODA was susceptible 
to certain kinds of national pressures, albeit only those closely aligned with its 
political ideology and identity perception. 
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ii. The policy approach 
 
The policy shows a high level of conceptual incoherence and indicates an overall 
very weak commitment to WID/GAD, compared to other donors and the global 
discourse at the time (Andersen and Baud 1987, p. 230). Notably, it does not mention 
equality between men and women. It merely recognises women’s contribution to 
development and states that the aid programme has aimed to meet their specific 
needs and interests. The overall aim of British aid is clearly stated as helping the 
“economic and social development of the world’s poorest countries” and women are 
presented as an important “resource” to this end (ODA 1986, p. 1). 
 
Further, the policy presents WID issues as only relevant in specific areas and not 
across the entire aid programme and takes a strong view against influencing recipient 
government’s stance on WID (ODA 1986, p. 6). Lastly, the policy includes a strange 
division of projects regarding WID. Notably, it is suggested to divide projects into, 
  
…those which have an impact on society in general – but for which 
it would be impossible to ascertain the impact on women in 
particular; those which can be expected to have an impact on 
women, but whose benefits do not depend on women being 
agents…; and those where benefits will accrue to women and where 
women’s role is crucial in implementing the project. (ODA 1986, p. 
6) 
 
This formulation did not reflect the global or regional discourse at the time 
(Andersen and Baud 1987, p. 230), which suggests that the drafters did not aim to 
please an external audience or had much expertise in this field.  
 
Thus, overall, the approach to WID taken by the policy is incoherent and no 
meaningful discussion of the types of challenges women face, or what ODA will do 
to address them, is provided, suggesting weak commitment to the norm. This 
conclusion is further supported by findings from a number of NGO reports on the 
policy published at the time. Notably, a War on Want report published in 1988 finds 
that, “Policies in this area are a low cost public relations exercise to satisfy the 
Development Assistance Committee, lobbyists on the UN Decade for Women and 
public opinion” (Mazza 1988, p. 29).  
 
 134 
iii. Level of operationalisation 1986 – 1987 
 
In contrast to many development actors, ODA did not establish a post specifically 
dedicated to WID/GAD, as the issue was formally placed under the responsibility of 
two Social Development Advisors. This set-up was considered grossly unsatisfactory 
and reflected a very limited commitment to actual norm uptake by senior 
management (Eyben 2003, p. 881). There were no staff incentives for including WID 
in other official’s work and WID was not part of staff performance reviews (Jensen 
2006, p. 25). 
 
Programming tools specifically for WID were scarce, consisting of the 1988 strategy, 
which will be analysed in the next Chapter, and a checklist developed in the mid-
1970s that was very limited in its utility and actual use (Mazza 1988, p. 21 and p. 
39). The use of the programming tools on WID was not compulsory.  
 
An analysis of a number of general programming tools strongly suggests that they 
had not adequately taken up WID. Notably, the guidelines Planning Development 
Projects issued in 1987 do not mention WID at all, even though they include a list of 
social issues (education, health, housing, water, wastewater and sewage) (O.D.A. 
1987). Moreover, the guidelines include key questions for each issue to help guide 
programming. None of the questions include sex-disaggregation and reference is 
only made to generic groups such as “student” and “people”.  
 
The 1988 document on Appraisals of Projects in Developing Countries explicitly 
refers to gender but merely states that it is ‘obvious’ and does not require special 
consideration as it will be taken into account if appropriate (ODA 1988a). This 
suggests, yet again, a weak approach to WID/GAD reflecting limited understanding 
and/or engagement with the concept. No budget was allocated to the implementation 
of the WID policies and no systematic staff training on WID/GAD was put in place.   
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Table 9: Summary of WID/GAD operationalisation in ODA 1986 - 1989 
 
 
The above strongly suggests that the norm was only weakly operationalised in the 
three years following the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD. A report 
published by War on Want report comes to the same conclusion:  
 
The few women and development policies that do exist are 
ineffective….the checklist and guidelines are not used…There are 
few safeguards of women’s interests. Project planners and 
evaluators do not have to prove that they have taken women into 
account...Above all, policy on women and development is just not 
taken seriously.” (Mazza 1988, p. 39) 
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iv. Summary: Which norm integration driver dominated? 
 
The above analysis strongly suggests that also ODA’s first step towards norm 
integration was driven by social influence. Importantly, prior to the adoption of the 
policy, there was no pressure to take action on WID/GAD from inside ODA or from 
government or parliament. Yet, there was emerging pressure from a group of CSOs 
ideologically aligned with government, which started to call for action on the norm. 
This, together with testimonials of ODA officials who worked there at the time, 
suggests that it was this reputational pressure that lead to the adoption of the first 
ODA WID/GAD policy. Moreover, the analysis of the policy itself and the level of 
operationalisation, both of which are very weak, further suggest that norm 
integration was indeed driven by social influence considerations rather than ethical 
considerations relating to the intrinsic or instrumental value of the norm. 
 
Why did this norm integration driver dominate? 
 
i. Explaining the timing  
 
The timing of the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD by ODA can be 
explained by reference to its particular organisational structure. First, being bilateral 
and part of the Foreign Office, ODA had a source of authority ‘delegated’ by the 
British government and a mandate dominated by a desire to act in the UK’s national, 
particularly commercial, interest (Ryrie 1984). Combined with financial autonomy 
from external sources, this meant that ODA was not overly concerned with looking 
like it was acting in line with global development trends, making it virtually immune 
to external global pressure and scrutiny, at least in relation to WID/GAD. Yet, its 
structural set-up meant that it was susceptible to pressure from national CSOs more 
or less in line with the current government’s political ideology. Thus, the ‘nature of 
scrutinisers’ was fairly homogenous and aligned with government ideology. This 
meant that any action on WID/GAD would need to be triggered by either internal 
pressure or pressure from specific national CSOs. 
 
The presence of internal pressure was made less likely due to the relatively 
homogenous top-level decision making involving only very few actors and helps to 
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explain why no pressure for action on WID/GAD from inside ODA was exercised. 
Thus, action on WID/GAD relied on pressure from specific national CSOs who got 
organised and got access to decision-makers around the Third World Conference on 
Women. 
 
ii. Explaining the approach  
 
The ease at which the decision to draft the first WID policy was taken, and its 
incoherent content, was closely linked to the homogeneity and informal decision-
making in the organisation and its limited exposure to scrutiny, all of which meant 
that norm uptake depended largely on the interest of a few individuals inside the 
organisation. Indeed, this was the case with the 1986 WID policy.   The policy was 
drafted by the, then, Chief Social Development Advisor, Sean Conlin in cooperation 
with the information office (Interview with Eyben). There was no consultation within 
or outside ODA and the policy was never discussed and approved in any formal 
setting (Interview with Eyben). Thus, the drafting process was low-profile and non-
participatory and can be characterised as homogeneous, centralised, and informal, 
providing operational staff with considerable freedom and almost no scrutiny. This 
meant that staff’s personal conviction and knowledge regarding the norm could be 
fairly directly included in the policy, resulting in a strong reliance on the level and 
nature of operational staff’s personal commitment to the norm to determine the 
dominant norm integration process. This, coupled with a lack of strongly intrinsically 
committed individuals in the drafting process, lead to a weak and incoherent policy 
(Interview with Eyben).  
 
iii. Explaining the level of operationalisation  
 
The reasons for the very limited steps towards norm operationalisation taken by 
ODA around the adoption of the first policy are rooted in the same structural 
characteristics that explained the late timing and weak policy approach. As a bilateral 
agency, ODA was only susceptible to scrutiny from particular groups that were fairly 
homogenous and did not call for action on WID/GAD (government, parliament and 
certain CSOs). Without such pressure, ODA relied on an internal push to take action 
on the norm. Yet, its homogenous decision-making structure that was dominated by 
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only very few actors made the presence of a decision-maker willing to call for action 
on the norm unlikely.  This was especially so as ODA had a weak mandate on 
development and WID/GAD would not have easily fit as a priority issues for the 
department.  
 
Having said that, the large amount of freedom for operational staff – a result of 
ODA’s open mandate and its informal decision-making structure – would have made 
it possible for staff to take action, especially low-cost action, on the norm (as will be 
seen later). Yet, this move would have required operational staff who were 
personally driven to take action on WID/GAD, as there was no pressure to do so 
from senior management. As outlined above, this was not the case in ODA at that 
time, explaining the weak level of norm operationalisation. 
 
5.4 The explanatory power of organisational characteristics summarised 
 
The analysis above has established that the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD 
happened at very different times in the three organisations and that in each case, this 
development was driven by social influence considerations rather than instrumental 
ethical or intrinsic ethical considerations.  It was also shown that, despite a common 
dominance of social influence, the strength of norm uptake differed considerably 
between the three organisations with ODA exhibiting the weakest norm uptake, 
while both UNDP and the EC showing signs of stronger norm uptake.   
 
It has further been argued that both, the different timings of the first high-level 
recognition, as well as the dominance of social influence and the variance in norm 
uptake were in each case influenced by specific organisational characteristics. This 
section briefly summarises these arguments in preparation for an expansion of the 
analysis in the next Chapter. 
 
Explaining the timing 
 
The difference in timing of the first high-level recognition of the norm was largely 
due to the organisations’ different (1) sources of authority leading to susceptibility to 
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scrutiny from different kinds of ‘scrutinisers’; (2) their substantive mandate; and (3) 
the composition of their decision-making bodies. 
 
Both the EC and the UNDP had a split source of delegated authority, with UNDP’s 
authority being partly rooted in delegation from the UN system and partly from its 
member states, and the EC looking to its member states on the one hand, and the 
European Parliament, on the other. This meant that both organisations were 
susceptible to scrutiny from a variety of different groups, making the nature of their 
‘scrutinisers’ multiple and diverse, thereby increasing the likelihood of the presence 
of a scrutiniser that speaks out on behalf of the norm. In the case of the EC it was the 
Women’s Committee of the European Parliament that played this role, while in the 
case of UNDP it was ECOSOC.  
 
In addition, UNDP’s substantive mandate, although fairly weak at the time, was still 
relatively strongly focused on promoting global development, especially compared to 
the EC whose main task was to promote European integration. This further increased 
UNDP’s  susceptibility to pressure from global development trends, helping to 
explain why it was the first to take action on WID/GAD. 
 
ODA, due to its bilateral nature and its resulting source of authority being delegated 
by the UK government and its very weak mandate on global development, in 
contrast, was almost ‘immune’ to external, global pressure and only susceptible to 
scrutiny from a fairly homogenous and small group of scrutinisers (NGOs of similar 
political ideology, members of parliament of same political party), which is why it 
took much longer for the ‘scrutinisers’ to get organised and put pressure on ODA to 
take action on WID/GAD.  
 
Viewing the organisations in this light explains why they took action on WID/GAD 
at such different times, as they were all susceptible to different kinds of pressure. Out 
of the three, only UNDP was significantly susceptible to global pressure, while it 
required pressure from the European Parliament and British NGOs respectively to 
push the EC and ODA to act.   
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Moreover, the timing of WID/GAD uptake was influenced by the composition of the 
decision-making forum of the organisations, particularly the number of principals 
and their cultural diversity. This was especially so once the norm had become 
increasingly internationally recognised in the early 1980s. Notably, in the case of the 
EC it was explicit pressure from one vocal member state – the presence of which was 
facilitated by its multi-member and diverse decision-making body – that led to the 
adoption of the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD. Yet, in contrast to UNDP, 
cultural diversity was only mild and the EC’s mandate was not strongly focused on 
neutrality and ownership of developing countries. Combined with an increased 
international recognition, this decreased the reluctance of members to speak out for 
WID/GAD in the Council and decreased the opposition from others to take some 
action on the norm.  
 
The flipside of the argument can also be illustrated by reference to ODA. In this case 
it was the homogenous and small number of principals that decreased the likelihood 
of the presence of a vocal protagonist who could have instigated action on the norm.  
None were present, making any action on the norm entirely reliant on external 
pressure, to which ODA was hardly susceptible, explaining the late adoption of its 
WID/GAD policy. 
 
Explaining the policy approach 
 
Overall, the approaches to WID/GAD dominant in the reviewed policies were to a 
significant extent influenced by the (1) composition of the decision-making bodies; 
(2) the decision-making process; (3) the strength of the mandate and (4) the resulting 
level of freedom of actors to promote the norm as they saw fit. 
 
UNDP’s approach was largely determined by the high-level of diversity and multi-
membership of the Governing Council, which meant that there was no agreement on 
the value of the norm, and its consensus-based decision-making. Combined with its 
weak substantive, yet strong procedural mandate focused on neutrality and 
developing country ownership, this meant that there was no freedom for vocal actors 
to push the norm as they saw fit, especially in an international context in the mid-
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1970s when the norm was only just emerging.  This resulted in a weak and non-
conceptual approach to WID/GAD. 
 
Similarly, the EC’s approach was strongly influenced by the medium level diversity 
and multi-membership of the Council and its consensus-based decision-making, 
which meant that there was no agreement on the value of the norm. However, in 
contrast to UNDP, the EC’s mandate, which allowed for the promotion of European 
values, and less culturally diverse composition meant that some member states had a 
greater degree of freedom as they were less concerned with promoting specific 
values through development cooperation. In addition, by the 1980s the norm had 
achieved greater international recognition. This explains the weak and incoherent, 
although more conceptually engaged, approach taken by the EC. 
 
In the case of ODA, which was the weakest of the three in terms of policy coherence 
and operationalisation, social influence considerations drove norm integration 
precisely due to the homogeneity and informal decision-making in the organisation, 
its weak mandate and its resulting limited exposure to scrutiny, all of which meant 
that norm uptake depended largely on the interest of a few individuals inside the 
organisation. As the case study showed, the few individuals involved in WID/GAD 
in ODA in the mid 1980s were not particularly interested in the norm, explaining the 
overall dominance of social influence and the fact that ODA was the last to take up 
WID/GAD and did so in the weakest way. 
 
Explaining the level of operationalisation  
 
The above account has shown that two structural characteristics - diversity and multi-
membership - made comprehensive operationalisation difficult, especially in a 
consensus-based decision-making forum, as there was no agreement on the value of 
the norm. The cases of the EC and UNDP illustrated this point very well. However, it 
was the same diversity and multi-membership that also facilitated earlier steps 
towards norm operationalisation in both UNDP and the EC. ODA, with a 
homogenous and limited membership decision-making structure and only weak 
susceptibility to scrutiny saw no steps towards operationalisation during the 1970s 
and early 1980s. Similarly, the Commission, being very homogenous, centralised and 
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only mildly susceptible to scrutiny, did not take significant action on WID/GAD 
either. This suggests that diversity and multi-membership, two features characteristic 
of multilateral aid agencies, are a double-edged sword for norm integration. While 
they facilitate some action on the norm – potentially more so than homogeneity and 
limited number of principals in decision-making – also seem to be obstacles to 
comprehensive norm uptake. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Chapter has shown that in all three cases norm integration was driven by social 
influence rather than ethical considerations. The only instance in which ethical 
considerations seemed to dominate was in the Women’s Committee of the European 
Parliament. This was due to the fact that there was no agreement on, or appreciation 
of, the value of the norm among top-level decisions makers in either organisation – a 
factor, which was strongly influenced by organisational characteristics. In UNDP and 
the EC/EU this lack of agreement was a result of the high and medium level of 
cultural diversity and multi-membership in decision-making, coupled with 
consensus-based decision-making, which meant that action on the norm required 
negotiation, justification, and compromise, thereby reducing the freedom and power 
of committed actors at different levels to take action on the norm as they saw fit. In 
the case of ODA/DFID, the homogenous decision-making structure on WID/GAD 
and the few decision-makers involved meant that staff would have had ample 
freedom to promote the norm as they saw fit. Yet, the absence of committed 
decision-makers and staff – again a function of the homogeneity and limited number 
of decision-makers – made the presence of committed actors less likely. Indeed, no 
committed actors were present and, coupled with ODA/DFID’s low susceptibility to 
scrutiny, this meant that ODA/DFID was the slowest to take action on WID/GAD 
and, when it did, took very weak action indeed. 
 
Importantly, the Chapter has also found that the same characteristics that made 
UNDP and the EC less likely to have norm integration driven by ethical 
considerations – multi-membership and cultural diversity of decision-making 
structures – if combined with an open mandate and strong susceptibility to scrutiny 
to multiple and diverse ‘scrutinisers’ (in the case of UNDP), helped to kick-start 
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some kind of action on the norm.   Yet, to repeat, it was also the same diversity and 
multi-membership in the case of UNDP and the EC that lead to an incoherent policy 
approach and patchy operationalisation.  
 
Multilateral organisations might, therefore, be better (faster and slightly more 
comprehensive) at initial norm uptake than their bilateral counterparts. However, the 
Chapter also clearly shows that this was more related to their heightened reputational 
concerns than greater sensitivity to ethical considerations as norm integration in 
neither organisation was driven by ethical considerations.  
 
In summary, the Chapter suggests that certain characteristics typical of multilateral 
organisations – multi-membership and cultural diversity in decision-making – if 
combined with an open mandate and, especially if combined with strong susceptible 
to scrutiny from multiple scrutinisers, make organisations more likely to take some 
kind of quick action on a new norm. Yet, the same characteristics reduce the 
likelihood of agreement on and appreciating of the norm, leading to negotiation, 
justification and compromise, all of which reduce the freedom and resources of 
committed actors, if present, to have their beliefs on the norm drive norm integration. 
Characteristics most typical of bilateral organisations, on the other hand – few 
members and homogenous decision-making and weak susceptibility to scrutiny – if 
not combined with a committed top-level decision-maker, make these organisations 
slow to take any action on the norm, and when they do, make the action likely to be 
very weak indeed. 
 
The above indicates that, although organisational characteristics specific to 
multilateral or bilateral organisations influence when and how a norm may be taken 
up by an organisation, the importance of ethical considerations in norm integration 
seems to be minimal in all cases. This insight certainly calls into question simplistic 
assertions on the importance of ethics in norm integration and especially, any kind of 
generic claims that multilateral organisations, due to their structural set-up, are more 
likely to be guided by ethical considerations than their bilateral counterparts. 
 
However, so far, the analysis has only focused on one key moment very early in the 
norm integration process in each organisation, making the above findings highly 
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tentative. In order to expand the analysis and test the above findings, the following 
Chapter considers the second key moment in norm integration: the adoption of the 
first comprehensive WID/GAD strategy. 
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Chapter 6: First comprehensive WID/GAD strategy or policy 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous Chapter has analysed the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD in 
UNDP, the EC, and ODA and has put forward two arguments. First, it has made the 
case that in all three organisations the first formal step towards norm integration was 
dominantly driven by social influence considerations rather than considerations 
relating to the value of the norm as such. Second, the Chapter has argued that the 
dominance of this particular norm integration driver was significantly influenced by 
the organisations’ specific organisational characteristics. In particular, it was 
suggested that certain characteristics most typical of multilateral aid organisations – 
cultural diversity and multi-membership in decision-making bodies, and consensus-
based decision-making – make strong norm integration, comprehensive and coherent 
policies, and the dominance of intrinsic ethical arguments for norm integration, all of 
which are indicative of norm integration overall driven by ethical considerations, 
unlikely. This is so because these characteristics make an agreement on, and 
appreciation of, the value of the norm among decision-makers less probable, thereby 
leading to negotiation, justification and compromise. These, in turn, make coherent 
policies and comprehensive norm operationalisation less likely. Yet, it was also 
shown that the same characteristics, if combined with strong susceptibility to 
scrutiny from diverse scrutinisers, made the organisations quick at taking some kind 
of action on an emerging norm.  
 
Moreover, and critically, the Chapter also suggested that characteristics most typical 
of bilateral aid organisations – cultural homogeneity and few members in decision-
making –equally provide a constraining environment for ethical considerations to 
drive norm integration, as they make the presence of a committed top-level decision-
maker less likely. The absence of such top-level commitment, combined with low 
levels of susceptibility to scrutiny, made ODA even less likely to take any kind of 
action on WID/GAD than UNDP and the EU.  
 
Thus, the Chapter provides a first set of arguments suggesting that ethical 
considerations did not matter much at all in the norm integration processes analysed 
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in all three organisations. In other words, the findings provide little support for the 
claim that ethical considerations matter at all. More specifically, although 
multilateral organisations may be quicker at new norm uptake, the findings provide 
no support for the claim that they provide a more conducive environment for ethical 
considerations to matter. 
 
This Chapter expands the analysis to the first comprehensive WID/GAD strategy 
adopted by each organisation. It proceeds like the previous Chapter by first 
establishing which norm integration driver dominated the process and subsequently 
examines if this dominance was influenced by organisational characteristics.  
 
The Chapter finds that the adoption of the first comprehensive WID/GAD strategy 
and norm integration in the subsequent three years was also overall driven by social 
influence considerations in each organisation. As in the previous Chapter, the simple 
and overarching reason for this was the continued lack of agreement on, and 
appreciation of, the importance and value of the norm by the organisations’ top-level 
decisions makers. The same organisational characteristics noted in Chapter Five – 
multi-membership and culturally diverse decision-making bodies, and consensus-
based decision-making processes – are found to have made such an agreement more 
difficult; while homogeneity and few decision-makers made any kind of appreciation 
of the value unlikely. 
 
Yet as Chapter Five, this Chapter finds that characteristics most typical of 
multilateral organisations – cultural diversity, multi-membership and high levels of 
susceptibility to scrutiny – were also instrumental in facilitating action on the norm, 
as they increased the likelihood of the presence of committed and vocal decision-
makers who put the issue on the organisations’ agenda, making norm 
operationalisation in UNDP and the EC slightly more comprehensive than in ODA. 
 
The one remarkable difference between this Chapter and the previous one is that in 
this second step towards norm uptake there was a visible presence of ‘pockets of 
ethical commitment’ that drove parts of the norm integration process in all three 
organisations reflected in more coherent policies and strategies. In each case, this 
was largely enabled by the presence of committed individuals at decision-making 
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and/or operational level in each organisation who were – albeit to different levels – 
enabled to act on their personal ethical commitment due to increasing operational 
freedom. Yet, in all three organisations, these individuals did not have significant 
decision-making power or resources and, therefore, did not manage to influence the 
overall process that drove norm integration across their organisations.  
 
Crucially, the presence, and level of freedom, power11, and resources of committed 
decision-makers and operational staff – and thus, their ability to influence norm 
integration – was significantly conditioned by organisational characteristics. 
Notably, in the case of UNDP and the EU the Administrator and some member states 
respectively seemed very committed to the norm but certain organisational 
characteristics of UNDP’s and the EU’s decision-making bodies, especially their 
diversity and multi-membership, which made agreement on the value of the norm 
less likely, reduced the freedom of these decision-makers and committed operational 
staff, where present, to act on their beliefs. In other words, organisational 
characteristics most typical of multilateral organisations (diversity and multi-
membership) provided some kind of ‘straight jacket’ for committed decision-makers 
and, even more so, operational staff, to have their ethical commitments to the norm 
drive norm integration at organisational-level. 
 
Yet, the example of ODA shows that also the reverse characteristics – homogeneity 
and few members in decision-making – can provide a constraining environment 
because they make the presence of a committed top-level decision-maker less likely. 
This absence of a committed decision-maker, in the case of ODA during the second 
key moment, coupled with low susceptibility to scrutiny, meant that committed 
operational staff, when present, were also not given the freedom, power, or resources 
to have their ethical beliefs on the norm drive norm integration. This explains why 
norm integration in all three cases was dominantly driven by social influence at the 
level of the organisation. 
 
                                                
11 “Power” in this context refers to “decision-making power”, such as the inclusion in certain 
decision-making fora.  
 148 
6.1 The first comprehensive WID/GAD strategy or policy in UNDP 
 
Which norm integration driver dominated? 
 
i. Process and timing 
 
UNDP adopted its first comprehensive WID/GAD strategy in 1986. This section 
shows that the decision to adopt this strategy was a result of (1) specific pressure 
from certain vocal member states, combined with highly critical findings of UNDP’s 
norm integration efforts by an inter-organisational assessment, (2) the increased 
global momentum on the norm around the Third World Conference on Women, and 
(3) personal commitment by the new UNDP Administrator, Bill Draper. Each point 
is illustrated below. 
 
Pressure from vocal member states and global momentum: Since the first high-level 
recognition of WID/GAD in 1975 there was increasing pressure for action emerging 
from specific member states in the Governing Council, particularly the Nordics, 
Canada, and the United States. These countries started to regularly ask for updates on 
UNDP action on norm integration and frequently expressed concern that not enough 
was being done. Notably, the Nordics stated in a debate on a WID/GAD evaluation 
carried out in 1982 that “the report gave reasons for serious concerns” and that “the 
Nordic countries believed that action to ensure that women become both participants 
and beneficiaries of technical co-operation activities should be continued and 
intensified..,” (UNDP 1982b, para. 20 and 21). 
 
In response to these concerns and with a view to the Third World Conference on 
Women to be held in 1985 the Governing Council decided in 1982 to undertake an 
inter-organisational assessment of the integration of WID/GAD into a number UN 
agencies, including UNDP. The decision clearly states that, 
 
…suitable evaluation studies should be prepared …for presentation 
to, and use by, the World Conference that will be convened in 1985 
to review and appraise the achievements of the United Nations 
Decade for Women. (UNDP 1982a, para. 49(d))   
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The findings of this assessment, published in March 1985, were highly critical and 
strongly called on UNDP, as well as the other UN agencies, to take more systematic 
action on the norm (UNDP 1985c, para. 89). Notably, the assessment stated that, 
there was a “neglect of women’s interests” in many projects reviewed and that this 
was most likely because “existing guidelines and instructions are not being adhered 
to” (UNDP 1985c, para. 87). It explicitly concludes that “A call for action needs to 
focus on how to surmount the obstacles rather than dwell on accomplishments” 
(UNDP 1985c, para. 98). The critical findings of this evaluation were put forward as 
one key rational for the adoption of the strategy. Notably, the Administrator 
explicitly states in his report of 1985 that, “…based on the recommendations of the 
study brought forth, UNDP is launching a major strategy to encourage greater 
involvement of women in all UNDP supported projects and programmes” (UNDP 
1985c, para. 16).  
 
In addition, strong and explicit calls from the Nordics and a few other supportive 
countries for more action on the norm continued and intensified. For instance in June 
1985, the Nordics explicitly stated that they, “…strongly favoured improving the 
situation of women and bringing them into the mainstream of the development 
process” (UNDP 1985e, para. 23). They were strongly supported by the Netherlands, 
Canada and the US (UNDP 1985e, para. 30 and 37). Indeed, it was Canada that put 
forward a proposal to develop a strategy for WID/GAD implementation with 
“verifiable objectives and a time-frame for implementation” (UNDP 1985d, para. 
30). This call for a strategy was explicitly endorsed by the United States delegation 
(UNDP 1985d, para. 33). 
 
Following this pressure from Canada, the US and the Nordics, and the negative 
findings of the inter-organisational assessment, the Governing Council officially 
requested the Administrator in 1985 “to develop…an internal implementation 
strategy to strengthen the capacity of the Programme to deal with issues of women in 
development….” (UNDP 1985d, para. 3).  
 
Commitment by the UNDP Administrator Bill Draper: In addition to pressure by 
specific countries and the negative findings of the assessment, accounts from 
WID/GAD officials who worked in UNDP at the time suggest that the new 
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Administration played an important role in the adoption of the strategy. Notably, one 
WID/GAD specialist interviewed for this thesis stated that, “He (Draper) wanted to 
make this a landmark for himself and his position. He wanted this to be his…He 
pushed the issue strongly” (Interview with Eide). This view is further supported by a 
number of senior UNDP officials interviewed for this thesis. (Interview with Eide; 
Interview with Hamadeh; Interview with Leitner; Interview with Reid). Indeed, when 
asked why the first WID/GAD strategy was adopted, another former WID/GAD 
official simply and firmly proclaimed “Draper – it was Draper!” (Interview with 
Hamadeh). Murphy further endorses the personal commitment of Draper in his 
detailed account of UNDP when he states that “Bill Draper put attention to women 
and advocacy for women at the centre of the Programme’s work” (Murphy 2006, p. 
205). Draper himself made a strong statement to the Governing Council to this 
effect. He stated that “Rather than rhetoric, a genuine commitment was required on 
the part of the United Nations agencies, and donor and recipient countries. As far as 
UNDP was concerned, he had already made that commitment…” (UNDP 1986c, 
para. 46). 
 
Yet, interestingly, UNDP staff who worked with Draper also strongly assert that 
Draper’s commitment was to a significant extent based on the fact that there was a 
increasing international momentum and strong pressure by some member states on 
UNDP to take action on WID/GAD, not a strong belief in the value of gender 
equality as such (Geisler 1999). According to a former Head of the WID Division, 
“..he (Draper) he was extremely conservative…he was a practical and very 
successful capitalist and he was committed to the issue but not with an intellectual 
understanding of it” (Interview with Eide). Another high-level UNDP official sated 
that WID/GAD was simply a “fashion” and that this “fashion had a constituency so 
“he (Draper) went along with it (WID/GAD) like they (Heads of Agency) go along 
with other topics” (Interview with Kaul) Yet, “personally, he was as favourable of 
women’s issues as he was of other issues” (Interview with Kaul). In other words, 
these accounts suggest that Draper’s commitment to WID/GAD was less motivated 
by a strong personal belief in the value of gender equality and more motivated by his 
susceptibility to political pressure on WID/GAD and a recognition that the 
promotion of the issue was a political opportunity for himself and UNDP. Thus, 
although Draper’s personal commitment seems to have been very important in these 
 151 
developments, the analysis suggests that his commitment was considerably driven by 
political and reputational consideration relating to UNDP as well as himself, not 
considerations about the value of the norm as such. 
 
ii. Policy approach 
 
The approach taken in the strategy is remarkably different from the 1975 Governing 
Council decision. Although the strategy is still very limited in its conceptual 
deliberations it is more conceptually explicit than the first high-level recognition and 
strongly framed in instrumental arguments. Notably, the strategy states that its 
general objective is “to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of development 
programmes supported by UNDP through the active involvement of women as 
participants and/or beneficiaries” (UNDP 1986d, para. 253). Equity, equality, or 
rights are not mentioned at all in the entire document.  
 
Despite the inclusion of instrumental arguments, the approach in the strategy 
continues to be conceptually very thin and strongly focused on procedural issues. For 
instance, the strategy’s stated aim, rather than being the integrating of women in 
development or the promotion of gender equality, is framed in exclusively 
procedural terms as “the creation, within UNDP of an institutionalized process…(so) 
that women’s interests are furthered and safeguarded” (UNDP 1986d, para. 1). A 
detailed analysis of the content shows, that indeed, the strategy calls for the 
development of further guidelines and databases for sex-disaggregated data and 
women’s profiles, extensive staff training, the integration of WID in country 
programming, and makes solid suggestions for systematic evaluations and reviews of 
the integration of WID.  
 
The strategy is quite bold in explicitly pointing the finger at the Governing Council 
for not providing sufficient resources for the integration of WID and makes it very 
clear that the strategy can only be meaningfully implemented if sufficient resources 
are granted (UNDP 1986d, para. 27). Last, the strategy describes clear lines of 
responsibility and calls for more accountability of senior staff in the promotion of 
WID (UNDP 1986d, para. 6). Thus, overall, the strategy shows an, albeit limited, 
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explicit uptake of instrumental arguments for the promotion of WID, and a continued 
strong focus on procedural issues that include strong calls for adequate funding.  
 
iii. Operationalisation 
 
The section below shows that the level of norm operationalisation in UNDP from 
1986 to 1990 increased but, overall, remained weak and underfunded and in some 
cases, such as human resources, seemed to decrease within the same period. 
 
Human resources: The number of staff dedicated to the promotion of WID/GAD in 
UNDP increased steadily over the period of analysis. After a slow start in the 1970s, 
the mid-1980s saw the setting up of the first UNDP division for Women in 
Development (WID division) in 1986. The division was staffed with two policy 
advisors and one director at D2 level and placed in the Bureau of Programme, Policy 
and Evaluation. This strategic position meant that the director of the division was 
part of senior management, part of the Personnel Committee and part of the Action 
Committee, which approved large projects over 500,000 USD (Interview with Eide).  
According to a statement of the director to the Governing Council, the setting up and 
status of the WID division was “not tokensim…the location of the division in 
UNDP’s organization also testifies to the sincerity of this initiative…we have access 
to each and every corner of the organization” (Eide 1987). In an interview for the 
thesis, the director further stressed the empowered position she and her colleagues in 
the division occupied in the organisation, especially through their participation in the 
Action Committee, 
 
We had a weekly, so called, Action Committee – which was 
extremely valuable because in this committee I met all other senior 
managers and those responsible for programmes and projects – they 
had to come and present anything that was over 500,000 USD –…I 
could propose as amendments to these projects…I was a full 
member of the Committee. (Interview with Eide) 
 
Despite this overall positive assessment, Miller and Razavi find that the division had 
“no authority to ensure that its suggests were followed” (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 
17). The director concurs as she stated that “They (members of the Action 
Committee) all very politely listened but I never had the opportunity to follow up 
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what they really did” (Interview with Eide). Moreover, the budget allocations to the 
division were highly insufficient, as discussed below and the division was, even 
officially, considered severely understaffed” (UNDP 1990b, para. 44). 
 
In addition to the WID division, UNDP set-up a WID/GAD focal point system. 
(UNDP 1989a; Kardam 1991). The focal point system continued and expanded 
throughout the entire research period. However, numerous evaluations have found 
that the system did not function well, mainly because the mandate of the focal points 
was too broad and their status too junior (Geisler 1999, para. 4.2). Indeed, it was 
UNDP’s official strategy to appoint UN volunteers – not professional staff – as 
gender focal points in country offices (UNDP 1997, para. 170). 
 
In 1992 the WID division was renamed ‘Gender in Development Programme’ and 
became part of the Social Development and Poverty Elimination Division and 
subsequently the Poverty Practice Area (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 366). 
Although one additional policy advisor was recruited, the Division was overall 
downgraded, the director was moved from being at D2 to D1 level (lower) and, as a 
result, the division had less strategic access to decision-making in the organisation, 
such as management meetings (Interview with Hamadeh). Moreover, the move of the 
unit to be part of a large division focused on social development and poverty, send a 
signal that WID/GAD was not considered as a priority in itself, but part of UNDP’s 
efforts to achieve other overarching goals, such as poverty reduction (UNDP 2006).  
 
Overall, a number of external assessments concur with my assessment above as they 
find that the WID division/GIDP was severely under-staffed and under-funded 
throughout the research period and that its position in the organisation did not give it 
adequate authority (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 366). Mondesire notably 
states that,  
 
No matter how it is rationalized, the current status of the gender 
planning function in UNDP cannot serve the gender equality goals, 
which the organization so ardently articulates…GIDP is severely 
limited in the reach of its actions by not having access to certain 
important management arenas. (Mondesire 1999, p. 99) 
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Training: Training on WID essentially commenced with the setting-up of the WID 
division in 1987, although some ad-hoc WID training sessions were held even prior 
to that as noted in the section above. Since staff training was one of the official roles 
of the division, efforts were significantly stepped-up in the late 1980s. The number 
of training sessions for staff increased and training was further expanded to cover all 
levels of staff as well as government counterparts (United Nations Development 
Programme 1989a). In addition WID/GAD was mainstreamed into regular training 
programmes of UNDP (United Nations Development Programme 1989a). During 
this period UNDP had a full-time staff member exclusively dedicated to training and 
during the early 1990s and the norm was included as a compulsory element in the 
staff induction course for all UNDP professional staff. Importantly, WID/GAD was 
treated at the same level as all other thematic issues, such as poverty reduction 
(Interview with Leitner).Yet, only 15% of staff had attended specific WID/GAD 
training courses by 1990 (UNDP 1990b, para. 27).  
 
Although the content of training changed over the research period, it was largely 
focused on practical and technical aspects of the norm, and did not stress the 
importance of gender equality per se or the need for social transformation to achieve 
it (UNDP 1986d; Interview with Mondesire). Indeed, according to Kabeer, the 
approach promoted in UNDP training – the ‘Harvard framework’ - contains “little 
that would challenge existing gender roles or the allocation of power between men 
and women” (Naila Kabeer quoted inPorter 1999, p. 9).  
 
Programming tools: The development of programming tools for the 
operationalisation of WID/GAD increased considerably in the second half of the 
1980s.  Most notably, the already existing WID guidelines were updated and made 
more specific and a UNDP Programme Advisory Note (PAN) – Women in 
Development – was issued in 1986 (Kardam 1991, p. 20). This is a detailed, coherent 
and comprehensive document (Kardam 1991, p. 20). 
 
Shortly after the adoption of the PAN, a strong and comprehensive operational WID 
strategy was published in 1987. The strategy clearly puts the responsibility for 
WID/GAD at the highest level and calls for a comprehensive inclusion of WID in all 
projects and programmes (UNDP 1987, para. 5). This contrasts UNDP’s approach 
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strongly with ODA’s and the EC’s approach of limiting WID to specific areas in 
which women were considered relevant.  The strategy is further remarkable as it 
allows UNDP a considerable advocacy role on WID vis-à-vis partner governments 
(UNDP 1987, para. 7). The strategy also provides mechanisms to help to ensure that 
WID/GAD is taken up at every stage of the project cycle, especially the approval and 
evaluation stages.  
 
Last, the strategy introduces a WID Project Review Form. This form was intended to 
be used in all projects and includes questions on the “pertinence of women’s issues 
to the project in order to generate proposals that specify how the project will 
integrate women” (UNDP 1988, para. 48(a)). Importantly, from 1988 onwards the 
use of the form was mandatory (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 366). In 
addition, to enable meaningful monitoring and evaluation, a WID questionnaire was 
sent to all field offices in 1989 to establish baseline data on the inclusion of WID at 
country level (Eide 1987). 
 
The trend to produce very comprehensive programming tools for the 
operationalisation of WID continued in the 1990s (UNDP 1993). This was so much 
so that Hafner and Pollack judged the quality of some of UNDP’s programming tools 
as “one of the best” (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 366). Thus, overall, this 
assessment suggests that from the mid-1980s onwards, UNDP has consistently 
produced comprehensive, coherent, and mandatory programming tools for the 
integration of WID/GAD. 
 
However, despite the existence of these very strong tools, their effectiveness was not 
systematically monitored or assessed and available evidence suggests that they were 
not very effective or widely used (Geisler 1999, p. 42). One evaluation that was 
carried out regarding the use of the Project Review Form finds that “In many field 
offices, the only activity undertaken related to women in development is the filling in 
of the women-in-development project review form…it is a pro-forma activity rather 
than, as intended, an aide-memoire...” (UNDP 1990b, para. 33). Another UNDP 
document stats that “By and large...gender was superficially added to the project 
background to pass the screening process, but rarely integrated into the operating 
assumptions of the development sectors” (UNDP 1996, p. 2). 
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This trend of weak implementation continued throughout the late 1980s and 1990s. 
One large-scale evaluation finds that although “Planning instruments to address 
women and gender concerns have been around since the late 1980s but from all 
indications were never widely used” (Mondesire 1999, p. 23). This conclusion is 
further supported by data from interviews with high-level UNDP officials conducted 
for this thesis. Notably, one top-level official stated that, “…they (UNDP) are very 
good at it in theory but the practice is not always so good” (Interview with Anstee). 
An external consultant who has worked on WID in UNDP concurs when she states 
that, there was only “lip service paid” to the issue, particularly by senior 
management (Interview with Mondesire).  
 
Integration in overall policies: The level of integration of WID/GAD in overall 
policies and reports increased somewhat from the mid-1980s onwards.  For example, 
WID was consistently mentioned in the Administrator’s reports to the Governing 
Council, starting in 1985. In line with the largely non-conceptual, yet slightly 
instrumental, approach in the 1986 strategy, the reports almost exclusive focus on 
procedural issues and do not engage in any justification and conceptual detail 
regarding WID/GAD. A case in point is the Administrator’s report on ‘Women in 
Development’, which does not provide any conceptualisation or justification of the 
norm but provides over 13 pages of procedural detail (UNDP 1990b). Having said 
that, this analysis also shows that, when mentioned, the underlying rational was 
almost exclusively focused on instrumental reasoning with a strong focus on national 
ownership and respect for culture and tradition. Notably, the Administrator’s report 
clearly states that, “A sensitivity to gender issues is a means of improving 
development efficiency” (UNDP 1990b, para. 34). Equality, empowerment and 
rights are not mentioned at all. 
 
The integration of WID/GAD into overall policies and programming tools intensified 
with the increasing reference to Human Development, and subsequently Sustainable 
Human Development from the late 1980s onwards. WID was presented at times as 
one component – and at times as an important means towards – Human 
Development. Either way, this inclusion meant that many general documents, tools 
and policies include specific references to WID (United Nations Development 
Programme 1994).  
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Financial resources allocated to WID/GAD: As mentioned above, UNDP was the 
first organisation out of the three that put it place efforts to record how much of 
UNDP’s technical cooperation budget was spent on WID/GAD in 1974 (UNDP 
1982a). However, the accuracy of this system, especially when gender 
mainstreaming became the preferred strategy for the advancement of WID/GAD, left 
a lot to be desired.  Notably, Miller and Razavi find that “the mainstreaming strategy 
makes it difficult for the UNDP to calculate the total resources being spent on 
women” (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 27). Another evaluation also finds that “A 
review of the existing financial management system shows that the current UNDP 
classification framework does not allow to track resource allocation to gender 
mainstreaming within its present structure” (UNDP 1998b, p. 11). Despite the weak 
system to measure budgetary allocations to WID/GAD, there is some available data 
on resource allocations to WID/GAD throughout the period of analysis. This strongly 
suggests that throughout the period of analysis the budget allocated to promoting 
WID/GAD through technical cooperation as well as financial resources allocated to 
the WID division/GIDP were very low and considered grossly inadequate, even by 
some member states themselves (United Nations Development Programme 1982; 
United Nations Development Programme 1986c).  
 
The limited resource allocation to WID/GAD continued in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, with an average allocation of 0.7% (Mondesire 1999, p. 7). In 1990 the 
Nordic countries bluntly stated in a Governing Council debate that it “…considered 
that it was obvious that, if the division was not given sufficient resources, there 
would be a danger that the whole issue would be marginalized in UNDP” (UNDP 
1990c, para. 144).  
 
Performance incentives: UNDP seems to have made the greatest efforts at 
introducing performance incentives on WID/GAD in staff management among the 
three organisations assessed. Indeed, in the late 1980s accountability for the 
recruitment of women was included in UNDP staff performance evaluations. 
According to a senior UNDP official, UNDP staff had to report on the extent to 
which they had promoted the recruitment and professional advancement of women in 
UNDP (Interview with Leitner). In addition, in 1990, a report to the Governing 
Council stated that “Gender sensitivity is listed as a dimension of the new 
 158 
performance appraisal system currently being introduced” (UNDP 1990b, para. 22) 
and Miller and Razavi talk about “GIDP’s strategy for pushing for clearer incentive 
structures” to encourage staff to integrate WID/GAD in their work (Razavi and 
Miller 1995a, p. 21). However, no formal or comprehensive system to include 
WID/GAD in performance appraisal systems for staff was introduced during the 
period of analysis (UNDP 2006). 
 
iv. Summary: What norm integration driver dominated? 
 
The evidence strongly suggests that the first WID/GAD strategy was a result of 
strong and increasing pressure from specific members states, negative findings of a 
large-scale WID evaluation, and the increased global momentum around WID/GAD. 
All three aspects also encouraged the newly appointed Administrator to push for 
action on the norm from the inside, further contributing to the adoption of the 
strategy in 1986. This already suggests that, despite increased commitment to 
WID/GAD by some member states, and arguably by the Administrator himself, the 
decision to adopt this first detailed strategy was largely driven by social influence 
considerations. This conclusion seems especially plausible when accounts of 
 
 
Table 10: Summary of WID/GAD operationalisation in UNDP 1986 - 1989 
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WID/GAD officials are considered that suggest that the Administrator’s push for 
action on WID/GAD was indeed less due to his personal commitment to the value of 
gender equality, but rather driven by pressure from the UN system and vocal member 
states. 
 
The approach to WID/GAD taken in the strategy is largely non-conceptual, although 
some instrumental arguments are included in the justification of the strategy. The 
strategy is coherent and comprehensive. Moreover, considerable steps towards norm 
integration, especially regarding the programming tools, the integration of WID in 
broader policies and tools and attempts to include WID/GAD into performance 
incentives were taken. This indicates increased genuine commitment – or freedom to 
express commitment – to the norm by some member states as well as by operational 
staff inside the Administration. Without such commitment, there would not have 
been any noteworthy pressure form inside the Governing Council and the 
Administration would not have produced a strong strategy and very comprehensive 
programming tools for norm integration.  
 
However, the implementation of the strategy was severely underfunded, the 
programming tools developed were hardly used, there was no accountability for their 
use, and the suggested performance incentives on WID/GAD never materialised. In 
addition, numerous evaluations of WID/GAD in UNDP during that time find that, 
overall, there was a widespread lack of commitment to WID/GAD (UNDP 1982a, 
para 75(a); 1980). 
 
Taken together, the above observations strongly suggest that, despite pockets of 
genuine commitment to the norm in the Administration and among member states, 
overall norm integration across the organisation was still dominantly driven by social 
influence considerations rather than instrumental or intrinsic ethical considerations. 
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Why did this norm integration driver dominate? 
 
i. Explaining the timing 
 
The timing of the first comprehensive strategy was a result of three interrelated 
factors: (1) increasing pressure form member states in the Governing Council; (2) 
increased international momentum and pressure on UNDP to better integrate 
WID/GAD; (3) a supportive incoming Administrator. 
 
The first two factors are strongly intertwined with UNDP’s specific organisational 
characteristics. First, the presence of very vocal principals who exercised consistent 
pressure in UNDP’s decision-making forum was a function of its cultural diversity 
and multi-membership, which increased the likelihood of the presence of principals 
willing to speak out on behalf of the norm. This was particularly so (and in contrast 
to 1975) as the global momentum on WID/GAD had significantly increased and 
more member states had strong bilateral policies on the norm.  
 
Second, the fact that the global developments and the resulting pressure for action on 
WID/GAD had a relatively strong impact on UNDP – at least compared to the other 
two case studies – was certainly also linked to UNDP’s source of authority being 
partly delegated from the UN system, but also increasing ‘moral’ and linked to the 
promotion of human development, making UNDP much more susceptible to pressure 
from the UN system. Indeed, UNDP’s ‘moral authority’ gained prominence in the 
mid-to late 1980s with the incoming Administrator, shifting UNDP’s main focus 
from procedural aspects of developing country membership to substantive issues 
relating to human development (as described in Chapter four). It was this shift that 
allowed UNDP to engage in more advocacy and speak out on behalf of the norm. 
Indeed, Murphy’s account of UNDP clearly observes that this shift in mandate lead 
to UNDP to take on an explicit advocacy role, including on WID/GAD (Murphy 
2006, p. 7).  
 
This shift in mandate, together with vocal member states and mounting UN system 
pressure rooted in the third World Conference on Women and the negative findings 
of the inter-organisational assessment, further help to explain why the Administrator, 
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motivated by reputational concerns, personally pushed for the adoption of the 
WID/Gad strategy, further contributing to its adoption in 1986.  
 
ii. Explaining the policy approach 
 
Why did UNDP’s policy approach remain largely non-conceptual, yet increasingly 
focused on instrumental (rather than intrinsic) arguments for norm integration? First, 
direct pressure from certain member states inside the Governing Council, a function 
of the organisation’s culturally diverse and multi-member decision-making body, 
albeit now coupled with an increased global momentum of the norm and stronger 
bilateral policies on WID/GAD in certain countries that encouraged member states to 
speak out on behalf of the issue, lead to an increased inclusion of instrumental 
arguments. In addition, the overall lack of agreement, especially from developing 
countries, combined with a consensus-culture, meant that even intrinsically 
committed staff promoted a largely instrumental and non-conceptual approach to 
WID/GAD. 
 
Let me first illustrate my argument that strong pressure by certain states – the Nordic 
countries, the Netherlands and Canada – influenced the approach taken by UNDP. 
Notably, the Nordics issued a joint statement to the Governing Council in 1985 
“arguing that the focus on women’s reproductive roles ignored the important 
productive roles of women.” And that WID “was not just an issue of justice and 
equality, but a question of growth and efficiency, a means to accelerate substantially 
the development process” (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 14). The Netherlands 
explicitly supported this approach. Notably, the Dutch delegation stated in a 
Governing Council debate in 1986 that  “Denial to women of their right to act as 
agents and beneficiaries of development meant the wastage of one of the world’s 
most valuable human resources” (UNDP 1986b, para. 62). Canada, possibly the most 
vocal on this issue, stated in a debate in 1985 that “It believed that only when it was 
fully understood that development must involve both women and men in order to be 
effective would women in development be incorporated systematically into all 
project and programme planning” (UNDP 1985e, para. 31). In addition, and 
discussed in the section on operationalisation, the above countries also explicitly 
 162 
pushed for the adoption of procedural measures to institutionalise WID United 
Nations Development Programme 1985d).  
 
This push towards instrumentalism by the Nordics, the Netherlands and Canada was 
taken up by the Administrator who “...whole-heartedly endorsed the views of the 
Nordic and other delegations…Women represented a resource [my emphasise]...” 
(UNDP 1986b, para. 13). This view was promoted as it enabled the Administrator to 
present WID as fitting squarely within UNDP’s existing mandate. Notably, he states 
that “To fulfil its mandate to support the efforts of the developing countries to 
accelerate their economic and social development, the United Nations development 
system should above all take full cognizance of women as a development resource in 
need of the same attention as the male half of the population” (UNDP 1985c, para. 
112). 
 
Further, the instrumental approach to WID and the focus on procedural issues was 
also strongly promoted inside the administration by the head of the newly established 
WID Division, Ingrid Eide. For Eide, as for many WID/GAD officials, this approach 
was a strategic decision based on the political climate of the period and the specific 
mandate of UNDP and not a reflection of their personal convictions that were 
strongly feminist. In an interview for this thesis she stated that, 
 
I think it is important that, yes, of course we know about the 
suffering and the humanitarian needs, etc, but our focus in UNDP is 
on development. Equality is the issue for CSW…our mandate is 
development. So I tried to narrow the focus. ..It (WID) had to be a 
question of professionalism – you could say that I was promoting 
the issues of WID as an independent variable for development…I 
tried to be realistic and pragmatic – more reformist than 
revolutionary…I had to professionalise and de-emotionalise the 
issue in order to intrigue the professionals that you had in UNDP. 
(Interview with Eide)  
 
This pragmatic approach was consciously continued by the WID Division director 
that followed Eide, Elizabeth Reid. Notably, Reid stated that during her time in 
UNDP she made a conscious effort not to be seen as  “constantly having a neon light 
above (her) head saying ‘Women!’” as, according to her, this would not have been 
conducive to carry out effective work on WID/GAD (Interview with Reid). Another 
 163 
high-level UNDP staff member concurred when she stated that “We in UNDP are 
always very balanced and pragmatic…we were careful not to use arguments that 
were too feminist” (Interview with Leitner). The view that the instrumental and 
procedural approach was a conscious decision by WID/GAD advocates is further 
supported by an analysis of Geisler who finds that “advocacy by the director and 
other WID entrepreneurs was not aggressive or strident...commentators remember 
this period very well and confirmed that the “style” of advocacy had been non-
threatening and helped to create a climate of acceptance for WID” (Geisler 1999). 
 
However, as much as the approach was a decision taken by key individuals, it was 
strongly influenced by UNDP’s organisational set-up. First, this choice of approach 
was a result of the fact that, even in the decades following the first official 
recognition of WID, there was no conceptual agreement on the importance and 
relevance on WID in UNDP’s highly diverse decision-making body. Notably, in a 
debate in 1990 Sri Lanka framed women strongly as wives and mothers when its 
representative stated that, “To improve the quality of life of women, their tasks as 
housewives and mothers must be made less burdensome” (UNDP 1990c, para. 128). 
In contrast the Pakistan delegation stated that “In Pakistan, the old concept that a 
woman’s sphere of activities was confined to her home had undergone revolutionary 
changes since independence” (UNDP 1990c, para. 128). In addition, most other 
vocal countries, such as the Nordics, strongly pushed for the full integration of 
women in all spheres.  The only thing that seemed to be a common threat over the 
years and across the various countries’ and the administration’s contributions on 
WID/Gender was the stress on procedural issues and the framing of the issue in 
instrumental terms. One Governing Council report, for instance, explicitly states that 
“all members agreed that the attainment of national development goals depended in 
large measure on the participation of both men and women in the development 
process” (UNDP 1990c, para. 128). 
 
This lack of agreement on a conceptual approach to WID/GAD strongly influenced 
the strategies chosen by WID/GAD advocates inside the organisation. Notably, one 
former head of the WID Division stated in an interview for this thesis that, due to 
this lack of agreement in the Executive Board one “would not take an issue to the 
Board if you cared about it” as it would not be accepted. Rather, one would work 
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quietly and frame issues in such a way that they were easily acceptable. For instance 
the instrumental approach to WID/GAD was a “deliberately chosen strategy” as 
UNDP’s governance structure was “highly politicised” and represented a “straight 
jacket” for the promotion of certain issues such as WID/GAD. Another UNDP staff 
member noted that “Radical work on gender is not possible. Sad, but it was also an 
education for me to realize the limitations of an institution like this. From the 
outside, it’s quite impressive and overwhelming. It’s only when working on the 
inside that you recognize the constraints” (Menon Sen quoted in Murphy 2006, p. 
210). 
 
Second, the decision by WID/GAD advocates to focus on an instrumental and almost 
non-conceptual approach was strongly influenced by the organisation’s mandate. 
Both dominant mandates, ‘neutrality’ and ‘developing country ownership’ until the 
mid-1980s and subsequently Human Development with a strong focus on poverty 
eradication, lent themselves much more to norm integration along instrumental and 
procedural lines as they did not require a shift in mandate, but rather a re-framing of 
the norm to fit within the overall mandates. Excerpts of the interview with Ingrid 
Eide quoted above show that these considerations indeed played an important role. 
Murphy concurs when he states that,  
 
Rather than embracing feminist theory as the core to understanding 
development, most analysts took the easier pat of adopting a non-
paradigmatic approach that asked whether the conditions of women 
within society had an impact on a variety of development indicators 
including income per capita, technological innovation, and 
sustainable levels of population growth. (Murphy 2006, p. 204) 
 
Thus, the largely non-conceptual approach and the increasing focus on instrumental 
arguments was a result of the explicit pressure from some member states as well as a 
strategic decision by internal WID advocates. Importantly, however, this strategic 
decision by WID advocates to focus on instrumentalism did not seem to be a 
reflection of their personal conviction, as outlined earlier. Instead, it was a strategic 
decision based on their perception of UNDP’s mandate, its organisational culture, the 
diversity of, and large number of principals in its decision-making structure 
combined with consensus-based decision-making, and the resulting lack of 
agreement on a conceptual approach to WID.  
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iii. Explaining the level of operationalisation 
 
The reason for the specific level of operationalisation of WID/GAD can also be 
linked back to UNDP’s organisational structure. First, the few steps that were taken 
were the result of consistent pressure and earmarked funding from certain committed 
member states, which was facilitated by the organisation’s high-level of cultural 
diversity and large number of principals in its decision-making body and, 
controversially, its limited financial autonomy that enabled earmarking. A case in 
point was the decision to set-up a WID division in 1986. Although the decision was 
not formally discussed in the Governing Council, as the analysis of Governing 
Council debates and decisions reveals. However, protagonists such as the director of 
the WID Division at that time, as well as observers of this process suggest that it was 
pressure from specific countries – the Nordics and Canada – that pushed UNDP to 
set-up this division. In an interview for this thesis, a former director stated that the 
WID division “was set-up due to pressure from the Nordics, especially Norway, and 
Canada (Interview with Hamadeh). Hafner and Pollack come to the same assessment 
in their analysis of WID/GAD in UNDP as they state that “Throughout the late 1980s 
and 1990s, for example, the governments of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark and Finland took leading roles, both unilaterally and as members 
of the Governing Council, to integrate women into the development process and to 
hold the UNDP accountable for the implementation of gender policy” (Pollack and 
Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 355).  
 
In addition, the observed increase in WID/GAD training in the late 1980s was 
enabled by the provision of specifically earmarked funding for this purpose from 
Norway (Geisler 1999). This indicates that it was cultural diversity and a large 
number of principals, which increased the likelihood of the presences of at least one 
committed actor in the decision-making forum willing to fund a specific activity, and 
the ability to earmark funding that allowed for certain steps towards norm 
operationalisation to take place. 
 
Moreover, the personal commitment of key individuals, such as the Administrator, 
should not be overlooked, especially regarding the setting-up of the WID Division. 
This view is supported by a number of senior UNDP officials interviewed for this 
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thesis (Interview with Eide; Interview with Hamadeh; Interview with Leitner; 
Interview with Reid) and further endorsed by Murphy who states that “Bill Draper 
put attention to women and advocacy for women at the centre of the Programme’s 
work. He created the Women in Development Division…” (Murphy 2006, p. 205). 
He further finds that senior management came to view the meetings of the Action 
Committee, set up by Draper, as a space that “obliged us to take into consideration 
issues of gender...” (Murphy 2006, p. 238). Geisler concurs when she states that “As 
a result of external pressure, combined with a new support senior management at 
UNDP, the Division of Women in Development was created in 1987” (Geisler 
1999). 
 
Since, as established above, Draper did not seem to have a specific interest or 
understanding of WID/GAD he was open to action on WID/GAD and, thus, 
increased the freedom in the Administration to promote initiatives to operationalise 
the norm. Notably, former senior UNDP staff stated in interviews for this thesis that 
Draper “did not have a political agenda” regarding WID, which meant that “…he 
listened…he gave me voice” (Interview with Reid). According to former UNDP 
officials working on WID/GAD, it was this space and freedom to act that facilitated 
a number of concrete steps towards norm operationalisation, such as the increase in 
training and the introduction of performance incentives as the Administrator, 
“…supported everything we did” (Interview with Eide; Interview with  Miller; 
Interview with Reid).  
 
In addition, many of the specific steps towards operationalisation did not have to be 
discussed or approved by the Governing Council, further increasing the level of 
freedom of operational staff. Murphy concurs as he states that, “Such creative results 
came about because UNDP has attracted people who not only believe in what they 
do, but who have been able to be creative in times of crisis, and been willing to put 
themselves on the line and had the freedom [my emphasis] to do so” (Murphy 2006, 
p. ix). 
 
However, the overall lack of funding for WID/GAD and the lack of accountability 
mechanisms for the use of WID/GAD tools significantly limited the power of 
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WID/GAD staff to promote the norm as they saw fit and reduced the level of norm 
operationalisation. Hafner and Pollack concur as they find that, 
 
While the UNDP has undergone a fundamental transformation of 
organizational procedure in the last three decades, making the 
incorporation of gender equality a legitimate goal, it is far from 
clear that these policies have brought about the institutional changes 
in structure and culture that are necessary for a mainstreaming 
approach. (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 358). 
 
Indeed, it was the same diversity that enabled some operationalisation to happen, that 
proved to be an obstacle for comprehensive and wide-reaching training funded 
through core funds, as it made overall agreement of allocating core funding to 
WID/GAD training difficult. Indeed, in debates by the budgetary committee on fund 
allocation for the strategy “Several members expressed their support for the 
Administrator’s proposal” and even “expressed concern that the implementation 
phase had not been planned to start until 1988 and asked whether this phase could 
not begin earlier” (UNDP 1986a, para. 5), while others expressed concern that “..the 
financial proposals were being made on an issue on which general agreement had not 
yet been reached by the Council, and that the strategy proposed could involve, in the 
long term, an encroachment on the prerogatives of recipient countries” (UNDP 
1986a, para. 6). The final decision reached allocated highly insufficient resources to 
the implementation of the strategy (UNDP 1986d, para. 29). 
 
6.2 The first comprehensive WID/GAD strategy or policy in the EC 
 
Although the EC had adopted a number of Council Conclusions on WID/GAD since 
the first high-level recognition of the norm in 1982, it was not until December 1995 
that the Council adopted its first Resolution on WID/GAD entitled Integrating 
Gender Issues in Development Cooperation (Council of the European Union 1995). 
This Resolution is widely considered to be the first EC policy on WID/GAD as it is 
by far the most detailed statement on WID/GAD since 1982 and, as Resolution, has a 
higher standing than the previously adopted Conclusions (OECD 1998, p. 34). 
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Which norm integration driver dominated? 
 
i. Process and timing 
 
As mentioned above, in the decade preceding the adoption of the first comprehensive 
WID/GAD policy, the Council adopted a number of Conclusions on WID/GAD. All 
Conclusions are very short and do not provide any concrete guidance on next steps to 
further integrate WID/GAD in EC development cooperation. Moreover, the 
Conclusions are overall strongly framed in efficiency terms (Council of the European 
Communities 1985; Council of the European Communities 1987, para. 2). In 1989 
the legally binding Lomé IV convention was adopted, which regulated the EC’s 
relations with all African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. The revised Convention 
includes more extensive references to WID/GAD, although on the whole the issue is 
still framed in similar terms and no additional specific requirements for integration of 
the issue are made. After the turn of the decade, the discussion of WID/GAD in the 
Council decreased and did not substantially flair up until preparations for the Fourth 
World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 commenced. It is in this context 
that the 1995 Resolution was adopted.  
 
The decision to adopt a Council Resolution on WID/GAD was taken at the 
Development Council meeting in May 1993 (Council of the European Communities 
1993b). In contrast to the first high-level recognition, the European Parliament did 
not seem to have played a role in this decision. Notably, none of the Reports or 
Resolutions from the Development Committee in the years prior to the decision in 
1993 called for the adoption of a Resolution or a more detailed WID/GAD policy 
(European Parliament 1992a, 1992b). Also, one of the protagonists involved in the 
drafting of the Commission Communication and the Resolution stated in an 
interview for this thesis that “Parliament did not play a significant role…it came very 
late in this” (Interview with Colombo). If it was not pressure from Parliament, what 
then lead to the decision to adopt the policy? 
 
The reason for this decision seems to have been two-fold. First, the Conclusions 
themselves and commentators suggest that it was the upcoming Fourth World 
Conference on Women that lead to the decision to develop a detailed policy on 
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WID/GAD. Notably, the Conclusions are clearly framed in the context of the 
upcoming Fourth World Conference on Women.  They state the intention to adopt a 
Resolution in paragraph five and paragraph six makes a strong commitment for the 
Community and the Member States to participate fully in the upcoming conference 
(Council of the European Communities 1993). Elgstroem concurs with this 
assessment as he notes that there was an “emerging perception among high-level DG 
officials that the Union had to have a gender policy to present at the forthcoming 
Women’s Conference in Beijing” (Elgstroem 2011, p. 463). There was desire 
amongst Commission and Council officials to “look good” in Beijing (Elgstroem 
2011, p. 464). An external gender expert who was part of the drafting team of the 
Resolution concurs, as she explicitly stated in an interview for this thesis that the 
Resolution was adopted as it was “very fashionable” at the time, particularly with the 
upcoming conference in Beijing (Interview with Colombo). 
 
Second, it has been suggested that it was explicit pressure from Denmark, a country 
with a very strong bilateral WID/GAD policy as well as pressure from European 
NGOs, that finally lead to the adoption of the decision to adopt a Resolution in 1993 
(Elgstroem 2011). Thus, indeed, it seems to have been pressure rooted in the 
upcoming World Conference on Women and the explicit push by committed member 
state that resulted in the decision to adopt the EC first WID/GAD policy. 
 
Following the Council Conclusions of 1993, and as a basis for the envisaged 
Resolution, the Commission set out to draft a Communication on Gender Issues in 
Development Cooperation. The Communication followed an in-depth assessment of 
WID/GAD policies of the EC and its member states, which was conducted by an 
external consultant under the supervision of the gender desk in DGVIII (Colombo 
1994). It was the same consultant who was subsequently asked to draft the text of the 
actual Communication (Interview with Colombo). Following instructions set-out in 
the Council Conclusions, the drafting process was supported by the EC gender expert 
group, which was composed of representatives of all member states as well as the 
Commission. Notably, the expert group met to discuss various approaches to 
WID/GAD best suited to the Communication and Resolution and reviewed a draft of 
the Communication at its meeting in May 1995 (Elgstroem 2011, p. 466).  
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The actual Commission Communication is strongly farmed in efficiency terms. 
Notably, the summary of the document states that “This paper…details the impact of 
existing disparities for sustainable development, and explains how neglecting these 
disparities can jeopardise the effectiveness of development actions” (Commission of 
the European Communities 1995a, summary). The substantive section of the paper 
continues this trend. Article 10 for example states that, 
 
Improving women’s control over natural resources and benefiting 
from their experience…are important steps for avoiding 
mismanagement of the ecosystem….If the direct effect of mothers’ 
education on their children’s health and education is taken into 
account, it clearly appears that women’s education yields a high 
return on investment…Spending on improved health care for adult 
women offers the largest return from health care spending than for 
any other demographic group of adults. (Commission of the 
European Communities 1995a, para. 10) 
 
Despite this strong instrumental focus, the issue of gender is dealt with in a detailed 
way stressing the socially constructed nature of it and couching the document in 
strong and transformative language (UNDP 1986d, para. 27). In addition, the 
Communication comprehensively outlines what needs to be done to integrate gender 
into EC development cooperation. This is done in much more detail than in the 
Resolution (Council of the European Union 1995a, para. 3). Overall, the document is 
strong on procedure but weak on its overall objective. When it mentions its 
objective, it is strongly framed in efficiency terms and not at all in terms of rights or 
achieving equality between women and men.  
 
The actual Resolution was discussed and refined by a working group of the 
Development Council at three meetings in November and December 1995 
(Elgstroem 2011, p. 467). Ole Elgstroem’s detailed analysis of debates in these 
meetings shows that in the course of the discussions a few issues were dropped while 
others were included. This will be further discussed in the section that explains the 
approach taken in the policy. The final Council Resolution was formally adopted by 
the European Council on 20 December 1995. 
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ii. Policy approach 
 
Overall, the Resolution is fairly incoherent, exhibiting very limited conceptual clarity 
or engagement with WID/GAD. Notably, neither the overall aim of the Resolution 
nor the approach taken is clearly stated. First, paragraph one suggests that the 
objective of the policy is to facilitate “women’s participation in development” 
(Council of the European Union 1995a, para. 1) while paragraph two indicates that 
the Resolution’s aim is to “redress gender disparities” (Council of the European 
Union 1995a, para. 2), an objective quite different from promoting women’s 
participation in development. This difference is not recognised or explained. 
Regarding the approach to WID/GAD, the Resolution is equally unclear. Although 
social justice is mentioned once, the reference seems rather tokenistic, suggesting 
that the dominant approach taken by the Resolution is rooted in efficiency. 
Specifically, the reference states that “the Council recognizes that redressing existing 
gender disparities is a critical issue in development in terms of aid effectiveness and 
social justice, as women are as indispensable partners as men in achieving the 
objectives for development cooperation…” (Council of the European Union 1995a, 
para. 2). Thus, although social justice is mentioned, it is linked back to ‘achieving the 
objectives for development cooperation.’ The document also states that “gender has 
crucial implications for the achievement of all development objectives” further 
suggesting an overall focus on efficiency. Equality is only mentioned once in relation 
to NGOs, as the Resolution states that “the importance of the dialogue between 
NGOs and national machineries and NGOs’ positive role in promoting gender 
equality are recognised” but is clearly not seen as an objective of the Resolution 
(Council of the European Union 1995a, para. 8). 
 
The overall incoherence is further illustrated by the fact that the bulk of the 
Resolution outlines, what the document calls “general principles for gender-sensitive 
development cooperation” (Council of the European Union 1995a, para. 2). Despite 
this title, most of the issues listed are not actual principles but rather strategies on 
how to integrate gender. For instance, the first ‘principle’ is that “gender analysis at 
macro-, meso- and micro-level must be mainstreamed in the conception, design and 
implementation of all development policies and interventions, as well as in 
monitoring and evaluation” (Council of the European Union 1995a, para. 2). Another 
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‘principle’ is that an “analysis of differences and disparities between women and 
men must be a key criterion for assessing the goals and results of development 
policies and interventions” (Council of the European Union 1995a, para. 2). Not only 
are both strategies rather than principles, they are also essentially saying the same. 
 
Apart from this incoherence, the Resolution strongly calls for the inclusion of gender 
equality issues in policy dialogue, includes a comprehensive definition of gender in 
line with global discourse, and includes a fairly specific and comprehensive list of 
strategies for the further integration of gender in EC aid (Council of the European 
Union 1995a, para. 4). 
 
iii. Level of operationalisation  
 
Human resources: The level of human resources dedicated to WID/GAD was 
reduced in the early 1990s and, importantly, the one remaining post was filled by a 
seconded ‘detached national expert’ and funded directly by a member state. The 
countries seconding and funding this post were the Netherlands and Denmark and 
with the accession of Sweden in 1995, predominately Sweden (Interview with 
Varnai). The fact that staffing of the WID desk was done on temporary contracts, 
staffing was overall very inconsistent, lead to frequent staffing gaps and highly 
limited continuity or institutional memory on the issue (Braithwaite 2003, p. iii; 
Interview with Joelsdotter-Berg). Overall, during this period as well as beyond, 
numerous evaluations, including by the OECD/DAC, have found the level of staffing 
for WID/GAD in the EC to be insufficient 
 
The position of the WID desk in DG VII in the organisational hierarchy improved 
slightly in the early 1990s when it was renamed ‘GAD’ desk and moved to the 
Human and Social Development Unit. However, according to a former WID desk 
officer and other commentators this was still a highly marginalised position, with no 
direct influence on the policies and actions of the DG (Interview with Joelsdotter-
Berg; Interview with Turner). 
 
Although an informal network of gender focal points was set-up in the mid-1990s, 
this network was considered fairly disorganised and ineffective (Pollack and Hafner-
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Burton 2000, p. 446). Notably, an evaluation conducted in 2003 found that “Some 
gender focal points exist but it is not clear where and how many….most spend very 
little working time on gender issues, have no ToR for their gender work and are not 
trained or provided with support” (Braithwaite 2003, p. iv).  
 
Overall, human resources allocated to WID/GAD in the EC were too few, placed in a 
marginalised position and not included in many decision-making or advisory groups. 
 
Training: Staff training on WID/GAD in DG VIII commenced in 1991 with a set of 
three training sessions over a period of three years. The training sessions were not far 
reaching and approximately only 30 staff were trained per year (Interview with 
Colombo, pp. 35 - 43). Indeed, records suggest that in 1993 only seven staff 
members attended WID/GAD training (Interview with Colombo, p. 35). Different 
sets of trainings on WID/GAD continued, but training was never compulsory for DG 
VIII staff (it was for staff in DGI) despite efforts by WID/GAD desk office 
(Interview with Joelsdotter-Berg). This suggests that WID/GAD training was weak. 
An in-depth evaluation of WID/GAD in EU development cooperation concurs as it 
finds that training was “insufficient to produce a sustained improvement in 
knowledge and skills of staff and partners” (Braithwaite 2003, p. 1).  
 
Programming tools: In the early 1990s the WID desk in DGVIII produced guidelines 
for the integration of WID/GAD in EC development cooperation with ACP 
countries, which were still in force post 1995 (Commission of the European 
Communities 1991). The guidelines are extremely strongly framed in efficiency 
terms. A case in point is the headings in the section on “Why WID” which are “Cost-
Effectiveness; Development Impact; and Development Sustainability”. The entire 
‘why’ section essentially makes detailed cases for why women’s roles are important 
in relation to key development goals such as food security, population growth and 
the environment (Commission of the European Communities 1991b, pp. 9-10). The 
section concludes that “In short: investments in women as part of the human capital 
have a high pay-off…by increasing economic efficiency and impact of our 
development operations, and (by leading) to more effective use of natural resources 
and lower population growth rates” (Commission of the European Communities 
1991b, p. 10). Even enhancing the status of women is justified as it, in turn, is a 
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determining factor in reducing birth rates. The issue of “equity concerns” is merely 
mentioned once in passing (Commission of the European Communities 1991b, p. 9). 
 
Regarding the technical guidance in the ‘how’ section, the document is very good 
and practical. However, the language used in the actual guidelines is fairly weak 
stating that implementing the suggested measures is “advisable…desirable…should 
be considered” (Commission of the European Communities 1991b, p. 27 and 33). 
 
In addition, a number of other tools, such as Gender Impact Assessments, and a 
Gender Marker Fiche were developed and gender was included in the mandate of the 
Quality Support Group in DG VIII which reviewed all financial proposals over two 
million Euros (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 446). However, the use of these 
tools was not obligatory, with the exception of the Gender Impact Assessment form, 
and a comprehensive evaluation found that most tools were rarely used.12  
 
Overall, throughout the period under investigation the use of programming tools 
seems to have been low and actually regressed. One evaluation finds that, 
 
…some of the previous mechanisms for supporting the integration 
of gender fell into misuse during the period 1995 – 1999, indicating 
regression rather than progress in some key areas….the once 
obligatory Gender Impact Assessment Form…was not revised to 
take into account the new DAC requirements post 1995 and has 
fallen out of systematic use. (Braithwaite 2003, p. iv). 
 
Integration in overall policies and programming tools: An analysis of general 
programming tools for development shows that WID/GAD has not been 
comprehensively integrated. Notably, the basic formats for project documents in the 
manual “Project Cycle Management – Integrated Approach and Logical Framework” 
do not include WID/GAD and the overall document only includes a single reference 
to women in development equating WID/GAD with socio-cultural aspects of 
development (Commission of the European Communities 1993b, p. 55). Other 
                                                
12 Notably, one evaluation finds that “within the Commission the manual has not been used very 
much; some desk officers confess that they have given it away to a ‘woman expert’, others have it on 
their shelves but it is clear that they have never opened it.”(Colombo 1995, p. 3). Also, another report 
comments on the fact that due to the inclusion of WID/GAD in the mandate of the Quality Support 
Group, “ it is theoretically possible for a project to be rejected on grounds of gender-blindness…but 
this has not happened yet”(Turner 1997, p. 18). 
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general guidelines “most notably for countries strategies – make references to gender 
as a cross-cutting principle but provide no practical guidance on how to take gender 
issues into account” (Braithwaite 2003, p. iv). Indeed, a number of evaluations of 
actual EC country strategies or other financing proposals under the EDF found that 
the vast majority did not integrate WID/GAD (Turner 1997, p. 27). Moreover, 
WID/GAD was not integrated in monitoring and evaluation systems nor was 
WID/GAD considered at all in the mid-term review and revision of Lomé IV or the 
financial review of EC-ACP cooperation carried out in 1996 (ACP-EEC 1995). Also, 
none of the Commission Annual Work Programmes over the entire decade refer to 
WID/GAD.  
 
Financial resources allocated to WID/GAD: Financial resources allocated to 
WID/GAD also decreased by the end of the decade. Although in 1998 a financial 
regulation on Integrating Gender in Development was adopted, financial allocations 
to the gender budget line remained extremely low totalling about 0.016% of the EC’s 
total budget for ACP countries under the Lome convention (Turner 1997) and 
actually decreased by 50% from 1998 onwards (Braithwaite 2003, p. iv; Turner 
1997; Council of the European Communities 1998). 
 
Performance incentives: Throughout the entire period of analysis gender was never 
included in staff performance assessments. 
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Table 11 Summary of WID/GAD operationalisation in the EC 1995 - 1998 
 
iv. Summary: Which driver dominated? 
 
The decision to adopt the EU’s first WID/GAD policy was to a significant extent 
influenced by the upcoming Fourth World Conference on Women and a desire by 
Commission Officials and member states to ‘look good’ in this international forum. 
This was clearly illustrated by the way in which the decision to adopt the Resolution 
and the Resolution itself was framed and re-affirmed by primary interview data and 
secondary sources.  
 
This external impetus was complemented by pockets of internal pressure from a 
vocal member states in the Council. This strongly suggests that the decision to adopt 
the policy was largely driven by reputational and social influence considerations. 
This conclusion is further supported by the very incoherent approach taken by the 
policy and the findings on norm operationalisation that show that hardly any steps 
towards norm operationalisation were taken around the adoption of the policy. 
Indeed, certain crucial aspects, such as financial resources, decreased in the late 
1990s. Both suggest that norm integration was not driven by a genuine appreciation 
of the value of norm – thus, ethical considerations about the norm – across the 
organisation, but rather by social influence. 
 
 177 
However, despite the overall dominance of social influence, instances of norm 
integration driven by ethical considerations were observed. This was most notably so 
in the Commission Communication that preceded the Resolution. The document was 
coherent and comprehensive and strongly framed in instrumental ethical 
considerations. The drafting process of the document also suggests that it was indeed 
carried out by individuals personally persuaded of the importance of the norm. 
However, these ‘pockets of commitment’ were largely at operational level, did not 
have decision-making powers and, thus, did not influence the approach taken by the 
organisation as a whole. 
 
Why did this driver dominate? 
 
i. Explaining the timing of the policy 
 
The above account showed that two factors led to the adoption of the first 
comprehensive EC WID/GAD policy: (1) reputational concerns relating to the 
upcoming World Conference on Women in Beijing and (2) pressure from some vocal 
member states within the Council, notably Denmark. Both factors and how they 
influenced norm integration are functions of the EC’s organisational structure. 
 
First, the reason that the EC was the last of the three case studies to adopt a 
WID/GAD policy is related to its level of susceptibility to scrutiny and the nature of 
its scrutinisers, both of which are a function of its mandate and source of authority. 
Notably, the reason for why the EC did not seem to feel any pressure around the 
Third World Conference on Women in 1985, while it reacted to the Fourth World 
Conference, was due to the EC’s weak global mandate on development and its 
internally focused source of authority that is not in any significant way related to 
global or UN-wide trends and developments.  This meant that the EC was only 
mildly susceptible to global, external scrutiny but much more susceptible to internal 
scrutiny from Parliament and the Member States.  
 
These ‘scrutinisers’ did not exercise any pressure around the Nairobi conference and 
only did so, albeit still limited, in the run up to the 1995 conference. Indeed, an 
analysis of Council documents shows that the Third World Conference of Women 
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was only mentioned in passing by the Council once in Conclusions adopted in 1985 
(Council of the European Communities 1985). This was indeed so rudimentary that 
the European Parliament criticised the Council for failing to endorse the agreement 
reached at the Nairobi conference (European Parliament 1986b, para. 34). 
 
This lack of pressure from the Council was again facilitated by organisational 
structure. Notably, the only mild diversity of the Council with fewer principals than 
UNDP meant that there was less likelihood of strong and consistent pressure on 
action on WID/GAD from inside the Council. Specifically, countries such as 
Norway, Canada, Sweden and the United States, that were very vocal in UNDP and 
pushed it to act in 1986 were not present in the European Council. This helps to 
explain while no pressure to adopt a comprehensive policy or strategy was exercised 
by member states in the Council prior to 1995, not even around the Nairobi 
conference. It was not until Denmark pushed the issue that action was taken. 
 
In addition to the member states, also the European Parliament did not exercise any 
pressure on the Council for action on WID/GAD after the first high-level recognition 
and prior to 1995, as an analysis of Parliamentary Reports and Resolutions, and 
interviews with protagonists reveal (Interview with Colombo; European Parliament 
1992a, 1992b). This was partly due to the fact that the issue of WID/GAD was 
increasingly seen as an issue to be promoted by the Development Committee, not the 
Women’s Committee that had been instrumental in achieving the first high-level 
recognition of the norm in 1982. However, the Development Committee took a very 
hands-off approach to the issue and viewed it as something best dealt with by another 
body: the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific Joint Parliamentary Assembly. For instance, a 
Motion for a Resolution on Improving the Living Conditions of Women in the Third 
World proposed in the Committee in 1983 was never adopted. The official reason for 
this, outlined in a letter from the Development Committee to the President of the 
Parliament, was that the “issue should be discussed by our partners in the ACP-JPA” 
(European Parliament Committee for Development Cooperation 1983). 
 
The few actions that were taken by the Development Committee on WID/GAD took 
a very reserved approach. Notably, the Parliament stated in a Resolution that it 
“[w]ould not attempt to impose its views on the governments of non-Community 
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countries….but will endeavour to secure full equality of men and women based on 
respect for each one’s culture and traditions” (European Parliament 1986b, para. 33). 
The accompanying report by the Development Committee also strongly stressed that 
“  “[w]omen in the Third World or the integration of women into the development 
process is not an emancipation issue” (European Parliament 1986b, para. 5). 
 
Thus, none of the EC’s source of authority ‘delegators’ or ‘scrutinisers’ pushed for 
action prior to 1995, which resulted in no action on the norm. With global pressure 
mounting significantly and with member states in the EC becoming increasingly 
vocal on the issue this changed. Pressure was exercised by some key ‘delegators’, 
notably Denmark, partly encouraged by the increased global momentum, and others 
were less reluctant to agree, due to this same momentum and a feeling that the EC 
‘ought to be seen to be doing something’, leading to the adoption of the Resolution in 
1995. This explains the timing of the action and further supports the argument that it 
was indeed social influence considerations, not considerations relating to the value of 
the norm, be they intrinsic or instrumental, that drove this second key moment of 
WID/GAD integration. 
 
In short, it was the EC/EU’s limited susceptibility to scrutiny, a function of its weak 
mandate as a development actor and its delegated source of authority, combined with 
only mild diversity in its decision-making body, that led to the late adoption of the 
first WID/GAD strategy. 
 
ii. Explaining the approach  
 
The reason for the policy’s strong conceptual incoherence can be found in the 
diversity and multi-membership in the Council with a consensus-based decision-
making structure. The resulting need for agreement among diverse actors lead to a 
shying away from ‘controversial’ language that was too transformative or rights or 
value-based and a focus on practical and efficiency-based arguments (Interview with 
O'Neill).  Yet in contrast to UNDP, there was no strong procedural mandate that 
would have limited the promotion of any values or engagement in conceptual issues. 
Both points are very well illustrated by an analysis of deliberations of the gender 
expert group. This shows that the main areas of disagreement amongst the group 
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were the role of NGOs, the place of positive action alongside mainstreaming and, 
very importantly, whether the main approach should be ‘women in development’ or 
‘gender in development’. According to Ole Elgstroem who has studied this process 
in detail, the meetings clearly show that “Defining common standpoints in the EC 
context has required norm negotiations between these ideational camps” (Elgstroem 
2011, p. 465).  
 
The text of the Resolution and – albeit to a lesser extent – the Communication reflect 
this need for compromise and consensus to some extent. Members of the expert 
group considered it “good but too general” as “its formulations were deliberately 
kept uncontroversial…in some cases, where members of the group had conflicting 
opinions, comprises were sought that resulted in imprecise and lofty language” 
(Elgstroem 2011, p. 466). This need for compromise further explains the strong 
focus on efficiency, as this type of language was considered less offensive and non-
controversial, and, thus, easier to push through a decision-making process that 
involves diverse members and requires consensus.  
 
The impact of diversity and the resulting need for compromise on the dominant 
approach to WID/GAD is further illustrated by a quick look at the European 
Parliament’s approach to WID/GAD during that same period. An analysis of the 
European Parliament Resolution on the Fourth World Conference on Women shows 
a very different approach to WID/GAD. On the whole the Resolution is strongly 
couched in language promoted in Beijing, thus much more focused on rights, 
equality and transformation rather than development effectiveness. Notably, the 
Resolution calls on all national constitutions to “include women’s rights” and 
stresses the need to “teach the idea of equality and calls on the governments to 
organize campaigns to enhance awareness on equality issues” (European Parliament 
1995, para. 10). Regarding development, strong emphasis is put on rights, including 
sexual and reproductive rights (European Parliament 1995, para. 3) and the 
Resolution even takes a pro-abortion stand (European Parliament 1995, para. 40). 
 
The reason for this difference in approach can be linked to the different 
organisational set-up of the Parliament. First, the Resolution originated in the 
Women’s Committee, which is a strongly homogenous group of intrinsically 
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persuaded actors – thus, providing a lot of freedom and not requiring much 
compromise or ‘watering-down’ in order to reach agreement. Second, the adoption 
process of the actual Resolution did not require consensus but merely a majority, 
even the formal adoption process did not require the level of compromise that the 
adoption of the Council Resolution required. In short, it was medium diversity and 
multi-membership in decision-making that facilitated the drafting of the Resolution 
but also the same diversity, coupled with a formal decision-making process and the 
need for consensus that made the actual approach taken in the Council Resolution 
incoherent, vague, and overall focused on efficiency arguments rather than intrinsic, 
value-based arguments. 
 
Lastly, also the example of the Commission Communication confirms my argument. 
Notably, the Commission Communication’s more coherent and overall stronger 
approach was an outcome of the overall informal and homogenous decision-making 
structure inside the Commission, yet this time combined with enhanced freedom for 
WID/GAD officials to take action enabled by the increased global momentum on 
gender in the run-up to Beijing and the resulting increased interest and openness of 
EC member states towards this issue. This gave WID/GAD officials a lot of freedom 
and allowed them, including the consultant who drafted the Communication, to 
include issues, which they personally considered important, such as positive action 
on WID/GAD in the Communication (Interview with Colombo). However, overall, 
the approach in the Communication is still very cautious and efficiency-based. 
According to interviews with official working on WID/GAD during this decade, this 
was a result of strategic considerations as they were “keen to produce a document 
that was likely to be accepted by the Council” (Interview with Colombo). Indeed, 
interviews with officials working on WID/GAD during this decade strongly suggest 
efficiency arguments were favoured as they were thought to be more effective in 
changing colleagues’ behaviour (Interview with Marchetti; Interview with Fransen). 
This observed self-censorship that was also present in UNDP seems to suggest a 
certain underlying organisational gender bias and will be further discussed in 
Chapter Nine. 
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iii. Explaining the level of operationalisation  
 
The reason for why overall operationalisation was low in this second decade of 
analysis is linked to two factors. First, overall budgetary allocations were decided on 
by the Council and second, most specific decisions on implementation were taken at 
the level of the Commission.  
 
As discussed above, the Council, due to its composition, did not agree on the value 
or importance of WID/GAD and, thus, did not allocate sufficient funds to its 
integration. This certainly hindered a number of steps, which, although relatively 
inexpensive, would have required some financial resources. Cases in point are the 
hiring of an adequate number of WID/GAD officers from the core budget and the 
rolling out of WID/GAD training for staff.  
 
In addition, however, many decisions regarding specific steps towards norm 
operationalisation, such as the development and use of programming tools and the 
including of WID/GAD in performance incentives were taken at the level of the 
Commission. Coupled with a ‘delegated’ source of authority, which made the 
Commission only weakly susceptible to global trends, meant that it relied heavily on 
a strong internal push or an explicit push for by the Council to take any action on 
WID/GAD. As seen above, the Council did not exercise such a strong push for 
action.  The set-up of the Commission, due to its homogeneity of top decision-
makers, also made the presence of a vocal top-level decision-maker less likely. 
Indeed, according to interviews, no such commitment seems to have existed around 
1995 (Interview with Fransen). According to one former official working on 
WID/GAD, there was “no management back-up” on the issue (Interview with 
Fransen).  
 
However, in contrast to the previous period, WID/GAD officials’ freedom for action 
had increased slightly due to the growing global momentum around Beijing and a 
resulting increased interest by member states, explaining the slightly more coherent 
and specific approach in the 1995 Commission Communication. Despite this, the 
lack of top-level commitment meant that WID/GAD officials remained very few in 
numbers, highly marginalised in the organisational hierarchy and severely under-
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funded. Coupled with an overall dominant source of authority and identity perception 
as ‘delegated’, this severely limited the power of WID/GAD officials to 
operationalise the norm and helps to explain the observed weak norm 
operationalisation.  
 
6.3 The first comprehensive WID/GAD strategy or policy in ODA 
 
ODA adopted its first comprehensive WID strategy entitled “Strategy for the 
Implementation of ODA’s Policy on Women in Development” in 1988 (ODA 1988). 
 
Which driver dominated norm integration? 
 
i. Process and timing 
 
An analysis of debates in the House of Commons shows that there was no pressure 
from Parliament on ODA to take further action on WID/GAD after the adoption of 
the 1986 policy (UK Parliament 1988, 1987) and no formal records on how the 
decision to adopt the strategy in ODA was taken exist (Interview with Eyben; 
Interview with O'Neill). Yet, interviews with officials who worked in ODA during 
the time, including with the draftsperson of the strategy herself, strongly suggest that 
the decision to draft a strategy was the result of bargaining between a committed 
Social Development Advisers (SDAs) and senior management in ODA. The SDA, 
who was also the main contact person with the WID lobby that had been actively 
pushing for the adoption of the first policy in 1986, approached senior management 
with the specific request from the WID lobby to establish a quota for women to take 
up scholarships funded by ODA. Senior management refused the quota but granted 
permission to draft a WID strategy, in order to, at least, be seen to be somewhat 
responding to the lobby. As the SDA recalls,  
 
So I had a meeting with more senior staff about whether we could 
agree to this request for a quota and they said ‘no’ and I looked 
disappointed…so I said, when they were feeling sympathetic, if we 
can’t have a quota can we have a strategy for WID. And that 
sounded to them as an easier thing than a quota so they said ‘yes, go 
away and draft a strategy’. (Interview with Eyben)   
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Thus, the decision to draft a strategy was taken without formal deliberation or wider 
consultation and seemed the result of bargaining and, ultimately, pressure from a 
national lobby group that had been effectively channelled into the organisation 
through a committed WID/GAD advocate inside the organisation. This strongly 
suggests that the decision to adopt a strategy does not reflect a long-term strategy or 
overall increased institutional commitment to WID and but was, instead, driven by 
social influence considerations. 
 
ii. Policy approach 
 
Although following a similar drafting process as the 1986 policy – informal and 
centralised –  the approach taken by the 1988 strategy is remarkably different from 
the first policy. Notably, it presents WID as “an important component of its (ODA’s) 
policy on poverty alleviation” and recognises that “there are compelling equity 
arguments for giving special attention to promoting women’s opportunities” (ODA 
1988, p. 1). Recall that equity was not mentioned in the first policy and integrating 
WID/GAD was certainly not presented as an important component of ODA’s work. 
Yet also in the 1988 strategy, equity arguments, although mentioned are not 
discussed and the sentence recognising them is immediately followed by a strong 
instrumental arguments for promoting WID. It states that, “The calculation that 
women account for two-thirds of the world’s work-hours, receive ten per cent of its 
income and own one per cent of its assets…indicates the economic benefit to be 
secured from (the) promotion of women’s interests” (ODA 1988, p. 1). 
 
Further, and again in contrast to the 1986 policy, the strategy takes a bold approach 
to culture. It states that,  
 
Consistent consideration of both aspects (seeing women as agents of 
development and consumers of the output of development) is 
necessary everywhere and particularly in those countries where the 
cultural tradition attributes inferior status to women. (ODA 1988, p. 
2) 
 
 
The strategy also provides a brief but comprehensive outline of a range of obstacles 
“to the full participation of women in the development process”, covering issues 
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from women’s legal status, to their cultural status and access to a wide variety of 
services. Most importantly, the strategy outlines detailed and concrete guidelines on 
how the norm should be integrated across ODA. Notably, it calls for the inclusion of 
WID/GAD in policy dialogue with partner countries and suggests concrete entry 
points in this regard; it provides guidance on how the norm should be integrated in 
project design; calls for staff training and the inclusion of WID/GAD expertise in 
terms of reference for consultants; and makes concrete requests to specific ODA 
divisions, such as the statistics division, the information department, and the 
international division, to integrate WID/GAD in their work (ODA 1988, p. 4).  
 
Overall, the strategy is coherent, comprehensive and framed in both instrumental and 
intrinsic terms, with an underlying preference for the former.  
 
iii. Operationalisation 1988 -1991 
 
Human resources: The number of human resources allocated to social development, 
which included WID, increased from two to three in 1988 and seven in 1991. A 
number, which, although representing an increase, was still judged to be grossly 
unsatisfactory, considering that SDA were responsible for all aspects of social 
development, not just WID/GAD (Eyben 2003, p. 881). 
 
In addition to this increase in numbers, also the status of SDAs remained low. SDAs 
were employed at grades 6 or 7, which meant that they were not included in regular 
meetings with their superior, the Chief Economist (Interview Eyben) and did not 
have their own department or division. Due to their low status SDAs were also not 
part of the Projects and Evaluation Committee (PEC), whose role it was to review 
draft projects and programmes above a certain budget to ensure that they meet 
certain requirements. The PEC had the power to request amendments and advises the 
Minister on whether or not to approve a project or programme. Not being part of this 
committee significantly reduced SDAs’ power for quality insurance regarding 
matters of social development, including WID/GAD. 
 
Training: Specific staff training on WID was introduced in the late 1988s. The 
training methodology included practical as well as strategic gender needs, which was 
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significant since the inclusion of strategic gender needs implied a move towards an 
inclusion of the concept of power and empowerment. Crucially, a top-level directive 
issued by the Minister Chris Patten made training compulsory for all staff (Interview 
with Moser). An internal evaluation of the training found that it was highly 
successful in increasing staff understanding of the importance of WID/GAD and 
when to ask for expert input (Sheelagh 1998). 
  
However, due to its short duration (1 day) and the resulting lack of focus on practical 
skills, the training did not enable staff to fully integrate WID/GAD into their work 
themselves. Another evaluation found that training had only reached 30% of staff in 
the early 1990s and most staff trained were junior as senior managers were found to 
be only “poorly represented on the course” (Trumbull and Wall 1994, p. 38; 
Sheelagh 1998; Interview with Iredale). This actual limited reach of the training was 
also confirmed by interviews undertaken for this thesis, as the majority of those 
interviewed who worked in ODA during that time had not been trained on 
WID/GAD; and those that led departments were not aware whether their team 
members had been trained, even in departments such as education (Interview with 
Iredale; Interview with Symons; Interview with Weaver; Interview with Glenworth).  
 
Programming tools: Programming tools specifically for WID were scarce, consisting 
of the 1988 strategy, which was not very specific or practical, and a checklist 
developed in the mid-1970s, which was very limited in its utility and actual use. The 
use of the both tools on WID was not compulsory (Mazza 1988, p. 21 and 39). 
 
Financial resources: No budget was specifically allocated to the implementation of 
the WID policies or strategy and the amount of general funds spent on the promotion 
of WID/GAD was not tracked. 
 
Performance incentives: There were no staff incentives for including WID in their 
work and WID was not part of staff performance reviews (Jensen 2006, p. 25). 
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Table 12: Summary of WID/GAD operationalisation in ODA 1986 - 1989 
 
 
iv. Summary: Which norm integration driver dominated? 
 
The decision to develop the first comprehensive strategy in ODA in 1988 was taken 
in response to pressure from a national lobby group. Although channelled through a 
committed official inside ODA, the overall driver of the actual decision to draft the 
strategy was a response to pressure from a national lobby group, thus, related to 
reputational concerns, suggesting a dominance of social influence. This conclusion is 
also supported by the fact that the level of operationalisation, which remained very 
weak in the three years following the adoption of the strategy. 
 
Only the approach taken by the strategy, which is coherent and comprehensive, 
points to the presence of pockets of genuine commitment to the norm and moments 
of norm integration driven by ethical – mostly instrumental – considerations. 
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However, as with UNDP and the EC above, these ‘pockets of commitment’ were 
positioned at operational level and did not have sufficient freedom or power to have 
their commitment reflected at organisational level. 
 
Why did this driver dominate? 
 
i. Explaining the process and timing 
 
Like the first policy in 1986, also this strategy seems to be a direct result of the 
organisation’s mild susceptibility to pressure from national CSOs who got organised 
around the 1985 Nairobi Conference – a function of its ‘delegated source of 
authority’ – yet, this time channelled through an ODA staff member personally 
committed to the norm, who arrived in late 1986 (Interview with Holden; Interview 
with Eyben). Although the actions of this individual were very important, they were 
strongly facilitated by ODA’s organisational structure, particularly its homogeneous, 
centralised, and informal decision-making structure on matters relating to WID. This 
gave operational staff some freedom to take action on the norm as they saw fit, as it 
did not require formal approval from multiple and/or diverse actors, like the other 
two case studies did. Notably, the SDA responsible for WID/GAD at the time stated 
in an interview for this thesis that, “In ODA there was an enormous freedom” 
(Interview with Eyben). 
 
The key difference to 1986, however, was that this time the process involved 
operational staff strongly committed to the norm, who arrived in late 1986 (Interview 
with Holden; Interview with Eyben).  
 
ii. Explaining the approach 
 
The observed change in policy approach reflected in the strategy seems to haven 
been largely a reflection of key staff members’ personal convictions. Notably, 
Rosalind Eyben, the SDA in charge of drafting the policy, was knowledgeable on 
WID and strongly committed to a ‘social development approach’ to gender equality 
(Interview with Eyben).This approach, which views WID as an important part of, 
and tool to, achieve social development, is clearly reflected in the strategy.  
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However, despite the important role played by individual staff, as above, their views 
could only be so directly reflected in the policy due to the decision-making structures 
involved being homogeneous, centralised, and informal giving WID/GAD staff 
ample freedom to promote the norm as they saw fit. In this regard the policy is 
similar to the Commission Communication analysed above, which exhibits similar 
characteristics and was also drafted in a homogenous, centralised and informal way. 
 
Having said that, although WID advocates managed to fairly freely decide on which 
approach to include, the dominant approach to WID/GAD promotion in this and 
subsequent policies was largely focused on instrumental arguments aligned with 
ODA’s already existing priority of economic and social development, again similar 
to the other cases. This approach, although not necessarily reflecting WID/GAD 
officials’ personal convictions (Interview with Holden), was chosen as a strategy that 
was thought to be most effective for norm integration in the organisation (Interview 
with Holden; Interview with Eyben). 
 
iii. Explaining operationalisation 
 
The reason for why the operationalisation of WID was overall weak was, yet again, 
linked to the administration’s decision-making structure, albeit this time at high-
level. Its relatively homogeneous decision-making structure composed of fairly few 
actors and its limited susceptibility to external pressure resulting from its ‘delegated’ 
source of authority and its financial autonomy from external funding sources made it 
heavily reliant on a high-level ‘push’ either from government, Parliament or from 
inside ODA to take comprehensive action on WID/GAD. There was no push from 
government and Parliament and ODA’s structure made it relatively unlikely for such 
a push to exist inside the Administration. Its delegated source of authority, making it 
hardly susceptible to external scrutiny or pressures, and its homogenous decision-
making body made the presence of a committed individual unlikely. The absence of 
such a push at high-level meant that the status of WID/GAD still remained low in the 
organisation. Although this provided freedom for WID/GAD advocates, it did not 
provide institutional backing, in other words status or resources for WID/GAD 
advocates, necessary for comprehensive norm operationalisation and overall norm 
integration process driven by ethical considerations at the level of the organisation. 
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6.4 The explanatory power of organisational characteristics summarised 
 
Explaining the timing 
 
The specific timing of the adoption of the first comprehensive WID/GAD strategy in 
each organisation was strongly influenced by (1) the organisations’ different level of 
susceptibility to scrutiny from more or less diverse scrutinisers, which was in turn 
influenced by the organisations’ mandate and source of authority, and (2) by the 
composition of its decision-making bodies. 
 
The reason why UNDP was the first of the three organisations to undertake this 
second key step towards norm integration was largely a result of its strong 
susceptibility to scrutiny from multiple scrutinisers, including the UN system, which 
was a function of UNDP’s split source of delegated authority (UN system and 
member states), its increasing moral authority and its overall mandate as a global 
development organisation. This, in turn, meant that UN system pressure had 
considerable impact on UNDP, particularly in contrast to the other two organisations.  
ODA only took action once some of the ‘scrutinisers’ it was most susceptible to – 
national CSOs – publically called for action on the norm, while the EC only acted 
fairly late in response to internal pressure from Commission officials and member 
states. 
 
In addition, the level of multi-membership and cultural diversity also significantly 
influenced the timing of the adoption of the strategies, albeit coupled with the 
organisation’s substantive mandate. Notably, the adoption of the first WID/GAD 
strategy in UNDP was to a significant extent a result of explicit pressure from a 
number of vocal member states, the presence of which was facilitated by the multi-
membership and cultural diversity of the Governing Council. In addition, the 
likelihood of a decision-maker to call for action on the norm was further facilitated 
by increased international recognition of WID/GAD (compared to the 1970s) and 
UNDP’s substantive mandate as a global development organisation.  The EC 
Council’s multi-membership, yet only mild cultural diversity and weaker mandate as 
a ‘global’ development organisation, meant that there was no vocal decision-maker 
calling for action on the norm, resulting in no strong political push from the Council 
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to the Commission to take any significant action on the norm prior to 1995.  Thus, it 
was not until global pressure rose significantly in the run up to the Beijing 
Conference, that the EC felt the need to take action.  
 
ODA’s homogenous, centralised, and informal decision-making relating to issues of 
WID/GAD meant that only few top-decisions makers were involved in high-level 
decisions on the norm, reducing the likelihood of the presence of a vocal principal 
willing to push for action on the norm. Yet, the informal nature of decision-making 
also meant that operational staff had a lot of freedom to take action on the norm as 
they saw fit. It was this freedom, together with pressure from a national lobby group, 
and strong personal commitment from the WID officer, that lead to the adoption of 
the strategy. 
 
Explaining the approach 
 
The approach to WID/GAD in all three strategies was significantly influenced by the 
composition of the organisations’ decision-making structure regarding the norm. 
Notably, UNDP’s multi-membership, high-level of cultural diversity, and consensus-
based decision-making and the resulting lack of agreement on the importance of 
WID/GAD meant that norm integration involved debate and required negotiation, 
justification, and compromise, which lead to the continuation of an almost non-
conceptual and instrumentally-focused policy approach to the norm. Similarly, the 
multitude of views on WID/GAD in the Council and the need for agreement meant 
that the overall policy approach favoured instrumental arguments, as reaching an 
agreement required negotiation and justification, and this was more readily done 
using instrumental arguments and relying on reputational pressure. In contrast to 
UNDP, there was no strong procedural mandate that might have lead to an overall 
non-conceptual approach.  
 
Interestingly, however, in both cases there was also a noticeable shift towards a more 
comprehensive and coherent policy approach to the norm, which was a result of the 
presence of committed operational staff and a context that offered slightly more 
freedom for action on WID/GAD due to the ever-increasing international recognition 
of the norm. Yet, in both cases, the level of freedom was curtailed by the need for 
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negotiation, justification and compromise, as well as a considerably amount of self-
censorship by WID/GAD advocates. 
 
Due to its centralised and homogenous decision-making, especially on WID/GAD 
related matters, operational staff in ODA were not restricted to the same level and, 
thus, had considerably more freedom to take action on the norm as they saw fit. It 
was this freedom, and the fact that the strategy was not formally debated, that 
explains its comprehensive form. However, also ODA operational staff exercised a 
high-level of self-censorship, which explains the overall preference for instrumental 
arguments over intrinsic ones also in ODA’s approach. 
 
Explaining the level of operationalisation 
 
The overall weak level of operationalisation in all three organisations was a result of 
a lack of agreement on, and appreciation of, the importance of WID/GAD in the 
organisations’ top decision-making bodies.  In the case of UNDP and the EC the lack 
of agreement was a result of their decision-making bodies’ multi-membership and 
culturally highly diverse decision-making body coupled with a consensus culture. 
This lack of agreement meant that there was no strong political backing or, even 
remotely, sufficient funding for WID/GAD staff to operationalise the norm.  
 
However, the same structural characteristics, coupled with the ability of member 
states to earmark funding, also contributed to the decision to adopt the strategy in the 
first place and also directly lead to some of the few steps towards operationalisation 
that were actually taken by UNDP and the EC during the periods under investigation. 
Indeed, in both organisations, it was one or a few vocal member states, the presence 
of whom was facilitated by the organisations’ multi-membership and cultural 
diversity, that significantly influenced the decision to adopt the WID/GAD strategies 
and lead to a number of steps towards operationalisation. 
 
The reverse of this argument has also been illustrated through the example of ODA. 
In ODA, due to its homogenous decision-making forum that only involved very few 
decision-makers, the likelihood of the presence of a committed and vocal decision-
maker was reduced. This was further compounded by the fact that ODA’s 
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‘delegated’ source of authority meant that it was only mildly susceptible to scrutiny 
from very few scrutinisers (government, parliament, national CSOs), only some of 
which (nation CSOs) were vocal on the issue. In addition, the organisation’s 
substantive mandate was very weak and did not provide an ‘easy hook’ or incentive 
for the integration of WID/GAD. All of this gave top-level decisions-makers 
freedom to pursue issues they deemed important. The absence of such commitment 
amongst top-level decision-makers in ODA during this period of study meant that the 
norm was not considered important, resulting in very few steps towards norm 
operationalisation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As the previous Chapter, this analysis has shown that also the adoption of the first 
comprehensive WID/GAD strategy in all three organisations was largely driven by 
social influence considerations rather than ethical considerations, be they 
instrumental or intrinsic. The simple, overarching, reason for this is the same as in 
Chapter Five: For norm integration to be overall driven by ethical considerations 
across an organisation would require agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of 
the norm by the organisation’s top decision-makers, especially if decisions are taken 
by consensus.  
 
The lack of agreement on the value and importance of WID/GAD reduced the 
freedom, power, and resources of actors committed to the norm in each organisation, 
leading to weak operationalisation as well as to incoherent and a strongly 
instrumentally focused or largely non-conceptual policies.   
 
Also in agreement with Chapter Five, this Chapter has shown that the likelihood of 
such an agreement was significantly influenced by organisational structure 
suggesting that organisations with characteristics more typical of multilateral 
organisations – multi-membership, a high-level of cultural diversity and consensus-
based decision-making – are less likely to agree on the importance or most 
appropriate approach to a norm. The divergence of views in the cases analysed was 
exacerbated, as the norm did not fit squarely within the organisation’s existing 
mandates, thus, not providing an easy hook or blueprint for norm uptake.  
 194 
ODA’s homogenous and centralised decision-making on WID/GAD, on the other 
hand, made agreement on the norm more likely. However, the same characteristics 
made the presence of committed and vocal decision-maker less likely, making an 
appreciation of the value of the norm among top decision-makers less likely. Without 
such appreciation, and coupled with ODA’s highly limited susceptibility to external 
scrutinisers, ODA was less likely to take any action on the norm. When ODA did 
take action, in response to national CSO pressure – one pressure source that the 
organisation was susceptible to – this was limited to policy changes.  
 
The policy was coherent and comprehensive as it was developed by committed 
actors within the organisation. Yet the lack of commitment at top-level meant that 
these individuals were not given the power or resources to comprehensively integrate 
WID/GAD across ODA. 
 
In short, the Chapter concurs with the previous one in its finding that ethical 
considerations did not drive norm integration in the three cases analysed but showed 
that certain organisational characteristics mostly typical of multilateral organisations 
facilitated some kind of action on the norm. Yet, this was due to these organisations’ 
greater susceptible to reputational – not ethical – concerns. Indeed, the Chapter 
suggests that norm integration in multilateral organisations seem generally unlikely 
to be driven by ethical considerations as their structural set-up leads to a constant 
struggle to reach agreement, making the organisations less likely to reach 
comprehensive norm integration, especially integration driven by intrinsic ethical 
considerations. 
 
Characteristics typical of bilateral organisations, especially few and homogenous 
decision-makers, seem to make organisations less likely to take any action on a new 
norm at all, as they make it less likely for a committed decision-maker to be present. 
If such top-level commitment is not present, and combined with low susceptibility to 
only very few and homogenous scrutinisers, bilateral organisations may not only be 
less likely to take action at all on a new norm, but when they do, this tends to lead to 
weak norm integration. 
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Can it, therefore, be concluded that ethical considerations are generally unlikely to 
drive norm integration in development organisations – and more broadly, that the 
cases indicate that ethical considerations do not carry much weight at all in 
international development organisations? This is not necessarily the case as one 
finding from the case studies might offer a potential context in which ethical 
considerations could drive norm integration: If multi-membership and diversity seem 
an obstacle for ethical considerations to dominate, then the reverse – homogeneity 
and limited membership, if combined with the presence of a committed decision-
maker – might offer a more promising context.  However, due to the absence of such 
a committed decision-maker in ODA during the first two key moment this assertion 
has only been hinted at by the example of the Women’s Committee in the European 
Parliament in Chapter Five, and the example of the Commission Communication in 
this Chapter, but has not yet been fully explored. The next Chapter turns to this. 
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Chapter 7: Towards a theory on the impact of organisational 
characteristics on ethical considerations: Additional 
empirical evidence to complete the findings 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous Chapters have argued that, both, the first high-level recognition of 
WID/GAD as well as the adoption of the first comprehensive WID/GAD strategy 
were driven by social influence rather than intrinsic or instrumental ethical 
considerations in all three organisations. Although some steps towards norm 
integration were taken in each case, these were largely due to external pressure, 
albeit the origins of the pressure and the level of susceptibility to it varied 
considerably between the organisations. Policies were incoherent and 
operationalisation weak in each case. The Chapters have argued that the reason for 
this was that in no organisation was there agreement on, and appreciation of, the 
value of WID/GAD among top-level decision-makers. As a result, operational staff 
committed to the norm, where and when present, had insufficient political backing, 
resources, and freedom to significantly influence norm integration and have their 
convictions regarding the norm reflected at organisational-level. 
 
The lack of agreement or appreciation of the norm, in turn, was the result of 
particular organisational characteristics in each case. Specifically, the Chapters found 
that in the case of UNDP and the EC agreement on the norm was made less likely 
due to the organisations’ multi-member and culturally diverse decision-making fora 
that operated on consensus. Yet it was also found that the same characteristics, 
coupled with strong susceptibility to scrutiny from multiple scrutinisers and a 
mandate as a global development organisation, made UNDP quicker at taking some 
action on the norm than the other two. This was so because multi-membership and 
cultural diversity increased the likelihood of the presence of vocal decision-makers 
who called for action on the norm, particularly once the norm was widely 
internationally recognised; and susceptibility to scrutiny from multiple scrutinisers, a 
function of the organisation’s source of authority and global mandate, also made the 
organisation more likely to respond to global trends, including on WID/GAD. 
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On the flipside, homogeneity and centralised decision-making involving only few 
individuals, as was the case in ODA, made agreement on the norm among top-level 
decision-makers easier to achieve. However, the same characteristics made the 
presence of a decision-maker committed to the norm less likely, reducing the 
likelihood that the value of the norm would, in fact, be appreciated. Coupled with 
weak and inward-looking susceptibility to scrutiny and a weak mandate on global 
development, this made ODA less likely to take any action on the norm at all.  
 
Does the above suggest that ethical considerations are, thus, highly unlikely to drive 
norm integration in any kind of development aid organisation? I propose that this 
may not be the case as the analysis so far has provided some tentative findings that 
suggest that homogeneity and more centralised decision-making – if combined with 
the presence of committed and vocal actors – can lead to strong agreement on, and 
appreciation of, the norm and, thus, lead to more comprehensive, coherent, and 
intrinsically-focused policies and strategies. Notably, during the periods analysed so 
far such a presence was observed in the European Parliament Women’s Committee, 
at the operational level in the Commission in the 1990s, and in ODA from the late 
1980s onwards. In each case policies emerging from these fora were coherent, 
comprehensive, and framed around the intrinsic value of WID/GAD. However, in 
none of the cases was a committed actor present in top-decision making, thereby 
limiting the freedom, power, and resources of individuals in these fora to have their 
approaches reflected at organisational-level or operationalised. Thus, so far the 
analysis has not yet been able to explore the full extent of this tentative suggestions: 
Are homogeneity and few decision-makers, if combined with top-level support for 
the norm, possibly more likely to lead to more comprehensive norm uptake 
indicative of norm integration overall driven by ethical considerations? 
 
In this Chapter I turn to this point and explore it in more detail by considering 
additional empirical evidence drawn from the entire research period from the 
organisation that exhibits these characteristics (homogeneity and few decision-
makers) in its top-level decision-making: ODA/DFID. Specifically, the leadership of 
Lynda Chalker (1989-1997), and subsequently, Clare Short (1997 – 2000) are 
analysed. 
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The Chapter shows that, indeed, the presence of top-level commitment, or at least 
openness, in a homogenous decision-making body with a limited number of 
principals, can enable more comprehensive and coherent policies and strategies and 
strong norm operationalisation, indicative of norm integration driven by ethical 
considerations. Yet, the findings do not suggest that the organisation itself, or even 
the majority of staff, had become convinced of the ethical desirability of WID/GAD 
at any point. Indeed, the dominance of ethical considerations at organisational-level 
in the cases analysed was largely due to the fact that committed individuals were 
given the freedom and power to act on their ethical beliefs and, thereby, managed to 
have these beliefs reflected at organisational-level.  
 
Thus, the Chapter supports the finding of the previous two Chapters, which suggest 
that organisations per se seem generally unlikely to be driven by ethical 
considerations – but that individuals inside them may be. Critically, however, 
organisational structure can significantly hinder or enable such individuals to act on 
their ethical beliefs and have them reflected at organisational-level, by providing (or 
not providing) them with sufficient freedom, power, and resources to act on their 
personal commitments to the norm. This, in turn, influences the extent to which norm 
integration may be driven by ethical considerations at the level of the organisation. 
 
7.1 The arrival of a supportive top-level decision-maker in ODA: Lynda 
Chalker 
 
This section expands the analysis of WID/GAD integration into ODA/DFID beyond 
1988 to examine if norm integration changed with shifts in ODA/DFID leadership in 
1988. First, available evidence on the new Minister of State for Overseas 
Development, Lynda Chalker’s, attitude to WID/GAD is considered and second, the 
impact of her commitment to the norm is examined. 
 
Lynda Chalker’s growing openness to WID/GAD 
 
Lynda Chalker took over from Chris Patten as Minister of State for Overseas 
Development in 1989 and held the post until 1997 when she was replaced by Clare 
Short. Interviews with a number of ODA staff who directly worked with her strongly 
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suggest that during her first few years in office Lynda Chalker, although not 
opposing action on WID/GAD, was, like Chris Patten, not particularly supportive of 
the issue. Notably, one SDA stated in an interview for this thesis that, “There was no 
resistance form the top (under Chalker). But there was no difference between Patten 
and Chalker. In the early years, Chalker was referred to as a ‘closet feminist’ () and 
not very knowledgeable or outspoken on WID/GAD (Interview with Holden). 
 
However, interviewees and secondary sources also concur that in the early 1990s 
Chalker’s understanding of, and support for, WID/GAD shifted due to persistent 
internal advocacy by some Social Development Advisors (SDAs) in ODA. One 
former SDA stated that, “Lynda Chalker was a bit different [from Patten]. Strangely 
enough towards the end of her time she got more interested in it…She got much 
more into it.” (Interview with Holden) Another SDA who joined ODA in the mid-
1990s stated that “I met Lady Chalker in Beijing in 1995. I think she was interested 
from a WID point of view and I think that she did get the point about WID….” 
(Interview with Keeling). This view was endorsed by an official who implemented 
projects for ODA on WID in Kenya and met Lynda Chalker on a number of 
occasions. Notably, she stated that “I found Lynda Chalker easy to work with on 
gender…she had more clarity (than Patten and Short).” (Interview with Okondo). 
 
Other observers of WID/GAD in ODA concur with the observation that Chalker was 
indeed open and supportive of WID/GAD. Notably, Jo Beall states that Lady Chalker 
showed great  “interest in women’s issues…” (Beall 1998, p. 237), which facilitated 
much action on WID/GAD in ODA in the early 1990s. Another account notes that 
ODA’s work on “…women in development was benefiting from…Lynda 
Chalker…being supportive.” (Eyben 2003, p. 886) Indeed, in 1995, Chalker agreed 
to  “make a break-through speech in which she spoke of gender equality as a human 
right.” (Eyben 2003, p. 886) Eyben notes that “Her speech emphasized that women 
as well as men have rights. Top civil servants strongly disliked this rights language 
and instructed the Chief Economist to control its use.” (Eyben 2007, p. 74) All the 
above strongly suggests that Lynda Chalker was, indeed, open towards, and 
supportive of, WID/GAD and became increasingly vocal on the issue during her time 
in office. 
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What impact, if any, did this increased top-level openness to WID/GAD, combined 
with the continued presence of strongly committed operational staff, have on the 
dominant norm integration process in ODA? The next section turns to this by 
looking at (1) the policy approach and (2) operationalisation under Chalker. 
 
Which norm integration driver dominated?  
 
i. Impact on policy  
 
In 1992 ODA adopted a new WID/GAD policy (ODA 1992b). The policy represents 
a further step towards a more coherent and comprehensive approach to WID/GAD 
and is framed in much less instrumental language than the previous ones. Notably, 
the entire foreword focuses on the importance of meeting women’s needs, taking into 
account their interests, and giving them a voice in the development process without 
tying these issues to effective development or economic growth. In addition, 
women’s triple roles are recognised and a much more comprehensive appreciation of 
the various challenges women face in developing countries is presented. For 
example, the policy starts with an explicit section entitled “The Challenge” which 
specifies a number of obstacles faced by women. Importantly, these include “legal 
rights” and “social status” in addition to previously recognised issues such as 
education. In particular, the policy takes a much stronger stance on cultural and calls 
for including WID in policy dialogue. (ODA 1992b, p. 1) Notably, the policy quite 
boldly states that “These restrictions (in social status) stem form a cultural 
atmosphere that accords women a lower status than men,” and that ODA’s “highest 
priority is to change attitudes in developing countries” (ODA 1992b, p.1). 
 
The 1992 policy was replaced by a new policy in 1995 (ODA 1995). This policy 
represents a further, and very significant, departure in approach from previous ODA 
WID policies as it is strongly framed in explicit transformative language of rights 
and empowerment. The title alone is a case in point: Making Aid Work for Women. 
This title was a conscious and explicit move away from an instrumentalist view of 
WID/GAD making it clear that it is aid that should work for women, not women who 
should work for aid (Interview with Eyben). The policy itself puts strong emphasis 
on transformation and power relations. Notably, it states that “Our goal is to 
 201 
transform the partnership between men and women” and opens with an account of an 
ODA project in India where “for the first time anyone can remember, women from 
villages…are having a say in the decisions which most affect their lives” (ODA 
1995, p. 1). Culture and recipient government-led development are not mentioned as 
reasons for different approaches to WID. On the contrary, it states that “women 
everywhere do have the right to choose what they want in all areas of life…” and that 
it is “women and men in the South” – as opposed to their governments – that should 
“inform and influence” ODA’s approach. (ODA 1995, p. 1) Lastly, the policy also 
includes concrete strategies on how it should be implemented, making it a 
comprehensive document. 
 
ii. Impact on operationalisation 
 
Human resources: Human resources allocated to social development, including 
WID/GAD, grew from seven in 1991 to 25 in 1996. (Watkins 2004, p. 13.) In 1992 
Social Development, the section responsible for promoting WID/GAD, became its 
own department, which increased its political clout as well as its financial autonomy 
of the Social Development Advisors (SDAs) as the department had its own allocation 
of funds. In 1995 the head of the Social Development Department was promoted to 
Chief Social Development Advisor. This was particularly significant, as it gave 
SDAs a seat on the Project Evaluation Committee (PEC). The PEC’s role was to 
review draft projects and programmes above a certain budget to ensure that they met 
certain requirements. The PEC had the power to request amendments and advise the 
Minister on whether or not to approve a project or programme. Having a seat on this 
committee significantly increased the SDA’s power to ensure that issues of social 
development, including WID/GAD, were included in ODA’s larger projects and 
programmes. The SDAs’ inclusion in the PEC was followed by them being given a 
seat on the Project Evaluation Team in 1996, marking a second important 
development towards operationalising WID/GAD.  
 
Training: In the early 1990s a new training methodology for WID/GAD was 
introduced in ODA/DFID. The method included the concept of ‘strategic gender 
needs’ (Moser 1993) (Molnyeux 1985), which shifted the focus of WID/GAD from 
welfare towards empowerment and social transformation. Training on WID/GAD 
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further intensified during the mid-1990s and remained compulsory. An evaluation of 
the training found that it was highly successful in increasing staff understanding of 
the importance of WID/GAD and when to ask for expert input. (Sheelagh 1998) Due 
to its short duration (1 day) and the resulting lack of focus on practical skills, an 
evaluation of the training found that it did not enable staff to fully integrate 
WID/GAD into their work themselves. However, awareness-raising goals seemed to 
have been achieved (Sheelagh 1998, p. 27). 
 
Programming tools: In 1993 ODA produced a guide to programming called the 
Social Development Handbook (ODA 1993). The document comprehensively 
includes gender equality and women and also contains a specific section on “Women 
in Development”. Thus, the handbook is framed in line with the ‘two-pronged 
approach’ to gender equality promotion – gender mainstreaming alongside a women-
specific focus – an approach that was quite avant-garde in the early 1990s and only 
became wide-spread at global level with the Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action.  
 
Moreover, the handbook explicitly includes and explains the concept of ‘gender’ in 
addition to ‘women’. The definition of gender is detailed and strongly refers to its 
‘transformational’ potential (ODA 1993, p. 90). The handbook also includes strategic 
alongside practical gender needs. Thus, the handbook takes a very strong approach to 
WID/GAD and features elements of both intrinsic and instrumental ethical 
arguments to justify the norm.  
 
Broader policies: A consideration of broader policy statements and tools suggests, in 
contrast, that WID/GAD had not been comprehensively integrated across the 
organisation. Although some reference to WID/GAD seem to be made as a matter of 
course, this is done in a very haphazard way suggesting the uncritical and shallow 
acceptance of a certain rhetoric regarding the norm, not actual norm integration. A 
case in point is a Technical Note on ‘Aid and Poverty Reduction’ (ODA 1991) that 
enshrined ODA’s overall policy aims, in the absence of a White Paper (the last 
White Paper was adopted in 1975). The Note does include WID, however in a weak 
way and not in line with ODA’s WID policy. Notably, the note recognises that one 
“of the underlying social processes (contributing to poverty) are rooted in class, 
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gender, regional and economic relations” (ODA 1991, p. 39) and calls on staff to 
“…identify geographical, ethnic, sectoral and gender issues in poverty” when 
conducting a poverty assessment. Further, it states that ODA will address “cultural 
attitudes which constraint activities of certain groups, eg. women and low-status 
casts” (ODA 1991, p. 39). Also, the note requires staff to engage in some sex-
disaggregation when target groups are identified. However, sex-disaggregation is 
only required regarding life expectancy; illiteracy; and primary education enrolment. 
It is not required for nutritional measures; asset ownership; and access to public 
goods and services. (ODA 1991, p. 39) This reflects a very traditional conception of 
WID, which is not in line with the more progressive ODA WID documents published 
at that time. Another example is the education policy Power of Change published in 
1992, which does not mention WID/GAD at all and, although it included a thematic 
annex which covered issues such as the environment (ODA 1992a). 
 
An analysis of ODA’s mission statement issued in 1996 further supports this 
conclusion. The mission statement does include WID/GAD but merely states that 
“…ODA will aim…to help people achieve better education and health and to widen 
opportunities, particularly for women” (ODA 1996, p. 8). Also, a programming tool 
published in 1995, entitled Guide to Social Analysis for Projects in Developing 
Countries does not comprehensively mainstream gender equality. Although it 
includes an annex on a “Guide to the participation of women in development 
projects” (ODA 1993), gender equality or women are not included in the bulk of the 
guide. Notably, none of the other checklists provided, including those on education 
and health, including any mention of women or gender equality. 
 
Budget: The creation of separate division for Social Development increased 
resources for WID/GAD as it effectively meant that Social Development had 
increased operational autonomy but also its own financial resources (Interview with 
Eyben). Although this did not represent a specific budget for WID, it increased the 
likelihood for resources being specifically dedicated to its promotion (Interview with 
Eyben). In addition to the establishment of a Social Development Division, ODA 
introduced a Policy Information Marker System (PIMS) which aimed to “track 
expenditure against priority policy objectives of the aid programme in order to 
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improve accountability and inform policy debate, monitoring and aid management” 
in 1993 (Jensen 2006, p. 75). 
 
Staff incentives on WID/GAD: WID/GAD was not included in ODA staff 
performance reviews and no incentives for undertaking work on the issue were put in 
place. 
 
 
i 
  
 
 
Table 13: Summary of WID/GAD operationalisation in ODA 1992 - 1995 
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ii. Summary: Which approach dominated? 
 
The above analysis shows that both the policy approach as well as the 
operationalisation of the WID/GAD norm became significantly more comprehensive 
in the mid-1990s. In addition, the approach in policies, strategies, and training 
materials was becoming increasingly focused on intrinsic arguments, strongly 
promoting social transformation. Despite these indications of ethical considerations 
increasingly driving norm integration, the analysis also found that the norm was not 
well integrated into overall policies or programming tools. 
 
The observed suggests that norm integration was driven by more than just social 
influence – it was driven by significantly widespread considerations of the 
instrumental and intrinsic ethical value of WID/GAD among WID/GAD officials. 
Importantly, however, I am not suggesting that this means that the organisation itself, 
or indeed the majority of staff working for ODA, were at this point persuaded of the 
intrinsic importance of the WID/GAD, as this is not the aim of this thesis and 
methodologically difficult, if not impossible to establish, as outlined in Chapter 
Three. Moreover, the limited inclusion of WID/GAD in general policies and 
programming tools would cast serious doubt on such a conclusion. All I am 
suggesting is that the above shows that some individuals in the organisation were 
driven by ethical considerations and were able to have their beliefs drive norm 
integration to a significant extent, thereby shifting the dominant norm integration 
driver from social influence towards instrumental and intrinsic considerations. 
 
Why did this approach dominate? 
 
The shift in the kind of considerations that drove WID/GAD integration in ODA was 
most likely to some extent influenced by shifts in global discourse, particularly 
around the Forth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, as will be further 
discussed below. However, the extent to which these particular global development 
were reflected in ODA – as opposed to previous global developments on gender – 
and the fact that changes did not remain at policy level but also affected 
operationalisation, was significantly facilitated by ODA’s homogenous and 
centralised decision-making structure on WID/GAD, yet this time combined with an 
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open and supportive top-level decision-maker. This structural constellation provided 
operational staff with a great deal of freedom as well as necessary top-management 
support (providing sufficient power and resources) for action on WID/GAD. In other 
words, committed SDAs who had arrived in the organisation in the late 1980s  were 
given the chance to quietly and relentlessly push their agenda. They could fairly 
liberally – almost invisibly – promote WID/GAD (Interview with Eyben; Interview 
with Holden). Indeed, one gender expert specifically noted that under Chalker, they 
“had a lot of freedom” to promote WID/GAD as they saw fit without scrutiny or 
interference from above (Interview with Glenworth). In the words of another SDA, 
Chalker’s open but non-interfering approach enabled them to “not really tell (the 
people above you) what you are doing, just doing it” (Interview with Glenworth). 
 
Indeed, both the 1992 and 1995 policy were drafted by the Social Development 
Division in consultation with NGOs  (Interview with Eyben) but were never debated 
in ODA or in any other forum. Moreover, the training materials that introduced the 
concept of strategic alongside practical gender needs, was developed by a consultant 
in cooperation with the SDAs and also were never discussed, scrutinised, or had to 
be defended in any way (Interview with Eyben). The rolling out of the training as 
well as the upgrading of the SDAs to have their own department with increased 
funds and financial autonomy and, subsequently gain a seat on the PEC and the 
Evaluation Committee, was, according to one SDA, the result of “five years 
investment in relationships” (Interview with Holden) that was ultimately successful 
due to support from top-management. 
 
This, therefore, strongly suggests that it was the considerable level of freedom of 
committed operational staff, coupled with the necessary funding and political 
backing, all of which were enabled by the homogenous and centralised decision-
making structure and top-level support, that contributed to this shift in policy 
language and level of operationalisation. 
 
  
 207 
7.2 Reverting back to limited support for WID/GAD in ODA/DFID: Clare 
Short 
 
To further examine this finding, let me expand the analysis to cover the first years of 
DFID under the leadership of Clare Short. In 1997 the incoming labour government 
set-up an independent department for international development – DFID – and 
appointed Clare Short as Secretary of State for International Development.  Although 
Clare Short had a reputation as a strong and vocal feminist in her previous career 
(Interview with Holden), there was almost unanimity amongst staff who were 
interviewed for this thesis and had closely worked with her that she was not 
supportive of the promotion of WID/GAD. 
 
The reason for Clare Short’s lack of support for WID/GAD was, as suggested by 
interviewees and secondary sources, that Short wanted to raise the profile of the 
organisation by strongly aligning it with the, then, prominent global development 
agenda: poverty eradication, the International Development Targets (IDTs) and 
subsequently the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Interview with Colley). 
Notably John Vereker, Permanent Secretary of ODA/DFID from 1994 – 2002 stated 
that,  
 
The Secretary of State (Clare Short) and I agreed on day one (after 
the setting up of DFID) that the mission of the Department was the 
reduction, and eventual elimination, of world poverty; and that our 
immediate objective was to harness the global effort to the 
International Development Target for 2015. (Vereker 2002, p. 37)  
 
Other SDAs interviewed for this thesis concur. Notably, one stated that “Clare Short 
changed everything. Most importantly she pushed for a strong poverty focus” 
(Interview with Levesque) while another SDA noted that,  “She (Clare Short) had her 
agenda – the poverty route. She said that aid is all about poverty – like nobody else 
before. That was probably the most important thing she did” (Interview with 
Holden). 
 
Indeed, already during the Short’s first years in office, everything the Department did 
had to be aligned to ‘poverty eradication’ and Clare Short was known for micro-
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managing and checking every policy statement to ensure that it reflected her vision. 
Notably, one senior ODA official stated that there was “a lot more scrutiny from her. 
She would rewrite texts. She was very assertive and did not trust civil servants” 
(Interview with Glenworth). Another interviewee who had worked with Clare Short 
stated that for Short it was “My way or the high way” (Interview with Okondo). 
 
The shift to poverty eradication was so strong that staff across the organisation felt 
that they had their “wings clipped” after 1997 (Interview with Glenworth) in many 
different areas such as education (Interview with Levesque), natural resource 
management (Interview with Hellin), and gender equality. Indeed, there was evident 
pressure on ODA staff to align DFID’s gender work to ‘international development 
jargon’. For instance, Rose Eyben noted a strong pressure to include, what she calls 
“gender myths” (Eyben 2007, p. 75) into DFID gender policies post-1997 in order to 
align WID/GAD to the dominating global development discourse.   
 
The shift to an exclusive focus on global development trends was considered 
detrimental to meaningful work on gender (Interview with Moser). Specifically, one 
SDA noted that, 
 
Clare Short was a complete maverick to work with. Very, very 
strong on parts of the development agenda…but actually completely 
blind to certain aspects of development and gender was certainly 
one. It was very, very difficult to dialogue with her on gender 
issues…it was difficult being a SDA at that point. (Interview with 
Keeling) 
 
Another similarly noted that, 
 
All I know that it sort of became more difficult (under Clare 
Short)…The people who were left behind in London had quite a 
tough time. They thought that Labour was going to be great, all the 
values were going to be there and we are going to have great gender 
policies. But I think they had to actually lie low a bit. It was a 
strange dynamic. Short did not want to be seen to be only talking 
about gender. She had other more import things she wanted to talk 
about like globalisation…She did not want to be one of the girls. 
She wanted to be one of the men.  (Interview with Holden) 
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The above accounts strongly suggest that Clare Short was not particularly open to, or 
supportive of, action on WID/GAD and, by strongly pushing the IDTs, the MDGs 
and poverty reduction, she significantly reduced the freedom and room for 
manoeuvre of WID/GAD advocates inside the organisation. Did this change in top-
level support for WID/GAD and the resulting reduction in freedom of WID/GAD 
operational staff impact on the dominant norm integration driver? The section below 
turns to this point. 
 
Which approach dominated? 
 
i. Impact on policy 
 
In 1998 DFID published an ‘Issue Paper’ entitled Breaking the Barriers: Women and 
the Elimination of World Poverty (DFID 1998). The document is very strongly 
framed in instrumental terms, linking WID/GAD to poverty eradication, the new 
thematic focus area of DFID. Notably, it states that “Gender inequality is preventing 
us from eliminating poverty. It is in all our interests to remove it” (DFID 1998, p. 
11). Interestingly, a rather defensive approach seems to be taken as references is 
made to the observation that “The empowerment of women does not need to be at 
the cost to men, but creates benefits for society as a whole” (DFID 1998, p. 11). 
Although the document does not mention rights, it refers to ‘empowerment’ and also 
claims to be taking a gender approach: “Our policy recognises that unlike biological 
roles, which are determined by sex, gender roles are determined by society and can 
be changed” (DFID 1998, p. 15). However, the document itself largely mentions 
‘women’, and does not propose any specific strategies on how ‘gender’ should be, or 
is being, addressed.  
 
The attempts to show what DFID has done to promote WID/GAD are very vague, 
uncritical, and provide hardly any information on what has actually been done, let 
alone, achieved.  For instance, the document only provides the following information 
on projects in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania, 
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In Uganda, where the rural poor find it difficult to benefit from 
conventional banking services, a village banking project allows both 
women and men to save and obtain credit…New urban programmes 
in Kenya and Tanzania will promote an active role of women in 
decision making, improving basic services, and creating 
opportunities for economic, social, and human development. (DFID 
1998, p. 6; p. 10) 
 
Although reference to strategic gender needs is included in the document, this seems 
to be done very vaguely suggesting nothing more than ‘lip-service’ to the concept, 
 
The Western and Eastern India Rainfed Farming Projects support 
women’s practical needs, with tools, income generating, credit, and 
savings schemes. The strategic role of women in village institutions 
and the management of farming systems is increasingly being 
promoted. (DFID 1998, p. 5)  
 
The document provides no further information on what the organisation intends to do 
to address strategic needs.   
 
Lastly, the section on ‘Future work’ is very short and provides hardly any concrete 
information on what DFID is planning to do to promote WID/GAD (DFID 1998, p. 
18). The vague nature of the document and failure to provide future objectives or 
strategies suggests limited appreciation of the importance of WID/GAD. However, 
the fact that DFID, since its 1997 White Paper, had taken on a strong poverty focus 
seems to have provided a ‘hook’ for WID/GAD. This document is the first in a long 
list of strategies and policies on gender that explicitly aim to link the aim of gender 
equality to poverty eradication, the International Development Targets, and later the 
Millennium Development Goals (DFID 2000b).  
 
In 2000 DFID adopted a Target Strategy Paper on Poverty Elimination and the 
Empowerment of Women (DFID 2000b). The strategy is strongly framed in 
efficiency arguments. First, the overall aim of the strategy is stated in explicit 
efficiency terms. Notably it states that “The aim of the UK international development 
policy is to contribute to the elimination of world poverty…The struggle for gender 
equality is a key instrument for lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty” 
(DFID 2000b, p. 10). In contrast to previous policies, there is a strong emphasis on 
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‘evidence’ backing up these efficiency arguments, largely relying on data generated 
by the World Bank. Notably, the strategy specifically states that,  
 
…there is a growing and compelling body of evidence that shows 
that not only do women bear the brunt of poverty, but also that 
women’s empowerment is a central precondition for its 
elimination….In the past, all of these (other donors) have been weak 
in their approach to gender concerns. This situation is rapidly 
changing, however, as new knowledge is emerging of the constraints 
imposed by inequality on economic development. (DFID 2000b, p. 
24)  
 
This represents a further shift away from a focus on the value of gender equality 
towards a strong preference for evidence-based instrumental arguments.  
 
The strategy paper is also tightly linked to the International Development Targets 
(IDT), as is illustrated by a strong focus on gender equality in education – a key 
theme in the IDTs and subsequently in their successor, the Millennium Development 
Targets. “The headline target for gender equality relates to education…” (DFID 
2000b, p. 8). Notably, and in line with approach taken in the ITD, education is not 
referred to as a ‘right’ and is strongly framed in efficiency terms: “In sub-Saharan 
Africa it has been argued that the cost to countries which have failed to give girls a 
fair chance of getting education has been a reduction in economic growth of 0.7% 
every year for the last 30 years. As a consequence, those countries now have GNPs 
roughly 25% lower than if they had given girls a better chance.” (DFID 2000b, p. 16) 
 
ii. Impact on operationalisation 
 
Human resources: Despite a general increase in staff human resources dedicated to 
WID/GAD saw a number of set-backs, especially after 2000 (Jensen 2006, p. 31). 
Notably, in 2001, the restructuring of the Policy Division resulted in the loss of the 
post for Chief Social Development Adviser. The Project Approval Committee 
composed of Chief Advisers vetting all major funding proposals in relation to 
DFID’s policies was also disbanded in 2001, further reducing the status and 
influence of social development, including WID/GAD. To add to this negative trend, 
Jensen’s in-depth evaluation of DFID’s WID/GAD promotion suggests that “the 
group (SDAs) has also grown less in comparison with other professional advisory 
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groups such as those for economics and governance and conflict. As a consequence, 
staff providing lead expertise and drive for gender equality have diminished” (Jensen 
2006, p. 31). 
 
Table 14: Summary of WID/GAD operationalisation in DFID 1997 - 2000 
 
 
iii. Summary: Which norm integration driver dominated?  
 
The above showed that there was remarkable shift in policy language to efficiency-
based arguments, a decrease in operationalisation, and a strong alignment of 
WID/GAD to global development trends.  These trends, most notably the IDTs and 
the MDG included WID/GAD to some extend, yet in a highly limited way linking 
gender equality strongly to education and health. DFID did exactly the same at 
policy level, while decreasing the integration of the norm in its operations. This, in 
particular the limited conceptualisation of WID/GAD and the weak commitment to 
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operationlisation, is strongly suggestive of norm integration driven by social 
influence – a desire to act as a global development actor and fit in with other 
development leaders – not ethical considerations relating to the instrumental or 
intrinsic value of WID/GAD per se.  
 
Why did this approach dominate? 
 
As previously, DFID’s shift in discourse and operationalisation of WID/GAD from 
1997 onwards was certainly influenced by a general shift in global development 
discourse, including on gender, reflected in the IDTs and the MDGs. However, the 
above account also strongly suggests that how the global discourse impacted on 
DFID was to a significant extent influenced by the reduced top-level support for 
WID/GAD, coupled with Clare Short’s strong agenda to make DFID a leading global 
development actor by aligning it with certain global development trends. The 
structural set-up of the department, especially after DFID was set up as an 
independent government ministry headed by a Cabinet Minister, gave Short 
considerable power to shape DFID. In the words of one senior DFID staff, DFID’s 
independence “gave Clare Short a lot of leeway to push her agenda” (Interview with 
Jones). Thus, highly centralised and homogenous decision-making, combined with 
lack of openness or support for the norm, led to significantly reduced freedom of 
committed operational level staff to promote the norm as they saw fit and led to an 
overall dominance of social influence driving WID/GAD integration in the 
organisation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Chapter has explored the claim, which has tentatively emerged from the 
previous Chapters, that two characteristics typical of bilateral aid agencies – relative 
cultural homogeneity and limited number of decision-makers – if combined with a 
supportive top-level decision-maker, are likely to lead to norm integration being 
driven by ethical, especially intrinsic ethical, considerations. By including additional 
empirical evidence from ODA until 2001, the Chapter has shown that, indeed, it 
seems that the change in top-leadership from Chris Patten to Lynda Chalker and 
subsequently to Clare Short, all of whom had different levels of support for 
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WID/GAD, made a significant difference to how WID/GAD was integrated. 
Importantly, under Lynda Chalker, the minister who was most open and supportive 
to action on WID/GAD, the analysis shows that there was a shift towards norm 
integration driven by instrumental and subsequently intrinsic ethical considerations 
at the level of ODA. Yet, this shift was reversed back to social influence under Clare 
Short. 
 
Thus, the findings suggest that bilateral agencies, although less likely than 
multilaterals to take any significant action on a global norm, if they include a 
supportive top-level decision-maker, are more likely to allow for norm integration to 
be driven by ethical consideration, than their multilateral counterparts. Importantly, 
however, this is not to say that the organisations as such are more likely to be driven 
by ethical considerations. Rather, the analysis suggests that organisational 
characteristics specific to bilateral agencies – cultural homogeneity and few members 
in decision-making – can allow for more freedom and power for committed 
individuals inside these organisations to act on their beliefs and have them reflected 
at organisational-level. This last point strongly emphasises the role of individuals in 
decision-making, as well as at operational level, in determining which norm 
integration driver dominated. Does this mean that actors matter more than 
organisational characteristics in explaining the observed processes? Before turning to 
this point, and others, as potential alternative explanations in Chapter Nine, the 
following Chapter, summarises and consolidates the findings of this thesis. 
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Chapter 8: A theory on the impact of organisational characteristics 
on ethical considerations: Summary of findings 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous Chapters have provided detailed empirical evidence on the impact of 
organisational characteristics on the extent and nature of ethical considerations in the 
integration of the WID/GAD norm in UNDP, the EC/EU, and ODA/DFID. This 
Chapter summarises and consolidates these findings. It shows that, essentially, the 
empirical data presented in the previous Chapters strongly points to two significant 
overall findings: 
 
First, the case study findings strongly suggest that norm integration, when it took 
place, was largely driven by social influence rather than ethical considerations 
in all three organisations throughout the period of analysis. In fact, and critically, 
the findings indicate that the organisations per se were not driven by ethical 
considerations at all. Yet, in some instances, the people within them were. And when 
these individuals were given the freedom, power, and resources to act on their 
personal ethical beliefs, these beliefs were reflected at the level of the organisation.  
 
Critically, it was found that the level of freedom, power, and resources of committed 
actors was significantly influenced by organisational characteristics. In other words, 
organisational characteristics were found to make it more or less likely for actors 
inside an organisations to be able to act on their ethical beliefs, thereby significantly 
influencing the extent to which their beliefs were reflected at the level of the 
organisation, manifested through policies and levels of operationalisation.  
 
Specifically, the case studies found that characteristics most typical of bilateral 
organisations – cultural homogeneity and a limited number of actors in decision-
makers, and a flexible mandate on development cooperation – if combined with a 
committed decision-maker, make these organisations more likely to provide such 
freedom, thereby facilitating actors’ ethical beliefs on the norm to be reflected at the 
level of the organisation. Importantly, to repeat, this is not to say that the findings 
suggest that bilateral organisations per se, or even the majority of staff in these 
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organisations are more likely to hold certain beliefs. It merely means that some 
actors in the organisation hold such beliefs and are more likely to be enabled to push 
their beliefs up to the level of the organisation.  
 
Moreover, the case studies found that, although certain characteristics most typical of 
bilateral organisations may provide an enabling environment for committed staff to 
act on their beliefs, bilateral organisations are also highly volatile. Their leadership 
and, often, also their overall mandate is prone to frequent changes in line with 
electoral cycles. Thus, the level of ‘openness’ of the mandate as well as the level of 
commitment among top-management is likely to change frequently, making bilateral 
organisations likely to swing from strong norm integration driven by ethical 
considerations to weak norm integration driven by social influence or no action on 
the norm at all.  
 
This insight leads to the second finding of this thesis: The WID/GAD norm did not 
always matter. If, when, and to what extent, it mattered was conditioned by 
organisational characteristics. Specifically, the finding suggests that bilateral 
organisations, if they do not include a committed decision-maker, are more likely to 
take no action at all on a new norm, largely due to their limited susceptibility to 
scrutiny. The likelihood of the presence of a committed decision maker is also 
decreased because of the homogeneity and limited number of decision-makers, 
typical of bilateral development organisations. Indeed, the case studies found that 
characteristics most typical of multilateral organisations – cultural diversity and 
multi-membership in decision-making – if combined with an open mandate and a 
high level of susceptibility to scrutiny to multiple scrutinisers, make these 
organisations significantly more likely to take some, usually quick, action on a new 
norm, than bilateral organisations. 
 
Yet, the same characteristics typical of multilateral organisations that facilitate quick 
action on a new norm also make agreement and appreciation of the norm less likely, 
leading to negotiation, justification and compromise, thereby reducing the freedom 
and resources of committed actors to promote the norm as they see fit. Norm 
integration is, thus, most likely not driven by committed actors’ ethical 
considerations but rather by a general agreement by decision-makers that the 
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organisation should be seen to be doing something on the particular norm  – a 
process referred to as social influence by this thesis.  
 
In short, certain organisational characteristics most typical of bilateral organisations 
make norm integration either very likely to be driven by ethical considerations or 
may lead to next-to-no norm integration at all depending on the presence of a 
committed top-manager and the openness of the mandate. Both, the openness of the 
mandate and the presence of a committed to-manager, in turn, are likely to be subject 
to frequent changes due to bilateral organisations’ volatility. Characteristics most 
typical of multilateral organisations, on the other hand, are more stable and are most 
likely to lead to some kind of norm integration, yet not driven by ethical 
considerations but by social influence.  
 
This Chapter summarises these findings and re-visits some of the key empirical data 
in order to further support and consolidate the insights gained from the detailed case 
studies. The first section discusses the overall finding that ethical considerations did 
not matter much in the norm integration processes studied and when they did, they 
mattered to people, not to organisations. When, and to what extent, people could act 
on their beliefs was significantly conditioned by organisational characteristics. The 
specific characteristics that matter in this context are discussed in detail and 
empirical evidence in support of their importance is re-visited. 
 
The second section consolidates the second finding of the thesis that suggests that if 
and when norms matter in organisations is significantly conditioned by 
organisational characteristics, making multilateral organisations more likely to 
quickly respond to new norms than their bilateral counterparts. 
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8.1 Overall finding 1: Ethical considerations do not matter much in 
organisations 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the case studies showed that, when norm 
integration did take place in the three organisations, it was largely driven by social 
influence rather than ethical considerations in all three organisations throughout the 
period of analysis. In fact, and critically, the findings indicate that the organisations 
per se were not driven by ethical considerations at all – but some people within the 
organisations were. And when these individuals were given the freedom, power, and 
resources to act on their personal ethical beliefs, these beliefs were reflected at the 
level of the organisation.  
 
Critically, however, the case studies clearly found that organisational characteristics 
did matter. They mattered because specific organisational characteristics were found 
to make organisations more or less likely to provide freedom, power, and resources 
to individuals to act on their beliefs and have them reflected at organisational-level. 
In other words, organisational characteristics were found to make it more or less 
likely for people to be able to act on their beliefs, thereby significantly conditioning 
the extent to which their ethical commitments manifested themselves at the level of 
the organisation and drove processes at the level of the organisation. 
 
Specifically, the cases found that one factor was particularly critical in conditioning 
the level of freedom and power of committed actors: the level of agreement on, and 
appreciation of, the value of the norm among top-level decision-makers. Simply put: 
the higher the level of agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of the norm 
among top-level decision-makers, the greater the freedom, power, and resources of 
committed actors to promote the norm as they see fit. This, in turn, impacts on the 
coherence, comprehensiveness, and dominant frames of policies and the level of 
norm operationalisation. The level of agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of 
the norm is influenced by a number of specific organisational characteristics, with 
agreement and appreciation particularly facilitated by: 
1. Cultural homogeneity in decision-making body 
2. Few members in decision-making body 
3. Open mandate 
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4. Presence of committed actor in decision-making body 
 
Since the first three of these characteristics are more typical of bilateral aid 
organisations than multilaterals, this finding suggests that bilateral organisations are 
more likely to have norm integration driven by ethical considerations than their 
multilateral counterparts. The next section outlines these findings in detail and 
revisits some of the key empirical evidence that underpins them. First, the 
overarching finding  - the impact of agreement and appreciation of the norm – is 
outlined and a number of sub-findings are presented that explain how and why this 
factor impacts on the level of freedom of resources of committed actors and, thus, on 
the likelihood of ethical considerations driving norm integration. Second, the section 
shows how the said organisational characteristics make agreement on, and 
appreciation of, the value of the norm more or less likely. 
 
Overall finding 1: Agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of the norm among 
top-level decision-makers in an organisation increases the freedom of committed 
actors inside the organisation, including operational staff, to promote the norm as 
they see fit. This is highly likely to result in coherent and comprehensive policies 
that include arguments framed around the intrinsic value of the norm and 
comprehensive norm operationalisation, indicative of norm integration driven by 
ethical considerations. 
 
Diagram 4: Overall finding 1 
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The reverse has also been found: 
 
The reverse to overall finding 1:  No agreement on, or appreciation of, the value of 
the norm among top-level decision makers reduces the freedom and resources 
available to committed actors and leads to either no action on the norm or to 
incoherent and weak policies strongly based on procedural and instrumental 
arguments and weak norm operationalisation. Both are indicative of norm 
integration driven by social influence. 
 
Diagram 5: The reverse of overall finding 1 
 
 
Importantly, the overarching finding includes one specific detail that is of critical 
importance: It makes a deliberate distinction between agreement on the value of the 
norm and appreciation of the value of the norm. Agreement on the value of the norm 
simply means that opinions on the norm converge, regardless of the whether the 
opinions are for or against the norm. Appreciation, on the other hand, implies a 
positive view of the norm – the norm is considered good or appropriate.  
 
To explain and contextualise these overarching finding, the analysis has offered a 
number of sub-findings. These first outline how agreement and appreciation among 
top-level decision-makers matter (specific findings 1.1 – 1.4) and second, show how 
and which organisational characteristics significantly condition the level of 
agreement and appreciation of the norm (specific finding 1.5). 
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Summary of specific findings and consolidated empirical evidence  
 
Specific finding 1.1: No agreement on, and appreciation of, the norm it is likely to 
lead to debate and, especially in consensus-based decision-making, require 
compromise. Debate will likely involve negotiation and justification, and 
compromise necessitates the accommodation of different views, both of which 
restrict the freedom of committed actors to promote the norm as they see fit. The 
result is likely to be incoherent and weak policies as well as a preference for 
efficiency and procedural arguments.  
 
Diagram 6: Specific finding 1.1 
The case of both the EC Council Conclusions of 1982 and the Resolution of 1995 
have clearly illustrated the impact of lack of agreement, and the resulting debate and 
need for compromise, on the level of freedom of the drafting team, and ultimately on 
policy coherence. Notably, the analysis of the drafting process of the Conclusions 
has clearly shown that one of the reasons for the high-level of incoherence in the 
document caused by the way in which national culture was treated and the overall 
very cautious language was a result of diverse views on this matter, especially 
expressed by France who was not in favour of the inclusion of WID/GAD, the 
resulting debate, and ultimately, the compromise suggested by the drafting team (see 
Chapter Five). 
 
Also the analysis of deliberations of the Gender Expert Group leading up to the 1995 
Council Resolution showed that there was considerable disagreement in the Group 
relating to, for example, the place of positive action alongside mainstreaming and, 
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very importantly, whether the main approach in the document should be ‘women in 
development’ or ‘gender in development’. These disagreements were certainly partly 
due to diverging expert opinions of equally committed gender advocates, and thus, 
not exclusively related to the lack of appreciation of WID/GAD in the Council. 
However, interviews conducted for this thesis also strongly suggest that the 
disagreements observed were to a significant extent rooted in different ‘briefs’ given 
by committed, and not so committed, member states and an acute awareness by the 
expert group that the text would have to be agreeable to all members of the Council. 
(Interview with Joelsdotter-Berg; Interview with Colombo). This led to debate and 
resulted in a conceptually fairly incoherent document strongly framed in instrumental 
terms (see Chapter Six). Indeed, one EC gender official stressed that the policy was 
“thin” because “nobody dared to take a stand, making it (the policy) a bit of 
everything” (Interview with Joelsdotter-Berg). The same verdict was expressed by 
members of the expert group themselves, who, as stated in Chapter Six, considered 
the Resolution “good but too general” as “its formulations were deliberately kept 
uncontroversial…in some cases, where members of the group had conflicting 
opinions, comprises were sought that resulted in imprecise and lofty language” 
(Elgstroem 2011, p. 466). 
 
Last, also the case of UNDP illustrates this finding. Specifically, as outlined in 
Chapter Five and Six, the lack of agreement on a conceptual approach to WID/GAD 
strongly influenced the strategies chosen by WID/GAD advocates inside the 
organisation, limited their freedom, and made conceptual engagement in general, 
especially intrinsic arguments, almost invisible. Recall that, one former head of the 
WID Division stated in an interview for this thesis that, due to this lack of agreement 
in the Executive Board her Division would frame issues on WID/GAD in such a way 
that they were easy to justify based on UNDP’s accepted mandate. For instance the 
instrumental approach to WID/GAD was a “deliberately chosen strategy” as UNDP’s 
governance structure was “highly politicised” and represented a “straight jacket” for 
the promotion of certain issues such as WID/GAD, especially as an important value 
in itself (Interview with Reid). Indeed, recall that another UNDP staff member also 
noted that “Radical work on gender is not possible. Sad, but it was also an education 
for me to realize the limitations of an institution like this” (Menon Sen quoted in 
Murphy 2006, p. 210). 
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Specific finding 1.2:  No agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of the norm, 
especially in a consensus-based decision-making culture, makes sufficient funding 
and strong political backing for norm integration less probable. As a result 
committed actors, including operational staff, have only very limited freedom or 
resources to integrate the norm as they see fit. This, in turn, is likely to lead to weak 
norm operationalisation. 
 
Diagram 7: Specific finding 1.2 
 
 
The case of UNDP has strongly illustrated that a lack of agreement on the norm lead 
to insufficient funding and political support, which reduced the freedom and power 
of committed staff, especially operational staff, to promote the norm and ultimately 
resulted in norm operationalisation remaining weak and incomprehensive. A case in 
point was the fact that, despite efforts by the Administrator and operational staff, and 
regardless of the fact that staff training was enshrined in the 1986 strategy, 
widespread training was not possible as the Governing Council did not agree on its 
importance and did, therefore, not allocate sufficient funding for this purpose. Recall 
that in a Governing Council debate on the training some member states expressed 
concern that “…the financial proposals were being made on an issue on which 
general agreement had not yet been reached by the Council, and that the strategy 
proposed could involve, in the long term, an encroachment on the prerogatives of 
recipient countries” (UNDP 1986a, para. 6). This meant that operational staff did not 
have the power, resources, or freedom to effectively operationalise WID/GAD. 
 
Similarly, the cases of the EC Council and ODA showed that throughout the period 
of analysis, the lack of agreement on the importance of WID/GAD lead to the 
allocation of highly insufficient financial resources, which resulted in weak human 
resources and highly limited staff training. Moreover, the weak agreement in the case 
of the EC meant that the Council did not exercise any political pressure on senior 
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Commission officials to allow operational staff to put in place better programming 
tools or set-up accountability systems for staff’s actions or inactions on WID/GAD.  
 
Specific finding 1.3: Agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of a norm means 
that norm integration does not require compromise or involve much debate on the 
norm. This is likely to increase the freedom of committed actors to promote the norm 
as they see fit. This is likely result in more coherent and comprehensive policies and 
an inclusion of arguments framed around the intrinsic value of the norm. 
 
Diagram 8: Specific finding 1.3 
 
 
The example of the European Parliament in the early 1980s, the European 
Commission in the mid-1990s, and ODA in 1988 illustrate that agreement on, and 
appreciation of, the value of the norm facilitated a more coherent and comprehensive 
policy approach framed around the intrinsic value of the norm. Notably, the analysis 
of the European Parliament Resolution on the Fourth World Conference on Women 
showed that the document was very coherent and strongly framed in intrinsic terms. 
It stands out as strongly focused on rights, equality, and transformation; includes an 
explicit reference to sexual and productive rights; and even calls for the legalisation 
of abortion (European Parliament 1995, para. 40). This approach was only possible 
because the Resolution originated in the Women’s Committee, which was a strongly 
homogenous group of committed actors with a considerable amount of freedom – 
thus, not requiring much debate, negotiation, justification or compromise in order to 
reach agreement. Moreover, the adoption process of the actual Resolution did not 
require consensus but merely a majority (see Chapter Six).  
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Similarly, the 1995 Commission Communication’s coherent and overall stronger 
approach was an outcome of the overall agreement of the importance of WID/GAD 
amongst the few individuals tasked with drafting the document. The informal 
decision-making structure inside the Commission, the global momentum around the 
Beijing conference, and the lack of interest among top-level management meant that 
these individuals had a lot of freedom to draft the Communication as they saw fit, 
with next to no debate, negotiation, justification or need for compromise (see 
Chapter Six).  
 
Last, the coherent and comprehensive policy approach in ODA’s 1988 strategy and 
the 1992 and 1995 policies, which also stand out as they included some intrinsic 
arguments for WID/GAD, were an outcome of a homogenous and centralised 
decision-making process on matters related to WID/GAD that did not require debate, 
which gave key staff members a lot of freedom and, thus, made it possible for them 
to promote the norm as they saw fit (see Chapter Six). 
 
Specific finding 1.4: Agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of a norm makes 
sufficient funding and strong political backing for norm integration more probable 
and, thus provides committed actors, including operational staff with the freedom 
and the resources to comprehensively integrate the norm in the organisation’s 
operations, thereby making comprehensive norm operationalisation more likely. 
 
Diagram 9: Specific finding 1.4 
 
 
The example of ODA under Lynda Chalker in Chapter Seven illustrated this point 
very well. Through continuous internal lobby efforts, SDAs in ODA increasingly 
convinced the Minister in the early to mid-1990s of the importance of WID/GAD 
and, as indicated by interview data and secondary sources, Chalker became, indeed, 
significantly committed to WID/GAD. It was this commitment, combined with the 
fact that she operated in a largely homogenous decision-making system with only 
few decision-makers, especially regarding WID/GAD that allowed her to politically 
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as well as financially support WID/GAD integration. This, in turn, provided 
operational staff with ample freedom and resources to promote the norm as they saw 
fit, resulting in significant steps towards comprehensive norm operationalisation in 
the early to mid-1990s, such as the expansion of staff training and the upgrading of 
ODA’s unit responsible for WID/GAD promotion. 
 
Specific finding 1.5: Certain organisational characteristics make such agreement and 
appreciation more or less probable, thereby influencing the likelihood of coherent 
and comprehensive policies and strong operationalisation indicative of norm 
integration dominated by ethical considerations. 
 
Sub-finding 1.5.1: A high-level of cultural diversity and multi-membership make an 
agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of a new norm less probable. 
 
Diagram 10: Sub-finding 1.5.1 
 
 
Both the cases of UNDP and the EC have illustrated this point very well. Notably, 
the examination of reports of UNDP Governing Council session, describing the 
proceedings that lead to the 1975 as well as the 1985 decisions showed that countries 
from different cultural and religious backgrounds indeed expressed a range of 
diverging views on WID/GAD. As explained in detail in Chapter Five, in Governing 
Council debates in 1975 some UNDP member states very clearly stated their 
preference for a non-transformative approach to WID, emphasising the importance 
that WID does not “prejudice either the family as a social unit or the existing ways of 
life…emphasising that the role of women was the giver of life” while others, such as 
the Nordics, criticised UNDP’s approach for being too non-transformative and 
radical (UNDP 1975, para. 137).  
 
The level of disagreement continued throughout the 1990s as the analysis of a 
Governing Council debate in 1990 outlined. Recall that Sri Lanka framed women 
strongly as wives and mothers when its representative stated that, “To improve the 
Agreement on, and 
appreciation of, the 
value of the norm 
less probable 
High-level of cultural 
diversity in decision-making + = 
Multiple  decision-
makers 
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quality of life of women, their tasks as housewives and mothers must be made less 
burdensome” (UNDP 1990a, para. 128). In contrast the Pakistan delegation stated 
that “In Pakistan, the old concept that a woman’s sphere of activities was confined to 
her home had undergone revolutionary changes since independence.” (UNDP 1990a, 
para. 154) Most other vocal countries, such as the Nordics, strongly pushed for the 
full integration of women in all spheres. Last, a statement by the Assistant 
Administrator illustrates the level of disagreement very well when she stated that 
“…even the definition of the concept of integration of women in development left 
much to be desired: a range of opinions exists on the issue…” (UNDP 1982b, para. 
38) 
 
This lack of agreement on the most appropriate approach to WID/GAD did not, as 
such, necessarily mean that member states were not equally committed to the norm; 
that they lacked appreciation for the norm. However, statements exclusively 
focusing on women’s roles as wives and mothers do suggest a certain reluctance to 
embrace the value of gender equality. In addition, and most importantly, the case 
also shows that the diversity in UNDP’s Governing Council also meant that there 
were, in fact, diverging views on the importance of the norm – thus, different levels 
of appreciation of the norm. Notably, in a Governing Council session in 1976 
several member states, “referred specifically to the frank and realistic appraisal of 
limited unanimity among members participating in the discussion as to the 
importance of the subject…” (UNDP 1976b, para. 132) In addition, debates leading 
up to the 1982 EC Council Conclusion and the example of France’s insistence on a 
very cautious approach to culture, further illustrated the different levels of 
appreciation of WID/GAD. 
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Sub-finding 1.5.2: Homogeneity and few decision-makers make an agreement on the 
value of the norm more probable. 
 
Diagram 11: Sub-finding 1.5.2 
 
 
This finding is drawn from the analysis of the drafting process of ODA’s 1986 policy 
and 1988 strategy. The first case showed that the policy was drafted by one Social 
Development Advisor in cooperation with the information office (Interview with 
Eyben). There was no consultation within or outside ODA and the policy was never 
discussed and approved in any formal setting (Interview with Eyben). This meant 
that there was no debate on the issue, and therefore, no scope for disagreement. The 
approach simply reflected the SDA’s personal conviction and knowledge regarding 
the norm. 
 
In addition, the processes in the European Parliament’s Women Committee in the 
early 1980s and the European Commission in the mid-1990s further supported this 
hypothesis. In both cases, decision-making on WID was done in an informal way by 
few decision makers who, although coming from different national backgrounds, 
were homogeneous as, in they case of the Women’s Committee, they had grouped 
together (in the case of the Women’s Committee) or were working on WID/GAD (in 
the case of the Commission) because of their appreciation of the importance of 
WID/GAD. In both cases there was little debate or disagreement on the value of 
WID/GAD.  
 
Agreement on norm 
more probable 
Cultural homogeneity in 
decision-making 
Few decision-
makers + = 
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Sub-finding 1.5.3: Homogeneity and few decision makers, combined with the 
presence of a committed top-level decision-maker, make an agreement on, and 
appreciation of, the value of the norm more probable. 
 
Diagram 12: Sub-finding 1.5.3 
 
 
The case of ODA under Lynda Chalker outlined in Chapter Seven, especially in 
contrast to ODA under Patten, DFID under Clare Short and UNDP under Bill Draper 
illustrates this point very well. Only when Chalker was Minister for International 
Development all three factors were present, and, indeed, lead to an agreement and – 
crucially – an appreciation of the value of the norm at top-level. In the case of ODA 
under Patten and DFID under Clare Short, the lack of a committed top-level 
decision-maker meant that the value of the norm was not fully appreciated at that 
level, while in UNDP, despite the presence of a committed top-level decision maker, 
the diversity and multi-membership of the decision-making forum made agreement 
and appreciation of the value of the norm overall difficult. 
 
Sub-finding 1.5.4: An open mandate on development cooperation makes an inclusion 
of different arguments for norm promotion more likely. 
 
Diagram 13: Sub-finding 1.5.4 
 
 
The examples of the EU and of ODA/DFID illustrate this finding very well. As 
established in Chapter Four, neither ODA/DFID nor the EU had a rigid or closed 
mandate on development cooperation. Indeed, ODA/DFID, as is typical of bilateral 
organisations, gave considerable leeway to its leadership to define the organisation’s 
priorities, as was particularly apparent when Clare Short came into power and 
drastically changed the direction of the organisation. This, in turn, changed the 
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overall mandate of the organisation and, with it, the arguments used for the 
promotion of WID/GAD. 
 
Also in the case of the EU, the organisation’s mandate on development cooperation 
was very general, and, thus, open and allowed WID/GAD advocates to use different 
arguments to promote the norm. 
 
Sub-finding 1.5.5: An open mandate on development cooperation, combined with the 
presence of a committed decision-maker, makes the inclusion of intrinsic arguments 
more likely. 
 
Diagram 14: Sub-finding 1.5.5 
 
Both the cases of the EU and of ODA under Chalker have shown that an open 
mandate on development cooperation provides committed actors in decision-making 
– provided they are present – with the freedom to promote the norm using different 
types of arguments, including intrinsic ones. The examples of the EC Conclusion and 
Resolution, as well as ODA’s 1986 policy described in Chapter Five and Six are 
cases in point. 
 
Sub-finding 1.5.6: A closed and rigid mandate makes an inclusion of instrumental 
arguments for the norm most likely 
 
Diagram 15: Sub-finding 1.5.6 
 
 
The case of UNDP illustrates this finding particularly well. While UNDP’s 
substantive mandate was rather weak until the late 1980s and the uptake of Human 
Development, it was procedurally very strong and focused on impartiality and 
neutrality. This meant that WID/GAD had to be framed in line with these priorities 
Inclusion of intrinsic arguments for 
the norm more likely  = 
Open and flexible 
mandate 
Committed top-level 
decision-maker(s) + 
Inclusion of instrumental arguments 
for the norm most likely = 
Closed and rigid 
mandate 
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and provide WID/GAD advocates little freedom to do otherwise. This lack of 
freedom intensified with the mandate shift to human development, requiring 
WID/GAD advocates to link the norm strongly to the achievement of human 
development.  
 
The case of DFID under Clare Short is another case in point. DFID’s strong focus on 
the International Development Targets and poverty eradication under Short meant 
that all of DFID’s actions had to be justified in relation to their contribution to 
effective poverty eradication, including WID/GAD. Thus, instrumental arguments 
for the promotion of the norm took centre stage during this period. 
 
Specific finding 1.6: In summary, cultural homogeneity, few decision-makers, a 
committed decision-maker at top-level, and an open mandate make agreement on, 
and appreciation of, the norm at top-level highly likely, thereby reducing the need for 
debate, negotiation, justification, and compromise and increase political and financial 
support for the norm. This, in turn increases the freedom, power, and resources of 
committed actors, including operational staff, to promote the norm as they see fit. 
This makes the inclusion of intrinsic ethical arguments, coherent and comprehensive 
policies, and strong operationalisation more likely, all of which are indicative of 
norm integration driven by ethical, especially intrinsic ethical, considerations.  
 
Diagram 16: Specific finding 1.6  
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Again, the example of ODA under Lynda Chalker outlined in Chapter Seven 
illustrated this finding very well. Out of all organisations and across the entire 
research period, the data strongly suggests that only when all four factors were 
present, there was agreement and appreciation of the value of the norm among top-
level decision-makers, which, in turn, allowed for intrinsic arguments to feature, 
enabled the adoption of coherent and comprehensive policies and comprehensive 
norm operationalisation, all of which indicate norm integration driven by ethical 
considerations. 
 
8.2 Overall finding 2: Norms do not always matter – and if and when they 
matter is conditioned by organisational characteristics 
 
Somewhat contrary to much literature on norms and to the initial expectations of this 
thesis, the findings of the case studies show that in certain instances the norm did not 
have any impact at all on some of the organisations studied – not even on 
organisational rhetoric. If and when the norm impacted on organisations at all was 
found to be significantly conditioned by organisational characteristics. The 
characteristics that have been identified as facilitating action are: 
• High-level of cultural diversity in decision-making 
• Multi-membership in decision-making 
• High-level of susceptibility of scrutiny from multiple scrutinisers 
 
As these characteristics are mostly typical of multilateral organisations, the findings 
suggest that multilaterals are generally likely to take quick action on a new norm 
than their bilateral counterparts.13 
 
The following section illustrates how exactly these characteristics make an 
organisation more or less likely to take some action on a norm and summarises the 
empirical evidence that underpins the findings. 
 
                                                
13 This finding will be further refined in the conclusion when insights from other donors are added. 
This shows that bilateral organizations, if they included a committed top-level actor, are likely to lead 
norm integration efforts, subsequently promote the norm at multilateral level, which, in turn, results in 
many other bilateral organisations to take some action on the norm. 
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Consolidated empirical evidence underpinning the findings 
 
Specific finding 2.1: Cultural diversity and multi-membership increase the likelihood 
of the presence of a vocal actor willing to push for action on the norm in an 
organisation’s decision-making forum, making any action on the norm more 
probable, especially if the norm has wide international recognition, thereby reducing 
the reluctance of other members to agree to the proposed action. 
 
Diagram 17: Specific finding 2.1 
 
 
This finding emerged most clearly from the example of both, the first high-level 
recognition and the first WID/GAD strategy in the EU/EC. Both developments were 
to a significant extent a result of specific pressure from a few member states – 
notably Denmark and the Netherlands – that were committed to the norm, as 
illustrated by their bilateral policies. The presence of such committed actors in 
decision-making was made more likely due to the cultural diversity and multi-
membership of the EU’s decision-making body, the Council.  
 
In addition, the few steps that were taken to operationalisation WID/GAD in EU 
development cooperation after the first high-level recognition, such as the 
establishment of the WID/GAD desk and the funding of WID/GAD officers  
(Commission of the European Communities 1984b, p. 22) all happened in responses 
to concrete pressure and specifically earmarked funding from the same member 
states in the Council.  
 
Moreover, also the example of the adoption of UNDP’s first WID/GAD strategy 
strongly supports this finding. In this case, it was the presence of very vocal member 
states, Canada and Norway, who exercised consistent pressure in UNDP’s decision-
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making forum to take action on the norm. As above, their presence was facilitated by 
the decision-making forum’s high level of cultural diversity and multi-membership. 
Importantly, the pressure of the committed actors was given more credit and weight 
once the WID/GAD norm had achieved wide international recognition. 
 
Moreover, as was the case in the EC, the few steps that were taken to operationalise 
the norm after the adoption of the strategy were the result of consistent pressure and 
earmarked funding from certain committed member states. A case in point was the 
decision to set-up a WID division in 1986, which was set-up in response to explicit 
pressure from the Nordics and Canada, and the increase in WID/GAD training in the 
late 1980s, which was directly funded by Norway. 
 
Sub-finding 2.2:  Cultural homogeneity and few decision-makers decrease the 
likelihood of the presence of a vocal actor willing to push for action on the norm. 
This reduces the likelihood of any action on the norm. 
 
Diagram 18: Sub-finding 2.2 
 
 
The case of ODA up until the early 1990s illustrated this point very well. ODA took 
no steps on WID/GAD until 1986 partly because its homogenous decision-making 
structure, that was dominated by only very few actors made the presence of a 
decision-maker willing to call for action on the norm unlikely. Indeed, no such 
committed decision-maker was present, helping to explain the late and overall weak 
uptake of the norm. 
 
Yet, if, when, and to what extent the organisations took action on WID/GAD was 
also significantly influenced by their level of susceptibility to scrutiny and the nature 
of the ‘scrutinisers’, as summarised in sub-finding 2.3: 
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Sub-finding 2.3: The more susceptible to scrutiny and the more diverse the 
scrutinisers, the more likely it is that an organisation takes action on a new norm. 
 
Diagram 19: Sub-finding 2.3 
 
 
The processes observed in UNDP illustrate this point very well, as it was the fact that 
UNDP was strongly susceptible to scrutiny from multiple scrutinisers, including the 
UN system, that lead to the adoption of the first WID/GAD high-level recognition 
and was also instrumental in the adoption of the first strategy in 1986. The EC, on 
the other hand, was mainly susceptible to scrutiny from its member states and 
parliament, and only took action once pressure from these sources increased in the 
late 1970s/early 1980s. It was the absence of such pressure until the mid-1990s, 
which helps to explain why the EC took no action on WID/GAD during that time 
and only did so, once pressure from a specific member states, once again, increased. 
 
ODA was the last to recognise the norm in 1986 as it was virtually immune to global 
pressure and only susceptible to fairly homogenous and few scrutinisers – 
government, parliament and, albeit only very mildly – national CSOs. It only took 
action once the national CSOs aligned to the then government’s dominant ideology 
got sufficiently organised around the Nairobi Conference and called on ODA to take 
action on WID/GAD. 
 
  
Action	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  norm	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Action	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Sub-finding 2.4: The level of susceptibility to scrutiny and the nature of the 
scrutinisers is a function of organisation’s source of authority, including its funding 
source, and its mandate.  
 
Diagram 20: Sub-finding 2.4 
 
 
UNDP was strongly susceptible to multiple scrutinisers because it had a split source 
of delegated authority – making it susceptible to pressure from the UN system and its 
member states. It was also strongly susceptible to scrutiny, especially from its 
member states, because its funding depended on support from the member states and 
its mandate made it a global development actor as well as the ‘development 
programme of the developing countries’ 
 
The EC, due to its mandate as acting on behalf of its member states and as being held 
accountable by Parliament and exclusively funded by the member states, was 
strongly susceptible to scrutiny from these - medium-diverse scrutinisers. This, 
however, did not include global bodies, making it not very responsive to global 
trends. 
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ODA, being bilateral and part of the Foreign Office, had a source of authority 
‘delegated’ by the British government and a mandate dominated by a desire to act in 
the UK’s national, particularly commercial, interest. Combined with funding coming 
exclusively from the UK government, this meant that ODA was not overly 
concerned with looking like it was acting in line with external standards of ‘good 
development’, making it virtually immune to external global pressure and scrutiny, 
only susceptible to few and fairly homogenous scrutinisers, and only very mildly 
susceptible to scrutiny from outside government or parliament. 
 
In summary, all the above findings strongly suggest that organisations with culturally 
diverse and multi-member decision-making bodies and high-levels of susceptibility 
to scrutiny from diverse scrutinisers are more likely to take some action on a new 
norm, especially once the norm has reached significantly wide international 
recognition. As these characteristics are mostly found in multilateral organisations, 
the findings suggest that these types of organisations are, indeed, more likely to take 
quick action on a new norm than their bilateral counterparts.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has summarised the findings drawn from the empirical case studies. It 
has drawn-out two overarching findings and a number of sub-findings that emerged 
from the case studies and consolidated the empirical evidence in their support. First, 
it was shown that the case studies strongly suggest that overall, norm integration was 
mostly driven by social influence, not ethical, considerations in all three 
organisations. When ethical considerations played a role, this was mostly driven by 
individual actors who were given the space and resources to act on their beliefs, 
enabling them to have their beliefs reflected at the level of the organisation.  
 
The findings showed that certain characteristics – relative cultural homogeneity, a 
limited number of decision-makers, and the presence of a supportive top-level 
decision-maker – made it more probable for committed actors in an organisation to 
have this freedom, resulting in norm integration being driven by these actors’ ethical 
beliefs on the norm. Since these characteristics are mostly found in bilateral aid 
agencies as opposed to multilaterals, the findings suggest that it is these types of 
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organisations that are more likely to feature norm integration driven by ethical 
considerations. Importantly, however, this does not mean that the organisations per 
se are more likely to be driven by ethical considerations about the norm, or even that 
the majority of their staff are. It merely means that these organisations are more 
likely to offer the freedom and resources for committed actors to integrate the norm 
as they see fit.  
 
Second, the Chapter discussed the second overall finding of the case studies that 
indicates that in some cases, norms do not have any impact on organisations at all 
and that, if and when they do is significantly conditioned by organisational 
characteristics. Indeed, evidence was consolidated that indicates that the some of 
same characteristics that make norm integration in bilateral organisations more likely 
to be driven by ethical considerations, in fact, decrease the likelihood of such 
organisations to take any action on the norm in the first place. Specifically, 
homogeneity and a limited number of decision-makers, combined with a low level of 
susceptibility to scrutiny from few and homogenous scrutinisers – in the case of 
ODA a function of its weak mandate on development and its position as a bilateral 
agency and a wing of the Foreign Office for most of the period of analysis – can lead 
to very delayed and extremely weak action on a norm. This is because the impact of 
global pressure on the organisations is very low, making the organisations reliant on 
an internal push for norm uptake. This, in turn, is made less probable in a 
homogenous decision-making forum with a limited number of decision-makers, 
simply because the likelihood of the presence of a decision maker who is committed 
and willing to push for action on the norm is reduced. On the contrary, multilateral 
organisations, largely due to the diversity and multi-membership of their decision-
making bodies, and their high level of susceptibility to scrutiny from diverse 
scrutinisers, a function of their mandate and source of authority, are faster at taking 
some action on new norms.  
 
In short, multilateral organisations tend to be faster at norm uptake of new norms, but 
are more likely driven by social influence, not ethical considerations. Bilateral 
organisations, on the other hand, are less likely to take any quick action on a new 
norm at all. Yet, when they do act, norm integration is more likely to be driven by 
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ethical considerations than in multilateral organisations. This overall finding is 
summarised in diagram 21 below. 
 
Diagram 21: Impact of specific organisational characteristics on the importance of ethical 
considerations in norm integration in development organisations 
 
 
 
 
Importantly, however, and at the risk of repeating, the findings do not show that 
bilateral organisations with a committed decision-maker are as such are more likely 
to be driven by ethical considerations. Rather, the analysis suggests that 
organisational characteristics specific to bilateral agencies can allow for more space 
and power for committed individuals to act on their beliefs and have them reflected 
at organisational-level.  
 
This last point strongly emphasises the role of individuals in decision-making, as 
well as at operational level, in determining which norm integration driver dominated. 
This leads to a further question: Do actors matter more than structure in explaining 
the observed processes tying in with extensive literature on the role of ‘policy’ or 
‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Sustein 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; True and 
Mintrom 2001; Elgstroem 2011; Park 2011; Caglar, Pruegl, and Zwingel 2013)?  Or 
could the findings be better explained by focusing on global discourse rather than on 
organisational characteristics? Last, this and the previous Chapters observed that 
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throughout much of the period of analysis there was a particular reluctance among 
many individuals at all levels towards the specific issue of gender equality and it was 
noted that often WID/GAD advocates chose to promote the norm through 
instrumental-ethical and not intrinsic-ethical arguments despite their personal 
convictions to the contrary. Might this be suggestive of an underlying gender bias in 
large bureaucracies in general that may offer a better explanation for the observed 
processes? The next Chapter turns to the power of these alternative explanations for 
the findings of this thesis. 
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Chapter 9: Alternative explanations and the generalisability of the 
findings  
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this thesis is to critically engage with the assertion that multilateral aid 
organisations are, as such, more likely to be driven by ethical considerations than 
their bilateral counterparts and, more broadly, to examine if ethical considerations 
have any weight at all in international development organisations. To do so, 
comparative heuristic case studies of the introduction of WID/GAD into three 
international development organisations with very different organisational 
characteristics have been conducted. Based on the findings of these case studies, the 
thesis has established a number of findings that cast significant doubt on the 
simplistic assertion that multilateral organisations are, as such, more likely to be 
driven by ethical considerations than their bilateral counterparts. Indeed, the thesis 
has suggested that organisations per se seem generally unlikely to be driven by 
ethical considerations – yet people within them might be. If these committed 
individuals are given the freedom and power to act on their personal ethical beliefs 
on a norm, they can drive norm integration, and have their commitment reflected at 
organisational-level. This manifests itself through coherent policies that include 
strong intrinsic arguments and comprehensive norm operationalisation. 
 
Thus, the analysis certainly points to the importance of specific actors in determining 
the role that ethical considerations play in norm integration, tying in with extensive 
existing literature on the role of ‘policy’ or ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Sustein 1997; 
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; True and Mintrom 2001; Elgstroem 2011; Park 2011; 
Caglar, Pruegl, and Zwingel 2013). Second, shifts in global discourse on the norm 
have featured as having influenced what approach to WID/GAD dominated in the 
three organisations.  Notably, the thesis clearly outlines that global approaches to 
WID/GAD have moved, for example, from the ‘welfare approach’ to the ‘economic 
efficiency approach’ to the ‘rights approach’ and, thus, the observed shifts in 
WID/GAD ‘frames’ in the three organisations might simply be reflections of this 
discourse. Third, the cases have also suggested that the specific nature of the norm 
may have significantly influenced how it was integrated into the organisations. 
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Attitudes to gender equality as such, seemed, at times, hostile and operational staff 
responsible for promoting the norm consciously shied away from promoting the 
norm based on its intrinsic value. Might any of these three factors provide better 
explanations than the ‘organisational characteristics’ theory put forward by this 
thesis? 
 
Moreover, the analysis has only focused on one norm and three organisations. Might 
this restricted research focus not mean that the findings are only applicable to these 
particular instances and, thus, no general conclusions can be drawn? 
 
This Chapter turns to these critical questions. First, the three alternative explanations 
are examined. It is shown that, although important, how, and to what extent all three 
factors influenced norm integration was significantly conditioned by organisational 
characteristics. Thus, the following shows that my theory does indeed help to refine 
current theories on norm integration in particular, and the role of ethical 
considerations more generally, by outlining how organisational characteristics (1) 
impact on what kind of, and to what extent, global discourse influences 
organisations; (2) limit or enable actors to act on their personal ethical beliefs and 
empower or restrain them to makes their beliefs and action influence outcomes in 
international politics; and (3) conditions how bureaucratic gender-bias affects the 
integration  of WID/GAD.  
 
Second, the Chapter turns to the question of generalisability, starting with a 
consideration of the extension of the theory to other organisations. This is done by 
taking a brief look at the integration of WID/GAD into four other multilateral and 
bilateral organisations to broadly gauge if the theory developed by this thesis might 
be applicable to other organisations. It is found that the theory seems plausible also 
in the context of other organisations. However, this expansion exercise further 
refines my findings. Notably, it suggests that, although generally less likely to 
respond quickly, some – albeit very few – bilateral organisations with committed 
top-level decision-makers also seem to be the first to facilitate the emergence of 
international norms. These organisations, together with other actors, subsequently 
promote the norm at the multilateral-level. Once taken up by multilaterals, there 
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seems to be a knock-on effect on other bilateral organisations, possibly due to the 
increased international status that multilateral uptake represents. 
 
Last, the theory proposed by this thesis is briefly applied to another norm – ‘human 
rights mainstreaming/human rights-based approach to development’ (HRM/HRBA) 
to provide some tentative thoughts on the extent to which the theory is applicable to 
other norms.  
 
It is found that, indeed, the suggestion that bilateral organisations either 
comprehensively and coherently integrate norms (when a committed decision-maker 
is present) or take highly restrictive or no action at all on a norm (when no 
committed decision-maker is present); while multilateral organisations are more lore 
like to be in the ‘middle of the road’ and largely driven by social influence, holds in 
the face of HRBA.  
 
9.1 Alternative Explanations 
 
Global discourse  
 
Alternative Explanation 1: ‘The language used to introduce and institutionalise the 
norm simply reflects the dominant discourse on development in general, and on the 
norm specifically, at the time. It is, therefore, not influenced by specific 
organisational characteristics, and does not reveal anything particular about the 
extent to which ethical considerations matter in an organisation.’ 
 
Throughout the analysis frequent references have been made to shifts in global 
discourse on gender specifically, and development aid in general. However, do these 
shifts in global discourse provide a better explanation for the way in which 
WID/GAD was promoted in the three organisations than organisational 
characteristics? 
 
I submit that this is not the case for three reasons. First, global discourse does not 
explain why the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD and the adoption of the 
first comprehensive WID/GAD policy took place at very different times in each of 
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the three organisations. Recall that the first high-level recognition happened in 1975 
in UNDP, in 1982 in the EC, and in 1986 in ODA, while the first comprehensive 
policies were adopted in 1986, 1995, and 1988 respectively. While developments in 
UNDP were most closely aligned to global trends and discourse, an explanation 
referring exclusively to global discourse does not shed sufficient light on 
developments in ODA or the EC and on why the organisations reacted at such 
different times and to such different extents. 
 
Second, the three organisations, as well as sub-institutions, such as the European 
Parliament, employed very different approaches during the exact same period. A 
case in point is the year 1995 when ODA adopted its fourth, and the EC its first 
comprehensive WID/GAD policy. While ODA’s policy is strongly framed in terms 
of rights and empowerment, the EC’s approach is strongly efficiency-based. 
Moreover, in both the first high-level recognition and the first policy, the EC Council 
took a very different approach to WID/GAD than the Parliament and the 
Commission. Simple reference to global discourse alone does not help to explain 
these differences.  
 
Third, the case suggests that reference to global discourse is an unsatisfactory 
explanation for why certain approaches to WID/GAD dominated in the three 
organisations simply because there was never only one global discourse on gender 
equality. Notably, in 1995, the Fourth World Conference on Women was held in 
Beijing, which framed WID/GAD strongly in terms of rights and empowerment and 
introduced the concept of gender mainstreaming. Yet, other, very influential, voices 
in international development employed a very different discourse on WID/GAD at 
exactly the same time. A case in point is the OECD, which took an extremely strong 
instrumental approach in its DAC High-Level Meeting Statement on Gender 
Equality. The statement opens with the following lines, 
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There is strong emerging consensus that to achieve sustainable, 
people-centred development, progress towards equality in the roles 
of women is essential. This consensus is based on ample evidence: 
investment in the education of girls quite possibly yields a higher 
rate of return than any other investment;…as economic actors they 
are clearly also key to reducing poverty and to improving the 
effectiveness of structural adjustment programmes... (OECD 1995, 
p. 1) 
 
Similarly, although the International Development Targets and the Millennium 
Development Goals brought a general shift to strong instrumental arguments relating 
WID/GAD to poverty eradication and an almost exclusive focus on WID/GAD in 
relation to in education and health in the late 1990/early 2000s, UNIFEM took a very 
different approach at exactly the same time. Notably it focused on ‘gender justice’ 
and ‘social transformation’ and aimed to incorporate gender equality as an integral 
part of human development – not as a means towards it (UNIFEM 2000, p. 20-21). 
 
Thus, reference to global discourse alone does not explain the difference in timing of 
development on WID/GAD in the three organisations, does not help to explain the 
difference in approach during the same period, and seems overall weak since there 
was never only one dominant global discourse on gender equality at any given point 
during the period of analysis. 
 
This is not to undermine the importance of global discourse altogether, as the 
account above certainly suggests some role for it. However, I suggest that the level of 
influence of global discourse as well as the kind of discourse that influenced the 
organisations was conditioned by their organisational characteristics. What mattered 
most in this context was the organisations level of susceptibility to scrutiny and the 
nature of the scrutinisers, both of which were a function of the organisations’ source 
of authority and mandate. 
 
Both the EC and ODA, with a delegated source of authority and a weak mandate on 
global development did not appear to be very susceptible to global discourse of any 
kind.  This was particularly pronounced in the case of ODA which did not rely on 
external approval for either its reputation or its funding, especially in the years before 
Clare Short took over and introduced a greater focus on DFID’s international 
 246 
reputation. Notably, ODA did not respond to shifts in discourse around the first and 
second World Conference on Women or to calls from the OECD/DAC. When it did 
take some action in 1986, the approach taken was, in fact, not in line with global 
discourse. 
 
Also the EC did not at all react to the first two World Conferences on Women or the 
UN Decade on Women and certainly did not adopt its first conclusions in 1982 due 
to global pressure emanating from these conferences. This is illustrated by (1) the 
timing of the conclusions, as they do not closely enough follow any of the 
conferences, and (2), the fact that neither the Conferences nor the World Decade on 
Women are even mentioned in the 1982 Conclusions. Although it is likely that the 
pressure exercised by the Netherlands, which ultimately lead to the adoption of the 
Conclusions, was influenced by the global momentum, this influence was only 
indirect and only felt due the EC’s medium-level of diversity. The limited influence 
of global discourse can further be illustrated by the 1985 conclusions, which only 
make one passing reference to the Nairobi Conference and were indeed criticised by 
the European Parliament for failing to endorse the agreement reached at the Nairobi 
Conference (European Parliament 1985). 
 
UNDP, on the other hand, with a split source of identity partly rooted in the UN 
system and a mandate as a global development actor was the first to follow global 
discourse on WID/GAD. However, due to its second source of authority – its 
member states – UNDP’s approach was throughout quite unique as it was strongly 
non-conceptual and remained instrumentally focused, even during discursive shifts 
around Beijing (Mondesire 1998). 
 
All the above strongly suggests that a simple reference to ‘global discourse’ does not 
provide a better explanation for the observed approaches to WID/GAD in the three 
organisations over the period analysed.  Although various global discourses 
influenced the three organisations’ approach to WID/GAD, the kind of discourse, as 
well as the extent to which it mattered, was significantly conditioned by two 
organisational characteristics: the organisations’ source of authority and their 
mandate strength on development. 
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Actors  
 
Alternative explanation 2: ‘Organisational characteristics are secondary to agents. 
What ultimately matters are agents and their actions.’ 
 
The account above is frequently linked to personal convictions and specific actions 
taken by top-level decisions makers and operational staff in all three organisations. 
Indeed, one key finding of the thesis – that organisations per se are unlikely to be 
driven by ethical considerations while people within them may be – strongly pointing 
to the importance of actors. This finding ties in with extensive work on the role of 
‘policy’ or ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in norm emergence, change, and integration 
processes (Sustein 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; True and Mintrom 2001; 
Elgstroem 2011; Park 2011; Caglar, Pruegl, and Zwingel 2013). 
 
However, does exclusive reference to actors provide a better explanation to the 
observed norm integration processes than the theory on organisational characteristics 
advanced by this thesis? I argue that this is not the case because, as already 
mentioned in previous Chapters, the case studies have shown that the presence, 
freedom, and power of committed actors is significantly conditioned by 
organisational characteristics. Thus, while not downplaying the importance of 
actors, I argue that actors are significantly enabled or restrained in their actions by 
the characteristics of the organisation they work in. This is so much so that the same 
actor is likely to act differently in different organisational settings. Let me illustrate 
this point below. 
 
First, all cases illustrated that the presence of a committed top-level decision-maker 
in an organisation’s decision-making forum, who is willing to push for action on the 
norm, is made significantly more or less probable depending on the number of 
members and the level of cultural diversity of the decision-making body, coupled 
with the level of international recognition of the norm and the openness of the 
organisation’s mandate. The higher the diversity, the large the number of members, 
and the more recognised the norm and the more open the organisation’s mandate, the 
more likely it is that an actor willing to push for action on the norm will be present in 
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decision-making. This, as was shown, can significantly influence the extent to which 
the organisation takes action on a new norm. 
 
Second, all cases have shown that the freedom and power of committed actors was 
significantly influenced by organisational characteristics. This was so at decision-
making, as well as operational, level. Taking the former first, recall that, particularly 
in the case of ODA/DFID, the role of decision-makers in influencing WID/GAD 
integration was significantly conditioned by the particular structure they were 
operating in. Mostly notably, both Chalker and Short could only directly influence 
the organisational approach to WID/GAD to the extent they did as they were 
operating in a homogenous and centralised decision-making system, particularly in 
relation to WID/GAD, where they could take decisions without debate or approval 
from any body. It was indeed more or less ‘their way or the highway’ regarding 
WID/GAD, as suggested by one interviewee (Interview with Okondo). This meant 
that their approach to WID/GAD could be fairly directly reflected at organisational 
level. In the case of Lynda Chalker, this meant an open but largely hands-off 
approach that gave knowledgeable and committed SDAs the freedom and power to 
take action on the norm as they saw fit. This was further facilitated by the fact that 
ODA did not have, or aim to play, a strong role as a leading development donor, 
therefore not needing to promote a particular agenda or talk a specific talk. This was 
partly due to Lynda Chalker’s personality (Interview with Eyben) but also a result of 
the position of ODA as wing of the Foreign Office, making its susceptibility to 
external scrutiny weak and inward looking. 
 
The latter changed when Clare Short took office. Her desire to elevate DFID’s status, 
coupled with her power to shift the organisation in the direction she saw fit due to the 
homogenous and centralised decision-making process and the increased political 
clout that came with DFID’s independent status, meant that DFID became 
increasingly concerned with its general external reputation as a donor and a desire to 
be increasingly viewed as global leader in development. Space for WID/GAD 
advocates shrunk and all work on the norm had to be aligned to the global anti-
poverty agenda. Thus, although in both cases, Challker’s and Short’s personalities 
played a significant role, their actions were to a significant extent conditioned by 
ODA’s/DFID’s specific organisational set-up. 
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The example of UNDP illustrates the flipside of the argument. Although Bill Draper 
was widely viewed as committed to WID/GAD his leverage for action was severely 
restricted by UNDP’s highly diverse and multi-member decision-making body and 
its source of authority partly rooted in delegation form the member states. In the 
words of one interviewee, he was confined by the “organisational straightjacket” of 
UNDP (Interview with Reid). Similarly, Gus Speth, who took over from Bill Draper 
in 1993, although not particularly committed to WID/GA, did not drastically change 
UNDP’s work on WID/GAD, due to the same “organisational straightjacket”. 
 
In addition to the importance of committed individuals in decision-making, the thesis 
has also very strongly pointed to the role of operational staff. Yet again, their 
freedom and power was significantly conditioned by organisational characteristics.14  
Let me illustrate this claim first by reference to ODA/DFID. Notably, although the 
SDA in charge of WID/GAD remained the same from 1986 until 2000, the 
organisation’s approach to the norm changed considerably. Interview data as well as 
personal reflections published by her strongly suggest that, although her commitment 
to WID/GAD did not change throughout this period, her room for manoeuvre and the 
strategies chosen for norm integration varied depending on the organisational space 
she had at any given time. Notably, the SDA stated in an interview for this thesis that 
under Chalker,  
 
…there was enormous freedom…we were working in a very 
enabling environment. That changed (under Clare Short)…we were 
too creative and having too much fun. They could not control 
us…just see what happened to people working on gender and social 
development issues now in DFID. It is really pathetic. Their hands 
are so tide – they have not got the same freedom at all. I could never 
do now what I did then. (Interview with Eyben)  
 
Thus, the organisation’s volatility and the resulting frequent changes in top-
management, combined with the fairly homogenous and limited number of decision-
makers and the open mandate that gave top-management ample freedom and power 
to set new priorities for the organisation, significantly influenced the freedom and 
power of committed operational staff. Yet, the homogeneity, few decision-makers, 
                                                
14 The mere presence of operational staff working on WID/GAD was not so much conditioned by 
organisational structure, as most donors employed someone in this capacity already during the early 
1980s. Their status and resources – in other words, their power – and freedom differed considerably.  
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and open mandate also meant that, when top-level commitment existed, committed 
actors had a lot of freedom and power to act on their beliefs. 
 
On the contrary, operational staff in UNDP were, throughout the research period, 
significantly limited by the organisation’s specific characteristics, especially the 
multi-membership and cultural diversity of its decision-making body. Recall that one 
former WID/GAD staff noted that,  
 
UNDP lives in terror of saying or doing something that will annoy 
the government, so they dumb down the language grossly 
simplifying what feminist research has proven at the start. Radical 
work on gender is not possible. Sad, but it was also an education for 
me to realize the limitations of an institution like this. From the 
outside it’s quite impressive and overwhelming. It’s only when 
working on the inside that you recognize the constraints.  (Menon 
Sen quoted in Murphy 2006, p. 210)  
 
Another WID/GAD staff mentioned in an interview for this thesis that in UNDP they 
“could not work transformatively” (Interview with Reid) and another noted that 
“certain arguments could just not be used” (Interview with Leitner).  
 
Combined with the finding that UNDP’s multi-membership and cultural diversity 
also reduced funding for WID/GAD, this strongly suggests that UNDP’s 
organisational set-up significantly restrained the freedom and power of operational 
staff committed to WID/GAD to act on their personal beliefs. 
 
In short, this thesis has shown that, while actors significantly influenced the kind of 
norm integration driver that dominated in each organisations, the extent to which 
they could influence these processes was significantly conditioned by the 
characteristics of the organisation they worked in.15  
                                                
15The account in this thesis focuses largely on the impact of organisational characteristics on norm 
integration and, admittedly does not pay explicit attention to the complex interrelation between 
organisational characteristics and agents or actors. This is done due to the nature of the research 
question and in the interest of focus and clarity. However, this thesis does not intend to downplay the 
importance of this aspect, particularly because in all cases, while agents were conditioned by 
organisational characteristics, they also significantly influenced these characteristics. This is 
recognised in the narrative above, but no deep engagement with this point is possible due to the 
research focus and in the interest of clarity. 
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Bureaucratic gender bias  
 
Alternative explanation 3: ‘All bureaucracies are “gendered and engendering 
process(es), such that (their) outcomes, internal organization, and culture reflect and 
promote the interest of men.” According to this argument gender is “constitutive of, 
not contingent to, administration” and is “a constitutive element of social 
relationships based on perceived differences between sexes” (Joan Scott quoted in 
Goetz 1992, p. 9). 
 
According to this line of reasoning, the findings of the thesis are essentially not about 
organisational characteristics, agents, or global discourse, but are best explained by 
reference to a widespread bureaucratic gender bias that affects all bureaucracies, 
including multilateral and bilateral development agencies. Indeed, ample and very 
insightful literature on gender in development bureaucracies argues that gender-
biased power structures in such bureaucracies are the key factors that determine how 
these organisations operate. Notably, Goetz finds that “..women’s experiences of 
change in developing economies has tended to be distilled through the development 
process in ways which strongly reflect the gender politics and gendered interests of 
the users of information” (Goetz 1994, p. 28). Referring to what Adele Mueller calls 
“the bureaucratization of feminist knowledge”, Goetz further suggests that 
“bureaucratic procedures for information generation…has the effect of stripping 
away its political content” (Goetz 1994, p. 28). Cornwall et all agree: “The 
institutional and organisational forms of international development, as 
bureaucracies…produce pressures for simplification, sloganizing and lowest 
common denominator consensus” (Cornwall, Harrison, and Whitehead 2007, p. 16). 
They refer to these processes of simplification as manifestations of a “politics of 
influence” and of “power relations within development” which “ensure that feminist 
through remains thoroughly marginal” (Cornwall, Harrison, and Whitehead 2007, p. 
16). 
 
Seeing ‘gender bias’ as a form of power, potentially very subtle and possibly 
disguised as ‘appropriate behaviour’, the findings of the case study do indeed suggest 
that it was present in all three organisations and that it substantially conditioned the 
kind of norm integration processes that gender advocates deemed appropriate in all 
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three organisations analysed. Notably, external evaluations, academic accounts, as 
well as interviews conducted for this thesis with staff in all three organisations across 
the entire research period noted a widespread apprehension among staff and 
management towards the issue of gender equality. For instance, an external 
evaluation of WID/GAD in the EC found, 
 
…a certain degree of resistance to integrating the concept of gender, 
with several officers viewing it as a gimmick or passing phase, and 
others mentioning that if gender is included everywhere, it will 
annoy people. One expert even suggested that gender might be a 
possible ‘virus’.” (Colombo 1994a, p. 37)  
 
Elgstroem, also referring to the EC, states that,  “One of my informants called DG 
VIII a ‘male organization’, another claimed that most officials there ‘couldn’t care 
less’ about gender issues. ‘There is no understanding and little sympathy’ is yet 
another typical quote” (Elgstroem 2011, p. 470). A comprehensive review of 
WID/GAD in the EC similarly finds that, “There has been a lack of encouraging 
statements from top management on the importance of the integration of gender. 
Staff members believe that gender is very low on the list of priorities of the 
institution” (Jensen 2006, p. iv). 
 
Evaluations carried out on UNDP reach similar conclusions. One noted explicit 
reluctance by staff to take action on gender as, “...questionnaire responses indicate 
that, to address gender issues, explicit instructions have been ignored by missions 
and, at times, by Governments” (UNDP 1990b). Another evaluation found that,  
“Some women staff members indicated that WID issues are not taken seriously by 
male colleagues and that the response has often been laughter when women in 
development was mentioned” (Kardam 1991). Mondesire also clearly finds in her 
1999 evaluation that there was no senior management support for action on 
WID/GAD (Mondesire 1999). An evaluation of WID/GAD training in ODA/DFID 
equally found reluctance towards the issue among many staff. Some senior members 
of staff stated that “you can never get away from gender, its always there.” (Sheelagh 
1998, p. 20) and that  “..it (gender) is not appropriate to what my department does 
and fortunately we’re exempt from the usual DFID rules so we don’t have to do it…” 
(Sheelagh 1998, p. 21). 
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Interviews conducted for this thesis strongly support these findings. For instance, one 
interviewee stated that, the reason why he got involved in WID/GAD work was to 
“limit the damage the bra burning feminists [in the organisation] were causing” as 
they were, according to him, “suggesting a lot of nonsense” (Interview with Pearce). 
Moreover, a number of high-level officials interviewed explicitly stated that they did 
not want to be associated with women’s issues as this was considered bad for their 
career. One official, who had turned down the position as head of the Gender in 
Development Programme in UNDP said that she did so because: “I did not want to 
be totally associated with women’s issues. It is different when you are in a technical 
field but gender was not like that…it was not considered a technical field, it was 
(considered) soft and limiting your personal growth and influence..” (Interview with  
Miller). Another interviewee noted that, “I was very proud of the fact that I had 
never dealt with women’s affairs...” Individuals who had worked closely with Clare 
Short, similarly stated that Short, “came from quite a strong feminist background but 
she did not want to be seen as the great feminist around DfID… She did not want to 
be one of the girls. She wanted to be one of the men” (Interview with Holden). This 
strongly suggests that there was certainly a strong sense amongst officials in the 
three organisations that gender issues were viewed with a certain apprehension, 
particularly if framed in terms of ‘feminist language’. 
 
WID/GAD advocates seemed to be very much aware of such a gender-bias and 
adjusted their strategies accordingly. Specifically, this seems to have lead to, what I 
refer to in the thesis, significant ‘self-censorship’ of WID/GAD advocates that 
resulted in the overall preference for instrumental arguments in all cases throughout 
most of the examined period. Notably, one former head of the WID division in 
UNDP stated that,  
 
I tried to represent myself not as a narrow minded women-only 
feminist and instead as concerned with development in a broader 
perspective –when they realised that I was married and had three 
sons – I became a normal person and with my professional and 
political background…I was accepted as one of their kind. 
(Interview with Eide) 
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Another WID/GAD official in DFID noted that, “…feminist arguments just did not 
work” and another stated that talking about values or rights was seen to make one at 
best unpopular and ineffective and at worst being “laughed at” (Interview with Hay).  
 
The particular aversion to gender equality across different levels in all three 
organisations found by the evaluations cited above, although not independently 
assessed by this thesis, very likely also influenced the level of operationalisation of 
WID/GAD, as it lead to weak political support for WID/GAD officials and limited, 
or even negative, pressure on general staff to promote the issue. This may have had 
particularly large impact in hierarchical bureaucracies, such as the three case studies, 
as one interviewee noted, “civil servants do what they are told” (Interview with Hay) 
and since there was “little serious commitment from the management” (Interview 
with Hay) this negatively impacted on the level of norm operationalisation. Indeed, 
the interviewee stated that, “if performance was affected, they would do something. 
This is bureaucracy and people do what they are told” (Interview with Hay).  
 
However, and taking into account the constitutive effect of gender-bias on structure, 
the case studies have also shown that the way in which gender-bias constrained 
action on norm integration, especially action by WID/GAD staff, was also 
significantly conditioned by specific organisational characteristics. Notably, the 
cases show that the extent to which WID/GAD staff felt constrained by gender-bias 
depended to a significant extent on the openness of the mandate of the organisation. 
UNDP, having a strong mandate focused on ‘impartiality’ and ‘neutrality’ made staff 
particularly keen to avoid value-based arguments and focused on the 
“professionalisation” of the issue instead. Both the EC and ODA/DFID pre-1997 had 
much weaker and broader mandates on development, which meant that WID/GAD 
staff were less constraint in how they could frame the issue and, indeed, both 
organisations’ approach to WID/GAD includes both intrinsic and instrumental 
arguments as well as a much higher level of conceptual engagement than in UNDP. 
When DFID’s mandate became more restrictive in 1997, WID/GAD staff were 
certainly more constraint in how they could address the underlying gender-bias in 
DFID and promote WID/GAD across DFID. 
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In addition, the organisation’s source of authority and the composition of its 
decision-making body further influenced how gender-bias in the organisation 
affected the action of WID/GAD staff, because it impacted on their level of freedom 
and power to promote the norm as they saw fit as outlined in the previous section. 
Notably, UNDP’s source of authority partly rooted in ‘delegation from the member 
states’ combined with the multi-member and highly diverse decision-making forum 
that did not agree on the value of WID/GAD meant that WID/GAD staff were 
strongly constrained in their actions. This limited them in how they could approach 
WID/GAD in general, including how they could aim to address the organisation’s 
underlying gender bias. ODA staff, in the years prior to 1997, on the other hand, 
were most free to promote the issue as they saw fit. Although still constrained by a 
gender-biased culture, which helps to explain the still strong focus on instrumental 
arguments in ODA (‘self-censorship’), the constraint was less than in the other two 
organisations, particularly UNDP. In other words, certain organisational 
characteristics influenced to what extent WID/GAD staff had strategic entry points to 
overcome or even address the underlying gender-bias and promote the issue 
according to their beliefs. 
 
Summary 
 
The section has established that, although global discourse, actors, and gender-bias, 
have impacted on how WID/GAD was integrated in all three organisations, the way 
in which all factors influenced norm integration was significantly conditioned by 
specific organisational characteristics. This further illustrates the added value my 
theory brings to attempts at understanding the role of ethical considerations in 
different types of development organisations in general, and in norm integration, and 
specifically the integration of WID/GAD, in particular. 
 
9.2 The question of generalisability: Other organisations and another norm 
 
As recognised in Chapter Three, the method chosen for this thesis, comparative 
heuristic case studies, brings with it a number of strengths and weaknesses. While 
the detailed and in-depth qualitative work allowed for by this method enables in-
depth findings with “explanatory richness”, this comes at a certain cost of 
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generalisability (George and Bennett 2005, p. 30). This thesis has almost exclusively 
focused on one norm and three organisations. To what extent are the findings that 
have emerged from this study generalisable to other norms or other organisations? 
 
This section turns to this question and discusses the extent to which the findings of 
this thesis are generalisable, or at least, contingently applicable to “types or subtypes 
of cases” (George and Bennett 2005, p. 31). Since the findings of the thesis are based 
on the selection of (1) specific organisations and (2) a specific norm, the following 
section will discuss the implications of each in turn, beginning with the former.  
 
Generalisability: Other organisations 
 
The case studies have, broadly speaking, pointed to the following two overall 
findings on the impact of organisational characteristics on the importance of ethical 
considerations in, and the timing of, WID/GAD uptake: 
 
1. Importance of ethical considerations: Organisations with cultural homogeneity 
and few members in decision-making, if coupled with the presence of a committed 
decision-maker, are likely to provide ample freedom, power, and resources to actors 
committed to a norm to have their commitments reflected at the level of the 
organisation – likely to lead to coherent and intrinsically-focused policies and 
comprehensive operationalisation. On the other hand, organisations with culturally 
diverse and multi-member decision-making bodies and consensus-based decision-
making, are less likely to provide such freedom, likely to lead to less coherent and 
instrumentally-focused policies and patchy operationalisation. 
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2. Timing of norm uptake: Organisations with high-levels of cultural diversity and 
multi-membership in decision-making, coupled with a high level of susceptibility to 
scrutiny (multiple and/or active scrutinisers) and an open mandate, are quicker to 
react to new norms than organisations with low-levels of cultural diversity, few 
members in decision-making, low levels of susceptibility to scrutiny, and a closed 
mandate. 
 
This section takes both findings in turn to establish the extent to which it is plausible 
to suggest broader applicability to different organisations. 
 
i. Importance of ethical considerations 
 
Organisations with cultural homogeneity and few members in decision-making, if 
coupled with the presence of a committed decision-maker, are likely to provide 
ample freedom, power, and resources to actors committed to a norm to have their 
commitments reflected at the level of the organisation – likely to lead to coherent and 
intrinsically-focused policies and comprehensive operationalisation. On the other 
hand, organisations with culturally diverse and multi-member decision-making 
bodies and consensus-based decision-making, are less likely to provide such 
freedom, power, and resources likely to lead to less coherent, instrumentally-focused 
policies and patchy operationalisation. 
 
As the characteristics likely to reduce freedom and power of committed actors to act 
on their beliefs - cultural diversity and multi-member decision-making - are most 
commonly found in multilateral organisations, this finding suggests that multilateral 
organisations may be less likely to have norm integration driven by ethical, 
especially intrinsic ethical considerations. Bilateral organisations with homogenous 
and few decision-makers, if combined with a committed decision-maker, on the 
other hand, are more likely to provide such freedom and are, thus, more likely to 
have norm integration driven by ethical considerations.  
 
Crucially, the claim examined here is not that all, or even most, bilateral aid 
organisations are likely to have WID/GAD integration dominated by ethical 
considerations. Much more modestly, the claim advanced and assessed here is that 
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ethical considerations are more likely to dominate norm integration in a bilateral 
organisation than a multilateral organisation. Using the indicators applied in this 
thesis to measure the different norm integration drivers, one would therefore 
expected multilateral organisations to be more likely to have weak WID/GAD 
policies either framed in procedural (non-conceptual) or instrumental terms and weak 
operationalisation, while bilateral organisations are more likely to feature 
comprehensive and intrinsically focused policies and comprehensive 
operationalisation. 
 
To examine the extent to which this theory applies to other organisations, the section 
below provides a brief overview of the integration of WID/GAD into the World 
Bank and the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and 
then turns to the integration of the norm into two bilateral organisations: the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORAD. Due to space constraints, this 
section does not engage in process analysis and only looks at policies and secondary 
data on levels of WID/GAD operationalisation to gauge how WID/GAD has been 
taken up by these organisations. The findings are, thus, highly tentative but provide 
an indication of the extent to which the theory proposed here might be applicable 
beyond the three organisations studied. 
 
Multilateral organisations 
 
World Bank: The World Bank first substantively included WID/GAD in its 1984 
Operational Manual. This inclusion was non-conceptual and, overall, weak. Notably, 
WID was included under ‘Sociological Aspects of Project Appraisal’. It was framed 
largely in non-conceptual terms, aiming for the greater participation of women in 
relevant areas. The manual was not accompanied by concrete strategies of how this 
should be done or by any incentives or enforcement mechanisms (Razavi and Miller 
1995a). Subsequent evaluations judged that the manual “failed to make 
responsiveness to WID a routine concern in operations” (Razavi and Miller 1995a, p. 
34). 
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The first comprehensive WID/GAD policy was adopted in 1994. It is strongly 
framed in efficiency terms. Notably the strategy opens with the following paragraph, 
 
Women produce half the food in some parts of the developing 
worlds, bear most of the responsibility for household food security, 
and make up a quarter of the work force in industry…Improving 
women’s productivity can contribute to growth, efficiency, and 
poverty reduction. (World Bank 1994, p. 9) 
 
This strong focus on efficiency continues throughout the strategy and paragraphs 
such as the following are frequently found in the document: “Investing in women is 
critical for poverty reduction. It speeds economic development…it produces 
significant social returns” (World Bank 1994, p. 22). 
 
Despite lengthy discussions for making the efficiency case for WID/GAD the 
document is weak on strategy. No concrete strategies of how the policy should be 
implemented are outlined and no concrete commitments to implementation are made 
in the document. Thus, in addition to being strongly framed in efficiency terms, the 
document is not very comprehensive. 
 
The strong focus on efficiency continued into the 2000s. Notably, the World Bank’s 
2002 gender policy opens with the following paragraph: 
 
Several major World Bank reports provide strong empirical 
evidence that the gender-based division of labour…tend to slow 
development, economic growth and poverty reduction.. (World 
Bank 2002, p. 1)  
 
This exclusive focus on efficiency is carried forward throughout the document, with 
statements such as “Gender inequality retards economic growth and poverty 
reduction” commonly used. All thematic issues mentioned, such as education, health, 
and access to agricultural inputs, are also exclusively framed in efficiency terms 
(World Bank 2002) 
 
The policy is also remarkable in its ‘hands-off’ approach regarding entrenched  
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gender inequalities and only allows for World Bank intervention if the ‘opportunity 
costs’ are considered high enough, 
 
Because the religious or cultural traditions that define and justify the 
distinct roles and expected behavior of males and females are 
strongly cherished and socially reinforced, change in gender systems 
is often contested... Especially where the CGA suggest that 
opportunity costs of ignoring gender issues are high, Bank staff will 
be proactive in bringing gender issues to the attention of their 
country counterparts. (World Bank 2002, p. 2) 
 
Regarding operationalistion, numerous evaluations conducted of the integration of 
WID/GAD into World Bank policy and operations concur that, overall, “gender 
concerns have not been systematically integrated into World Bank operations” 
(World Bank 2005; Razavi and Miller 1995a; World Bank 2010).  One evaluation, 
for instance, found that, “lack of training” and limited “focus” of policies and 
strategies have “proved detrimental to the effective implementation of policy.” 
Regarding impact on gender equality outcomes, the evaluation found that “The 
Bank’s efforts have been marginal and have only had negligible impact as a result” 
(World Bank 2005, p. xiii). 
 
Food and Agricultural Organisation: The Food and Agricultural Organisation 
(FAO) adopted its first WID/GAD strategy in 1989. The strategy is entitled Plan of 
Action for the Integration of Women in Development and aims to ensure that “in the 
organisation’s sphere of responsibility, women are accorded equal rights and 
opportunities” and that “their potential contribution is put to good use by their 
societies” (FAO 1989a, p. 1). Thus, although conceptually quite vague, the approach 
taken is mostly instrumental. The stress on efficiency arguments is further supported 
by a brief examination of discussions in the FAO Council around the adoption of the 
Plan of Action in which it was noted that “The issue of women in development is 
basically an issue of hard development economics - making the best use of economic 
potentials in order to obtain growth and development” (FAO 1989b, p. 181). 
 
The Plan provides some detail on implementation, with priority given to staff 
training and the strengthening of technical divisions to incorporate WID into their 
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programme of work, but does not include a comprehensive or wide-ranging strategy 
for the integration of WID/GAD. 
 
The Plan was revised in 1995. The new Gender Action Plan is even more strongly 
framed in efficiency terms. Notably, women’s lack of access to land and other 
agricultural inputs is exclusively presented as a major obstacle to productivity The 
strategy opens by stating that, 
 
Agricultural and rural development that is equitable, effective and 
sustainable cannot be pursued without an explicit recognition of the 
tremendous contribution of rural women…women’s empowerment 
will be central to achieving initiatives aimed at raising levels of 
nutrition, improving production and distribution of food and 
agricultural products, and enhancing the living conditions of rural 
populations. (FAO 1995, para. 1) 
 
The focus on instrumental-ethical arguments has continued and to some extend 
intensified to this day, for instance in the recently adopted new FAO gender policy 
(FAO 2013, p. 1). 
  
Overall, evaluations carried out on FAO’s work on gender are highly critical of the 
organisation’s achievements. One evaluation found that FAO’s gender action plans 
have “left little mark on the organization” (FAO 2011b, p. 10) and a gender audit 
noted that there are  “major impediments to gender mainstreaming at FAO” and that 
FAO is “far behind many of its peers and nowhere near where it ought to be” (FAO 
2011a, p. 2). 
 
Summary on multilateral organisations: Although very brief, the above 
overview does suggest that gender policies of both, FAO and the World Bank, seem 
to be largely based on instrumental arguments and, at least in the 1980s and 1990s, 
were not very coherent or comprehensive. Moreover, operationalisation of 
WID/GAD has left much to be desired across the board. In order for the above to 
support my findings, this would need to be significantly different in some bilateral 
aid organisations. The next section turns to this question. 
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Bilateral organisations 
 
Crucially, the claim examined here is not that all, or even most, bilateral aid 
organisations have more coherent and intrinsically focused WID/GAD policies or 
have more comprehensively integrated the norm in their operations. Much more 
modestly, the claim advanced and assessed here is that coherent policies based on the 
intrinsic value of the norm and comprehensive operationalisation are most likely to 
be found in bilateral aid organisations. In other words, if one observes intrinsically 
focused policies and comprehensive operationalisation it is most likely to be in a 
bilateral organisation. Instrumentally focused policies and weak operationalisation 
are found in both, multilateral as well as bilateral organisations.  
 
The following section analyses the integration of WID/GAD into policy language 
and operationalisation of three bilateral donors. 
 
Netherlands: As already mentioned in the previous Chapters, the Netherlands 
adopted its first WID policy in 1980. The document is remarkable in its level of 
detail, coherence, and strong intrinsic approach to gender equality. Most notably, it 
puts the improvement of women’s living and working conditions as a core goal of 
development aid (para 1) and explicitly states that it aims to transform social – and 
power – relations. For instance, the policy states that, 
 
Women will not be in a position to influence their lives until they 
have achieved some degree of economic independence... This 
implies that men..,will bear their share of responsibility in three 
realms of activity: domestic duties, bringing up children and caring 
for the sick and elderly…development programmes and 
projects…should be designed to bring about social change that will 
alter the traditional attitudes. (Directorate General for International 
Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 
1980, para. 3.1) 
 
Moreover, the policy specifically states that it aims to support the “fight against 
women’s subordination” (Directorate General for International Cooperation of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1980, para. 3.1.4) and strongly 
critiques other donors including the UN that frame the issue as a “social problem” 
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(Directorate General for International Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Netherlands 1980, para. 4.2.3). 
 
The policy also includes a detailed and comprehensive checklist for the inclusion of 
WID/GAD into development cooperation. This checklist further underlines the 
strong and almost confrontational approach taken by the policy as it states that, 
 
 …it must be realized that the participation of women in the 
development process necessarily involves major changes in the 
institutionalised power relationship between the sexes…Obviously 
this process will encounter strong opposition. Development 
programmes aimed at improving the position of women and 
enabling them to participate in the development process must allow 
for such resistance. (Directorate General for International 
Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 
1980, annex, p. 1) 
 
Following the adoption of this policy the Netherlands put in place a number of 
concrete steps to operationalise WID/GAD, such as gender training, and was 
considered “ahead of the game” in its efforts in this regard (Jackson 1992, p. 92).   
 
The first WID/GAD policy was replaced in 1992 with a policy entitled, “Women in 
Development: Advancing towards Autonomy” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands 1992). As the title suggests, the policy focuses on women’s autonomy as 
the basis for the integration of women into development. It notably states that, 
“..development policies have to be oriented explicitly to women in development. 
This can best be done on the basis of the concept of autonomy” (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Netherlands 1992, p. 11). Autonomy is understood broadly as 
including the following three aspects (1) physical, (2) economic; (3) socio-cultural 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1992, p. 15)  
 
This is a very comprehensive understanding of the different spheres that require 
attention to achieve women’s empowerment and gender equality and includes 
controversial issues such as sexual and reproductive rights. 
 
The policy is further remarkable as it explicitly addresses issues of power and social 
transformation. For instance it states that, “..women are fighting, and have fought, for 
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economic and political rights and for control over their own bodies and lives in all 
places throughout history,” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1992, p. 
11) The policy also recognises that women suffer specific human rights abuses due 
to their sex (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1992, p. 11). 
 
In addition to this detailed conceptual engagement with WID/GAD, the policy also 
outlines a very comprehensive and ambitious implementation strategy, including 
instrument for operationalisation and specific targets (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Netherlands 1992, p. 18 - 22). Comprehensive operationalisation of WID/GAD 
that commenced after the adoption of the first policy continued throughout the 
1990s.  Tools for gender mainstreaming developed by the Dutch during this period 
were considered as “the best-developed gender analysis instrument so far” 
(Roggeband and Verloo 2006, p. 616). Moreover, an evaluation carried out in 1998 
found that “In the 1990s the processes accelerated…the amount of human and other 
resources made available increased substantially” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands 1998, p. 1) and that WID/GAD has become well integrated in projects 
and programmes (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 1998, p. 2). 
 
Last, also a recent DAC Peer Review 2010 the Netherlands is referred to as “an 
internationally recognised leader on gender equality and women’s empowerment in 
development and has a long and established track record in mainstreaming these 
issues in its development co-operation.  This impressive performance should be 
maintained…” (OECD 2011, p. 30). Gender equality is considered to have a “high 
profile and strong leadership from teams and individuals in the Hague and most 
Dutch embassies” (OECD 2011, p. 29)  and “spending on gender equality reflects its 
prioritisation of this issue. The Netherlands spent a higher proportion of ODA on 
gender equality and women’s empowerment activities in 2008 than most other DAC 
members” (OECD 2011, p. 47). 
 
NORAD: In 1985, the Ministry adopted its first WID policy, which strongly 
recognised women’s productive roles alongside their reproductive roles. The policy 
is comprehensive and coherent. Indeed, one evaluation of the integration of 
WID/GAD in Norwegian aid finds that NORAD was “one of the first national 
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development agencies to present a coherent policy document on the integration of 
WID into development aid.”(Geisler 1999, p. 12)   
 
Following the first policy, NORAD published a Strategy for Assistance to Women in 
Development in 1986. The strategy aimed to: (1) improve women’s living conditions; 
and (2) provide opportunities for women to participate in economic, cultural, and 
political activities with a view to change the mainstream of development to make it 
benefit women. According to some commentators, this strategy “espoused a very 
radical, ‘agenda-setting’ approach” (Geisler 1999, p. 12). Further, the strategy 
included an explicit mandate for NORAD to push for increased action on WID/GAD 
in multilateral organisations. It stated that Norway’s active participation in the 
multilateral organisations is “an opportunity to work towards a wider understanding 
of women’s role in development and thereby influence both the member countries 
and the organisations in relationship to WID” (Geisler 1999, p. 13). 
 
Thus, its seems that already in the early decades, NORAD stood out as an aid agency 
with coherent and comprehensive policies that included a significant focus on gender 
equality as an important value and of itself. This trend continued throughout the 
1990s and 2000s. A case in point is the 2007 – 2009 Action Plan. The Plan is 
remarkable as it strongly – almost confrontationally – puts the issue of women’s 
rights – at the heart of Norway’s development cooperation. Notably, the Plan states 
that, “The Government wants Norway to be a fearless champion of women’s rights 
and gender equality.” The Plan puts the “rights, participation and influence of 
women will be at the core of Norway’s development cooperation efforts” and aims to 
“ensure the realisation of the rights of women that are set out in international human 
rights conventions” (Nowegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007, p. 6). 
 
The substantive part of the plan lives up to these promises as it focuses on four 
thematic issues: women’s political empowerment, women’s economic 
empowerment, sexual and reproductive health and rights, violence against women. 
The latter two stand out as critical for women’s empowerment but often overlooked 
by many development agencies. Indeed, the Plan particularly strong on these two 
issues. It states that,  
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Norway will be a fearless champion of women’s sexual and 
reproductive rights…Establishing the right to safe abortion on 
demand was a milestone in the fight of Norwegian women for 
economic and political participation on the same terms as men. Far 
too many women die each year because they lack access to safe 
abortion on demand. We will also fight all forms of discrimination 
and stigmatisation on the grounds of sexual orientation. (Nowegian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007, p. 7) 
 
The Plan is also strongly transformative as it calls for,”…the redistribution of power, 
resources and care responsibilities between men and women….(Nowegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 2007, p. 6). 
 
Regarding implementation, NORAD seems to have made comprehensive efforts. 
Although the organisation was criticised for weak translation of policies into actual 
practice in the late 1990s and early 2000s (NORAD 2005), more recent assessments 
suggest comprehensive integration of the norm in NORADs operations. Notably, the 
2013 DAC Peer Review states that NORAD,  
 
…is among the more progressive voices in the global development 
landscape, committed to critical and challenging development 
issues. For example,,,, Norway…plays a leading role in promoting 
gender equality and women’s rights internationally and in following 
up on the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace 
and security. (OECD 2013, p. 25)  
 
It further finds that, “Norway has incorporated gender equality and women’s 
empowerment across its programmes” (OECD 2013, p. 38).  Specifically, the review 
states that,  “Norway has institutionalised and has allocated sufficient resources, 
under a team of four advisers on gender in the Ministry and another six in Norad, to 
provide an additional boost to ensuring that gender equality is incorporated across its 
programmes” (OECD 2013, p. 7). 
 
Thus, compared to other aid agencies, Norway’s policies and, although to a lesser 
extent, its implementation, stand out as being strong, coherent, and framed in 
intrinsic arguments. Commentators on aid and gender concur. For instance, 
Slebervick and Ostebo find that “Norway is often seen as a “world champion” in 
gender equality. Norwegian aid policies on gender often emphasise how lessons can 
 267 
be learned from “the Norwegian model” and experiences.” (Selbervik and Ostebo 
2013, p. 250) while an evaluation of Norwegian aid find that “Over the years the 
Norwegian Government has distinguished itself as a champion of women’s rights 
and gender equality both in Norway itself and also in its development aid strategies” 
(Geisler 1999, p. 12). 
 
Summary on bilateral organisations: In summary, the integration of WID/GAD 
into Dutch and Norwegian aid administrations was overall more comprehensive and 
policies were more focused on intrinsic arguments than the multilateral agencies 
examined above. This does indeed suggest that the theory developed by this thesis 
might be applicable beyond the three detailed case studies. In addition, a recent 
OECD/DAC report also supports my tentative assertion that bilateral organisations 
may be more likely to comprehensively operationalise WID/GAD, as it has found, 
 
...unprecedented political and policy commitment from OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors to accelerating 
progress towards gender equality, women’s empowerment and 
women’s rights…DAC members have become more active and 
strategic in their efforts to influence multilateral institutions’ 
performance on gender equality [emphasis added]; and have stepped 
up their engagement in global processes to protect and advance 
women’s rights. (OECD 2014a, p. 4) 
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ii Timing of norm uptake 
 
Organisations with high-levels of cultural diversity and multi-membership in 
decision-making, coupled with a high level of susceptibility to scrutiny (multiple 
and/or active scrutinisers) and an open mandate, are quicker to react to new norms 
than organisations with low-levels of cultural diversity, few members in decision-
making, low levels of susceptibility to scrutiny and a closed mandate. 
 
Since some of the characteristics that were found to make organisations quicker to 
react to new norms – high-levels of cultural diversity and multi-membership in 
decision making –are most typical of multilateral organisations, the finding suggests 
that, overall, multilateral organisations might be quicker to react to new norms than 
their bilateral counterparts. Likely exceptions are multilateral organisations with 
limited susceptibility to scrutiny, mostly expected in organisations that generate their 
own resources and have closed mandates such as international development banks, 
including the World Bank. 
 
The table below provides an overview of a number of multilateral and bilateral aid 
organisations and shows when they first recognised WID/GAD in their mandates. 
Without going into detail, as this would go beyond the scope of this thesis, the table 
indicates that multilateral organisations did indeed, react considerably earlier to 
WID/GAD than their bilateral counterparts.  
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Table: 18 Overview of first formal recognition of WID.GAD in key development organisations 
 
Date of first formal 
recognition of WID/GAD16 
Agency 
1973 USAID 
1975 UNDP 
1975 ILO17 
1980 Netherlands 
1982 EC 
1984 World Bank 
1985 Norway 
1984 CIDA18 
1985 UNICEF19 
1985 SIDA 
1986 DFID 
1986 Germany 
1986 Denmark 
1987 African Development Bank20 
1987 Inter-American Development Bank21 
1989 FAO 
1989 UNHCR22 
1989 WFP23 
1992 Japan24 
1996 Finland25 
1998 Austria26 
1998 NZ27 
2001 France28 
2003 Swiss29 
 
The table highlights one particularly notable exception to the observed trend: the 
United States, and the Netherlands. The United States was, in fact, the first aid donor 
(multilateral or bilateral) to recognise WID/GAD in its official mandate in 1973. 
Does this challenge my findings? 
 
                                                
16 “First formal recognition” refers to either the first inclusion of WID/GAD into the organisations’ 
mandates or the adoption of a first WID/GAD policy. The establishment of working groups or other, 
more informal measures, are not taken into account. 
17 (International Labour Conference 1975) 
18 The first WID/GAD policies of CIDA, SIDA, DFID, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Germany and 
USAID are referenced in (OECD 1988) 
19 (Peebles 2007) 
20 (Dodhia and Johnson 2005) 
21 (Inter-American Development Bank 2010)  
22 (UNHCR Executive Committee 1989) 
23 (Cammack 1999)  
24 (JICA 2007) 
25 (Womenwatch 2004) 
26 (Austrian Development Agency 2006) 
27 (Bennett 2013) 
28 (Aleyly 2004)  
29 (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 2013) 
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A closer look at both cases shows, that neither undermine the theory put forward in 
this thesis.  Recall, that the thesis has found that organisations tended to take some 
action on the norm when the scrutinisers they were susceptible to pushed for action 
on the norm. The reason for why multilateral organisations are generally quicker at 
responding to new and global trends is that they are more susceptible to multiple 
scrutinisers. This, in turn, means that there is a higher probability that one of the 
scrutinisers they are susceptible to will push for action on the norm. Importantly, the 
finding does not preclude the presence of committed and powerful scrutinisers in a 
bilateral setting, as the first high-level recognition of WID/GAD in ODA was indeed 
triggered by such pressure, it simply suggests that it is less likely. 
 
As already discussed above, there was strong internal pressure among Dutch 
politician also reflected at the level of the EC that helps to explain the early 
recognition of WID/GAD in the Netherlands. Also the first formal legal recognition 
of WID/GAD in the US Foreign Assistance Act, also known as the Percy 
Amendment, was the result of consistent lobbying of US Congressional hearings by 
domestic “women’s circles”  (Miller and Razavi 1995, p. 3). Specifically, it was 
decisive action by mainstream women’s organisations, spearheaded by two high-
ranking women in the US political establishment – Mildred May, Head of the US 
Information Agency Women’s Programme, and Virginia Allen, Deputation 
Assistance of State for Public Affairs – that put pressure on Congress to take action 
and, ultimately, lead to the adoption of the amendment (Fraser and Tinker 2004). 
Thus, the early recognition of WID/GAD in the US can be explained by the presence 
of powerful domestic ‘scrutinisers’ whose voices mattered to decision-makers in the 
US in the early 1970s. It was not a reaction to a global trend or global pressure and, 
therefore, does not undermine the theory put forward here that multilateral 
organisations are more susceptible to these types of trends and pressures. 
 
Yet, this insight does point to a potential refinement of the theory put forward here, 
as it might suggest that, although generally slower, one or a few bilateral 
organisations might also be the first to take action on a new norm. This point is 
further considered in the section on HRM/HRBA below. 
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Summary: This section has provided a brief overview of the integration of 
WID/GAD into a number of additional multilateral and bilateral donors. The findings 
of this section have tentatively indicated the viability of my suggested theory. First, 
an analysis of a number of other multilateral and bilateral aid organisations has 
further supported the suggestions that coherent and intrinsically-focused policies as 
well as comprehensive operationalisation are most likely found in bilateral agencies. 
Second, a look at when WID/GAD was first taken up by various development 
organisations suggests that, overall, multilateral organisations took action earlier than 
the majority of bilateral donors. 
 
Generalisability: Another norm 
 
This section briefly considers the integration of another norm - human rights 
mainstreaming/the human rights-based approach to development (HRM/HRBA) – 
into a number of multilateral and bilateral development organisations in order to 
gauge the extent to which the theory proposed in this thesis holds when confronted 
with a different norm. This section first introduces the norm and subsequently 
discusses the applicability of the two key findings to its introduction into UNDP, 
ODA/DFID, and the EU. 
 
i. The origins and definitions of HRM/HRBA  
 
Official attempts at linking the promotion and protection of human rights and 
development date back to the first World Conference on Human Rights that was held 
in Teheran in 1968. The conference recognised that “the achievement of lasting 
progress in the implementation of human rights is dependent upon sound and 
effective national and international policies of economic and social development” 
(Alston and Robinson 2005, p. 1). In 1977 the UN Commission on Human Rights 
“proclaimed the existence of a human right to development”, yet it was not until the 
mid-1990s that “the human rights community began to engage more directly and 
constructively with their counterparts working on development issues” (Alston and 
Robinson 2005, p. 2 - 3). In 1996 some donors started to adopt explicit policies 
recognising human rights and development and in 1997 Kofi Annan “directed all UN 
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agencies to contribute to the mainstreaming of human rights” (Alston and Robinson 
2005, p. 2; OECD 2006). 
 
Although no formal definition of human rights mainstreaming exists, it is usually 
understood as aiming for a “systematic integration of human rights in development. 
Beyond the use of conditionalities and direct support, this ‘transversal integration’ 
implies that human rights are accounted for in all sectors of development 
cooperation” (Holland and Doidge 2012, p. 9). HRBA, in contrast, is even more ‘far 
reaching’. Holland, for example, notes that, “Unlike mainstreaming policies, a 
HRBA refines development in terms of ‘rights-holders’ and ‘duty-bearers’. Fostering 
processes of citizen-state accountability, within the limits set by the human rights 
framework, becomes a central preoccupation in development cooperation policy” 
(Holland and Doidge 2012, p. 9 - 10). 
 
In 2003 the United Nations Development Group adopted a Common Understanding 
on Human Rights-Based Approaches to Development, which defines HRBA as 
encompassing the following three principles,  
 
1. All programmes of development co-operation…should further the 
realisation of human rights...; 
2. Human rights standards contained in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights…guide all development cooperation and 
programming;  
3. Development cooperation contributes to the development of the 
capacities of ‘duty-bearers’ to meet their obligations and/or of 
‘rights-holders’ to claim their rights. (UNDP 2014a) 
 
At its core, therefore, HRBA is a, 
 …radical affair…demanding profound changes in choices of 
partners, the range of activities undertaken and the rationale for 
them, internal management systems and funding procedures, and the 
type of relationships established with partners in the public and non-
governmental sectors. (Uvin 2004, p. 166) 
 
Similar to WID/GAD, HRM/HRBA has also been promoted using two different 
‘frames’: the instrumental and the intrinsic frame. Notably Alston and Robinson note 
that,   “Human rights work is seen as both an objective in its own right and as 
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contributing to improving the quality and effectiveness of development assistance” 
(Alston and Robinson 2005, p. 1).  
 
A recent OECD/World Bank publications elaborates on this further, 
 
The intrinsic reasons for integrating human rights in development 
relate to moral and ethical imperatives connected with human 
dignity and freedom...Donors also focus on human rights for 
instrumental purposes – as a means to an end – to improve 
development outcomes in relation to governance, poverty reduction, 
and aid effectiveness. (OECD and World Bank 2013, p. xxxi)  
 
The publication further notes that, “…some donors continue to question the added 
value of human rights to their development work and the link between human rights 
and development effectiveness” (OECD and World Bank 2013, p. xxxi) and Alston 
and Robinson note that the instrumental frame for HRM/HRBA is on the rise as they 
state that, “Donors are increasingly convinced that human rights are not merely 
‘moral considerations’ but are in fact instrumental in making development 
cooperation and poverty reduction more efficient…” (Alston and Robinson 2005, p. 
3). 
 
ii. Importance of ethical considerations:  
 
Organisations with cultural homogeneity and few members in decision-making, if 
coupled with the presence of a committed decision-maker, are likely to provide 
ample freedom, power, and resources to actors committed to a norm to have their 
commitments reflected at the level of the organisation – likely to lead to coherent and 
intrinsically-focused policies and comprehensive operationalisation. On the other 
hand, organisations with culturally diverse and multi-member decision-making 
bodies and consensus-based decision-making, are less likely to provide such 
freedom, power, an resources likely to lead to less coherent, instrumentally-focused 
policies and patchy operationalisation. 
 
UNDP: HRM/HRBA was first adopted by UNDP in 1998. The concept was strongly 
framed in terms of the ‘right to development’ and linked to sustainable development, 
which was UNDP’s overall mandate at that time, to human dignity. Notably, the 
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document states that “UNDP works for the full realization of the right to 
development” and that “ “Sustainable human development is directed towards the 
promotion of human dignity – and the realization of all human rights, economic, 
social, cultural, civil and political” (UNDP 1998a, p. iv). Issues of ‘citizen-state 
accountability’ noted by Holland as being critical to HRM/HRBA are not mentioned 
at all, and human rights are certainly not embraced as a cornerstone of UNDP’s 
work. Thus, while not framed in instrumental terms as such, UNDP’s first HR policy 
is very general and vague.  
 
Although UNDP has increasingly and explicitly taken on HRBA as such since then 
and produced a comprehensive HRBA policy in 2005 that recognised human rights 
and development as “interrelated, inter-dependent and indivisible”, these statements 
do not seem to have had any impact on the way the organisation operates. Indeed, 
Jack Donnelly has argued that UNDP has simply “redefine(d) human rights, along 
with democracy, peace, and justice, as subsets of development.” According to him, 
“…such a definition fails to address the relationship between economic development 
and human rights. Tensions between these objectives cannot be evaded by stipulative 
definitions” (Jack Donnelly quoted in Uvin 2002).  
 
Indeed, a brief consideration of discussions in UNDP’s main decision-making body, 
the Executive Board, shows that UNDP’s approach to HR/HRBA is remarkably 
hands-off and a-political. Notably, in a speech to the Executive Board in 2007 the 
Administrator stated that,  
 
It is important to be clear about what we mean when we are talking 
about a human rights-based approach to programming. UNDP’s 
stance on human rights is not one of political conditionality, but 
rather one of collaboration and cooperation…The policy, 
promulgated in 1998, specifies that UNDP should work to promote 
human rights, primarily through support for the development of 
national capacities. (McNeill and St. Clair 2009, p. 88) 
 
A brief analysis of debates in the Executive Board strongly indicate that this weak 
approach was largely a result of lack of agreement on the value and relevance of 
HRBA. A case in point is the discussion on the 2008 – 2011 Strategic Plan. The draft 
Strategic Plan proposed by the Administration included human rights as a “core 
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operational principle” for UNDP’s work as it states that “UNDP relies on a human-
rights based approach…as (a) core principle for all operational work” (UNDP 2007, 
para. 126).  
 
This explicit inclusion of HRBA in the Strategic Plan was strongly contested by 
some Executive Board members. Notably, the official report on the Executive 
Board’s discussion on the Strategy Plan states that, “Several – not all  [emphasis 
added] – delegations reminded the organization that it should work towards a human 
rights-based approach in its programmatic work” (UNDP 2007, para. 3). It added 
that,  
 
Some delegation…reiterated their contention that a human rights-
based approach is not within the UNDP mandate, nor does UNDP 
have normative, operational or monitoring competence in the area of 
human rights….They reaffirmed the view that development funding 
should be neutral, grounded in multilateralism and free of 
conditionalities, reflecting the universal, voluntary and grant nature 
of United Nations development activities as guided by national 
priorities..some delegations encouraged UNDP to remain sensitive 
to divergent viewpoints and cultural differences… (UNDP 2007, 
para. 24) 
 
Based on this strong reaction from some member states, the Administrator decided 
that,  “The draft that we put before you is not sufficiently balanced…UNDP staff is 
very committed and indeed directed by the deeply rooted understanding that 
‘development’ as a concept and as a practice will fail if imported or imposed and that 
building capacity to sustain ownership is the single most decisive contribution that 
can make a difference…all of our policies are driven by governments..” He further 
concedes that,  
 
The section on ‘operational principles’ should be rewritten 
entirely…the explicit recognition that UNDP’s contribution to 
gender equality, human rights and civic engagement is all about 
capacity development support and not, I repeat, not, about political 
conditionality. (McNeill and St. Clair 2009, p. 88)   
 
The final version of the Strategic Plan 2008 – 2011 does indeed not include any 
explicit references to HRBA as an operational principle. 
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Moreover, over recent years UNDP’s approach to HRBA has narrowed even further 
and has become more focused on HRBA’s instrumental value for sustainable 
development. Notably, a policy document published in 2012 explicitly presents the 
following as the sole rational for HRBA: “HRBA helps to achieve sustainable 
development outcomes…mainstreaming human rights contributes to human 
development” (UNDP 2012). 
 
This brief discussion indicates that, as with the case of WID/GAD, also in the case of 
HR/HRBA in UNDP, the organisation’s high-level of cultural diversity and multi-
membership in its decision-making forum and its formal decision-making, resulted in 
a lack of agreement on, and appreciation of, the norm, which in turn reduced the 
freedom of committed actors in the Administration who had included HRBA as an 
operational principle for UNDP’s work, to have their commitment reflected at the 
level of the organisation. Thus, as with gender, UNDP’s organisational 
characteristics, while allowing for an early reaction to HRBA, seem to be a straight 
jacket for comprehensive policies and action on the norm. Peter Uvin, concurs when 
he concludes that “HRBAs will probably be taken forward by NGOs and bilateral 
agencies, as multilateral agencies with their global state membership and 
bureaucratic weight seem unable to do so” (Uvin 2004, p. 122). 
 
DFID: DFID first recognised the relevance of human rights to development in its 
1997 White Paper.  The policy strongly reiterates the UK government’s commitment 
to “human rights and a more ethical foreign policy” and states that DFID will “give 
particular attention to human rights, transparent and accountable government and 
core labour standards, building on the Government’s ethical approach to 
international relations” (DFID 1997, p. 16, p. 50). More specifically, the paper states 
that in its work on sustainable livelihoods DFID will work to “promote human 
rights” and will employ a “human-rights based approach to labour issues” (DFID 
1997, p. 19, p. 65). 
 
Importantly, the policy takes a strong stand against certain governments, as it states 
that, “Where poor countries are ruled by governments with no commitment to 
helping the poor realise their human rights, we will help – where we can – through 
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alternative channels.” (DFID 1997, p. 39 - 40) This puts DFID’s approach to human 
rights promotion in stark contrast to UNDP’s approach.  
 
The 1997 policy commitment is further elaborated on in a Target Strategy Paper on 
Realising the Human Rights of the Poor adopted in 2000 (DFID 2000c). The paper 
states that it aims to provide a strategy for the “achievement of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of poor people” (DFID 2000c, p. 1). It notes that human rights 
are an integral part, as well as a means to, development and that human rights 
violations perpetuate poverty. The strategy is comprehensive and provides detailed 
suggestions on how HRBA should be operationalised. Thus, DFID was one of the 
first donor agencies to take up HR/HRBA and approached it in a comprehensive way 
stressing the importance of the value of human rights per se. 
 
Despite these strong early developments, more recent HRBA policies no longer 
explicitly refer to HRBA. Notably, DFID’s Business Plan 2012 only refers to some 
of the “underlying principles of HRBA” (DFID 2012). Indeed, d’Hollander et all 
suggest that there is now a “absence of a clear human rights-based approach” in 
DFID’s overall policy (D'Hollander, Marx, and Wouters 2014, p. 200). No specific 
policy on HRBA has been adopted by DFID since 2000.  
 
This change seem to be partly due to, according to Hollander, “a change of 
management in DFID” (D'Hollander, Marx, and Wouters 2014, p. 200). Indeed, it 
seems to have been Clare Short’s personal commitment to human rights that 
facilitated DFID’s comprehensive initial integration of the norm. Notably, Short had 
been the chair of the International Socialist Group on Human Rights and, before and 
during her time as Secretary of State of International Development was considered a 
“strong defender of human rights” (Piron 2003, p. 8). Importantly, Short’s interest in 
human rights “coincided with that of the new Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, who 
introduced an “ethical foreign policy” to provide direction for the work of FCO” 
(Piron 2003, p. 8). This commitment seemed to drop with changes in leadership in 
2003 (D'Hollander, Marx, and Wouters 2014). 
 
Thus, this example suggests that, indeed, as with WID/GAD, DFID is, as a bilateral 
agency first and foremost volatile in its approach and operationalisation of 
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HR/HRBA. Frequent changes in leadership in line with election cycles and 
centralised power with the Secretary of State mean that priorities frequently change. 
Yet, the example of DFID, particularly compared to UNDP, also indicates that 
bilateral organisations are, indeed, more likely to have comprehensive and 
intrinsically focused approaches to new norms if a committed decision-maker is 
present.30 
 
EU: The European Union has a relatively long history of integration human rights 
and democracy in its external relations, including its development cooperation. For 
example the EU has included a ‘human rights clause’ in all its partnership 
agreements with third countries since 1989 and has also established an instrument 
especially dedicated to the promotion of democracy and human rights (EIDHR) in 
third countries (D'Hollander, Marx, and Wouters 2014, p. 6). However, these 
approaches are institutionally separate from mainstream EU development 
cooperation activities and commentators refer to the “ghettoisation” of human rights 
in EU development cooperation (D'Hollander, Marx, and Wouters 2014, p. 12). 
 
In 2001 the EU first recognised the concept of mainstreaming of human rights across 
all its external relations in a Commission Communication (Commission of the 
European Communities 2001a). The document is very general and only mentions 
development cooperation as one of many areas of the EU’s external relations. HRBA 
as such is not mentioned in any EU policy document until 2012 when the EU 
Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights was adopted. In it a 
commitment is made that “in the area of development cooperation, a human rights-
based approach will be used to ensure that the EU strengthens its efforts to assist 
partner countries in implementing their international human rights 
obligations”(Council of the European Union 2012). The strategy also envisages the 
development of an HRBA toolkit. However, this toolkit has not yet been finalised at 
the time of writing (June 2014) and HRBA is only mentioned once in the Action 
Plan. Commentators concur that by 2014, “…the Commission had not formally 
adopted such a far-reaching approach (as HRBA)” (D'Hollander, Marx, and Wouters 
                                                
30 A brief look at other bilateral and multilateral agencies does indeed further support this finding, as 
some bilateral organisations seem to have taken up HRBA more comprehensively and focused on its 
intrinsic value than multilaterals. Cases in point are recently adopted policies by Germany and 
Denmark (Denmark 2013; Germany 2011). 
 279 
2014, p. 9). There is, thus, highly limited engagement with the concept and no 
concrete commitment on implementing HRBA in EU development cooperation. 
 
Although an analysis of the reasons for this goes beyond the scope of this Chapter, a 
brief look at examinations of debates on the strengthening of human rights 
conditionality for development aid among member states strongly suggests that there 
is no agreement on HRM/HRBA among EU member states (D'Hollander, Marx, and 
Wouters 2014, p. 6). Notably, some member states have “elaborated policies which 
tie the provision of budget support more explicitly to human rights” (Hollander 2014 
p. 6) while others fundamentally disagree with such an approach. This has lead to 
“fragmented frameworks” and “inconsistent responses” by the EU (D'Hollander, 
Marx, and Wouters 2014, p. 6). Thus, the multi-membership and diversity of 
decision-makers seems to have significantly contributed to the EU’s weak response 
to HRBA. 
 
Another factor that seems to have contributed to the EU’s slow and weak response to 
HRBA is the fact that the most powerful ‘scrutiniser’ of EU action, the European 
Parliament, has not taken any notable action to push for HRBA. Notably, it was not 
until 2012 that Parliament called on the Commission to take up HRBA (European 
Parliament 2012). This call is re-stated in a Resolution in 2013, albeit in a very weak 
manner. The Resolution does not ask the EU to take-up HRBA in its development 
cooperation and merely “Calls on the Commission to…ensure that EU development 
efforts do not contribute to further marginalisation of groups suffering discrimination 
and that EU funds are distributed fairly among different regions within a country..” 
(European Parliament 2012, para. 32). This finding further supports the theory put 
forward by this thesis, that suggests that the nature of scrutinisers is critical in 
facilitating action on a new norm, especially in a multi-member and diverse setting. 
 
Last, the reason for why the EU has finally adopted HRBA in its official policy also 
supports the findings of this thesis – most notably the suggestion that multi-
membership and diversity can also lead to some action on a new norm if a committed 
actor who is willing to push for action on it is present and if the norm has reached 
wide international recognition. The EU adopted HRBA largely in response to explicit 
pressure and lobbying from Denmark who, since 2012 has taken on an active role in 
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further promoting HRBA in the context of EU development cooperation.  Notably, 
Denmark has sponsored an EU seminar on HRBA in 2014 and explicitly includes as 
a priority issue to “work to ensure that human rights and democracy are included as 
key priorities in the EU’s development cooperation” (DANIDA). This suggests that 
it was pressure from this committed actor, supported by increasing international 
recognition of HRBA resulting in a broad acceptance that the EU should be seen to 
be doing something on it, that lead to the adoption of the first HRBA policy. 
 
Summary: Overall, this brief overview suggests that the most coherent and 
comprehensive integration of HRBA framed in intrinsic terms seems to have taken 
place by DFID under Clare Short. Yet, when DFID’s top-management changed, 
HRBA was de-prioritised This is very much in line with the findings on WID/GAD 
that indicated that bilateral organisations have the greatest potential of 
comprehensively and coherently integrate a new norm and frame it in intrinsic terms 
if a committed decision-maker is present. Yet, without such a presence, bilateral 
organisations, due to the limited number of decision-makers and their weak 
susceptibility to only a few and homogenous scrutinisers, bilateral organisations can 
easily take next-to-no action on a norm. 
 
The case of UNDP also supports the theory suggested by this thesis as it clearly 
shows that, while multilateral organisations with open mandates and high-levels of 
susceptibility to scrutiny are likely to take quick action on a new norm, the likely 
lack of agreement on the norm in their decision-making fora makes coherent and 
intrinsically-focused policies and comprehensive operationalisation generally less 
probable. This finding is further supported by the brief overview of HRBA 
integration into EU development cooperation and is also in line with the observation 
in a recent study that bilateral agencies have mostly adopted the HRBA, which, “On 
the spectrum of incorporating human rights in development…are the strongest 
articulation of donor and partner commitment while multilaterals have mostly opted 
for human rights mainstreaming policies ” (OECD and World Bank 2013, p. 25). 
 
Thus, the extension of the proposed theory to the HR/HRBA norm tentatively 
indicates the wider applicability of my findings. Bilateral organisations seem to 
integrate new norms either very quickly, comprehensively and framed in intrinsic 
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terms, thus indicative of norm integration driven by ethical considerations, or take 
next to no action on the norm at all, while multilateral organisations with high 
susceptibility to scrutiny and open mandates are likely to take some action, albeit 
weak and farmed in incoherent or instrumental terms – all of which points to norm 
integration driven by social influence consideration. 
 
Last, let me recognise one caveat. Although HRM/HRBA and WID/GAD are 
different norms, one could argue that they form part of a particular category of norms 
as they both touch upon power relations (either between the state and the citizen in 
the case of HRM/HRBA or between men and women in the case of WID/GAD), are 
frequently associated with ‘western culture’ and are thus, considered ‘political’ and 
‘controversial’. It is plausible that these particular qualities of the two norms studied 
influenced the findings of the thesis, as they are likely to make it more difficult to 
reach agreement on and appreciation of the value of the norm in a diverse and multi-
member setting. It may, therefore, be the case that less disputed norms may display 
different trends. Investigating this could be an interesting avenue for further research. 
 
ii. Timing of norm uptake 
 
Organisations with high-levels of cultural diversity and multi-membership in 
decision-making, coupled with a high level of susceptibility to scrutiny (multiple 
and/or active scrutinisers) and an open mandate, are quicker to react to new norms 
than organisations with low-levels of cultural diversity, few members in decision-
making, low levels of susceptibility to scrutiny and a closed mandate. 
 
According to this theory, and as established in the section on WID/GAD above, one 
would expect multilateral organisations, apart from those with a closed mandate and 
low susceptibility to scrutiny, such as international development banks, to have 
reacted quicker to HRM/HRBA than bilateral development organisations. 
 
Starting with the three organisations studied in this thesis – UNDP, the EU, and 
DFID – one would therefore expect UNDP to take quick action, and the EU and 
DFID to lag behind due to the latter two’s more limited susceptibility to scrutiny and 
DFID’s increasingly closed mandate from 1997 onwards. However, as shown in the 
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table below, DFID was the first of the three organisations to recognise the 
importance of human rights for development cooperation in 1997. UNDP followed-
suit in 1998 and the EU adopted an, albeit very weak, commitment to human rights 
mainstreaming in 2001 and only endorsed HRBA in 2012. 
 
This observation further supports the suggestion made in the context of WID/GAD 
and the Percy Amendment in the previous section, that the findings of this thesis 
hold, but need to be refined. Indeed, the observation strongly suggests that bilateral 
organisations – if there is a committed, or open, top-level decision-maker – are likely 
to be the first to push for a new norm.  
 
Indeed, a consideration of the timing of HR/HRBA uptake of other donor agencies 
(see table below) seems to further confirm this suggestion as it was two additional 
bilateral agencies, alongside DFID, that were the first to take action on HR/HRBA: 
CIDA and SIDA.  With this refinement in mind, the table below does confirm the 
overall theory established by this thesis: that multilateral organisations with open 
mandates and high-levels of susceptibility to scrutiny quickly follow normative 
trends. The majority of bilateral organisations eventually (but quite late) followed 
suite, while some bilateral organisations, as well as multilaterals that have very 
closed mandates and/or are hardly susceptible to scrutiny, such as international 
development banks, have not taken any action on the norm at all. 
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This confirms my overall finding that, on the whole, organisations with multi-
membership, cultural diversity, high susceptibility to scrutiny and open mandates are 
more likely to take some action on a new norm, while organisations with 
homogenous and few decision-makers, closed mandates or low levels of 
susceptibility to scrutiny or homogenous scrutinisers are less likely to do so. To 
recap, what this analysis draws out more clearly, however, is that new norms are also 
seem more likely to first emerge in a homogenous setting with few decision-makers 
– thus a bilateral setting. These agencies, together with other actors, seem to 
subsequently promoted the norm in multilateral organisations, which increases 
international recognition of the norm and finally leads to many (not all) bilateral 
organisations to take action on it. The case of the US in the context of WID/GAD 
and SIDA and CIDA with regards to HR/HRBA suggest as much.  
 
Table 15: Overview of first formal recognition of HR mainstreaming/HRBA in key development 
organisations 
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Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has first considered three explanations that could be put forward as 
alternatives to my theory on the impact of organisational structure on the role of 
ethics in development aid organisations. It was recognised that all three – global 
discourse, the role of actors, and gender-bias of bureaucracies – play an important 
role in determining dominant norm integration drivers. However, it was shown that 
how and to what extent they matter is significantly conditioned by organisational 
structure. Thus, although the nature of the norm integration drivers that dominate 
norm integration processes is a result of a complex interplay between different 
factors, organisational structure is one critical element without which theories on 
norm integration, and the role of ethics within it, are incomplete. 
 
Second, the Chapter has tentatively extended the findings of this thesis to different 
organisations and to a different norm. This exercise has shown that even if extended 
beyond these three case studies, the theory suggested seems plausible. Having said 
that, extending the theory to other organisations and another norm has further 
suggested an additional insight: Bilateral organisations, are also likely to be the first 
to take action on a new norm – quicker than multilaterals – and it is these bilateral 
organisations, together with other pressure groups, that seem to facilitate norm up-
take at multilateral level.  In short, bilateral organisations seem to integrate new 
norms either very quickly, comprehensively and driven by ethical considerations or 
take next to no action on the norm at all, while multilateral organisations with high 
susceptibility to scrutiny and open mandates take some action are likely to take some 
action, albeit weak and most driven by social influence consideration. Yet, as this 
finding only emerged through the extension to other organisations and norms, it 
requires further examination. 
 
After having further consolidated the findings of the thesis, it is now necessary to 
ask: What are the implications of my findings? Do they matter? The next and final 
Chapter turns to this. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion – Implications of findings and suggestions 
for further research 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to critically engage with the assertion that multilateral 
aid organisations are more likely to be driven by ethical considerations than their 
bilateral counterparts and, more broadly, to shed some light on the question of 
whether ethical considerations have any weight at all in international politics. To do 
so, comparative heuristic case studies of the integration of the WID/GAD norm into 
three organisations with very different organisational characteristics have been 
conducted. It was assessed which considerations – intrinsic ethical, instrumental 
ethical, or social influence considerations – dominantly drove the integration of this 
norm in the three organisations, and whether the kind of driver that dominated was 
influenced by specific organisational characteristics typical of bilateral or 
multilateral organisations. In other words, it was examined whether norm integration 
was at all driven by ethical considerations in any of the cases and, if so, whether this 
was facilitated by organisational characteristics most typical of multilateral or 
bilateral organisations. 
 
Based on this analysis the thesis has established a number of findings that cast 
significant doubt on the simplistic assertion that multilateral aid organisations are, as 
such, more likely to be driven by ethical considerations than their bilateral 
counterparts. Indeed, the thesis has suggested that aid organisations per se are 
generally unlikely to be driven by ethical considerations. Yet people within them 
may be and, if given sufficient freedom, power, and resources to act on their ethical 
beliefs, these individuals can drive norm integration and have their ethical beliefs 
reflected at the level of the organisation, manifested through coherent policies and 
comprehensive operationalisation.  
 
Crucially, however, this does not mean that organisational characteristics do not 
matter in this context. On the contrary, the thesis shows that they matter significantly 
because specific characteristics were found to influence the likelihood of individuals 
having the necessary freedom and resources to act on their personal beliefs. In other 
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words, it was found that organisations provide a critical enabling or restraining 
environment for people to act on their ethical beliefs. Whether the environment is 
enabling or restraining is significantly influenced by particular organisational 
characteristics. 
 
Specifically, the thesis has found that characteristics most typical of multilateral 
organisations – cultural diversity and multi-membership in decision-making – 
especially in consensus-based decision-making, reduced the freedom, power, and 
resources of committed actors to promote the WID/GAD norm as they saw fit as it 
led to a lack of agreement on, or appreciation of, the value of the norm in the 
decision-making body and, thus, required negotiation, justification, and compromise. 
This resulted in norm integration overall driven by social influence  – not intrinsic or 
instrumental ethical considerations – at the level of the organisation. This, in turn, 
manifested itself through weak policies often focused on the instrumental value of 
the norm, and weak operationalisation.  
 
On the flipside, characteristics most typical of bilateral organisations - cultural 
homogeneity, few decision-makers, and an open or flexible mandate - if combined 
with the presence of a committed decision-maker, increased the likelihood of 
agreement on, and appreciation of, the value of the norm and, thus, allowed for 
ample freedom, power, and resources for committed staff within the organisations to 
drive the norm integration process based on their personal ethical believes. This, in 
turn, led to coherent and comprehensive policies that included intrinsic arguments, 
and comprehensive operationalisation.  
 
Importantly, however, the same characteristics that made organisations more likely 
to allow for committed actors to drive norm integration – cultural homogeneity and 
few decision-makers – if combined with low susceptibility to scrutiny, homogenous 
scrutinisers, and without a committed decision-maker, made the organisations 
studied slow to take any action on the WID/GAD norm at all. On the contrary, 
cultural diversity and multi-membership in decision-making – characteristics typical 
of multilateral aid organisations that are likely to reduce the freedom and power of 
committed staff – especially if combined with high susceptibility to multiple 
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scrutinisers and an open mandate, made the organisations studied quicker to take 
some kind of action on WID/GAD.  
 
In other words, characteristics most typical of bilateral organisations, cultural 
homogeneity and few decision-makers, either provide a highly restrictive or highly 
enabling environment for norm integration, especially integration driven by ethical 
considerations, depending on the presence of a committed top-level decision-maker. 
Characteristics most typical of multilateral organisations on the other hand – cultural 
diversity and multiple decision-makers – are likely to lead to one or a few actors to 
call for some action on the norm, and, if the norm is internationally recognised, are 
likely to lead to some norm integration. However, due to the set-up of such a 
decision-making body, norm integration is, overall, likely to be weak and driven by 
social influence rather than ethical considerations. 
 
The aim of this Chapter is to take a step back from these specific findings and ask 
one key question: so what? Do the findings matter? What, if anything, do they add to 
current theorising on the integration of gender into organisations specifically, or 
norm integration and the role of ethics within it more broadly? This is done first, by 
re-visiting two prominent frameworks on factors that are said to influence how 
organisations have taken up WID/GAD suggested by Miller and Hafner and Pollack, 
and already touched upon in the introduction of this thesis. It is shown that my theory 
supports, but also further refines, some of their suggestions by exposing some 
explanatory factors suggested by these frameworks as indicators rather than 
explanations of a certain level of WID/GAD integration. This shows that my theory 
does indeed add to current thinking on organisations and gender equality.  
 
Second, the Chapter asks: does it matter that multilateral organisations do not seem 
more likely to be driven by ethical considerations than bilateral organisations? It is 
shown that this finding does matter because, broadly speaking, many multilateral 
organisations base their authority on substantive moral legitimacy – in other words, a 
claim that they are driven by ‘doing the right thing’. By showing that multilateral 
organisations are not, as such, likely to be driven by ethical considerations, the 
findings of this thesis seriously casts doubt on these organisations’ claims to 
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substantive moral legitimacy, and, thus, call into question one of their fundamental 
basis of authority.  
 
Third, the Chapter asks more broadly whether it matters that ethical considerations, 
especially intrinsic ethical considerations, seem generally unlikely to drive 
international development organisations, and that social influence and instrumental 
reasoning tend to have more weight? It is argued that also this finding is significant 
as a dominance of social influence likely weakens the sustainability and 
comprehensiveness of norm uptake.  
 
Specifically, it is shown that, in contrast to theories that suggest that social influence 
concerns can fairly easily transform into sustainable and comprehensive norm uptake 
through processes of “argumentative self-entrapment” (Risse 2000) and “cognitive 
dissonance” (Checkel 2005) the cases analysed in this thesis suggest that social 
influence and instrumental-ethical reasoning did not lead to sustainable and 
comprehensive norm uptake. It is argued that this indicates that social influence and 
instrumental reasoning are, due to their nature, indeed highly unlikely to lead to such 
outcomes. This is so first, because social influence leads to shallow norm uptake 
following largely a logic of ‘appropriate rhetoric’ rather than ‘appropriate 
behaviour’. Second, instrumental-ethical reasoning for norm integration is highly 
volatile as it relies on (1) strong scientific means-ends relationships, and (2) on the 
‘ends’ staying the same. Both are often highly unstable, especially in the sphere of 
international development. Moreover, (3) instrumental reasoning is likely to lead to 
limited norm integration that only goes as far as to ensure that the norm performs 
well as an effective means; and (4) is unlikely to lead to deep changes in beliefs 
about the rightness of the norm, as such changes are not aimed for and the focus on 
the norm’s instrumental value risks ‘hollowing out’ the intrinsic essence of the norm. 
In short, the thesis suggests that ethical considerations are unlikely to matter much in 
aid organisations, and this seems to matter. 
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10.1  Refinement of other prominent frameworks on organisational 
characteristics and WID/GAD 
 
At the outset of this thesis it was noted that a number of scholars have developed 
frameworks that suggest that certain organisational characteristics influence if, when, 
and how organisations take up specific norms. It was shown that none of the 
frameworks focused on characteristics specific to multilateral or bilateral 
organisations, making them unsuited to the overall quest of this thesis. However, in 
conclusion, I would like to re-visit two of these frameworks as they focus 
specifically on WID/GAD and are frequently cited in general literature on gender 
and organisations, in order to examine whether or not my theory adds to general 
theorising on gender and organisations. 
 
Miller’s framework 
 
In her contribution to Missionaries and Mandarines: Feminist Engagement with 
Development Institutions (Miller 1998). Miller introduces a framework for analysing 
why and how different development organisations have reacted to the WID/GAD 
norm. As described in the introduction to this thesis, the framework is based on 
insights developed by Kardam (Kardam 1993) and suggests that three factors 
influence how international organisation’s respond to WID/GAD. These are: 
1. Openness to external influence; 
2. Proximity of the organisation’s mandate to gender equality; 
3. Presence and capacity of gender advocates within the organisation (Miller 
1998, p. 138). 
 
The following takes each factor in turn and discusses it in light of the theory 
proposed by this thesis. 
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i. Openness to external influence 
 
The theory proposed by this thesis takes due account of an organisation’s ‘openness 
to external influence’. Referred to as ‘susceptibility to scrutiny’ the thesis indeed 
shows that this factor is critical in influencing when an organisation takes some kind 
of action on a new norm. 
 
However, my findings add a certain ‘cautionary note’ regarding norm integration 
prompted by external influence, as the findings suggest that such integration is likely 
to be highly limited. Specifically, norm integration driven by a desire to ‘please the 
scrutinisers’ is expected to be taken up in highly visible areas to satisfy the 
‘scrutinisers’ but is relatively unlikely to be coherently comprehensively taken up by 
the organisation’s policies and operations, unless the process is also driven by 
internal advocates, as further discussed below. This point is not recognised by 
Miller’s framework. 
 
In addition, my theory adds to Miller’s framework in two more respects. First, it adds 
to the framework by drawing attention to the nature of the ‘scrutinisers’ or 
‘influencers’. The thesis suggests that it matters whether the scrutinisers are 
homogenous or diverse – with diverse scrutinisers more likely to include some that 
are vocal on a new norm. The example of UNDP and the EC, both organisations with 
fairly diverse scrutinisers (the member states and the UN system in the case of 
UNDP and the member states and the very diverse European Parliament in the case 
of the EC) on the one hand, and ODA with relatively homogenous scrutinisers on the 
other, have illustrated this point in detail. 
 
Second, the theory proposed by this thesis points to a number of organisational 
characteristics that influence an organisation’s openness to external influence, such 
as the organisation’s source of authority, its source of funding, and the strength of its 
mandate as a global development organisation, making ‘openness to external 
influence’ causally secondary to other characteristics. Recall that Chapter Eight 
illustrates that an organisation with a ‘delegated’ source of authority is likely to be 
highly susceptible to scrutiny from the delegators. If the delegators are diverse and 
vocal, the organisation will be susceptible to strong and diverse scrutiny. If, on the 
 291 
other hand, the delegators are homogenous and/or weak, scrutiny will be less. 
Similarly, an organisation is susceptible to scrutiny from its funders – and will be 
much less so if it generates its own revenue. Last, an organisation with a mandate as 
a global organisation is likely to be more susceptible to any kind of external scrutiny 
or influence than an organisation with an inward-looking mandate. These intricacies 
are not recognised by Miller’s framework.  
 
ii. Proximity of gender equality to mandate 
 
The factor of proximity of an organisation’s mandate is certainly important, but, as 
already discussed in Chapter Three and Four of this thesis, it is a weak explanation 
for differences in norm take-up overall, as organisations’ mandates evolve over time. 
One possible exception to this are organisations that were set-up with the sole 
purpose of promoting a specific norm, such as UNIFEM, now UN Women, with 
regards to gender equality. However, most organisations, and certainly those studied 
in this thesis, have broader mandates that have evolved considerably over time. 
 
Thus, rather than being an explanatory factor, this thesis suggests that the proximity 
of gender equality to the organisation’s mandate is an indicator of the extent to which 
the norm has been integrated. 
 
Having said that, the thesis does suggest that the speed at which a norm is taken up 
by an organisation’s mandate is important and is influenced by organisational 
characteristics, including the general level of openness and volatility of the mandate. 
Notably, it is suggested that an organisation with a fairly open mandate on 
development cooperation, such as the EC and ODA under Chalker, is more likely to 
narrow the proximity between a new norm and the organisation’s mandate. 
Moreover, certain organisations, in particular bilateral organisations, have a more 
volatile (potentially frequently changing) mandate and are, thus, more likely to 
change their mandate, thereby affecting the proximity of the norm. This was clearly 
seen in the example of ODA under Chalker and DFID under Short. 
 
Thus, the substantive proximity on an organisation’s mandate to gender equality – 
although important for short-term analysis – is more of an indicator of how an 
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organisation has integrated the norm in the longer-run rather than an explanation for 
it. 
 
iii. Presence and capacity of gender advocates within an organisation 
 
The role of gender advocates has been discussed in detail in Chapter Nine. The 
Chapter illustrates that the thesis very much acknowledges the role of individuals in 
influencing how organisations have integrated WID/GAD. However, Chapter Nine 
also shows that how and to what extent gender advocates can make their voices 
heard – in other words, their presence and capacity – is significantly conditioned by 
organisational characteristics. Thus, organisational characteristics take causal priority 
over the position of WID/GAD advocates. Moreover, as in the point above, the 
presence and capacity of WID/GAD advocates in an organisation is more of an 
indicator of the extent to which organisations have integrated WID/GAD rather than 
an explanation for it. 
 
Thus, overall, this brief discussion suggests that, rather than undermining Miller’s 
framework or being undermined by it, my theory adds to it. 
 
Hafner and Pollack’s framework 
 
In Mainstreaming Gender in Global Governance  Hafner and Pollack argue that the 
timing and extent to which gender mainstreaming was taken up by two international 
organisations, UNDP and the World Bank, was influenced by three factors: 
1. The organisations’ political opportunity structure; 
2. Fit of organisation’s mandate with the norm; 
3. The organisations’ capacity for implementation. (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 
2000, p. 339) 
 
Political opportunity structures are understood as “points of institutional access” for 
external actors and the level of “sensitivity to pressure from the international political 
environment” and, therefore, similar to Miller’s factor of “openness to external 
influence” (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 341). The third factor, the 
organisation’s capacity for implementation, is not defined or described in any detail. 
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i. Political opportunity structures  
 
As in the discussion of Miller’s framework above, the importance of political 
opportunity structures is very closely related to the level of susceptibility to scrutiny, 
which is recognised as playing a key role in influencing when and how a norm is 
taken up. Indeed, the specific findings of Hafner and Pollack mostly relate this factor 
to explaining the timing of norm uptake, rather than the depth of norm integration, 
and therefore strongly support the findings of this thesis on the impact of 
‘susceptibility to scrutiny’ on the speed at which organisations are likely to respond 
to new ideas. Hafner and Pollack notably find that, 
  
The UNDP is characterized as a relatively open organization with a 
weak capacity for implementation and has been a leader in the 
international development community in the early adoption of 
gender mainstreaming procedures…. The World Bank, in 
comparison, was for most of its history a relatively closed 
organization with a dominant frame less receptive to gender issues. 
Not surprisingly, the Bank has only recently incorporated the gender 
mainstreaming policy frame, largely in response to strong pressure 
from internal policy entrepreneurs. (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 
2000, p. 341)  
 
This suggestion is in line with the findings of this thesis and strongly supports the 
importance of the ‘level of susceptibility to scrutiny’ and the ‘nature of scrutinisers’ 
in influencing when WID/GAD was taken up by various organisations. 
 
ii. Mandate fit 
 
As discussed above, the extent to which an organisation’s mandate is aligned with 
the norm being promoted should be more seen as an indicator of the extent to which 
WID/GAD has been integrated into an organisation, rather than as an explanatory 
factor for it. This is especially so in the two case studies chosen by Hafner and 
Pollack – UNDP and the World Bank, as both organisations had an original mandate 
with similar distance to WID/GAD. 
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iii. Capacity for implementation 
 
Hafner and Pollack’s theory also claims to explain the difference in norm 
implementation in the two organisations. Indeed, the scholars suggest that what 
influenced the level of actual gender mainstreaming in the organisations was their 
“capacity for implementation.” (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 341) This is 
only further elaborated in the example of UNDP, where it is stated that, “donor-
driven resources and the lack of political will on the part of many host governments 
that must work to nationalise and sustain UNDP programs present substantial 
obstacles to the implementation of policy” (Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 354). 
 
These factors, although not further elaborated on by Hafner and Pollack, also 
strongly support the findings of this thesis that cultural diversity and multi-
membership in decision-making  – referred to in Hafner and Pollack’s work as a 
“lack of political will on the part of many host countries” – and “varying views and 
priorities of different donors”, can proof an obstacle to norm implementation 
(Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 354).  
 
Yet, in the case of the World Bank’s level of WID/GAD implementation, Hafner and 
Pollack’s framework significantly lacks theoretical and analytical depth. First, 
Hafner and Pollack assert that the World Bank has comprehensively implemented 
gender mainstreaming without substantiating this assertion (Hafner-Burton and 
Pollack 2002, p. 362). This is highly problematic, as the suggestion that the World 
Bank has successfully mainstreamed gender is far from undisputed (World Bank 
2010, 2005; Weaver 2010; Razavi and Miller 1995a). Second, the reasons for the 
alleged strong implementation of gender mainstreaming are not at all discussed. The 
authors merely state that, “The Bank’s record of implementation, however, has been 
more successful, reflecting its greater implementation capacity and resources” 
(Pollack and Hafner-Burton 2000, p. 341). 
 
This dubious case study as well as the lack of theorising strongly suggests that the 
attempts in this thesis go beyond what is offered by Hafner and Pollack. By pointing 
to the impact of composition of an organisation’s decision-making body, particularly 
its cultural diversity and number of members, on the freedom and resources of 
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committed actors in the organisation to promote the norm, and, ultimately, on the 
level of operationalisation, the theory proposed by this thesis significantly 
contributes to theorising on when, why, and how organisations take up gender issues 
in their rhetoric and operations.  
 
iv. Summary 
 
Overall, the above strongly suggests that findings of this thesis significantly 
contribute to theorising on when, why, and how organisations have taken up 
WID/GAD. This is particularly so as my findings do not contradict other prominent 
theories but rather further support and refine them, thereby offering a constructive 
contribution to theorising on gender equality in development aid organisations.  
 
Yet, what, if any, are the wider implications of the case study findings and the 
proposed theory? Do the findings matter beyond specific theorising on gender? The 
next section turns to this. 
 
10.2 Ethics does not matter more in MDOs than in BDOs: Calling into question 
MDO’s claim to substantive moral legitimacy 
 
This thesis has established that ethical considerations, although overall unlikely to 
feature prominently in development aid organisations, are more likely to do so in 
bilateral, rather than multilateral, agencies. It was found that this was the case, not 
because bilateral organisations per se were more driven by ethical considerations, but 
because these types of organisations, due to their homogeneous decision-making 
bodies with relatively few members, if combined with a committed top-level 
decision-maker, are more likely to provide freedom and power to committed 
individuals within the organisations to drive norm integration and have their ethical 
beliefs reflected at the level of the organisation. Certain characteristics most typical 
of multilateral organisations - multi-membership and cultural diversity in decision-
making – on the other hand, were found to make organisations less likely to provide 
such freedom, and power, thereby reducing the likelihood of norm integration driven 
by ethical, especially intrinsic, considerations at organisational-level. Yet, apart from 
debunking simplistic theories that suggest the contrary and offering some insights 
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into norm integration in organisations, does this finding matter? Does it matter that 
multilateral organisations are less likely to be driven by ethical considerations than 
their bilateral counterparts? 
 
In my view, it is important, even crucial, because it is inextricably linked to one 
factor that enables international organisations to exist and act in the international 
sphere: their authority. Authority here is understood as “the ability of one actor to 
use institutional and discursive resources to induce deference from others.” (Barnett 
and Finnemore 2004, p. 5) Importantly, one critical basis of this authority, 
particularly in the absence of coercion is the organisation’s legitimacy. Notably 
Bodansky states that, “Legitimacy concerns the justification of authority; it provides 
grounds for deferring to another’s decision, even in the absence of coercion…” 
(Bodansky 1999, p. 603). 
 
Buchanan and Keohane concur but add that legitimacy is a particularly crucial 
foundation of authority for global governance institutions. They state that, “If they 
(global governance institutions) lack legitimacy, then their claims to authority are 
unfounded and they are not entitled to our support.” (Buchanan and Keohane 2006, 
p. 407) This point is also put forward by Barnett and Finnemore who argue that, “to 
be authoritative, ergo powerful, they (international organisations) must be seen to 
serve some valued and legitimate social purpose…”(Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 
21). 
 
So, legitimacy is an important foundation of authority of international organisations. 
But, what exactly is legitimacy and is it relevant to international development 
organisations? The concept of legitimacy has been used in various and “often 
nebulous” ways in different kinds of literature and is, therefore, considered a 
“slippery concept” (Bodansky 1999, p. 601). Although there are numerous 
definitions of ‘legitimacy’, some suggesting that the concept only applies to 
relationships between “the ruler and the ruled” (Zaum 2013, p. 4), making it non-
applicable to much of development aid, there is an increasing amount of literature on 
the legitimacy of development organisations, indicating that the concept is very 
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much relevant in this sphere.31 Indeed, the OECD/DAC has found that one key 
reason for bilateral donors support to multilateral development organisation is their 
“legitimacy” (OECD 2011, p. 84).  
 
Legitimacy in these debates refers to debates on these organisations right to exist, 
receive funding, and act on behalf of others in the issue area of development. This 
understanding of legitimacy is in line with Edward’s conceptualisation of the concept 
as he states that “legitimacy is generally understood as the right to be and do 
something in society – a sense that an organisation is lawful, admissible, and 
justified in its chosen course of action” (Edwards 2000, p. 7). Suchman concurs 
when he states legitimacy, in this view, is based on “a generalised perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” 
(Suchman 1995, p. 573). 
 
Legitimacy, understood in this way, is fundamental for most development 
organisations, as being considered legitimate makes them less vulnerable to claims 
that they are “negligent” or “unnecessary” (Suchman 1995, p. 575). Most 
fundamentally, being considered legitimate by whoever is likely to financially 
support the organisation is crucial to secure funding, without which most 
development organisations, including the three analysed in this thesis, would cease to 
exist.  In short, development organisations’ ability to exist and act in the international 
sphere depends on their legitimacy, making it a critical concern for them (Suchman 
1995, p. 574). 
 
Different bases for legitimacy 
 
Legitimacy can be based on a variety of different standards and a number of different 
basis for legitimacy have been identified in the literature. (Suchman 1995; Zaum 
2013; Buchanan and Keohane 2006; Bodansky 1999). Due to space constraints and 
in the interest of focus, the following will only discuss one particular basis for 
                                                
31 As Kuchl states, “Development assistance organizations need to defend their legitimacy against the 
governmental apparatus (on which they depend for their funding), against the critical mass media, and 
against a growing number of lobby organizations.” (Kuehl 2009, p. 575). 
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legitimacy most relevant to this thesis – ‘moral legitimacy’. According to Suchman, 
“moral legitimacy reflects a positive normative evaluation of the organization and its 
activities…it rests on judgments about whether the activity is the “right thing to do” 
(Suchman 1995, p. 579). 
 
Moral legitimacy can be based on different considerations: consequential, 
procedural, and structural (Suchman 1995, p. 580).  Either “organizations should be 
judged by what they accomplish”, “they can garner moral legitimacy by embracing 
socially accepted techniques and procedures”, or “institutionally prescribed 
structures convey the message than an organization is acting on collectively valued 
purposes...” (Suchman 1995, p. 581). In my view the first and last can be grouped 
together as constituting a substantive basis of moral legitimacy – the former referring 
to substantive moral output legitimacy and the latter to substantive moral input 
legitimacy – while the remaining basis relates to procedural moral legitimacy. This 
distinction, omitting the differentiation between output and input legitimacy, has also 
been suggested by Bodansky (Bodansky 1999, p. 612) and Barnett and Finnemore 
who argue that international organisations “must be seen to serve some valued and 
legitimate social purpose (substantive), and, further, they must be seen to serve that 
purpose in an impartial and technocratic way by using impersonal rules 
(procedural)…” (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 21). 
 
i. Procedural and substantive moral legitimacy:  
 
There has been some debate in the literature on whether procedural or substantive 
moral legitimacy is more important. Notably, much quantitative work on 
development aid refers to multilateral organisations’ neutrality and impartiality – 
thus, procedural legitimacy – as most important. Coicaud and Heisekanen, on the 
other hand, has argued that it is substantive moral legitimacy that has become most 
important for IOs. He states that, 
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States saw in international organizations vital instruments to bring 
about a culture of mutually recognized values and rules, of common 
appeal and welfare, able to rise above states’ narrow and self-
interest outlook. The imperative of delivering public goods at the 
global level assigned by states to international 
organizations…emerged as the more important of the two criteria of 
legitimacy. International organisations derive their social and 
political meaning and validity from this criterion.” (Coicaud and 
Heiskanen 2001, p. 523) 
 
On yet another note, some have argued that procedural and substantive legitimacy 
are mutually reinforcing. For instance, Barnett and Finnemore suggest that 
improving procedural legitimacy can simultaneously lead to improved substantive 
legitimacy. They state that,  
 
In response to concerns that opaque procedures give voice to the 
powerful but silence the weak, many IOs have attempted to increase 
transparency, democratic deliberation, and local participation and 
representation. Open decision-making processes can do more than 
increase procedural legitimacy though. It is also intended to produce 
policies that will better serve those previously excluded and so be 
more substantively legitimate. (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, p. 169) 
 
This suggests that the more democratic, inclusive, and open an organisation is, the 
more justified are its claims to, not just procedural, but also substantive moral 
legitimacy. In other words, the organisation will be better at promoting common 
values and, adding Suchman’s understanding, more driven by “doing the right 
thing.” (Suchman 1995, p. 579) 
 
ii. MDO’s questionable claim to substantive moral legitimacy 
 
All three organisations studied in this paper proudly stress their open and democratic 
decision-making structures but also make explicit claims that they are working to 
promote internationally recognised principles and values – thereby making claims to 
both, substantive and procedural moral legitimacy. Notably DFID claims to  “lead 
the UK’s work to end extreme poverty” (DFID 2014), “UNDP…help(s) build 
nations that can withstand crisis, and drive and sustain the kind of growth that 
improves the quality of life for everyone” (UNDP 2014b), and the EC works “in 
order to reduce poverty in the world, to ensure sustainable economic, social and 
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environmental development and to promote democracy, the rule of law, good 
governance and the respect of human rights” (Council of the European Union 2012). 
Moreover, many development organisations, including the three focused on in this 
thesis, claim that they “occupy the high moral ground” (Uvin 2002). For instance 
DFID claims that it is acting out of a “moral responsibility” towards the poor (UK 
Conservative Party 2014) while UNDP declares that it is acting on “moral 
imperatives” (UNDP 2014b), and the EU states that its development cooperation is 
guided by “moral obligations” (European Union 2005, para. 1). Thus, both, 
procedural and substantive moral legitimacy – in other words, ‘doing things right’ 
and ‘doing the right thing’ – are important basis for the authority of international 
organisations, especially development organisations.  
 
While not specifically analysing procedural moral legitimacy, the findings of this 
thesis throw considerable doubt on these organisations’ claims to substantive moral 
legitimacy. Notably, the finding that aid organisations in general, and multilateral 
organisations in particular, are unlikely to be driven by ethical considerations – or an 
aim of ‘doing the right thing’ but rather by reputational concerns and social influence 
certainly calls into question any generic claim of development aid organisations, 
especially multilaterals, to substantive moral legitimacy. This, in itself, is an 
interesting finding and throws considerable doubt on these organisations basis of 
authority. 
 
Moreover, and critically, the findings of the case studies strongly indicate that the 
assertion that procedural and substantive moral legitimacy are mutually reinforcing is 
flawed and that the opposite may, in fact, be more plausible. In other words, it is 
suggested that procedural moral legitimacy can undermine substantive moral 
legitimacy. Recall that the cases have shown that strong procedural legitimacy can – 
and in the cases analysed did – undermine the ability to promote values and for 
ethical considerations to matter. Multi-member, inclusive and consensus-based 
decision-making required a high level of debate, negotiation and justification on the 
most appropriate course of action. This made it more difficult for organisations to 
promote values simply because values are difficult to justify and negotiate on and, as 
Barnett and Finnemore readily admit, there is a “lack of consensus on what goals or 
values are universally desired or welfare-promoting…” (Barnett and Finnemore 
 301 
2004, p. 169). With few and thin agreed global values and a general reluctance to use 
value-based arguments in negotiations and justifications, organisations that pride 
themselves for their ‘good procedures’, in other words, for being ‘neutral’ and 
‘impartial’ in their decision-making may, in fact, not be very strong at promoting 
substantive values. 
 
Thus, the thesis suggests that there may be a fundamental trade off between 
procedural and substantive moral legitimacy. Justified claims to procedural moral 
legitimacy by organisations with global membership and consensus-based decision-
making may, in fact, undermine claims to substantive moral legitimacy. This insight 
does not only throw doubt on theoretical claims by IR scholars, such as Barnett and 
Finnemore, on the mutually reinforcing nature of both types of moral legitimacy, it 
also further exposes generic claims of multilateral organisations to moral legitimacy 
as simplistic and in further need of critical engagement. 
 
10.3  Ethical considerations do not matter much at all in norm integration 
processes: Explaining shallow norm uptake 
 
The case study findings strongly suggest that ethical considerations were largely 
overshadowed by social influence considerations in all three organisations 
throughout the period of analysis. This indicates a highly limited impact of ethical 
considerations in the cases analysed. Apart from calling into question organisations’ 
claims to moral legitimacy, does this finding matter? Does it matter that ethical 
considerations do not really seem to drive norm integration in international 
development aid organisations? 
 
Some IR theorists suggest that it might not. Indeed, it has been argued that regardless 
of whether norm integration is kick-started by social influence or by a few 
individuals’ personal ethical beliefs, these processes can lead to ‘norm socialisation’ 
and ‘deep norm internalisation’ by which the norm is taken up by individuals’ or 
organisations’ interests and identities (Park 2011; Grigorescu 2002; Finnemore 1996; 
Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Risse 2000), or may even lead to a changes in actors’ 
beliefs about the ethical rightness of  the norm in question (Crawford 2002). Risse 
notably argues that such an outcome can happen through a process that he refers to 
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as “argumentative self-entrapment” (Risse 2000, p. 23). According to Risse, this 
process “starts as rhetorical action and strategic adaptation to external pressure but 
ends with argumentative behaviour” (Risse 2000, p. 32). Applied to the issue area of 
human rights, Risse, together with Ropp and Sikkink argue that,  “Even instrumental 
adoption of human rights norms, if it leads to domestic structural changes such as 
redemocratization, sets into motion a process of identity transformation, so that 
norms initially adopted for instrumental reasons, are later maintained for reasons of 
belief and identity” (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, p. 15). 
 
Along the same lines, Wendt refers to such an outcome as “Third Degree 
internalisation” in which actors follow norms “because they think the norms are 
legitimate and therefore want to follow them” (Wendt 1999, p. 272). The norm is 
accepted as legitimate due to its intrinsic qualities – not for instrumental reasons or 
coercion – and complying with the norm is not a strategy towards an exogenously 
given interest, but rather constitutes the actor’s interest and identity. The norm 
becomes a “preference over an outcome, not just a preference over a strategy” 
(Wendt 1999, p. 304). Similar to Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, Wendt suggests that the 
there is a “tendency for actors to internalize it (the norm) more deeply over time, to 
move inevitably from First Degree internalization (strategic calculation) to Third...” 
(Wendt 1999, p. 311).  
 
Checkel’s work on norm internalisation makes similar claims. Referring to ‘deep 
internalisation’ as  “type II internalisation” or “normative suasion” Checkels suggests 
that, “When normative suasion takes place, agents actively and reflectively 
internalize new understandings of appropriateness…(this) implies that agents adopt 
the interests, or even possibly the identity, of the community of which they are part” 
(Checkel 2005, p. 804). As Wendt and Risse, Ropp and Sikkink above, Checkel 
suggests that such an outcome can be the result of behaviour originally driven by  
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social influence, because,  
 
…at some point, they (people driven by strategic calculation) will 
likely need to justify these acts to themselves and others. As a 
result, a cognitive dissonance may arise between what is justified 
and argued for, and what is (secretly, privately) believed…(and) 
they internalize the justification. (Checkel 2005, p. 814) 
 
Indeed, Ole Elgstroem suggests that such ‘deep norm internalisation’ has in fact 
taken place in the EU regarding WID/GAD with the adoption of the 1995 
Resolution. He states that, “Interests were from now on constructed to include a 
strong concern for gender in development processes.” (Elgstroem 2011, p. 458) Such 
an outcome implies deep changes and should lead to sustainable and comprehensive 
changes in behaviour that outlive the presence of the original norm entrepreneurs. 
This, together with the theoretical accounts of Wendt, Checkel, and Risse et all 
would mean that the processes described in my thesis, although not driven by ethical 
considerations as such at the level of the organisation, can have broad and long 
lasting impact on behaviour in international politics. In other words, in might not 
really matter whether norm integration is indeed broadly driven by intrinsic or 
instrumental ethical considerations or social influence – as the effects on long-term 
behaviour may be very similar. 
 
However, evidence drawn from recent, comprehensive, and large-scale evaluations 
on WID/GAD suggest that, at least in the case of this specific norm and the three 
organisations examined, such deep norm internalisation has not taken place. Notably, 
all evaluations find that WID/GAD has not been well integrated in either the 
operations of the organisations, or the attitudes of staff or management in either of 
the three organisations. In the cases of DFID and UNDP, the evaluations even found 
that norm integration had regressed since the late 1990s. Notably, the DFID 
evaluation finds that the number of staff dedicated to WID/GAD are still insufficient; 
WID/GAD training is no longer compulsory and not widely attended, particularly not 
by senior management; the budget allocated to WID/GAD is still not reliably 
tracked; most programming tools are not gender specific and those that are, are not 
sufficiently disseminated or used; and WID/GAD is still not systematically included 
in staff performance appraisals. (Jensen 2006, p. 25 - 33)  
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Echoing these findings, the evaluation of WID/GAD in EC development cooperation 
notes insufficient and inconsistent staffing of the WID/GAD desk (p. iii); a 
regression of the availability and use of programming tools on gender over recent 
years (iv) haphazard and insufficient training; and grossly inadequate financial 
resources for the promotion of WID/GAD (iv). Overall it concludes that “In 
general…gender has been treated in a formalistic and limited way…” (UNDP 2006, 
p. v) 
 
UNDP’s last evaluation similarly finds that staff working on gender are insufficient 
in number and have limited authority financial resources allocated to gender are 
grossly inadequate; gender has become ‘less visible’ in overall policies and 
programming tools over recent years; and performance assessment also do not 
include gender. It concludes that “UNDP lacks both the capacity and the institutional 
framework for a systematic and effective gender mainstreaming approach” and 
therefore, “has not met the standards expected of a leader in development practice 
and promoter of international norms.” (UNDP 2006, p. iv - x) 
 
Indeed, looking at the WID/GAD movement in general, Razavi notes that  
“Comparative studies of institutional responses to gender have highlighted the need 
for sustained external pressure from an organized women’s movement if institutional 
change is to come about.” (Razavi 1998, p. 30) This certainly suggests that the norm 
had not been fully internalized or taken up in the ‘interests and identities’ of the three 
organizations over the three decades analysed in this thesis, strongly weakening 
statements, as those by Elgstroem and throwing doubt on the validity of the 
theoretical accounts of Wendt, Checkel, and Risse et al. 
 
While the reasons for this lack of ‘deep norm internalisation’ are certainly manifold, 
I suggest below that the dominance of social influence and instrumental arguments in 
the promotion of WID/GAD significantly contributed to this shallow and volatile 
norm uptake for two reasons: (1) the shallow impact of social influence and (2) the 
volatility of instrumental arguments. 
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The shallow impact of social influence: the logic of ‘appropriate rhetoric’ 
 
Although I am not denying that norm integration largely driven by social influence 
considerations can lead to strong norm integration, sustainable changes in behaviour 
and even changes in peoples beliefs as suggested by Risse, Roppe and Sikkink, 
Wendt, and Checkel, the findings of my thesis give reason to believe that such an 
outcome is highly unlikely. Indeed, norm integration driven by social influence was 
shown to tend to involve some steps towards norm uptake that are mostly high in 
visibility and low in cost. Changes in rhetoric were widespread and fairly 
sustainable, while operationalisation was patchy and highly volatile. Thus, it seems 
that norm integration driven by social influence did lead to changes in rhetoric and 
certain changes in what was considered ‘appropriate’.  
 
Yet changes in rhetoric did not lead to argumentative self-entrapment or any other of 
the suggested processes over the long, or even, medium-term. Rather, they largely 
remained just that: rhetoric.  Thus, the shift in logic of appropriateness also remained 
at the level of rhetoric, making the observed less a change in what was considered 
‘appropriate behaviour’ but merely lead to a shift in the ‘logic of appropriate 
rhetoric’. Numerous interviews conducted for this thesis strongly support this 
suggestion (Interview with Turner; Interview with Sichrovsky; Interview with 
Pearce; Interview with Iredale). Notably, interviewees stated that reference to 
WID/GAD in policy documents was mainly “automatic” and even “die-hards” who 
did not agree with WID/GAD talked the talk as “it was not in their interest to voice 
their opinion” (Interview with  Miller). Yet, the same logic did not apply to actual 
staff behaviour, as reflected in the low levels of operationalisation.  
 
The next section turns to possible reasons for this. 
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The volatility of instrumental-ethical arguments for norm integration 
 
As discussed above, instrumental-ethical arguments were widely used in all three 
cases and were often chosen by WID/GAD advocates as most effective given the 
institutional context they were working in. Indeed, advocates and feminist scholars 
alike have argued that,  
 
…instrumental arguments are not aberrations; they are part of 
everyday reality that constitutes feminist politics worldwide. In 
other words, instrumentalism – as opposed to advocacy around a 
staunchly feminist agenda – becomes inevitable when advocates 
seek to bring a feminist agenda within institutions and 
bureaucracies... (Razavi 1998, p. 38)   
 
Cornwall, Harrison and Whitehead suggest that “feminist engagement with 
development…has required the embrace of simplifications, in order to make strategic 
alliances and some inroads in the intensely political arena of policy-making” 
(Cornwall, Harrison, and Whitehead 2007, p. 15) and that these “Trojan Horses 
(managed to) lever open debates and mobilize support…” (Cornwall, Harrison, and 
Whitehead 2007, p. 4). They explicitly argue that “Feminist engagement has required 
the embrace of simplifications, in order to make strategic alliances and some inroads 
in the intensely political arena of policy-making” (Cornwall, Harrison, and 
Whitehead 2007, p. 15). Some gender advocates interviewed for this thesis agree 
with the above stance. One senior EC official noted that framing gender in 
instrumental terms “is very important to get things done – to persuade technical 
people to do something” (Interview with Fransen). Other interviewees noted that 
using instrumental arguments is “just a matter of reality…we live in market based 
word” (Interview with Mondesire) and that “it was probably bad (to use instrumental 
arguments) but necessary” (Interview with Young). 
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Indeed, there are examples where instrumental arguments have led to positive 
outcomes for women. Razavi, notably, refers to work by Naciri who argues that, 
 
…Moroccan women have seized the opportunities offered to them 
through formal education in ways that have truly transformed their 
lives…Thus even though Moroccan nationalist may have promoted 
female education for instrumental reasons, the women who have had 
access to education have pursued their own agenda in ways that 
were not necessarily expected or desired by policymakers. (Razavi 
1998, p. 38) 
 
While I am not denying that norm integration based on instrumental arguments can, 
at times, lead to norm uptake, and that instrumentalism was chosen for strategic 
reasons, I submit that the strategy may have had ultimately negative consequences 
for the promotion of the norm, helping to explain the weak and volatile uptake of the 
norm by all three organisations. This is so for four reasons. 
 
First, a focus on instrumental arguments and a strong means-ends relationship to 
justify a norm is based on scientific arguments that establish the means-ends 
relationship. If scientific evidence is inconclusive or new and contradictory evidence 
emerges, the justification is weakened. Indeed, Jensen finds in her large-scale 
evaluation of WID/GAD in DFID that, 
 
Despite the existence and availability of many internal and external 
policy and strategy documents explaining the relevance of gender 
equality to poverty reduction and demonstrating how gender 
inequalities hinder development…the extent to which the concept of 
gender equality is perceived as significant and essential to DFID’s 
mandate and core poverty reduction work remains unclear and 
unevenly understood amongst DFID staff. (Jensen 2006, p. 21) 
 
A number of detailed empirical studies further support this argument. Most notably, 
Jackson’s findings in her essay The Poverty Trap strongly concur with the above. 
She argues that “The instrumental interest in women as the means to achieve 
development objectives such as poverty reduction may ultimately undermine GAD. 
Gender appears to have collapsed into a poverty trap.” (Jackson 1998, p. 39) She  
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states that,  
 
The entrapment of GAD by poverty reduction presents analogous 
problems, for the view that it is the concentration of women 
amongst the poor and vulnerable, which justifies gender and 
development activity has some policy implications. Does this mean 
that where poverty is not feminised then there is no justification for 
GAD? (Jackson 1998, p. 50) 
 
This danger is not just theoretical, as indeed, some empirical studies have found a 
positive correlation between gender inequality and economic growth. Notably, 
Braunstein finds that, “..when gender discrimination is manifested in ways that do 
not compromise the overall quality of the labour force but merely lower the cost of 
labour for employers, systematically discriminating against women can have positive 
effects on growth” (Braunstein 2012, p. 15).  In another study by Seguino also finds 
that, “the gender gap in manufacturing earning was also positively associated with 
economic growth, largely via its positive impact on investments and exports” 
(Seguino quoted inKabeer and Natali 2013, p. 16). Along similar lines, Goetz and 
Sandler have noted “The looming presence of India and China on the development 
scene as power-houses of investment for growth raises new questions about the 
prospects of gender equality when it does not serve the purpose of keeping labour 
cheap for manufacturing megaliths” (Goetz and Sandler 2007, p. 170). Thus, basing 
a justification for gender equality solely on its instrumental value as a means to 
achieve economic growth or poverty reduction is unlikely to lead to sustainable and 
comprehensive norm internalisation. 
 
Second, if the ‘ends’ change, the justification for the norm collapses and has to be re-
thought. Indeed, many WID/GAD officials interviewed for this thesis mentioned that 
the biggest challenges with promoting WID/GAD was the fact that they had to 
constantly “re-package” the issue to make it relevant to colleagues working on 
different issues (Interview with Marchetti). The reason for this was the fact that 
WID/GAD was not framed as an intrinsically valuable issue, but had to be justified 
based on its instrumental value to achieve whatever the current ‘ends’ were. This 
required constant gathering of empirical data to ‘proof’ the relevance of the issue, 
and was especially challenging in important and heavily-funded issue areas such as 
infrastructure or energy. In contrast, interviewees, most of whom were also working 
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on children’s rights as the two were frequently combined in one post, did not 
experience the same problem with this issue, as “nobody questioned the relevance 
and importance of children’s rights” and the issue could simply be promoted as 
“important and of itself” (Interview with Marchetti). 
 
Third, an instrumental view of a norm is likely to lead to limited norm integration 
that only goes as far as to ensure that the norm performs as an effective means, not 
that the norm itself is taken up. Notably, the evaluation of DFID states that,   
 
With regard to the conceptual limitation of gender equality, the 
compromises made in the course of policy development have largely 
contributed to the narrowing down and the limiting of gender 
equality concepts. Although the process of consensus building is 
important and should not be undermined, it has particular 
implications for concepts such as gender equality. Indeed, it is the 
interpretation of gender equality that will determine the scope of its 
application. The narrower the interpretation, the more limited its 
application will be as a result. (Jensen 2006, p. 23)  
 
In line with this finding, one gender advocate who worked for ODA and UNDP 
noted that: 
 
Instrumenatlism has backfired in the end. It is easier language but 
we do not want to see women as production units in the post-2015 
dialogue because then you do not address the social justice issue, 
you are not transforming. If you see women as production units it 
means that you are condoning parents pulling their girls out of 
school to do farm work... (Interview with Okondo) 
 
Fourth, instrumental reasoning is unlikely to lead to deep changes in peoples 
believes about the norm as it does not even aim for such a change. In other words, 
instrumental norm integration is likely to lead to a ‘hollowing out’ of the norm, an 
abandonment of its ‘essence’, – that is likely to have negative implications on the 
depth and sustainability of norm integration. This view is widely reflected in feminist 
discourse on development. Molnyeux has notably stated that the “concern is that the 
transformative agenda has been captured by power, coopted and instrumentalized, 
and its political vision has been neutralized” (Molnyeux 2007, p. 234). Turquet et all 
concur as they state that “There has been an increasing sense among many involved 
in the feminist struggle to put ‘gender’ on the agenda in development institutions that 
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the term itself has been effectively eviscerated of any of its original political intent” 
(Eyben and Turquet 2013, p. 5). In other words “development institutions undermine 
feminist intent” (Eyben and Turquet 2013, p. 2).  Kerr suggests that this is because 
gender equality has become “technical rather than political and ultimately fails to 
address the systematic nature of gender and social injustice” (Kerr 1999, p. 197). 
Echoing this, Goetz and Sandler argue that  “We (feminists) have been assimilated 
when we were aiming for infiltration and influence” (Goetz and Sandler 2007, p. 
167). 
 
Razavi illustrates this point very clearly when she explains how a focus on poverty 
can undermine the achievement of gender equality because,  
 
…poverty policies are not necessarily a response to gender 
inequalities because gender discrimination is not caused by 
poverty…the social forces that create scarcity on the one hand, and 
discrimination on the other, are ‘analytically distinct but empirically 
seamless. (Razavi 1998, p. 30)  
 
Mukhopadhyay concurs. Based on an detailed study of the integration of gender 
equality in selected ministries in Ethiopia and development projects in Yemen, she 
concludes that “integrating gender concerns within policy agendas whose main 
objective is not necessarily the promotion of equal rights is a near impossible task 
and one that reinforces the powerlessness of gender advocates and the gender quality 
agenda” (in Cornwall et all p. 144). 
 
In addition, Weaver, in her detailed study of the WID/GAD integration into the 
World Bank comes to the same conclusion. She suggested that a focus on 
instrumental arguments may backfire as it leads to “shallow” internalisation of 
WID/GAD. In her study of WID/GAD in the World Bank she states that, 
 
My interviews confirmed that GAD advocates are leery of the 
“shallow internalization effect of unfunded mandates and aware of 
the necessity of inciting something deeper than instrumental 
rationality to produced more sustainable and self-enforcing 
behavioural change. (Weaver 2010, p. 84) 
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Referring to instrumentalisam as a “Faustian bargain” she finds that, 
 
Gender advocates in the Bank revel that over time the framing 
tactics employed here have sometimes entailed uncomfortable 
compromise. In order to gain intellectual and operational entry, they 
consciously chose a narrowed approach that validated gender ideas 
through technocratic projects that could provide quick, quantifiable 
results and were focused on the impact on national economics. The 
effect was more or less a ‘watering down’ of the policy norm’s 
scope. Many of the deeper issues, impeding women’s empowerment, 
security and development, particularly those embedded in social 
relations and cultures, are neglected or overshadowed. (Weaver 
2010, p. 84) 
 
All the above suggests that norm integration driven by instrumental arguments, even 
if the arguments themselves are strongly related to ethical considerations of other 
‘moral’ ends (i.e. poverty eradication) or driven by intrinsic ethical beliefs of norm 
promoters themselves, are likely to lead to volatile and unsustainable norm 
integration. Indeed, it is probable that such norms remain, in Inge Kaul’s words, 
“fashions” and “only survive if they have a constituency” (Interview with Kaul). 
While long-term shifts in rhetoric – an acceptance of the norm as part of a certain 
logic of appropriate rhetoric – seem easier to achieve, sustainable shifts in behaviour 
and especially the willingness to allocate sufficient resources to norm integration, are 
very difficult to reach and, in the absence of actual changes in beliefs on the intrinsic 
value of the norm, heavily rely on continuous pressure from committed individuals. 
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Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has turned to the wider implications of the findings of this thesis. Do 
they matter? This question was addressed by, first, considering the extent to which 
the theory proposed here adds to, or is refuted by, other prominent theories on how 
organisational characteristics influence the uptake of WID/GAD. By looking at 
Millers’ and Hafner and Pollack’s frameworks, it was shown that in many respects 
the theory proposed here reinforces, but also further refines, these frameworks, 
thereby adding to current theorising on development organisations and the uptake of 
WID/GAD in their policies and operations.   
 
Second, the Chapter has examined the significance of the finding that multilateral 
organisations are indeed less likely to be driven by ethical considerations and it is 
shown that this insight significantly undermines these organisations’ claims to 
substantive moral legitimacy, which provides an importance basis for their authority. 
In addition, the finding casts doubt on the widespread assertion that procedural and 
substantive moral legitimacy are mutually reinforcing and suggests instead that there 
might be a trade-off between them. 
 
Third, the Chapter has considered the implications of the broader finding that ethical 
considerations did not, overall, matter much and were overshadowed by social 
influence considerations. It was shown that social influence can lead to some action 
on the norm, but is likely to lead to incoherent and incomprehensive norm 
integration, mostly focused on highly-visible and low-costs areas such as the 
development of policies and strategies, thereby largely following a logic of 
appropriate rhetoric rather than appropriate behaviour. However, certain individuals 
hold strong ethical beliefs and, if given the freedom and power, can have these 
beliefs reflected at the level of the organisation. Yet, critically, such shifts are likely 
to be contingent on the continuous pressure of these individuals, and, thus, short-
lived.  This maybe especially so if norm integration is strongly focused on 
instrumental arguments, making norm uptake shallow and the justifications for the 
norm volatile by basing them on, often disputed and ever-changing, empirical 
evidence, and on certain specific ‘ends’. 
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Having said that, the last claim is merely tentative, as the scope of this thesis has not 
allowed for more in-depth engagement with this point. Yet it may be critical, as the 
examples of both WID/GAD and HRM/HRBA have suggested that there seems to be 
a widespread and increasing trend towards instrumentalisation of both norms. 
Indeed, the thesis suggests that, based on these two examples, norms may emerge 
framed in intrinsic terms but once they get taken up by broader development 
discourse, they tend to become ‘instrumentalised’ and lose their political and 
transformative edge. Norms seem to become means towards existing and non-
controversial organisational ends, leaving existing power structures and 
organisational goals untouched. What is the impact of such instrumentalism? Does it 
really have negative consequences on the level of norm integration and obstruct 
actual change to take place as suggested in this Chapter? Or is such instrumentalism 
a ‘necessary evil’ – a phase in norm integration – that will lead to gradual change and 
eventually result in ‘deep norm internalisation’? The fact that WID/GAD still does 
not seem to be effectively integrated in most donors’ development operations 
suggests the former, but only rigorous investigation could turn this assertion into 
more than what it is right now: a tentative claim. Such an endeavour, while beyond 
the scope of this thesis, would certainly be worthwhile and would shed more light, 
not only on whether ethical considerations carry any weight at all in international 
politics, but also on whether it actually matters if they do. 
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Annex 5: Interview questions 
 
5.1 Interview questions for ODA/DFID officials 
 
Name of interviewee: 
Dates and position in ODA/DFID: 
Date of interview: 
 
Policies and their drafting process 
• When, in your view, was the issue of women in development first recognised 
in ODA? What or who drove this process ? 
• Where you already in ODA when the 1986 booklet and the 1988 strategy was 
drafted?  
• If yes, could you tell me a bit about the drafting process of the 1988 strategy 
and the 1989 booklet?  
• If not, could you tell me a bit about the drafting process of the 1989 booklet? 
• Who was involved? Inside and outside ODA?  
• Why was the first strategy drafted in 1988 and a booklet so shortly 
afterwards, considering that the first booklet was drafted in 1986? (only 
shortly before) 
• What was the drafting process? Different from subsequent booklets? 
• There were quite a few follow-up booklets published in relatively quick 
succession. 
Why do you think this was the case? 
• Did the drafting process change with the different ministers or when DfID 
was set-up (for the last booklet)? 
• What was the drafting process of the 1997 White Paper? 
• What was the process for getting GAD included? Do you think it was 
successful? 
Discourse 
• What, in your opinion, was the dominant discourse in the late 80s/90s for the 
promotion of WID/GAD in ODA/DfID? 
• Was the discourse inside ODA similar to the more public discourse in the 
booklets? If yes, how so? In particular, was the discourse promoted by SDA 
different from the mainstream discourse in the organisation? 
• Did the discourse change over the 15 years? If so, how? 
• If yes, what influenced change in discourse? (global changes, changes in 
minister, external pressure – lobby groups, other structural changes – such as 
those in 2003?) 
• Did ODA/DfID’s susceptibility to external or internal pressure change when 
DfID became independent? 
• Did the ‘freedom’ social development advisors had on steering the discourse 
on WID/GAD change when DfID was set-up? 
Operationalisation  
• What was the dominant strategy to promote the norm inside DfID, for 
example training? (focused on efficiency or intrinsic / focused on training, 
persuasion, and awareness raising or on penalising) 
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• What were the milestones in the operationalisation of WID/GAD in 
ODA/DfID? (same as Eyben that things worked well in early 1990s but after 
Beijing there was a fatigue)  
• How much financial autonomy did the SDA have? Budget for WID/GAD? 
• In particular, what kind of trainings were provided? What approach was 
promoted? Did this change? 
• What made the milestones possible? (chance, structural issues, minister 
support?) 
• Overall, do you think this strategy was successful? In other words, by 2000 
had WID/GAD been taken up in DfID’s operations? 
• Do you think that the discourse focusing on efficiency / linking WID/GAD to 
other overarching aims ultimately weakened the uptake – as the overall aims 
changed? (from social development, to MGS, to aid effectiveness to value for 
money?) 
• (If not already answered) 
• In your opinion, has WID/GAD been taken up today? 
• Is there anyone else I should talk to? 
 
 
5.2  Interview questions for UNDP officials 
 
Name of interviewee: 
Dates and position in UNDP: 
Date of interview: 
  
Policies/strategies/discourse 
• When, in your view, was the issue of Women in Development first 
recognised by the UN in general and UNDP specifically? What or who drove 
this process (especially in UNDP?)? 
• How was the issue perceived in the administration as well as the Governing 
Council? Was it considered controversial/was there reluctance or was there 
general agreement that this is an issue important to UNDP? 
• The issue of Women in Development has been framed in different ways: as a 
question of human rights and social justice with a strong intrinsic value 
attached to equality and as an issue necessary for effective 
development/economic growth. Which frame do dominated in UNDP and 
why? Do you think this has changed? 
Specific regarding the WID division 
• How was the decision to set-up a Women’s Division taken? Who drove 
this/pushed for it? 
• 1986 strategy: decision to allocate no extra-budgetary resources: was this 
decision taken as a sign of support for having WID recognised as a core issue 
for UNDP or as a sign of lack of commitment? 
• In your view, was the way in which the WID division was set-up strategic 
enough (human and financial resources; positioning in the hierarchy of the 
organisation) – was it set up to make a difference or more to 
appease/window-dress? 
• Was Bill Draper particularly supportive of women’s issues? 
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Zooming out 
• Do you think UNDP’s multilateral character made it better or worse at taking 
up and spreading an issue like WID? 
• Overall: do you think gender equality has been accepted as an important 
value in the hearts and minds of UNDP officials – or is it mainly something 
that one knows one should be seen to be acting in line with. (Has the 
efficiency argument backfired?) 
• Any one else I should talk to? 
 
5.3 Interview questions for Members of the European Parliament who were 
members of the Women’s’ Committee and the Development Committee 
 
Name of interviewee: 
Dates and position in the EC/EU:  
Date of itnerview: 
 
• What made you join both the Women’s Committee and the Development 
Committee? (personal interest, political opportunities?) 
• What was the status of the two different committees? 
• Was it easy for a man working in the Women’s Committee? 
• Which, out of the two committees was more concerned with WID? 
• Was there a sense in the Development Committee that the issue of women 
was the responsibility of the Women’s Committee? 
• Discussions on Lome III 84/85 and and Lome IV 89/90: What were the key 
issue? Was the issue of Women in Development discussed? 
• What was the role of the Commission and the Council in this? Who was seen 
to be pushing the issue? 
• Who else do you think might be in a position to share some insights into 
these issues?  
 
5.4 Interview questions for European Commission officials not specifically 
working on gender 
 
Name of interviewee: 
Dates and position in the EC/EU:  
Date of interview: 
 
• Is gender equality promotion part of your performance appraisals? 
• Were you trained on gender? Were your colleagues/team trained on gender? 
• Were there any programming tools on integrating gender in your work? 
• Where these programming tools used (practical and/or compulsory?) 
• How was the issue framed? (equality as an important value, or an important 
issue to have effective development?) 
• Which frame, do you think, would have been more effective? 
• Were did you think the greatest push on gender came from and where the 
greatest resistance? (Inside the DG, the Commission, EC Institutions?) 
• Overall, what was the predominant attitude towards gender equality? 
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(Understood? Embraced? Resisted? Seen as good but only the gender 
expert’s responsibility?) 
• What do you think the greatest obstacle to operationalising gender in EU 
development cooperation was/is? 
• Overall, has it worked? Has gender been successfully taken up by EU 
development cooperation? 
• Who else could I speak to?  
 
5.5 Interview questions for EC/EU officials working gender 
 
Name of interviewee: 
Dates and position in the EC/EU:  
Date of interview: 
 
Push and pull factors 
• During your time as gender desk officer, where did the greatest push on 
gender equality and where the greatest resistance come from?  
o Within the DG,  
o the Commission,  
o the EC Institutions, etc? 
• In your view, was the European Parliament particularly vocal in promoting 
gender in development issues? 
• If so, was it mainly the Women’s Committee or the Development 
Committee? 
• What was the role of the ACP-EEC JPA in promoting gender in 
development? 
• What was the role of the Council: overall help or hindrance? 
• Do you think it was easier to promote gender in development in the context 
of the EU than in a national context? 
Discourse & attitude 
• During your time in DG Development, was gender in development promoted 
using ‘efficiency arguments’ (gender equality is important for effective 
development) or ‘rights/intrinsic arguments’ (e.g. gender equality is a right, it 
is an important value in itself)? 
• From your experience in the Commission, which types of arguments would 
be most effective to persuade colleagues of the importance of gender in 
development? 
• During your time in DG Development, did you feel that the issue of gender 
was widely understood and/or accepted by your colleagues or not? 
Operationalisaiton: 
• Was gender part of staffs performance appraisals? 
• What were the key programming tools developed during your time? 
• Were any of them compulsory? If not, why not? 
• Overall, what do you think the greatest obstacle to integrating gender in EU 
development cooperation was? 
• From your perspective now, do you think gender in development has become 
firmly integrated in the EU’s operations and EU officials’ attitudes? 
European Institute for Gender Equality  
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• Does the Institute deal with gender in external relations? 
• If not, was this ever a controversial issue? 
• During your time as desk officer, was DG Development represented in the 
numerous high-level structures for gender mainstreaming/equal opportunities 
such as the High-level group for gender mainstreaming and the Group of 
Commissioners for Equal Opportunities? 
• What was your relationship, if any, with other gender equality officials in 
other DGs (eg Employment)? 
Others to interview? Particular programming tools I should look at? 
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